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7Preface
Migration has always played a crucial role in the history of mankind. Nowadays the intensity 
and frequency of cross-border mobility are, however, much higher than in previous centuries. 
This is a consequence of diverse pull and push factors, combined with technological advance-
ment, and is true for Europe and Asia alike. This large-scale movement, however, changes 
the composition of the societies in the sending and receiving countries and results in some of 
today’s key challenges. 
Many European and Asian countries are characterized by ageing and shrinking popula-
tions. In order to ensure their economic growths and maintain their welfare systems, they 
have implemented a series of measures to reduce the demographic effects, among which 
opening channels to legal migration plays a key role. As these countries try to attract the 
same group of people, mainly highly skilled professionals and low-skilled workers, increasing 
competition between the two regions might be observed in the upcoming years. In particular, 
high-skilled professionals are targeted by receiving societies. They are encouraged to stay for 
longer periods or even enticed to settle down permanently. This is achieved by providing 
them with rights and benefits, facilitating their stay, and making them the target of integra-
tion policies. 
As the status of the countries in Europe and Asia differs greatly in terms of whether they 
are considered sending, receiving or transit countries of migration, it is hardly possible to 
generalize both the problems and the policies implemented to resolve them. 
AsiA
The situation in Asia is much more diverse than in Europe. This is due to the huge dif-
ferences in economic development and governance structures. The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) tries to foster dialogue and exchange on migration, migrant rights 
and protection. However, its capacities are very limited since it cannot interfere in the do-
mestic issues of its member states. Asia consists of important sending countries, such as the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Bangladesh, as well as countries whose economic development 
have transformed them into receiving countries of migration, such as Singapore, Republic of 
Korea and Malaysia. 
In addition, several states, like Thailand, can be considered as transit as well as receiving 
and sending countries. Due to this diversity, approaches to migration differ greatly within the 
region. In general, Asian governments are more restrictive in their admission policies, which 
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also increases the number of irregular migrations dramatically and makes the process more 
selective. Low-skilled migrants are hardly subject to integration approaches and have very 
limited rights. It should be clear from the start that they are seen as temporary workers, and 
are not wanted to stay for good. High-skilled professionals, on the other hand, are, in some 
countries, encouraged to integrate, contribute to the economy and build roots in the society. 
EuropEAn union
While the EU has developed significant rules and tools regarding border management, visa 
policy and irregular migration, legal migration and integration of non-EU nationals are two 
policy fields proven to be difficult to harmonize. A number of directives target specific areas 
of migration, but, until today, no coherent and comprehensive migration policy for people 
from outside the EU is in place yet. While free movement has been regulated successfully, 
allowing EU citizens to travel freely and work in other EU countries, the approach towards 
non-EU nationals has been selective. Some selected categories of legal migration have been 
addressed, but a comprehensive set of migration rules is missing. This is even more the case 
where integration policies at the EU level are concerned. With the exception of the family 
reunification directive and the long-term residents directive, this policy area suffers from le-
gal constraints deriving from the Treaty provision. Indeed, the EU has a purely coordinating 
power regarding integration issues. This means that the EU is only able to facilitate and 
enhance the coordination of national policies, as is the case, for instance, regarding language 
requirements, introductory programmes or civic education courses. Thus, it is impossible to 
analyse migration and integration rules and policies in Europe without looking at both the 
level of the EU and the individual Member States. 
intEr-rEgionAl
However, in the context of increasing mobility between Asia and Europe, such an exchange is 
timely. While much of the movements in Europe as well as Asia are still intra-regional, an in-
crease in migration between the two regions can be observed. According to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2010, 23 per cent of all Asian migrants resided in 
Europe and 12 per cent of European migrants did so in Asia. The majority of these migrants 
are high-skilled professionals and students who settle down temporarily. But in times of 
labour shortage, a number of European countries attempt to directly attract Asian medium-
skilled workers, for instance, nurses. In order to make this process mutually beneficial, it 
is essential to start the inter-regional dialogue at an early stage and exchange practices and 
policy approaches. This is exactly what this publication aims to offer.
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thE WAy AhEAd
Both Asia and Europe are facing common problems in terms of demographic change, the 
need to rebound from the economic crises and worries about their attractiveness in light of 
projected needs for legal migration. Some in Europe are even expressing concerns that the 
EU is losing ground in the “global war for talent”. This makes legal migration both a battle-
ground for the best and brightest, but also an opportunity to go beyond continental solutions 
to migration and foster genuine cooperation so that both continents can reap the rewards. 
With this in mind, there is plenty of scope for lessons learned and common approaches 
between Asia and Europe. Topics for concrete cooperation include skill- and certificate-rec-
ognition, cooperation among civil society organizations, governmental responses in engaging 
migrant communities, integration of returnees, cooperation in the post-university stage of 
students, migrant rights protection, awareness building, and pre- and post-departure courses. 
Such cooperation can be achieved through bilateral partnership agreements, multilateral 
dialogue fora, greater involvement by embassies in the receiving countries and government-
to-government discussions.
About this book 
In order to contribute to the understanding of current challenges and implemented solutions, 
this publication includes papers with perspectives from Europe and Asia. What are the mi-
gration and integration policies as well as present challenges in these countries? What can 
they learn from each other? How do they try to facilitate migration and make it a beneficial 
process? These and other questions will be addressed by this publication. 
The first paper by Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Miriam Ee analyzes regional approaches 
within the ASEAN framework. It discusses the migration regime in Southeast Asia, with 
a particular focus on low-skilled and undocumented migrants. The authors argue that the 
attempts to establish a regional framework are hindered by the economic diversity, the prefer-
ence for value-adding high-skilled migrants and the “ASEAN way” of doing things.
Yasushi Iguchi looks at the migration trends and policies in Japan. He shows that, de-
spite economic improvements in neighbouring countries, Japan has remained attractive to 
immigrants, who move not only to the big cities, but also the countryside. In the context of 
a missing national integration policy, Iguchi introduces several local initiatives which might 
fill this gap.
Leong Chan-Hoong, Patrick Rueppel and Danielle Hong discuss the migration and 
integration policies in Singapore. Being one of the few traditional immigration countries in 
Asia, Singapore has a comparatively comprehensive approach to migration and integration. 
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However, recent public discussions have led to some tightening of the open-door policy in the 
city state.
Dong-Hoon Seol takes a closer look at migration policies in South Korea. Once a major 
sending country of migration, the Republic of Korea’s economic transition has transformed it 
into a receiving society. Various immigrant groups are analyzed in this paper and the interac-
tion between locals and immigrants is of particular interest.
Ferruccio Pastore and Ester Salis provide a comparative overview of the European 
policy landscape in the field of labour migration. They focus on six key countries, comparing 
the decade before the current economic crisis with recent developments. They highlight the 
heterogeneity among EU Member States and illustrate how the crisis has resulted in an open-
ing process in some countries and more restrictive approaches in others.
Claudia Finotelli analyzes how the successful labour migration regime in Spain was 
changed by the economic crisis. After providing an overview on recruitment mechanisms 
and instruments, she argues that efficient migration management does not only depend on 
well-designed admission policies. 
Monica Quirico discusses the migration policy in Sweden. Often considered as a success 
story, the paper examines changes in the Swedish migration approach over the past years and 
addresses the supposed increasing feeling of xenophobia as a consequence of the economic 
crisis.
Camilla Devitt takes a closer look at the migration regime in the United Kingdom, 
which is clearly biased towards skilled workers. In particular, the enlargement of the EU in 
2004 had a huge impact on the British labour market. After discussing the policies targeting 
certain groups of migrants, the strengths and weaknesses of the approach are considered. 
Yves Pascouau analyzes the attempts at integration policies at the EU level. The paper 
takes into account the fact that the EU has no harmonizing function in this policy area, but 
uses soft tools to establish a de facto EU approach. The author shows that such attempts are, 
to a certain degree, successful in forging some convergence. 
Birte Steller addresses migration management in Germany. The illustrated changes in 
recent years show the reform of the German integration policy and the importance that un-
derstanding and dialogue plays in it. The paper examines a possible way to achieve benefits 
for sending and receiving countries.
Giovanna Campani discusses the multi-stakeholder approach to integration in Italy. 
The paper shows how the topic influenced domestic politics and how the local authorities, 
who are mainly responsible for integration, deal with it. She argues that the public sector re-
lies on the private and non-governmental sector to implement successful integration policies.
Tineke Strik looks at integration policies in the Netherlands. The paper illustrates the 
impact integration requirements have on migrants of various backgrounds, and argues that 
recent cuts in the provision of integration courses and emphasizing of the migrants’ responsi-
bility to integrate can, however, impact the earlier successes.
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Department of Geography and Asia Research Institute, National University of 
Singapore
Miriam Ee
Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore
AbstrAct
With the signing of the ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors 
(FA) in 2004, migration and integration issues gained significance on the agenda. Primarily 
concerned with increasing economic growth, this framework excludes the integration of low 
and unskilled migrant workers; instead, ASEAN efforts to address migration and integration 
issues have been limited to Mutual Recognition Agreements for skilled labour and profession-
als. After an analysis of migration policy in the region, we highlight specific barriers to the 
integration of labour migrants in two priority sectors – nursing, which is highly regulated by 
the state, and Information, Communications and Technology (ICT), which is typically self-
regulated and privately run. Despite a MRA for nursing allowing registered nurses to practice 
in another ASEAN country under supervision of local nurses without registering with the 
host country’s nursing regulatory authority, in practice, there are major barriers to the free 
movement of nurses within ASEAN in terms of skills recognition, licensure requirements and 
other protectionist measures. Although regulations governing the inflow of ICT professionals 
are not as stringent as those for healthcare professionals, private costs associated with job 
search and gaining foreign employment are higher in the ICT sector, largely due to limited 
information on international mobility within the industry. Three sets of barriers to greater 
integration are discussed. First, the economic and political diversity within ASEAN makes 
integration more problematic than in the European Union. Second, the primary concern 
with value-adding economic growth means that regional agreements are focused on skilled 
and professional labour migration only. Third, the “ASEAN way” of doing things – via a 
strong emphasis on consensus and non-interference with domestic policies – often means that 
the FA provision for the free movement of labour is usually trumped by domestic policies that 
do not reflect the same desire for labour integration. 
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1. introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 for the pur-
pose of accelerating economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
as well as to promote regional peace and stability (ASEAN 2012). Migration and integration 
issues became significant items on the agenda only much later in 2004 with the signing of the 
ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors (FA). The FA identified 
trade in services and the movement of “business persons, experts, professionals, skilled labour 
and talents” as two areas which concern the movement of people in the region (ASEAN 
2004: 7). As a product of the ASEAN founding purpose of accelerating economic growth, 
this framework for migration is primarily concerned with value-adding economic growth 
and thus, excludes the integration of low and unskilled migrant workers, who form the bulk 
of intra-ASEAN flows, especially in service sectors such as construction and domestic work 
(Bhatnagar, P & Manning, C 2005; Manning, C & Bhatnagar, P 2004). 
Although labour migration came onto the agenda only recently, in many ways, it is not 
a new issue to the region. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mass labour 
migration from China and India to Southeast Asia led to eventual settlement and the cre-
ation of immigrant communities and plural societies in the region (Lai, AE et al. 2012). 
Today, the disparate levels of economic development and income in ASEAN have created 
new socio-economic factors that strongly influence the corridors of migrant flows as well as 
the direction of flows (Chavez, JJ 2007). Intra-regional flows are asymmetrical and the ten 
ASEAN states may be categorized according to whether they are primarily labour receiving or 
sending (Kaur, A 2007). Net labour receiving countries include the wealthier Singapore and 
Brunei, while net labour sending countries are the poorer states of Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The two middle-income states of Malaysia and 
Thailand are both labour receiving as well as labour sending countries. 
In addition to the heterogeneous economic landscape, ASEAN nations also reflect a 
mix-bag of political and cultural conditions. Myanmar, for one, has only recently opened its 
borders to foreign investment and its government is still predominantly backed by the mili-
tary. Patron-client networks, on the other hand, dominate politics in the Philippines; and in 
Singapore, one dominant political party has consistently led the country since independence 
in 1965 (cf. Kerkvliet, BJT 1995). This diversity among ASEAN states is “unlike the relatively 
homogenous western European nations that formed the early European Community” noted 
by Pasadilla (2011: 8). The uneven political and economic conditions render integration more 
problematic in the ASEAN context. Furthermore, ASEAN places a high premium on sover-
eignty and non-interference, which may be traced to a fundamental principle adopted in 1976 
by all member states to mutually respect the “independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity” of all nations (ASEAN 2012; cf. Chavez, JJ 2007). ASEAN 
countries have demonstrated a preference for bilateral agreements and/or Memorandums of 
Understanding (MOUs) (Hugo, G 2009). Few multilateral agreements have been ratified 
and there has also been a very low level of ratification of international conventions, including 
rights-based approaches to labour governance such as that embodied in International Labour 
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Organization’s (ILO) Domestic Worker Convention. This follows Bhatnagar and Manning’s 
(2005: 171) observation that, “unilateral, national policies rather than regional or multilateral 
commitments dominate in [ASEAN] policies towards temporary foreign workers”. 
The challenge of achieving regional cooperation is also exemplified by the more recent 
deadlock over negotiations experienced by the Task Force on ASEAN Migrant Workers (TF-
AMW). The Task Force was formed in April 2006, comprising trade unions, human rights 
and migrant rights NGOs, and migrant worker associations, to work towards a “rights-based 
framework for the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers” in ASEAN 
(TF-AMW 2007). Notably, in January 2007, leaders of the 10 ASEAN countries met in 
Cebu, Philippines to sign a Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Migrant Workers that commits labour sending and receiving states to cooperate to protect 
the rights of migrant workers (Martin, P 2009). The Declaration was seen as an “important 
first step” to developing and implementing a “binding instrument on the promotion and 
protection of the rights of migrant workers in the region” (TF-AMW 2007). Since then, the 
Task Force has held several national and regional consultations and has prepared the ASEAN 
Framework Instrument on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers, which 
it formally proposed to the ASEAN Secretariat in May 2009 (Huguet, JW 2010). However, 
progress has not been entirely smooth sailing. The latest update provided by the Task Force 
revealed that negotiations on the draft have reached a deadlock, with Malaysia refusing to 
agree on key points concerning the inclusion of undocumented migrant workers and whether 
the instrument should be legally binding (TF-AMW 2010).
The migration framework in ASEAN is thus characterized by a fundamental concern 
with accelerating economic growth and integration efforts are hindered by the economic and 
political diversity in the region as well as the “ASEAN way” of doing things, that is, via a strong 
emphasis on consensus and non-interference with domestic policies (cf. Katsumata, H 2003). 
The rest of this paper looks at three categories of labour migration within ASEAN coun-
tries – skilled migration, low and unskilled migration and to a lesser extent, undocumented 
labour migration. The first section that follows examines country-specific policies for these 
three groups of workers and analyses them within the broad strokes of the ASEAN migration 
framework. The second section highlights specific barriers to integration of labour migrants 
in two priority sectors – nursing, and Information, Communications and Technology (ICT). 
These two sectors are chosen as they make an interesting comparison – the former is typically 
highly regulated by the state, while the latter is almost entirely self-regulated and privately 
run (cf. Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). The third and final section concludes with some 
policy implications of creating a freer movement of labour within ASEAN.
2. thE MigrAtion rEgiME in southEAst AsiA
Over the last decade, the movement of people between ASEAN nations has had an increas-
ing impact on the economic, social and demographic development of virtually all ASEAN 
states. Not only have the numbers of people moving increased, but the types of mobility 
have also become more complex (Hugo, G 2005b). According to Hugo (2005b: 94), this may 
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be attributed to the forces of “globalization, increased levels of education, proliferation of 
international media, improved transport systems and the internationalization of business and 
labour markets”. Indeed, increased levels of education and affluence in the richer ASEAN 
states have led citizens to eschew 3D (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) jobs. For example, 
plantation work in Malaysia is dominated by temporary labour migrants, as are jobs in the 
construction and domestic sectors in Singapore and Malaysia (Hugo, G 2009). This segmen-
tation of the labour market into skilled and unskilled jobs has led to a two-tier immigration 
policy, where skilled foreigners, such as professional, managerial and business elites, are often 
given preferential treatment and even encouraged to settle in the host country; while low and 
unskilled foreigners are employed on temporary contract terms on a “use and discard” basis 
(Yeoh, BSA et al. 1999; Yeoh, BSA & Lin, W 2012). 
skilled labour Migration in AsEAn
The movement of skilled labour flows mainly from the poorer to richer ASEAN countries. 
While the integration of skilled labour is clearly valued over low and unskilled labour, the 
three major labour receiving countries, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, differ signifi-
cantly in their policies, with Singapore being the most aggressive in attracting and retaining 
skilled foreign labour. Singapore places strong emphasis on importing and integrating highly 
skilled labour, such as business investors and professionals, who are referred to as “foreign 
talents” and differentiated from the low and unskilled “foreign workers”. Given a labour-short 
economy, the Singapore government has maintained that migrants contribute to the nation’s 
economic growth, even as the rapidly ageing population and declining fertility rates threaten 
to derail the country’s long-term economic growth trajectory (National Population and 
Talent Division 2012). In the new millennium, the country has demonstrated its desire to 
attract and retain foreign talents with offerings of employment passes with attached privileges 
of bringing dependents into the country, permanent residency and citizenship1. 
Unlike Singapore, the importing and integration of foreign migrants is not an explicit 
part of Malaysia’s national development strategy (Bhatnagar, P & Manning, C 2005). With 
its larger population base of citizens less prone to the ravages of rapid ageing, Malaysia is not 
as aggressive in seeking skilled immigrants. While the country has always pursued a relatively 
open policy for foreign employees in FDI firms, the admission of foreign professionals in 
other segments of the economy have been less open (Bhatnagar, P & Manning, C 2005). 
The government places restrictions on the number of positions that may be filled by expatri-
ates – only companies with a foreign paid-up capital of at least RM500,000 may be granted 
a limited number of permanent posts for foreigners (Malaysian Investment Development 
Authority (MIDA) 2012).
1  More recently, the government has tightened the inflow of foreigners in response to public discontentment over 
issues such as rising costs of housing and overcrowding on public transport infrastructure. With effect from July 2012, 
the Singapore government reduced the Dependency Ratio Ceiling, which specifies the maximum proportion of foreign 
workers that companies in various industries can employ (Chan, R 2012). S-Pass and employment pass criteria have 
also been raised to make it harder for companies to hire foreign professionals.
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In Thailand, the recruitment of skilled workers is even more centralized – the process 
integrates the immigration, labour and foreign investment arms of the government and 
is closely monitored (Manning, C & Bhatnagar, P 2004: 185). However, this looks set to 
change as the International Organization for Migration (IOM 2011) reports that Thailand 
has started to consider loosening the recruitment process of highly skilled workers in re-
sponse to its commitment to realizing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. 
According to IOM (2011), Thailand is likely to attract a significant number of professionals 
from other ASEAN countries, leading to a direct positive effect on the Thai economy. Yet, in 
practice, the “ASEAN way” of non-interference means that multilateral agreements are often 
subordinated to domestic policies and it is uncertain as to how soon policy changes would 
have an impact in Thailand. IOM (2011) recognizes that this is a problem that may not be 
overcome quickly and acknowledges that the recruitment of highly skilled foreigners remains 
a sensitive issue among the Thai in view of national security claims.
low and unskilled labour Migration in AsEAn
As with the movement of skilled labour, low and unskilled labour also flows mainly from 
poorer to richer ASEAN countries. Among the three major labour receiving states that at-
tract migrants from different ASEAN countries, Thailand draws in labour migrants mainly 
from the neighbouring Mekong region states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam 
(Manning, C & Bhatnagar, P 2004); while Singapore and Malaysia act as magnets for mi-
grants from less-developed countries in the region, namely Indonesia and the Philippines, and 
beyond. Of these labour sending countries, the Philippines stands out as one of the world’s 
major labour exporters. The majority of Filipino labour migrants leave for countries outside 
ASEAN – to the United States (over 2 million permanent migrants), Canada (over 500,000), 
Australia (over 200,000) and Japan (over 100,000) (Pasadilla, GO 2011). The Middle East is 
also another major destination, where over a million Filipinos migrants work on fixed con-
tracts in Saudi Arabia. Comparatively, ASEAN is not an important destination: there are just 
over 60,000 Filipino labour migrants in Singapore and over 80,000 in Malaysia (Pasadilla, 
GO 2011).
Many low skilled Filipinos in Singapore are employed as domestic workers. As “foreign 
workers” on short-term work permits, they are prohibited from taking up permanent resi-
dency or citizenship. They are also neither permitted to bring dependents into Singapore nor 
to marry and settle down in Singapore. The 206,000-strong foreign domestic workforce in 
Singapore is entirely female (Tan, A 2012). About half of them come from Indonesia and 
the Philippines is the second largest country of origin. Low and unskilled male migrants, 
on the other hand, are found mainly in the construction industry. These men come from 
other Asian countries, namely Thailand, Bangladesh, India and China. Low and unskilled 
Thai workers tend to migrate to stronger economies in East and Southeast Asia, the Middle 
East as well as other parts of the world. About 84 per cent of Thai workers overseas are male 
and employed in construction, manufacturing and agriculture (Department of Employment 
2010, cited in IOM 2011: 39). As of 2010, there were about 20,074 Thais deployed through 
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official channels and working in ASEAN countries, namely Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia 
(IOM 2011: 13).
Similar to Singapore, Malaysia also distinguishes between the recruitment of skilled 
and unskilled labour. Unskilled workers are referred to as perkerja asing (foreign contract 
workers) and they dominate the plantation, construction and domestic work sectors (Kaur, 
A 2007; Leigh, M 2007). Settlement is also not permitted for these workers, who are typi-
cally employed on temporary contracts, and the Malaysian government imposes a levy on the 
employers of these workers. 
In view of the less-favourable policies for low and unskilled workers in the host countries, 
some sending countries have in recent years stepped up efforts to protect their citizens over-
seas. The Philippines has long been the leader in developing a sophisticated policy regime to 
encourage and regulate its Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs), both skilled and unskilled. 
Migration has been employed as a two-pronged development strategy for the Philippines 
since the mid-1970s – firstly to generate remittances, and secondly as an explicit response 
to double-digit unemployment rates (O’Neil, K 2004). First, remittances from OFWs are a 
major contributor to the Philippine economy. In 2011, USD20.1 billion was remitted from 
overseas Filipinos via formal channels, accounting for about nine per cent of the country’s 
GDP (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) 2012; The World Bank 2012). This helped to sus-
tain economic growth even as export income declined due to weak demand from the Euro 
zone and the United States (Remo, MV 2012). 
Second, unlike most ASEAN countries, the Philippines trains many of its citizens for 
the explicit purpose of sending them overseas. The rationale for this is partly derived from 
arguments that the Philippine economy cannot effectively absorb its labour force; hence, its 
citizens can make a greater contribution by seeking employment overseas and remitting earn-
ings home (Hugo, G 2005b). For example, econometric analysis conducted by Goldfarb et al. 
(1984) found that the Philippines would gain a net benefit by training physicians for export. 
As a result of their strategic importance to the vitality of the economy, OFWs are highly 
valued in the Philippines. Each year, the president awards the Bagong Bayani (modern-day 
hero) award to honour outstanding migrant workers for demonstrating competence, respon-
sibility and showing a track record of contributing to the country’s foreign exchange earnings 
(Bagong Bayani Foundation (BBFI) 2011).
Indonesia appears to be closely following in the footsteps of the Philippines. However, 
at present, efforts are concentrated on protecting its low and unskilled migrants. Recent 
developments in Indonesia’s foreign policy have focused on the need to better protect the 
rights of its citizens working overseas (known as Tenga Kerja Indonesia or TKI). Particular 
attention has been paid to Indonesian women who work as foreign domestic workers overseas. 
Previously, foreign domestic workers working in Singapore were subjected to a placement fee 
of about eight months’ salary – this meant that they only received a meagre monthly allow-
ance of SGD10 or SGD20 for the first eight months of their two-year contract, as their salary 
went towards debt repayment (Tan, A 2012). Since mid-2012, however, the Indonesian gov-
ernment has stepped in to reduce the loan amount from about eight to four months’ salary. 
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The loan is now disbursed by an Indonesian bank, instead of an employment agency, thereby 
increasing the amount of regulatory surveillance over the recruitment process.
It is important to note that unlike the Philippines, where remittance is a significant 
contributor to the economy, Indonesia is not overwhelmingly dependent on remittances. In 
2007, USD1.1 billion was remitted via the formal banking sector, but according to Bank 
Indonesia’s (2009) estimates, total remittance via formal and informal channels was approxi-
mately USD6.1 billion. This corroborates Hugo’s (2005a) point that remittances in Asia are 
often underreported and underestimated. More recently, figures from Bank Indonesia esti-
mate that total remittance via formal channels in rose to USD6.1 billion in 2011. Although 
this figure pales in comparison with the USD20.1 billion remitted from overseas Filipinos via 
formal channels in the same year, it is significant that remittances to Indonesia have steadily 
been increasing since 2001. Furthermore, it is notable that since 2005, remittances have been 
higher than inflows of development aid (Bank Indonesia 2009: 8). This is particularly sig-
nificant given the centrality of remittances to household survival strategies among Indonesia’s 
poor (Bank Indonesia 2009; Hugo, G 2005a).
Another ASEAN country in which remittances are playing an increasing role in the 
economy is Vietnam. Hugo (2005b: 107) presents figures to show how in 2002, remittances 
from the Vietnamese diaspora reached USD2.4 billion, double the USD1.2 billion recorded 
just four years earlier. It is estimated, however, that this official figure underestimates the 
total remittance flow, which is closer to USD4 billion. Cohen (2003) argues that the remit-
tances, which were equivalent to 11 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP, were crucial in helping the 
country manage its USD2.77 billion trade deficit as well as to reduce pressure on the local 
currency and stimulate private investment. More recently, figures from the World Bank esti-
mate total remittances via formal channels to be about USD8 billion in 2010 – representing 
7 per cent of GDP and almost double net official development assistance (Migration Policy 
Institute 2011). All these remittance trends point to the growing importance of labour migra-
tion within ASEAN nations. 
undocumented labour Migration in AsEAn
Undocumented labour migration – the causes of irregular migration, state control of (or fail-
ure to control) the presence of undocumented migrants, and its links to documented flows 
– is a major force in the region that has attracted scholarly attention (Asis, MMB 2004). 
Data obtained from official channels for migration in ASEAN often differ significantly 
from unofficial channels for migration. In response to legal and physical barriers to labour 
migration, many Asian workers have adopted undocumented migration strategies (Hugo, 
G 2005b). Unofficial channels allow workers to bypass high transaction costs, as official 
channels for migration are almost always more expensive and time-consuming. Brokers and 
middle-men are significant mediators of migration in Asia, helping would-be migrants to 
navigate through the often complicated and bureaucratic process of recruitment (Lindquist, J 
et al. 2012). Although these operations are not entirely separate from the state and are in fact 
crucial even in official channels of migration, they are particularly indispensable in unofficial 
channels of migration. 
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With the exception of Singapore, the problem of undocumented labour migration is a 
significant one in the main labour receiving ASEAN states, namely Malaysia and Thailand. 
It is estimated that there are at least 1 million undocumented workers in Malaysia, mostly 
from neighbouring Indonesia but also some from the Philippines (Hugo, G 2009: 29). The 
problem has been particularly severe in the state of Sabah from as early as in the 1970s. 
Newspaper reports estimate that in 2010, there were more than 500,000 undocumented im-
migrants in Sabah, which has a total population of about 3.1 million (New Straits Times 
2012). In 2011, Malaysia announced that it will grant amnesty to some 2 million undocu-
mented migrants (Allard, T 2011). 
Thailand is one step ahead in this area and has already in place a more definite policy 
for regularizing undocumented migrants. Since the early 1990s, Thailand had an almost 
yearly amnesty programme to allow undocumented migrants to register legally for one to two 
years to work as labourers or domestic workers (IOM 2011). However, this kind of amnesty 
programme is not without flaws – as IOM (2011: 18) points out, it serves only as a quasi-
regularisation of migration as the worker’s status remains as “illegal, pending deportation”. 
In recognition of this problem, in 2004, Thailand devised the Nationality Verification (NV) 
process for the purpose of providing a more definite means of regularizing migration. As 
part of the process, undocumented migrants who are already in Thailand must provide per-
sonal data to their home countries for verification in exchange for a temporary passport or 
a certificate of identity, a visa to remain in Thailand for two years (extendable for two years 
before they must return home for at least three years) and a legal work status (IOM 2011: 
19). Alternatively, would-be migrants from neighbouring countries may seek employment in 
Thailand directly with temporary passports. 
While these regularization processes may have increased migrants’ confidence and access 
to rights, the inability to develop efficient bilateral systems to facilitate labour movement with 
other countries in the Mekong region, lack of transparency and high costs from unregulated 
brokers are some challenges that continue to hinder the progress of regularization (IOM 
2011). Once again, integration efforts are hindered by the economic and political diversity 
in the region as well as the “ASEAN way” of doing things, that is, via a strong emphasis on 
consensus and non-interference with domestic policies.
3. thE AsEAn rEgionAl FrAMEWork For MigrAtion And 
intEgrAtion
The 2004 ASEAN FA is a regional effort to promote labour mobility and integration. The 
FA identified trade in services and the movement of “business persons, experts, profession-
als, skilled labour and talents” as two areas that concern the movement of labour in the 
region. The member states agreed to achieve freer flow of trade in services, develop Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs) to facilitate the movement of skilled workers and to pro-
mote joint ventures and cooperation. However, it is important to note that the MRAs do 
not override domestic regulations. This is unlike the European Union (EU), where regional 
policies play a dominant role in shaping labour movement. An EU national is entitled to 
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work and live in any EU country without the need for a work permit; and upon legally resid-
ing in another EU country for five continuous years, one automatically acquires the right of 
permanent residence (EUROPA 2012). In ASEAN countries, as illustrated in the previous 
section, the right of permanent residence is only granted selectively to migrants whose skills 
are in demand. Another notable difference concerns labour market segmentation – within the 
EU, there is no explicit restriction on the movement and integration of low and unskilled EU 
nationals within the EU. However, within ASEAN, as the FA is primarily concerned with 
value-adding economic growth, emphasis is placed only on the movement and integration of 
skilled workers and professionals. 
Priority service sectors identified by the ASEAN FA for integration include e-ASEAN, 
healthcare, air transport and tourism (ASEAN 2009b). In order to facilitate the movement 
of skilled workers in these sectors, negotiations on MRAs were first mandated at the seventh 
ASEAN Summit held in 2001. As of 2009, seven MRAs have been signed by the ASEAN 
Economic Ministers for engineering, nursing, architecture, surveying, accountancy, and 
medical and dental practitioners (ASEAN 2009a). The aim of MRAs, as the ASEAN (2009a) 
report explains, is to “facilitate the flow of foreign professionals taking into account relevant 
domestic regulations and market demand conditions”. For example, the MRA for nursing 
allows a registered nurse to practice in another ASEAN country under supervision of a lo-
cal nurse without the need to be fully registered with the host country’s nursing regulatory 
authority (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). However, in practice, there are still barriers 
to the free movement of nurses within ASEAN in terms of skills recognition, licensure re-
quirements and other protectionist measures, as domestic policies still override the MRAs (cf. 
Matsuno, A 2008). 
specific barriers in nursing
Domestic policies governing the recruitment of foreign nurses in ASEAN are as diverse 
as the region’s economic and political conditions. Yet, it is possible to generalize that the 
wealthier countries have more liberal policies, whereas the lower income countries have more 
stringent regulations to restrict the inflow of foreign medical professionals (Manning, C & 
Sidorenko, A 2007). Driving these policies are domestic demand and supply factors. In the 
case of Singapore, the country has one of Asia’s most rapidly ageing population and conse-
quently, a high demand for quality health services (Huang, S et al. 2012; IOM 2008). This 
high demand, however, far outstrips supply as few Singaporeans train as nurses. Manning 
and Sidorenko (2007: 1092) report that although the number of health science graduates 
from Singapore’s polytechnics grew about ten per cent per annum between 1998 to 2003, the 
implied growth in demand for healthcare was 20 per cent over the same period. As such, the 
country is dependent on foreign nurses to meet the shortage. 
skills recognition
While foreign nurses make up about 20 per cent of Singapore’s nursing force and the coun-
try aggressively seeks to attract and retain them, a considerable amount of de-skilling takes 
place for foreign nurses seeking employment in Singapore. Foreign nurses who were mid-level 
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skilled workers, such as Registered Nurses in their home countries, often have to downgrade 
to low and unskilled workers, such as Enrolled Nurses or even to Nursing Aides in Singapore 
(Huang, S et al. 2012). Enrolled Nurses and Nursing Aides who earn less than SGD2,000 
per month enter Singapore under the work permit system like foreign domestic workers; and 
they are prohibited from bringing their families and excluded from permanent residency and 
citizenship considerations. The more skilled and qualified nurses who earn a fixed monthly 
salary of at least SGD2,000 are eligible for the “S-pass” (Ministry of Manpower 2012). This 
is an intermediate level work pass that was introduced in 2004 to facilitate the employment of 
foreign mid-level skilled workers (Huang, S et al. 2012). Only S-pass holders who earn more 
than SGD4,000 per month are allowed to bring in dependents, a benefit that is also extended 
to the higher-level skilled employment pass holders, that is, foreign professionals working in 
managerial, executive or specialised jobs.
Although the ASEAN nursing MRA accepts qualifications obtained in recognized 
institutions in the home country, it does not override the receiving country’s domestic regula-
tions. Therefore, the Singapore government is permitted to actively control the registration 
and enrolment of nurses, even downgrading their professional ranks, in order to maintain 
what it deems to be desired healthcare standards. While the state permits Enrolled Nurses 
and Nursing Aides to upgrade their skills to become Registered Nurses during the course of 
their work in Singapore, employers’ approval is required in order to apply for the examina-
tion. Unfortunately, in practice, there is little upward mobility as many employers prefer to 
keep their staff as Enrolled Nurses and Nursing Aides in order to keep salary costs down 
(Huang, S et al. 2012). 
licensure requirements
The shortage of nurses is not unique to Singapore. In its 2010 report, the International 
Council of Nurses projected a continued shortage of nurses in Thailand and Malaysia, which 
is expected to continue over the next five and ten years respectively. Like Singapore, Malaysia 
has taken steps to attract foreign nurses. It offers a separate examination for foreign and/or 
foreign-trained nurses to help ease their entry (Matsuno, A 2008). Thailand, on the other 
hand, despite the (projected) shortage, has not resorted to having an open policy for foreign 
health professionals, even though the ASEAN FA makes provision for the free movement of 
nurses. Instead, Thailand shields its professional health services from foreign competition by 
imposing strict registration procedures and tries instead to improve the retention rate of its 
local nurses (Matsuno, A 2008). 
To practice as a nurse in Thailand, one is required to pass the national licensure ex-
amination. However, the examination is conducted only in the national language, Thai. This 
poses a very high barrier to the entry of foreign nurses, who must first master Thai. In fact, so 
unwelcoming is this requirement that in the few years leading up to 2008, only one foreigner 
received a license to practice nursing in Thailand (Matsuno, A 2008). Language thus remains 
a significant barrier within the nursing sector in ASEAN. It is only in Singapore, Malaysia 
and the Philippines, where English is widely spoken, that the movement of nurses is relatively 
unhindered. 
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other protectionist Measures
Other barriers in the nursing sector include citizenship requirements and cross-sectoral quan-
titative restrictions (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). Citizenship requirements apply in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. In Indonesia, foreign doctors and nurses are not allowed to 
practice in local hospitals except on a temporary basis as senior medical officers or as medi-
cal specialists in corporations in the oil, gas and mining sectors (Manning, C & Sidorenko, 
A 2007). Likewise, professional health practice in the Philippines is restricted to Filipinos 
alone (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007: 1102). This, however, is understandable because 
the Philippines has a surplus of nurses, which is projected to continue until at least 2020 
(International Council of Nurses 2010). 
Cross-sectoral quantitative restrictions, on the other hand, are common in the Mekong 
region countries. Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia impose stringent restrictions on the 
number of foreign workers in a firm. Vietnam limits the number of full-time foreign workers 
in a firm to three per cent; Thailand caps the number at five foreign workers per company; 
and Cambodia restricts it to ten per cent (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007: 1102). Although 
these quantitative restrictions are not specific to the healthcare sector, they limit foreign hos-
pitals from establishing themselves in the local market, as they are unable to recruit sufficient 
local health professionals with the necessary level of skills.
individual Migration trajectories
In addition to regulatory barriers to movement within the nursing sector, it is also worth 
noting that for some nurses, moving within ASEAN is just the first step in a chain of migra-
tion ambitions. Countries like Singapore and Malaysia act as transit points for foreign nurses 
seeking further migration to popular destinations, such as the United States (US) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). The majority of foreign nurses who leave Singapore are Filipinos and 
they tend to move to the UK, US or Canada on completion of their employment contracts 
(International Council of Nurses 2010). Consequently, the co-existence of shortages and out-
flows of nurses to international markets is common in several ASEAN countries. Therefore, 
although reducing regulatory barriers may increase mobility within the nursing sector, such 
policy measures will do little to promote integration if individual migration trajectories are 
aimed at further destinations.
specific barriers in ict 
E-ASEAN was identified as one priority sector for integration in the 2004 ASEAN FA. In 
2005, the MRA for engineers was signed to “facilitate [the] mobility of engineering service 
professionals”, which include Information, Communications and Technology (ICT) engi-
neers (ASEAN 2005). The ICT sector provides an interesting juxtaposition to the nursing 
sector. The latter is typically highly regulated by country-specific laws and guidelines and 
monitored by influential professional associations such as the Singapore Nursing Board, 
Thailand Nursing and Midwifery Council, Nurses’ Association of Thailand and the 
Philippines Board of Nursing. In contrast, the ICT sector is almost entirely self-regulated and 
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standards are largely enforced by the private sector (cf. Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). 
Individuals have direct access to jobs in the ICT sector, unlike in nursing, where recruitment 
is highly regulated and often centralized. One key reason for this difference is that the quality 
of healthcare has a direct and obvious impact on human health, whereas the quality of ICT 
services does not bear so directly on human health (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). 
Governments are, therefore, understandably stricter with the enforcement of desired profes-
sional standards in the nursing profession than in the ICT profession.
In the healthcare sector, the higher income ASEAN countries have more liberal in-
migration policies for healthcare professionals. However, in the ICT sector, the same trend is 
not as apparent. Although the wealthier countries have, in general, more liberal in-migration 
policies, the ICT sector stands out as an anomaly. The lower income countries, such as 
Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, all have relatively more open 
policies to attract foreign investment to the ICT sector in comparison to their policies for 
other sectors of the economy (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). Their eagerness to attract 
foreign investment in ICT as a latecomer might help to explain their more liberal policies. For 
example, Myanmar is still many years away from producing graduates that are competitive in 
the international ICT market. Hence, in order to jump-start its ICT sector, Myanmar is eager 
to welcome foreign ICT professionals.
limited information and Visa procedures
Still, despite relatively liberal in-migration policies and e-ASEAN initiatives, there remain 
restrictions on the inward mobility of ICT professionals. Although regulations governing the 
inflow of ICT professionals in ASEAN countries are not as stringent as those for healthcare 
professionals, private costs associated with job search and gaining foreign employment appear 
to be higher in the ICT sector, largely due to limited information on international mobil-
ity arising from the unregulated nature of the industry (ASEAN-ANU Migration Research 
Team 2005; Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). Limited information causes processing 
delays in securing entry and work permits and reduces incentives for in-migration. As high-
lighted by the ASEAN-ANU (2005) report, the chief barriers to entry of ICT professionals 
into Myanmar and Laos are cumbersome work permit application procedures, which are ac-
companied by exorbitant visa fees and processing delays.
Quantitative restrictions and other regulations
Other barriers to entry relate particularly to quantitative restrictions, conditions on em-
ployment and economic needs tests. Quantitative restrictions are in place in countries like 
Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. But, recognising the shortage of ICT professionals, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication Technology of Thailand (MICT) was reported 
in 2005 to be working on relaxing the five-person quota in the local IT sector (ASEAN-ANU 
Migration Research Team 2005: 53). However, a search of MICT’s website reveals no policy 
updates about the quota (MICT 2007). Thus, while policy changes may be desired, the ac-
tual process of change is frequently slow and often encumbered by diverse local interests as 
well as limited data.
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Conditions on employment, on the other hand, are in place in Indonesia, Cambodia, 
Laos and Myanmar. These countries require an employer to ensure that capacity-building 
and skills-transfer take place, with the intention that local staff will eventually replace the 
foreign professionals (Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). Thus, the movement of ICT pro-
fessionals tends to be biased towards the high-skilled end of project managers (ASEAN-ANU 
Migration Research Team 2005).
Third, an economic-needs test allows foreigners to be employed only on a need-to basis 
and upon satisfaction of domestic requirements. In Malaysia, this means, among other things, 
that an employer is required to advertise domestically before extending the job to a foreigner 
(ASEAN-ANU Migration Research Team 2005). In Indonesia, foreign directors, managers 
and technical experts/advisors are allowed a maximum stay of two years, subject to a one-year 
extension, based on an economic-needs test (ASEAN-ANU Migration Research Team 2005).
skills recognition
In addition, there is the problem of non-recognition of educational qualifications and pro-
fessional training. Unlike the nursing profession, there is no standardized mechanism for 
the recognition of foreign IT qualifications (ASEAN-ANU Migration Research Team 2005; 
Manning, C & Sidorenko, A 2007). The onus is on individual employers to scrutinize the 
qualifications of their foreign recruits. It is important to note that the constantly changing 
nature of IT and computer science may mean that attempts to introduce standards may 
be excessive and slow to respond to technological developments (ASEAN-ANU Migration 
Research Team 2005). The ASEAN-ANU (2005) report also found that private invest-
ment in professional development via proprietary certification, such as those accredited by 
Microsoft and Cisco, yield a higher return through the premium accorded to an employee 
with such qualifications. As such, unlike the healthcare sector, industry certification rather 
than university degrees and diplomas may be more crucial for international mobility in the 
ICT sector.
In short, despite the relatively more liberal in-migration policies, the eagerness of many 
ASEAN countries to attract foreign ICT investment and regional initiatives to promote inte-
gration in the e-ASEAN sector, it is evident that many obstacles to the movement of labour in 
the region still remain. The final section explores some policy implications of improving the 
movement and integration of labour within ASEAN countries.
4. policy iMplicAtions
To date, ASEAN efforts to address migration and integration issues have been limited to 
MRAs for skilled labour and professionals. Neither low and unskilled labour migration nor 
undocumented migration issues have been addressed by regional efforts. Globally, the most 
liberal provisions for labour migration are found in the EU and in the Common Economic 
Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand (Neilson, cited in Bhatnagar, 
P & Manning, C 2005). These regional agreements grant access to the labour markets of 
member countries without work permits and provide mutual recognition of qualifications. 
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The ASEAN experience, however, shows that geographical proximity and a common history 
alone are insufficient for labour integration (Bhatnagar, P & Manning, C 2005). 
It appears that there are at least three barriers to greater integration in ASEAN. First, as 
mentioned in the introduction, the economic and political diversity within ASEAN makes 
integration more problematic than in the EU. Second, the primary concern with value-add-
ing economic growth means that regional agreements are focused on skilled and professional 
labour migration and exclude the integration of low and unskilled migrant workers. Hugo 
(2005b) points out that most net labour receiving countries in Asia tend to have strong 
restrictions on immigration. While people with high levels of financial or human capital 
are courted, other migrants are only allowed temporary stay and their rights are generally 
considerably curtailed in comparison to citizens. Common measures to ensure that low and 
unskilled migrants do not settle include: disallowing family to accompany or visit the worker, 
limiting the mobility of the worker within the country, tying the worker to a single employer, 
prohibiting marriage to citizens and restrictions on rights (Hugo, G 2005b: 114-5).
The third barrier to greater labour integration lies with the “ASEAN way” of doing 
things, that is, via a strong emphasis on consensus and non-interference with domestic 
policies. Theoretically, the ASEAN FA makes provision for the free movement of labour in 
priority sectors; however, in reality, domestic policies do not reflect the same desire for labour 
integration. A case in point is the nursing sector, where it is clear that domestic policies trump 
regional agreements and there remain many barriers to the free movement of nurses within 
ASEAN. 
The lack of regional cooperation on the issue of labour migration integration suggests 
that it is not on the active agenda of ASEAN as an issue of regional importance. If a freer 
movement of labour is to be achieved, then the underlying challenges posed by political 
and economic diversity, the emphasis on value-adding economic growth and the “ASEAN 
way” need to be addressed. In addition, as Hugo (2005b: 115) points out, migration policy 
development in Asia is too frequently based on the interests of particular groups and “misun-
derstanding of the nature and effects of migration”. He urges that there is a critical need for 
more evidence-based decision making. This calls for greater collaboration between research-
ers and policy makers with respect to the development of migration policy.
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AbstrAct
The objective of this article is to explore recent trends in migration and related policies, based 
upon empirical data and case studies from demographic, economic, social as well as labour 
market perspectives. 
The main findings of this article are: 
1) there are still strong factors attracting migrants who encounter growing labour mar-
kets mismatches at the local level; while 2) there are also factors which encourage migrants to 
leave the country, such as rapid economic development of neighbouring emerging economies 
as well as the traditional employment management policy of favouring people who prefer 
long-term employment.
3) According to some analyses of local labour markets, the density of migrants’ popula-
tion is high not only in large cities, but also in small and medium-sized cities with industrial 
agglomeration as well as rural areas with continuous outflows of younger people. Japanese 
workers and migrant workers are more or less complementary to each other in several ways. 
4) A survey by the “Alliance of Cities with High Density of Foreign Population” showed 
that language proficiency has a high correlation with stability and remuneration of migrants’ 
employment. However, local initiatives alone cannot provide enough incentives for migrants 
to continue learning the Japanese language.
The policy slogan to create “multicultural coexistence” in Japan is a grass-rooted con-
cept based on local realities. It is necessary to establish institutional infrastructures at the 
national level to enable consistency between immigration policy and integration policy as 
well as close collaboration of policies between local and national levels. The main targets 
are a) institutionalization of language standards, qualification of teaching staffs and legal 
incentives for migrants to learn Japanese language, b) reinforcement of active labour market 
policies for migrants together with policies for housing, social security and welfare as safety 
nets, c) strengthening of education for children who are lacking Japanese language skills and 
encouragement for them to pursue higher education. 
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The recent amendment of the Immigration Control Act and Basic Population Register 
Act, which came into force in July 2012, provides a basis for guaranteeing rights and fulfill-
ing obligations to migrants at local levels. This can be regarded as a first step towards the 
realization of a more comprehensive and effective migration policy in the near future. 
1. introduction
The objective of this article is to explore recent trends in migration and related policies, 
namely, 1) recent migration trends of Japanese and foreign population flows and their back-
grounds, 2) immigration flows of foreigners and their requirements, 3) relationship between 
migrants and locals using statistical data, 4) recent labour migration trends in Japan using lo-
cal data under the complex disasters, 5) measures taken by the central and local governments 
to integrate migrants economically and socially in Japan and 6) future prospects for migra-
tion and migration policies. Specifically, we are going to analyze related data and discuss such 
subjects in the following way: 
First, we will try to discuss the macro-economic and labour market environment of in-
ternational migration in and around Japan (Chapter 2). Second, we will describe the inflows 
and stocks of foreign nationals and the requirements of the Immigration Control and the 
Refugee Recognition Act (Chapter 3). Third, we will make an overview of the development 
of the labour market and foreign workers and their location, as well as their mobility (Chapter 
4). Fourth, we will statistically show the recent demographic change of the Japanese and its 
relation to foreign population (Chapter 5). Fifth, we will focus on the present stage of the 
social integration of foreigners with the newest data from the Alliance of Cities with High 
Density of Foreign Citizens (Chapter 6). Finally, we would like to summarize the discussion 
and main findings, followed by recommendation. 
2. chAngEs in MigrAtion oF JApAnEsE or ForEign 
nAtionAls And thEir bAckgrounds
Japan has entered the phase of declining population since 2005. The demographic factor may 
be one of the important factors which may explain the recent development of international 
migration.
However, the Japanese population increased in 2006, 2007 and 2009 because of positive 
net immigration of Japanese nationals. In addition, the positive net immigration of foreign 
nationals also compensated for such declines from 2005 to 2008. In this period, the Japanese 
economy has been expanding and domestic employment has been recovering (Table 1) 
(Iguchi 2012e). 
In September 2008, the world economic crisis broke out and manufacturing and finan-
cial sectors were the hardest hit. The net immigration of foreign nationals started to shrink. 
In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake happened. After the earthquake, 
530,000 foreigners left Japan within a month. But, they gradually returned as the situation 
of the nuclear plants stabilized. As a result, the registered foreign population declined slightly 
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(from 2.09 million in March to 2.07 million in December 2011). This year, the decline of the 
Japanese population has reached 200,000 and that of foreign nationals 5,000, which is the 
largest population decline after World War II. 
These changes varied according to nationalities: the largest decline in percentage was 
Brazilians, followed by Koreans, while the Chinese and Filipinos showed no substantial 
changes in population.
table 1: Development of Population in Japan (Unit: thousand, %)
Total Population Japanese Foreigner
Population 
in october Diff.
Rate of 
change
Population 
in october Diff.
Rate of 
change
Population 
in october Diff.
Rate of 
change
2005 127769 -19 -0.01 126205 -61 -0.05 1564 42 2.7
2006 127901 133 0.10 126286 81 0.06 1615 51 3.2
2007 128033 132 0.10 126347 62 0.05 1686 71 4.2
2008 128081 51 0.04 126340 -81 -0.01 1741 55 3.2
2009 128032 -52 -0.04 126343 4 0.00 1689 -52 -3.0
2010 128057 26 0.02 126382 38 0.03 1675 -14 -0.9
2011 127799 -259 -0.20 126180 -202 -0.06 1619 -56 -3.5
source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Estimates based on population census)
Aside from factors such as the economic crisis and the complex disasters, we would like 
to examine the factors that may explain the in- and outflow of foreign nationals as well as 
Japanese. They consist of long-term factors which might influence migration (either push 
factors or pull factors). 
First, deflation has occurred in Japan since the middle of the 1990s, while there is a trend 
of inflation in the global economy with the rapidly growing demands from emerging econo-
mies. The global inflation trend is primarily caused by soaring prices of energy, raw materials 
and food as a result of increasing demands from emerging economies, especially China and 
India, along with the background of abundant speculative money in the financial sector as a 
result of the quantitative easing of several developed countries with the debt crisis. 
Following the collapse of the bubble economy at the beginning of the 1990s, accumula-
tion of non-performing loans and contraction of bank credit have resulted in low investment 
and slow economic growth as well as deflation since the middle of the 1990s.
Even after overcoming the financial crisis through legislations in 1998, the deflation gaps 
at macro-level have continued irrespective of enormous expenditures by the government and 
quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan in order to stimulate the economy. 
One serious effect of deflation on the labour market is strong pressure to squeeze labour 
cost at enterprises. When we look at the domestic labour market, enterprises have to continu-
ously reduce labour costs not only by reducing the remuneration for regular employees, but 
also by replacing regular employees with employees on contracts. This has led to growing 
and diversifying mismatches in the local labour markets, as many unemployed cannot find 
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regular jobs and vacancies for technicians cannot be filled by a shrinking younger population 
who want to go to universities. 
In addition, there are growing numbers of inactive persons who are still young but dis-
couraged from working. As a result, an increasing number of long-term unemployed are now 
dependent upon social assistances. 
Second, Japanese employment systems function under the condition of low labour turn-
over, which in most Asian countries is much higher than in Japan. Many Asian talents seek 
faster evaluation, selection and promotion within a few years. In contrast, Japanese companies 
have long-term evaluation systems and do not have fast tracks for employees who are evalu-
ated as possessing high potential. For a long time, even large Japanese companies thought 
that there would not be so many job-changers, and there are no specific measures in their 
personnel policies for handling such a situation. 
In Asian companies growing rapidly, several measures are taken to prevent unexpected 
labour turnover and to assure the retention of essential personnel within the company. They 
implemented several reforms of their personnel policies following recommendations by 
American or European consulting firms on personnel policy. 
Perhaps in twenty or thirty years’ time, the mobility of the labour market in Asia will be 
substantially lower than today and many people will seek stable and long-term employment, 
under developed social security systems. 
As a consequence, there are two contrasting outcomes already evident in Japan. One 
outcome is the inflow of migrant workers into the local labour markets in order to fill the gap 
caused by the mismatches between demand and supply at the local level in Japan. 
Another outcome is the outflow of migrant workers, especially those with high potential 
already employed by Japanese enterprises. They are inclined to quit the company in a few 
years and even leave Japan to work abroad. The main reason might be that Japanese compa-
nies cannot concentrate human capital investment on employees with high potential (Iguchi 
2012 d). 
In addition, Japanese engineers, especially in the electronics industry, have changed jobs 
and been hired by Korean or Chinese firms, which offer much higher remuneration and bet-
ter working conditions. It has resulted in a growing outflow of Japanese engineers, with some 
“technology drain”, from Japanese firms to their competing firms in Asia. 
Now, we can classify several factors influencing international migration of both Japanese 
and foreign nationals (Table 2).
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table 2: Changing environment and factors affecting international migration in and 
around Japan
Environment Main factors Direction Reasons of inflows or outflows Examples 
Deflation in 
Japan 
versus 
Inflation in 
the world
- strong 
pressures 
to reduce 
total labour 
costs by 
enterprises
- delayed 
reform of 
employment 
systems 
to meet 
with high 
turnover
Inflow 
(Coming 
from 
abroad)
Mismatches in the local 
labor markets as a 
result of the declining 
and aging population 
(supply) and changing 
business models of 
companies because of 
globalization (demand) 
Net Inflow of 
Technical Interns, 
Japanese-Asians 
(New-Nikkeijin), 
and hiring of foreign 
students graduated 
from universities
outflow
(going 
abroad)
slow selection or 
evaluation for regular 
employees 
and 
increasing unstable 
employment of atypical 
employees
Net outflow of 
Japanese Brazilians 
etc. (Nikkejin), and 
resignation of foreign 
graduates in a short 
period or Japanese 
engineers finding jobs 
abroad
source: Made by the author
3. chAnging MigrAtion And rEQuirEMEnts oF 
iMMigrAtion
We now look at inflow of foreign nationals, taking into consideration the requirements set by 
the Immigration and Refugee recognition Act. 
In the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Article 1 stipulates the sole 
objective of the Act. It is “fair control of immigration and emigration”. There are no such 
objectives as protection of migrants, guarantee of rights and obligations or social integration 
of migrants.
Article 2-2 of the Act stipulates two different types of migrants by the Annex Table I and 
the Annex Table II. Annex Table I defines “statues of residence” for the purpose of “activities” 
performed by foreigners. They are “Diplomat”, “Official”, “Professor”, “Religious activities”, 
“Journalist”, “Investor /Business manager”, “Legal /Accounting services”, “Medical Services”, 
“Researcher”, “Instructor”, “Engineer”, “Specialist in humanities/International Service”, 
“Intra-corporate-transferee”, “Entertainer”, “Skilled Worker”, “Technical Intern Training” 
(1-I, 1-RO, 2-I,and 2-RO), (these 15 statuses are for working purposes), as well as “Cultural 
activities”, “Temporary visitor”, “Students”, “Trainee”, “Dependent” and “Designated activi-
ties” (these 5 statuses are for other purposes than working) (Table 3).
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table 3: new entry of foreigners according to status of residence
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
status of residence 
Total 7,721,258 7,711,828 6,119,394 7,919,726 5,448,019
status 
according 
to 
activities
status 
for 
working 
purposes
Diplomat 9,205 12,029 10,183 11,167 9,678
official 14,519 24,358 22,229 27,000 19,563
Professor 2,365 2,465 2,639 2,630 2,420
Artist 239 222 226 256 221
Religious activities 985 828 771 713 737
Journalist 119 226 170 136 59
Investor /Business 
manager 918 919 857 896 838
legal /Accounting 
service 8 2 4 3 4
Medical services 6 1 6 2 7
Researcher 559 563 592 528 423
Instructor 2,951 2,930 2,499 2,339 2,540
Engineer 10.959 9,212 3,363 2,852 4,178
specialist in 
humanities/
International service
7,426 5,690 4,167 4,113 4,658
Intra-company 
transferee 7,170 7,307 5,245 5,826 5,348
Entertainer 38,855 34,994 31,170 28,612 26,112
skilled labor 5.315 6,799 5,384 3,588 4,178
Technical Intern 
Training 1-I  -  -  - 2,282 5,178
Technical Intern 
Training 1-Ro  -  -  - 23,720 60,847
Technical Intern 
Training 2-I  -  -  -  - 0
Technical Intern 
Training 2-Ro  -  -  -  - 227
status 
for other 
purposes
Cultural activities 3,454 3,378 3,557 3,159 2,729
Temporary visitor 7,384,510 7,367,277 5,822,719 7,632,536 5,180,962
student 47,939 59,116 66,149 63,478 49,936
Trainee 102,018 101,879 80,480 51,725 16,079
Dependent 20,268 22,167 20,540 19,486 18,165
Designated activities 8,009 8,413 9,863 11,972 12,954
status according to 
social position
spouse or child of 
Japanese national 24,421 19,975 14,951 11,452 10,766
spouse and child of 
permanent resident 1,710 1,964 1,684 1,068 1,392
long-term resident 27,326 20,123 9,946 8,178 7,811
Temporary asylum 4 0 0 0 0
source: Ministry of Justice
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Annex Table II stipulates status of residences according to social positions. They are “Spouse 
or Child of a Japanese national”, “Long-term resident”, “Spouse and children of permanent 
resident”, or “Temporary visitor” (See Table 3). 
In addition, there is the status of “Permanent resident” in Annex Table II, which can 
be issued to foreigners who have stayed in Japan for at least ten years in principle, with the 
condition that he or she is of good conduct and can sustain his or her livelihood. In the case 
of a spouse of a Japanese, permanent resident status can be issued when he or she has been 
staying in Japan for less than five years. 
Article 5 stipulates the reasons for rejecting the application for landing, which include 
drug abuse or danger for social order etc. 
Article 7 stipulates the ordinance by Ministry of Justice on the activities of 14 sta-
tuses of residence: “Investor /Business manager”, “Legal /Accounting services”, “Medical 
Services”, “Researcher”, “Instructor”, “Engineer”, “Specialist in humanities/International 
Service”, “Intra-corporate-transferee”, “Entertainer”, “Skilled Worker”, “Student”. “Trainee”, 
“Dependent” and “Technical Intern Training” (1-I, 1-RO, 2-I,and 2-RO). This ordinance 
should be decided after consultation with Ministries Agencies concerned. 
The scope of accepting foreign workers are limited to foreigners with technology and 
knowledge or those with special skills, according to Annex Table I, while those foreigners 
with status of residence according to Annex Table II are able to conduct every kind of activity 
including low or unskilled jobs (Table 2). (Iguchi 2012d) 
Article 19 stipulates the permission for undesignated activities issued by the Immigration 
Bureau. Article 19-3 stipulates the “Residence Card” which should be issued by the 
Immigration Bureau when foreign nationals get permission for landing. 
Article 19-7 stipulates that foreign nationals should present the residence card and regis-
ter at municipalities according to the Inhabitant’s Registration Law. In addition, Article 19-16 
stipulates that foreign nationals should report to a local immigration bureau when they have 
changed their workplace. 
Article 19-17 stipulates the obligation for organizations which accept foreign nationals 
to report to the local immigration bureau, except when employers are obliged to report to 
Employment Service Offices according to Article 28 of Employment Countermeasures Law. 
The same law stipulates that these reports should be transferred from Minister of Health, 
Labor and Welfare to Minister of Justice. 
Article 20 states the procedures for changing status of residence. Article 21 stipulates the 
procedures for extending the stay with the same status of residence. These articles have guide-
lines by the ministry concerning requirements for changing or extending their statuses. These 
guidelines contain requirements such as paying taxes or holding certificate of social insurance 
etc. However, a lack of requirements does not necessarily lead to deportation of the migrants. 
Articles 24 and 25 mention the procedures for deportation. Article 50 stipulates special 
permission of stay granted by the Minister of Justice when there are humanitarian reasons. 
This article also has a guideline for the permission. 
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The total number of new entries was 7.7 million per annum before the world economic 
crisis in 2008. However, the annual inflow has drastically declined to almost 5.4 million in 
2011 after the rebound of new entries to 7.9 million in 2010. 
Although the entries of foreign nationals have been fluctuating as a result of external 
or internal shocks, the stock of migrants has been relatively stable and the decline of foreign 
residents still remains over two million according to the registration statistics. 
First, it is noteworthy that 980,000 foreign inhabitants hold permanent resident sta-
tus including special permanent resident status, which has been issued to the descendants 
of Koreans or Chinese who had been Japanese nationals before the end of World War II. 
Nowadays, according to Article 22 of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition 
Act, ordinary permanent residents have outnumbered those with special permanent resident 
status (Table 4). 
table 4: Registered foreigners according to status of residence
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
status of residence Total 2,152,973 2,712,426 2,186,121 2,134,151 2,078,508
Permanent resident total 869,986 912,361 943,195 964,195 987,508
  ordinary permanent resident 437,757 496,056 533,472 565,089 598,440
  special permanent resident 430,229 420,305 409,565 399,106 389,085
Non-permanent resident total 1,282,987 1,305,065 1,243,084 1,169,965 1,090,983
  student 170,590 179,827 192,668 201,511 188,605
  souse and child of Japanese 256,980 245,497 221,923 196,248 181,617
  long-term resident 268,604 258,498 221,771 194,602 177,983
  Technical Intern Training  -  -  - 100,008 141,994
  Dependent 98,167 107,641 115,081 118,865 119,359
specialist in humanities / 
International service 61,763 67,291 69,395 68,467 67,854
  skilled labour 44,684 52,273 50,493 46,592 42,634
  Engineer 21,261 25,863 29,030 30,142 31,751
  spouse of permanent resident 15,365 17,839 19,570 20,251 21,647
  Intra-company transferee 16,111 17,798 16,786 16,140 14,636
  Investor / Business manager 7,916 8,895 9,840 10,908 11,778
  Instructor 9.832 10,070 10,129 10,012 10,107
  Trainee 88,086 86,826 65,209 9,346 3,388
  others 223,628 226,747 221,189 146,867 77,631
source: Ministry of Justice
According to nationalities, China occupies 32.5% of registered foreign residents, followed by 
Korea, Brazil, the Philippines, Peru and the United States (Table 5). 
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table 5: Migrant stocks (registered migrant) in Japan
Countries of 
origin 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 %
Total 2,152,973 2,217,426 2,186,121 2,134,151 2,078,508 100.0
China 606,889 655,377 680,518 687,156 674,879 32.5
Korea 593,489 589,239 578,495 565,989 545,401 26.2
Brazil 316,967 312,582 267,456 230,552 210,032 10.1
Philippines 202,592 210,617 211,716 210,181 209,376 10.1
Peru 59,696 59,723 57,464 54,636 52,843 2.5
the Us 51,851 52,723 52,149 50,667 49,815 2.4
others 321,489 337,205 338,323 334,970 336,162 16.2
source: Ministry of Justice
4. diFFErEnt typEs oF MigrAnt lAbor And its locAtion 
And Mobility
The total number of foreign workers should be grasped by the reporting system of foreigners’ 
employment according to Article 28 of Employment Countermeasures Law. In reality, this 
system has become compulsory since October 2007 and it covers 686,000 foreign workers. 
However, this figure may underestimate the real number, 
Therefore, the author has estimated the number of foreign workers every year based on 
reliance on several kinds of statistics. The total number is 900,000 excluding those who have 
special permanent resident status (Table 6). 
According to the estimate by the author, foreigners who have the status of residents for 
the purpose of working, except technical intern trainees, represent 22.2 percent of foreign 
workers. Technical intern trainees, who possess a status of “designated activities”, and stu-
dents with permission for non-designated activities, amounted to almost the same number as 
those who have a status of residence for the purpose of working.
Foreigners of Japanese descent have traditionally been the largest group in this table. But 
their numbers have declined significantly since 2009 due to the world economic crisis. 
The number of overstaying foreigners has substantially declined under the efforts of the 
Immigration Bureau to reduce overstayers by half from 2005 to 2009. This figure also reflects 
the issuance of a “special permission to stay” by the Minister of Justice, which may be issued 
in the process of deportation when there are humanitarian considerations, as indicated in the 
guidelines attached to Article 25 of the Immigration Control and Refugees Recognition Act.
The estimate also reflects the fact that there are new foreigners who obtain permanent 
resident status. Many of them come from the category of Japanese descendants. If foreigners 
would like to build a house in Japan and secure bank loans, it is necessary for them to apply 
for permanent resident status. 
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In the labour market, the functions of foreign workers differ according to the categories. 
Graphics 1-5 show that technical intern trainees, who are under the rotation system and 
who are not able to change their jobs, are widespread in remote areas where the youth popula-
tion has declined and population aging is going on.
In contrast, foreign workers of Japanese descent and those with permanent resident status 
are mobile and concentrate in the areas with higher wages. The highly skilled foreign workers 
are mainly working in the areas of Tokyo, Aichi and Osaka. The locations of foreign students 
who are working part-time corresponds with that of universities and colleges (Graphics 1-5).
Graphic 1: Foreign workers as technical intern trainees (october 2011) 
source: Made by the author in reliance upon data from the reporting system of foreigners’ employ-
ment by Ministry of Health labour and Welfare. 
Graphic 2: Foreign workers of Japanese descent (october 2011)
source: Made by the author in reliance upon data from the reporting system of foreigners’ employ-
ment by Ministry of Health labour and Welfare. 
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Graphic: 3 Foreign workers with permanent resident status (oct. 2011)
source: Made by the author in reliance upon data from the reporting system of foreigners’ employ-
ment by Ministry of Health labour and Welfare. 
Graphic 4: Foreign workers with knowledge and technology (october 2011)
source: Made by the author in reliance upon data from the reporting system of foreigners’ employ-
ment by Ministry of Health labour and Welfare. 
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Graphic 5: Foreign part-time workers as students (october 2011) 
source: Made by the author in reliance upon data from the reporting system of foreigners’ employ-
ment by Ministry of Health labour and Welfare. 
5. thE rElAtionship bEtWEEn MigrAnts And locAls
Now we can statistically explore the relationship between demographic factors and interna-
tional migration using local data between 2005 and 2010. 
Looking at population movement at the local levels, population decreased in every pre-
fecture in December 2010. When we divide this movement into natural and social increase 
(or decrease), natural decrease was observable in every prefecture and social increase can be 
identified in several prefectures. These prefectures with social increase of population are ex-
ceptional: Social increase is observable only in the Tokyo metropolitan areas as well as Aichi, 
Shiga, Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka prefectures. Especially noteworthy is that in the disaster-
stricken areas, in the north-eastern part of Honshu Island, only Miyagi Prefecture (strictly 
speaking Sendai City) has been attracting people from neighbouring regions.
When we look at the age structure of Japanese nationals, it is noteworthy that the num-
ber of babies born annually is as high as 1.06 million, as in 2011, while it was almost 2.2 
million in the 1947-49 period, and 1.7-1.9 million in the 1965-74 period. 
Based on such descriptive data, we try to statistically explore the relationship between 
demographic movement and foreign population. We can obtain the following results from 
2000 and 2005: the declining population of youngsters has been compensated with the grow-
ing foreign population, especially technical intern trainees at the local level. 
It does not make sense when people insist that foreign labour should not enter the labour 
market, while females and the elderly should have priority for working opportunities. In real-
ity, Japanese Brazilians are concentrated in the areas where labour force participation and 
employment rate of females and elderly are high (Table 7 and Table 8). 
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table 7: Correlation between demographic changes and foreign population in 2000
share 
of youth 
population
labour force 
participation 
of the elderly 
Employment 
rate of the 
elderly
labour Force 
Participation 
of women
Employment 
rate of the 
women 
Total foreigner 0.301** 0.619*** 0.699*** 0.021 0.321**
special permanent 
residents 0.340** 0.100 0.360** -0.364*** -0.094
Japanese-Brazilians -0.054 0.686*** 0.504*** 0.410*** 0.474***
Foreign specialist 0.357** 0.293** 0.519*** -0.131 0.207
Technical intern trainees -0.437*** 0.217 -0.040 0.396*** 0.215
source: By the author in reliance on shiho (2011). The original data is population census (2000). 
Note: ***significant at 10% level. **significant at 5% level. *significant at 1% level.
table 8: Correlation between demographic changes and foreign population in 2005
share 
of youth 
population
labour force 
participation 
of the elderly 
Employment 
rate of the 
elderly
labour Force 
Participation 
of women
Employment 
rate of the 
women 
Total foreigner 0.203 0.528*** 0.731*** 0.128 0.486***
special permanent 
residents 0.294** -0.099 0.288** -0.347*** -0.037
Japanese-Brazilians -0.010 0.661*** 0.554*** 0.445*** 0.562***
Foreign specialist 0.241 0.114 0.505*** -0.209 0.184
Technical intern trainees -0.369*** 0.234 0.020 0.366** 0.247*
source: By the author in reliance on shiho (2011). The original data is population census (2005). 
Note: ***significant at 10% level. **significant at 5% level. *significant at 1% level.
6. locAl initiAtiVEs oF intEgrAting MigrAnts
Initiatives to integrate migrants into the society were started in Kawasaki City at the be-
ginning of the 1990s. After the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, there emerged initiatives 
to rescue people and reconstruct their lives in Kobe City. They called their movement as 
“Multicultural Coexistence”. 
In 2001, thirteen cities established the Alliance of Cities with High density of 
Foreign Citizens with the initiative of Hamamatsu City. In 2004, the Alliance defined the 
“Multicultural coexistence” as “a society which respects identity and culture of the mem-
bers on the basis of the guarantee of rights and the fulfilment of obligations to sustain the 
city life”. In 2005, the Council on Regulatory Reform of the Cabinet Office recommended 
that municipalities, in cooperation with government agencies, should strengthen policies for 
“multicultural coexistence.” To achieve this goal, migration policies should consist of both 
immigration control policy and multicultural coexistence policy as proposed by the Alliance. 
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Based on requests for regulatory reform, the cabinet adopted the three-year plan of 
regulatory reform in 2006 including amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugees 
Recognition Act and the Employment Countermeasures Law as well as the Inhabitants’ 
Register Law. Through this amendment, the data system of foreign citizens should be in-
tegrated to the data system of Japanese citizens and a digital network of municipalities and 
government agencies should be created so as to guarantee rights and to enable fulfilment 
of obligations to foreign citizens. The bill was passed by the parliament in July 2009 and 
the laws took effect partially in July 2010 and totally in July 2012. At the same time, the 
Foreigners’ Registration Law was abolished. 
However, this amendment of the laws is the beginning of migration policy reform. 
Municipalities recognized that the amendment of the new laws provide them with the ba-
sis for guaranteeing rights and fulfilment of obligations to foreign citizens. But, it will take 
further steps to realize effective data systems among inhabitant’s register, social security, tax 
system and so forth. 
In addition, the Alliance has been intensively taking measures at local levels to strength-
en language training. Therefore, it is urgent now to create an institutional infrastructure for 
language training by introducing Japanese language standards, evaluation methods, and 
qualification of teaching staff etc. It also tries to strengthen employment measures especially 
vocational training in foreign languages as well as more comprehensive measures for educa-
tion of migrant children. 
Because of emergency employment measures after the world economic crisis, there have 
been policies implemented by the government to promote the employment of foreigners. 
This budget also enabled municipalities to reinforce Japanese language courses for foreign-
ers, training for employment of foreigners as well as supporting foreign children to change 
from foreigners’ schools to Japanese public schools etc. However, the budget will expire at the 
end of March 2013. Although the Alliance made requests repeatedly to institutionalize such 
emergency measures, many of them will be abolished or eliminated. 
According to the new survey, language ability is an important determinant of the stabil-
ity of employment and sufficiency of household budget (Tables 9-12). 
table 9: Ability to speak Japanese according to the length of stay in Japan
length of stay in 
Japan
Japanese language
Total
I can speak speak a little I cannot speak
10 years and more 51.5% 43.9% 4.6% 100%
5 years to 9 years 18.6% 67.2% 14.2% 100%
2 years to 4years 10.4% 65.8% 23.8% 100%
one year or less 6.5% 42.9% 50.6% 100%
Total 39.0% 50.8% 10.2% 100%
source: Alliance of Cities with High Density of Foreign Citizens (2012) 
Note: samples are 910 Japanese Brazilians.
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table 10: Ability to read Japanese according to the length of stay in Japan
Ability to read Japanese language
Totallength of stay in 
Japan
No 
Answer
I can read 
newspapers
I can read 
simple 
Chinese 
characters
I can read 
Hiragana 
or 
Katakana
I cannot 
read 
Japanese
10 years and more 1.1% 16.3% 26.5% 43.7% 13.4% 100%
5 years to 9 years 0.9% 3.0% 17.8% 56.5% 21.8% 100%
2 years to 4years 0.0% 0.0% 12.3% 57.0% 30.7% 100%
one year or less 1.0% 0.0% 26.7% 38.7% 43.5% 100%
Total 1.0% 11.4% 22.5% 47.3% 17.9% 100%
source: see Table 9
table 11: Working status according to language ability
Japanese language 
ability
structure of household according to working status
TotalRegular 
employee
Dispatched 
worker
Part-time 
worker
No one is 
employed
Can speak 42.4% 31.3% 17.6% 8.6% 100%
speak a little 26.5% 49.2% 16.1% 8.2% 100%
Cannot speak 29.8% 22.0% 28.2% 20.0% 100%
Total 35.3% 38.2% 17.5% 9.0% 100%
source: see table 9
table 12: sufficiency of household income according to language ability
sufficiency of household Income
Total
Income is 
sufficient 
for the 
household
Income is 
not enough 
for the 
household
Income in 
insufficient for 
the household
living 
with social 
assistance
others
I can speak 47.2% 28.1% 18.4% 2.2% 4.1% 100%
I can speak 
a little 40.8% 32.6% 17.2% 3.7% 5.6% 100%
I cannot 
speak 35.2% 31.8% 19.3% 10.2% 3.4% 100%
Total 42.5% 31.0% 17.8% 3.8% 4.9% 100%
source: Alliance of Cities with High Density of Foreign Citizens (2012) 
Note: samples are 910 Japanese Brazilians.
The Alliance also made a request to the government to establish a new government agency for 
migration policy. However, the majority of the ministries have not agreed with the Alliance 
so far. In the meantime, the government has established an office within the Cabinet Office 
to promote the policy for long-term foreign residents and have compiled an action plan. 
However, they have no clear target, no financial background, and no deadline for creating 
institutional infrastructures for migration policy. 
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Concerning the scope of acceptance of foreigners, the government has been keeping the 
principle of accepting foreigners with technology and knowledge as much as possible, while 
unskilled foreigners should not be accepted. But, this principle has relevance only with Annex 
Table I of the Immigration and Refugees Recognition Act and no relevance with Annex Table 
II of the Act. 
The activities of civil society to support migrants in Japan had already started in the 
middle of the 1980s, when many Filipinos came to Japan as entertainers. Most of them were 
female workers and needed rescue from exploitation and infringement of human rights. Some 
Japanese NGOs, which had been providing shelters for women who suffered from domestic 
violence, also accepted trafficked women from the Philippines, Thailand or Columbia etc. 
At the same time, there are NGOs which try to give assistance to overstaying foreign-
ers who are not covered by sickness insurance and are not able to have medical treatment. 
From there emerged trade unions for foreign workers, which may carry out negotiations with 
employers when there are disputes. With the increasing number of Japanese Brazilians or 
Japanese Peruvians, NGOs have become active in many local areas where foreign inhabitants 
have increased. Although many of the NGOs in Japan are small and isolated, movements to 
build networks among them emerged in the Kanto area in 1991. To cover all areas of Japan, 
the Solidarity Network With Migrant Japan was established in 1997. 
Together with the “multicultural coexistence” policies, there are increasing numbers of 
volunteer citizens who provide lessons on the Japanese language for foreigners or who become 
tutors for foreign children. It is also noteworthy that many municipalities or local associations 
for international exchange employ interpreters or counsellors. These bilingual citizens play an 
important role in solving everyday problems for foreign citizens who are not covered by local 
communities. In case of emergency, they can also give reliable information to foreign citizens 
in foreign languages. 
Many of these initiatives are taken at the local level and are undertaken with the objective 
of “multicultural coexistence”. The capacity and effectiveness of such initiatives are limited, 
because local initiatives are undertaken in the absence of laws and regulations. Therefore, 
it is necessary to create institutional infrastructure for “multicultural coexistence” at a na-
tional level for providing language training, improving education for foreign children and 
youngsters, promoting employment for foreign workers and providing them with a safety-
net through social insurance as well as employment insurance. This may be an important 
investment for the future of the Japanese society which cannot be sustained without the 
participation of foreign citizens. 
7. conclusion
International migration in and around Japan is undergoing great changes. There are still fac-
tors attracting migrants, while there are other factors causing foreigners to leave Japan. This 
mechanism can be explained by the macro-economic environment and the situation in the 
labour market. Because of the world economic crisis and the complex disasters, the flow of 
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migrants fluctuated and net migration was negative in 2011. However, the stock of migrants 
has been resilient to several shocks and it remains over two million. 
The Japanese migration policy is mainly shaped by the Immigration Control and 
Refugee Recognition Act, which does not include social integration policies. There are two 
categories of migrants who enter Japan, either with the objective of activities, or for the social 
position of migrants. There has been a principle by the government to accept foreigners with 
technology or knowledge as much as possible, while so-called unskilled labour should not 
be permitted. However, only about twenty percent of the migrants entered Japan with the 
objective of working. 
When we look at the labour markets of foreign workers, they are concentrated in the 
areas with higher wages when they are mobile enough. But foreign workers without mobility, 
such as technical intern trainees, are also located in the areas of low wages and productivity, 
where the youth population has left for big cities and the population is aging. 
Then we statistically verified the relationship between foreign and Japanese nationals. 
As for technical intern trainees, they compensate for the loss of the youth population. As for 
Japanese Brazilians, where they are working, employment rate of females and elderly workers 
are also high. 
Based on these analyses, the author stresses the local initiatives of “multicultural coexis-
tence” in Japan. These initiatives have achieved the amendment of the Immigration Control 
and Refugee Recognition Act as well as the Inhabitants Register Law and Employment 
Countermeasures Law. All of the amendments have taken effect from July 2012 (partly from 
October 2007 or July 2010). 
However, this is the first step for guaranteeing the rights and fulfilling obligations to 
foreign citizens. We need to create more institutional infrastructures for language training, 
employment promotion, provision of safety nets, and education for foreign children and 
youth etc. These measures should be mainly taken at the local level together with civil society 
organisations, which are now growing its network around Japan. 
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AbstrAct
Singapore is a small city-state situated in the centre of Southeast Asia, and home to five million 
residents and non-residents. In 2000, a quarter of the Singapore population was considered 
non-native born. This ratio, by 2010, had increased to one-third of the total population. One 
million people were added to the population during this period, with the bulk of the influx 
coming in as permanent residents and short-term foreign workers. The core of local-born 
Singaporeans has shrunk considerably from 75% to 66% over the same period. This group 
is set to become the minority group in their homeland, should the trend persist. The rapid 
growth in population was primarily fuelled by the country’s liberal economic policies, and in 
reaction to the socio-demographic imperatives faced by the city-state. At the same time, the 
open-door policy was introduced to uplift the nation’s economic competitiveness and make 
up for the country’s anaemic fertility rate as the pace of ageing accelerates in the coming 
decades. 
Not surprisingly, the tectonic shift in the demographic landscape has unnerved the local 
community. Some Singaporeans are uncomfortable over the relentless influx of immigrants 
and foreign labour. The resentment that underscores the discontent ranges from resource 
competition (e.g., jobs, education scholarships) to intrinsic socio-cultural contestations (e.g., 
space, identity, cohesion), and a perceived political divide (e.g., government bias in favour 
of immigrants over local-born). The policymakers are cognisant of these emerging fractures 
and many policies have been put in place to address the imbalance. These include steps to 
recalibrate the intake of foreign labour and long-term residents, ramp up the provision of 
social infrastructure, impose a residential quota on permanent residents, increase grassroots 
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engagement, and sharpen policy entitlement for the different residential groups. What will 
the future hold for Singapore’s ethno-cultural terrain? What are the barriers to harmonious 
co-existence? And what is the trade-off in terms of economic growth and standard of living? 
This paper aims to examine these issues and identify the impending challenges in the decades 
to come. 
introduction
Singapore is historically an immigrant society that has a large number of people originating 
from abroad. Since the British founding of Singapore in 1819, the tiny island-state has been 
a magnet for immigrants from the region due to its strategic location at the southern tip of 
the Malaysian peninsula. Good geographical position enabled the former colony to transform 
into an important trading centre and make economic improvements at breakneck speed. 
Despite the economic progress under British rule, the colonial government made no ef-
fort to enhance ethnic relations. This lack of attention led to rising social tensions between 
the different racial communities which eventually ended in a few disruptive racial riots in 
the 1960s. When Singapore gained independence in 1965, maintaining social peace and har-
mony was deemed a key priority for the government. Racial integration was taken seriously in 
all spheres of public policies and every effort was made in the nation-building process to forge 
a distinctive Singaporean identity which all citizens could identify with and be proud of. 
The past experience in the management of racial and religious harmony and in the de-
velopment of civic health thus became the de facto template for the management of social 
diversity, including the challenges related to the recent influx of immigrants. While many 
other countries have also become recipients of immigrants in recent years, Singapore stands 
out with its comprehensive approach to regulate migration and foster integration into the host 
society. 
singAporE’s socio-dEMogrAphic lAndscApE
The modern city-state of Singapore has a land size of 714.3 km² (in 2011). The island has 
no hinterland or natural resources, and is highly dependent on imports and external trade. 
With a population density of 7,257 persons per km² (in 2011), Singapore is one of the most 
crowded countries in the world. Notwithstanding its geographic constraints, Singapore has 
done exceptionally well with its economy – between 1959 and 1991, the gross national prod-
uct per capita increased more than 14 times (cf. Quah 1992, p. 151-152).
According to the last population census in 2010,1 Singapore has a total population 
of 5.08 million inhabitants of which 1.31 million are non-residents (e.g., people holding 
an Employment Pass) and 3.77 million are residents (including 3.23 million citizens and 
541,000 permanent residents (PRs) (see Table 1)). Until the mid-1990s, approximately 90% 
1  All the data presented in this chapter refer to the results of the 2010 census (cf. Wong 2010) and the information of 
the Department of Statistics Singapore (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/keyind.html).
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of the total population were Singapore citizens. This ratio has fallen to less than two-thirds 
today. However, the ethnic composition has remained relatively stable for the last 40 years. 
The Chinese form the overwhelming majority with 74.1% of the population. The Malays 
are the biggest minority group, making up 13.4% of the total population. The Indians form 
9.2% of the population and the remaining ethnic groups, known collectively as Others, form 
the last 3.3%. The division of the population into these four groups (Chinese, Malay, Indian, 
and Others, or CMIO for short) can be found in all aspects of society and is crucial for im-
migration as well as integration policies. Although the CMIO-scheme can be criticised for 
generalising and neglecting intra-racial differences, the system helps in managing the various 
ethnic groups and other cultural challenges.
table 1: singapore’s Population size, Growth and Composition
1980 1990 2000 2010
Total Population (‘000) 2,413.9 3,047.1 4,027.9 5,076.7
Resident Population 2,282.1 2,735.9 3,273.4 3,771.7
singapore Citizens 2,194.3 2,623.7 2,985.9 3,230.7
Permanent Residents 87.8 112.1 287.5 541.0
Non-Resident Population
(e.g., Foreigners with Work Permit, 
Employment Pass, s-pass, long-
Term social Visit Pass, or student 
visas)
131.8 311.3 754.5 1,305.0
Average Annual growth (%) 1.5 2.3 2.8 1.8
Resident Population 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.0
singapore Citizens 1.6 1.7 1.3 0.9
Permanent Residents -4.5 2.3 9.9 1.5
Non-Resident Population 8.0 9.0 9.3 4.1
Ethnic Ratio (100%)
Chinese 78.3 77.8 76.8 74.1
Malays 14.4 14.0 13.9 13.4
Indians 6.3 7.1 7.9 9.2
others 1.0 1.1 1.4 3.3
source: singapore Census Reports; Wong (2010), edited by Patrick Rueppel
Singapore is not only a multi-racial society, but also a multi-religious one. Buddhism is the 
most common religion with 33.3% of the population. Christianity, with 18.3% of the popu-
lation, is becoming more important. Muslims (14.7%), Taoists (10.9%) and Hindus (5.1%) 
account for the other religious blocs (cf. Linnarz, 2011, p. 106).
In order not to discriminate against any of the four major ethnic groups, there are four 
official languages: Malay, Mandarin Chinese, Tamil and English. While the lyrics of the 
national anthem are kept in Malay to show respect to pre-colonial heritage, all signboards 
and official announcements are made in all four languages. English is the official inter-ethnic 
lingua franca as it enables the different races to communicate with one another. At the same 
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time, immigrants and foreigners from all over the world can also participate in Singapore’s 
multicultural society without much difficulty. 
oVErViEW oF thE driVing ForcEs thAt undErscorE 
singAporE’s iMMigrAtion policy 
Singapore’s multicultural landscape and immigrant policies need to be understood within 
the larger historical context. After the end of the Second World War, Singapore reverted 
to its colonial outpost status for the British (1945-1963) and then briefly became a part of 
the Malayan Federation (1963-1965) comprising Peninsula Malaysia, the Sabah state, and 
Singapore. Singapore became an independent state in 1965 when the city was expelled by 
the Malayan Federal government for spreading racial unrest to other parts of Malaya (cf. 
Lau, 1998). With no natural resources and a population of barely three million people who 
were mostly poor and unskilled, the prognosis for the then-650 km2 nation was bleak. How 
did Singapore leap from a third- to a first-world economy with one of the world’s highest 
per-capita income2 in one generation? The success factors are a combination of perseverance, 
strategic geography, and visionary leadership. 
As a small, open and vulnerable city-state, Singapore had no choice but to embed itself 
in the larger global economic system to survive and to prosper. The Republic started as a 
humble trading port for regional commerce but constantly reinvented itself to move up the 
economic value chain. Singapore has, over the years, attracted a sizeable amount of foreign 
direct investments in various sectors such as manufacturing, information-communication 
technology, engineering, financial services, biomedical sciences, and hospitality. The chang-
ing façades of the industries moved in tandem with the level of affluence and educational 
aspirations of a maturing population. 
Singapore’s economic miracle owes a lot to the far-sighted stewardship of Lee Kuan Yew, 
the founding Prime Minister, and the governing People’s Action Party which has garnered 
more than two-third majority seats in the parliament since 1963. Lee and other policymakers 
are firm believers in a market-driven economy and Singapore’s growth model is quintes-
sentially entrenched in pragmatic, neo-Keynesian principles. Keeping an open-door policy, 
promoting export-oriented industries, and ramping up factors of production are the key 
ingredients of success (cf. Yeung & Olds, 2004, p. 507-513). This approach has served the 
city-state well and has enabled it to leapfrog its geographic limitations and transcend the 
organic confines of a small state, one of which is the lack of adequate manpower and talent. 
Singapore’s economy however, reached full employment in the late 1970s (cf. Yeung, 
1973, p.162) and for more than 30 years, the Republic has had to import foreign labour at 
every level of the skills ladder to complement its domestic workforce. From the economic 
point of view, a liberal foreign manpower policy is not only vital to sustaining the country’s 
growth momentum, it has also proved to be critical in maintaining the country’s economic 
2  Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore – Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 www.mti.gov.sg/.../
Global%20Competitiveness%20Report%202011-2012.aspx?...Competitiveness%20Rankings
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competitiveness, especially in the development of new growth sectors and/or industries. The 
progression up the economic value chain could not have been achieved without the contribu-
tion from overseas talent. 
In the globalised political economy, Singapore faces a challenge that is common for all 
small states – how can it remain competitive and be useful to the international community? 
Situated between the two emerging giants of China and India, there is a perennial concern 
that the city-state will be bypassed by the rest of the world. For the Republic to uphold and 
uplift its current standard of living, a strong and dynamic workforce is vital, as well as a flex-
ible immigrant and foreign worker regime.
The insatiable demand for foreign labour is reflected in recent demographic contours. 
According to the population census reports, there were just 60,000 non-residents in 1970, 
comprising the expatriate communities, dependent pass holders, and transient employees 
who work in menial, low-paying, or risky jobs that Singaporeans shun. The size of the non-
residents category has since doubled every 10 years and by 2010, the figure had swelled to 1.3 
million, or approximate 26% of the total population (see Table 1). 
The trend for permanent residents (PRs) mimics the stratospheric rise in the transient 
non-residents group. The number of PRs has doubled every decade since 1980, and by 2010, 
it reached a record 540,000, or 11% of the total population. Notwithstanding this rapid in-
flux, the rate of new approved PRs has endured a dramatic swing in recent years due to the 
tightening of foreign labour intake. Between 2001 and 2008, an average of 49,000 applica-
tions for permanent residency was approved, rising to a peak of almost 80,000 new PRs in 
2008 (see Table 2). Subsequently, the numbers have dipped to no more than 28,000 in 2011. 
The take-up rate for Singapore citizenship follows a similar pattern, peaking in 2008, and 
tapering off in the following years (see Table 2). 
From the economic point of view, the liberal immigration policies have paid off hand-
somely for the city-state. Singapore was ranked as the most liveable city in Asia by the 
accounting firm PwC (cf. The Straits Times, Oct 11, 2012). It was also praised for the ease 
of doing business and for its infrastructure quality. Singapore is also known as Asia’s top 
destination for business meetings and conferences, as evident by the top tourism accolade it 
received from the World Travel Awards for 2012 (cf. The Straits Times, Oct 19, 2012). The 
awards are testament to how a well-calibrated and talent-centric labour policy can uplift liv-
ing standards for a small and vulnerable nation-state like Singapore. 
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table 2: Immigration trend
source: Dept of statistics, singapore
rEsidEntiAl clAssiFicAtions And thE AppropriAtion oF 
stAtE rEsourcEs
Taking an overarching view of the ebb and flow of international labour, the liberal immigra-
tion and foreign worker policies are part of a broader market-driven economic framework. 
Singapore is rebranding itself as a global business hub, an incubation city for arts, culture and 
education, and a centre of excellence for innovation and enterprise. This aspiration is sup-
ported by a repertoire of residential and work visas catering to different segments of business 
and household needs. 
To begin with, Work Permits (WP)3 are issued for foreigners at the lowest end of the 
skills ladder, with the bulk of them performing tedious jobs Singaporeans shun, such as those 
in the construction sector and in domestic care-giving. The Special Pass, or S-pass, is the next 
level of entry. This applies to the mid-level skilled foreigners holding at least a diploma, a de-
gree or technical qualifications. The S-pass is primarily designed to meet labour shortages for 
mid-level executives and frontline staff such as those in the Food and Beverage industry. At 
the highest end of the qualification ladder are the holders of Employment Pass (EP), compris-
ing professionals, managers, specialists, and senior executives with recognised qualifications 
and years of work experience. 
The categorisation of skills and work visas is closely tied to the entitlement and rights of 
the individual, their eligibility for permanent residency, and at a macro-level, an indication of 
whether they are deemed to be suitable long-term inhabitants of the island-state. Under the 
current regime, WP and S-Pass holders are not entitled to any form of social welfare, nor are 
3  Ministry of Manpower, Passes and Visas, accessed via http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/
Pages/default.aspx
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they allowed to bring in their dependents (with some exceptions).4 Most of them are also not 
eligible for residency application. 
Foreign workers in the WP category are also treated differently according to the indus-
tries of employment. Unskilled foreign workers in the construction sector, for instance, are 
mostly housed in temporary living quarters or workplace dormitories located far away from 
residential estates. On the other hand, foreigners on EP may sponsor their dependents to live 
in Singapore, but this option is generally not applicable to S-Pass holders and certainly not to 
employees on WP visas. 
Compared to WP and S-pass holders, those employed under the EP scheme are consid-
ered “more valuable” and are treated better than other categories of non-residents. While EP 
holders are not entitled to any state benefits, this segment of the foreign population is often 
seen as an intermediate step to gaining permanent residency. The PRs, on the other hand, 
are entitled to some form of state support and privileges, including access to medical and 
educational subsidies, and public housing ownership. PRs however, do not have equal rights 
as citizens; they do not have political voting rights and their entitlement is always pegged at a 
notch lower than that for citizens. Second-generation male PRs are also legally mandated to 
serve a two-year military conscription, just as citizens do.5 
Overall, the sharp policy differentiation is aimed at regulating the influx of foreign 
labour and long-term residents. The stratification provides policymakers a framework to 
channel manpower resources to selected industries and for different purposes. This helps to 
supplement the existing industries when the need arises as well as shorten the learning curve 
in developing new growth sectors. 
It should be emphasised that comprehensive data regarding the profile of immigrants 
and foreign workers in Singapore is either unavailable in the public domain, or is notoriously 
difficult to find. There is very little public information on the detailed breakdown in terms 
of ethnicity, country of origin, sectors of employment, and other nuanced criteria for long-
term residential application. The opaque outlook stems from the policymakers’ concern that 
the players may “game” the system if enough information is made publicly available on the 
criteria for work and residential applications.
opEn-door policy As A WholE-oF-goVErnMEnt ApproAch
The staggering influx of immigrants and transient labour is not the outcome of a single iso-
lated policy but the effect of a larger economic blueprint to achieving the renaissance city 
goal. The tectonic shift in the demographic landscape is a side effect of the global city as-
piration, and it illustrates the trade-off between economic competitiveness and population 
4  Ministry of Manpower, Passes and Visas, accessed via http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/s-
pass/before-you-apply/Pages/default.aspx
5  Sons of PRs must do NS to keep status: Defence Minister, Asia One, published Sunday Jul 01, 2012, accessed via 
http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20120701-356519.html
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management. For Singapore to be an influential city of the world, a wide-ranging approach 
is required. 
Indeed, in addition to various categories of employment visas, a plethora of strategic 
initiatives are in place to bring the world closer to Singapore. Examples of these measures 
include the Regional and Global Headquarters (RHQ and IHQ) Awards, Global Investor 
Programme (GIP), Global Schoolhouse initiative, Foreign Sports Talent (FST) Scheme, and 
overseas scholarships for non-Singaporeans. The business HQ awards are designed to attract 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to relocate their regional or global HQ operations to 
Singapore and to cement the Republic’s status as an Asian business hub. Besides the contribu-
tion from increased tax revenue, the presence of these HQs would also inject greater diversity 
and dynamism to the texture of the labour force as they are likely to relocate some of their 
senior executives to Singapore from the overseas base. This would result in a more cosmopoli-
tan, vibrant, and global-oriented work-force. 
The Global Investor Programme operates with a similar objective in mind – to welcome 
international investors with a good business or entrepreneurial track record to sink their roots 
in the city-state (Refer to GIP factsheet).6 Foreign nationals who are keen to set up or invest 
in a Singapore-based business worth at least $2.5 million will have their application for per-
manent residency fast-tracked. 
The Global Schoolhouse project was part of a 2002 strategic economic work plan to 
develop and transform the education sector to become an engine of growth for Singapore (cf. 
Sidhu, Ho, & Yeoh, 2011, p.259-261). The vision is consistent with the city-state’s objective 
to divert from its economic reliance on the manufacturing industry to a more service-oriented 
economy. The ambitious project aims to bring in 150,000 full-fee paying international stu-
dents and 100,000 international corporate executives on training by the year 2015. Suffice to 
say, the presence of the sojourners is designed to nurture the multicultural learning environ-
ment in schools and in the workplace. 
Singapore’s ambition to reinvent itself is not confined to the economy, as it also aspires 
to become a nation of great sportsmen. This goal is best exemplified in the Foreign Sports 
Talent Scheme. First conceived in 1993, the goal was to boost local sports excellence and to 
facilitate the development of a sports culture. The Singapore Table Tennis Association was 
the first to adopt the scheme, followed by other fraternities like football and athletics. Under 
the scheme, young and promising overseas sportsmen are offered citizenship to compete for 
Singapore in prestigious international sports events. It is assumed that winning sports medals 
can be a source of national pride and a unifying force for all Singaporeans.7 And medals were 
indeed won. Singapore earned itself a silver medal for women’s table tennis team in the 2008 
Beijing Olympics Games, and two bronze medals at the 2012 London Olympics. Both win-
ning contingents were fielded by an all-immigrant team. 
6  Contact Singapore, Global Investor Programme, accessed via http://www.contactsingapore.sg/Library/1/
Pages/1191/GIP%20Factsheet%20EN%202%20Oct%202012.pdf
7  “Olympics: Feng’s bronze can help galvanise S’pore sports: DPM Teo”, TanYo-Hinn, Today, 03 Aug 2012, 
accessed via http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1217638/1/.html
59
Managing Immigration and Integration in Singapore
Lastly, there is a wide range of scholarships offered to foreigners to study and work in the 
Republic. These include the ASEAN scholarships and Ministry of Education Scholarships for 
non-Singaporean residents. Until recently, up to 20% of places in the local universities were 
set aside for international students, with many of them receiving tuition waivers and guar-
anteed accommodation.8 In return for receiving government-funded education, the foreign 
beneficiaries are required to serve a working bond of up to six years upon graduation, thereby 
increasing the supply of manpower to meet the tight labour market. For the scholarship re-
cipients, it is viewed as an assured employment visa in-waiting. 
Many of these measures are not unique to Singapore and similar initiatives, like the GIP, 
can be found in other developed economics. But the Singapore open-door policy and its tar-
geted results are surprisingly audacious in terms of scope and the scale of implementation. 
For an island-state with a land size of barely 700 square km, the infrastructure required to 
support 250,000 international students and executives on training is a stretch on resources. 
Likewise, for Singapore to set aside 20% of tertiary enrolment for international students (most 
of them on scholarships paid for by the taxpayers) when less than 30% of every native-birth 
cohort (as at 2011) is offered a place to study in the publicly-funded universities is politically 
difficult to justify to the local population. More importantly, unlike other global cities such 
as London, New York, and Paris, Singapore is both a metropolitan city and a nation state. 
While liberal and talent-centric immigration policies are the quintessential ingredients for 
success in global cities, these priorities are usually balanced by other social objectives for the 
country as a whole. 
opEn-door policy to MitigAtE thE silVEr tsunAMi 
Economic competitiveness is not the only factor that underlies Singapore’s strong reliance on 
foreign labour and immigration. The obsession with population is also driven by the concern 
of an impending demographic “Silver Tsunami” when the baby boomers retire in the coming 
decades. The concern over senior citizens leaving the workforce en masse is compounded by 
low population fertility rates in the last 20 years. 
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) – defined as the number of children born to a woman – 
has steadily declined since the late 1970s (see Table 3). The TFR was 3.07 in 1970 and 1.15 
in 2010 (cf. National Population and Talent Division’s paper on Marriage and Parenthood 
Trends in Singapore).9 It was a norm four decades ago for married couples to have at least 
three or more children. Today, the average size of the household has shrunk considerably even 
as more Singaporeans are now choosing to remain single. Singaporeans are also living better 
8  “1,700 non-Asean students awarded scholarships each year”, Lin Zhaowei, The Straits Times, published Feb 18, 
2012, accessed via http://www.straitstimes.com/microsites/parliament/story/1700-non-asean-students-awarded-
scholarships-each-year
9  National Population and Talent Division, Prime Minister’s Office, Marriage and Parenthood Trends in Singapore, 
June 2012, Occasional Paper, accessed via https://www.nptd.gov.sg/content/NPTD/home/_jcr_content/par_content/
download_0/file.res/Issues%20Paper%20-%20Our%20Population%20Our%20Future.pdf
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and healthier due to improvements in public health services. The average life expectancy has 
increased from 65.8 years in 1970 to 81.7 years in 2010 (see Table 3). 
Demographically, a TFR of at least 2.1 is required for the population to be self-sustaining 
(cf. previous footnote).10 A persistently low TFR will have severe economic repercussions, in-
cluding a drain on the nation’s financial reserves to fund burgeoning social programmes for 
the aged. The impact of this demographic conundrum has already been felt in the old-age 
support ratio, determined by the number of working-age adults in support of each retiree who 
is at least 65 years old. In 1970, there were 17 working-age adults to one elderly Singaporean. 
Forty years later, the ratio has plummeted to 8.2 people and is projected to spiral down to 
fewer than three working adults in 2050 if the trend persists. Enlarging the pool of labour 
and immigrants became an obvious albeit short-term solution to the complex problem. 
table 3: singapore’s Demography
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Total Fertility Rate 3.07 1.82 1.83 1.60 1.15
old-Age support Ratio 17.0 13.8 11.8 9.9 8.2
life Expectancy at Birth (Years) 65.8 72.1 75.3 78.0 81.7
  Males 64.1 69.8 73.1 76.0 79.2
 Females 67.8 74.7 77.6 80.0 84.0
source: Population Trends 2012, Department of statistics Ministry of Trade and Industry
rEsEntMEnt on thE ground
As an historical immigrant society, Singapore has always been known to many foreigners 
as a hospitable and inclusive host society. Singapore is also home to many MNCs and non-
profit organisations, and their presence has created numerous jobs for the local economy and 
infused dynamism and vibrancy to the otherwise squeaky clean city-state. As such, it is ironic 
that some Singaporeans feel uncomfortable with the influx of foreigners. It is also challenging 
to identify the precise period in time where immigration came to be regarded as a problem. 
One could argue, from available statistics, that the discourse began in the mid-1990s when 
permanent residency was offered to foreigners at the rate of 30,000 persons per annum (cf. 
Koh, March 22, 1997). This is a significant rate, given that it represents 1% of the total 
citizen population in the 1990s. 
As a result of the rapid influx of new immigrants and foreign workers, the demographic 
landscape of Singapore has shifted dramatically over the last 20 years. Not only has the ratio 
of Singapore citizens decreased, but while the citizen population has expanded by 1.7 times, 
the pool of non-residents and PRs has collectively increased 9.3 times.
The relentless increase in non-native residents, especially among PRs and transient la-
bour, has led to heated debates on issues related to immigration, integration, and the meaning 
of citizenship. The groundswell of discomfort can be heard from a wide spectrum of sources, 
10  See footnote 8.
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including opinion polls, media reports, and online forums. The unease in the immigrant 
discourse is also extensively covered by the international media.11 
On the economic front, some Singaporeans feel that their job security has been com-
promised as they now have to compete harder with foreigners, be they transient workers or 
naturalised citizens; students and parents are unhappy with the large number of scholarships 
and university places allocated to international students; and foreigners are often blamed for 
causing runaway home prices, traffic congestion and breakdown in public infrastructure.12 
As at the 3rd quarter of 2012, the prices for resale public housing have increased by more 
than 95% compared to the same period in 2005. The stratospheric increase in housing prices 
coincided with the unfettered influx of immigrants and foreign workers between 2005 and 
2009 (cf. Resale Price Index, http://www.hdb.gov.sg and Table 2).
On the socio-cultural front, the presence of large groups of foreigners is seen to have af-
fected social cohesion and devalued the status of citizenship. Although many new immigrants 
and transient workers share similar ethno-cultural origins as the forefathers of the native-born 
citizens (e.g., ethnic Chinese and Indians), their social norms and behaviours are dissimilar to 
the ones now practised by the local native communities.13 Singaporeans feel that their status 
as native-born citizens has been displaced by the burgeoning number of foreigners. The chal-
lenges are further compounded by the fact that some recent immigrants are either ignorant 
of local taboos or unaccustomed to living in a multicultural environment, and are seen as 
disrespectful towards local hosts. The lack of English language proficiency is also a barrier for 
interaction between the non-English speaking immigrants and the ethnic minorities. 
More importantly, there is a lingering perception that the government treats foreigners 
better than native-born citizens. Singaporean men, for instance, feel disadvantaged because 
they have to serve a two-year military conscription whereas first-generation immigrants are 
exempted (cf. Leong, May 10, 2012). The resentment is further compounded by opaque im-
migration policies and the lack of public consultation. 
For some Singaporeans, the animosity reflects a deeper sense of insecurity, a perceived 
lack of a social safety net, and an enduring stereotype of PRs using Singapore as a spring-
board to other developed economies. The sentiments were noted in recent and past opinion 
polls: 73.2% of Singaporeans believed “job opportunities will be reduced for local-born 
Singaporeans if we have more immigrants”; 55.8% agreed that the “government attracted im-
migrants to Singapore at the expense of local-born citizens” (cf. Leong, in press); and 63% of 
11  “Singapore’s expat surge fuels economic fears”, Patrick Barta and Tom Wright for The Wall Street Journal, 
accessed via http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703414504575001302415117966.html
12  Han, Fook Kwang. “The real fear: Being pushed out of home.” In Singapolitics, accessed via http://www.
singapolitics.sg/views/real-fear-being-pushed-out-home
13  Peh, Shing Huei. “When Indians and Indians just don’t mix.” In The Straits Times, 3 March 2007.
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Singaporeans agreed or strongly agreed that “The policy to attract more foreign talent14 will 
weaken Singaporean’s feeling as one people, one nation” (cf. Tan & Koh, 2009). 
A survey by The Sunday Times six years ago (January 14, 2007) reported that 86% of 
respondents feared that foreigners will “take away jobs from Singaporeans”; 65% believed for-
eigners “enjoy all the privileges living in Singapore but (accepted) none of the responsibilities”; 
and 43% thought that “the Government cares more for foreign talent than Singaporeans”. 
Simmering tensions over the erosion of the Singaporean identity and status has built up over 
the years, as Singaporeans feel increasingly threatened by the unabated influx of immigrants 
and transient labour. 
In January 2013, the National Population and Talent Division, the government unit that 
oversees population affairs within the Prime Minister’s Office (cf. http://www.nptd.gov.sg), 
released the White Paper entitled “A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore”. It 
sets out key strategies and a roadmap for Singapore’s population policies to address current 
demographic challenges.15 Several main themes were featured, including the retention of a 
Singaporean core through the regulation of approving new citizens and permanent residents, 
the creation of jobs and opportunities for Singaporeans and the maintenance of strong infra-
structure to create “a good home” for all.16 
There was a public uproar over the projected population figure of 6.9 million by 2030. 
The White Paper was deemed to be “shocking and disappointing”,17 especially since immigra-
tion policies had already been fiercely debated since the last election in 2011. Additionally, the 
projected figures of taking in 15,000 to 25,000 new citizens per year to boost the declining 
total fertility rate (TFR) caused many to question if the trade-offs between economic growth 
and population expansion were worthwhile.18 Chief grouses included a deteriorating quality 
of life arising from a higher cost of living and widening income disparity.19 Furthermore, 
there was a sense that the structural and social consequences of the current population in-
crease, such as overcrowding, higher prices and job competition, had not been thoroughly 
addressed. Many Singaporeans felt that the White Paper was dismissive of public opinion, 
and further indication that the government could not be trusted. This wave of resentment 
14  In the Singapore migration discourse, the term “foreign talent” is sometimes used interchangeably with 
“immigrant”. It refers to high-skilled workers becoming PRs, new citizens, and expatriates, i.e., non-native. Low-
skilled workers are labeled as “foreign workers” which shows even a linguistic division between the groups.
15  “A sustainable population for a dynamic Singapore: White Paper”, published by the National Population and Talent 
Division, accessed via http://202.157.171.46/whitepaper/downloads/population-white-paper.pdf
16  “At a glance: White Paper on Population”, published Jan 29, 2013 on Singapolitics, accessed via http://www.
singapolitics.sg/fast-facts/glance-white-paper-population
17  “S’pore population to hit 6 million by 2020: paper” by Fann Sim, published Jan 29, 2013 on Yahoo! News, 
accessed via http://sg.news.yahoo.com/s%E2%80%99pore-population-to-hit-6-million-by-2020--paper-061718360.
html
18  “WP opposes Population White Paper: Sylvia Lim” by Rachel Chang, published Feb 4, 2013 on Singapolitics, 
accessed via http://www.singapolitics.sg/news/wp-opposes-population-white-paper-sylvia-lim
19  “Beyond the lightning rod of 6.9 million” by Gillian Koh, published Feb 2, 2013 on The Straits Times, accessed 
via http://www.ipscommons.sg/index.php/categories/politics/113-beyond-the-lightning-rod-of-69-million
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culminated in a public protest, which was attended by over 4,000 people.20 Among the issues 
raised were the lack of public consultation and questions over what constitutes a Singaporean 
core and how this would affect the future of Singapore.21
rEsponsE FroM thE goVErnMEnt
The simmering tension and resentment toward foreigners have not gone unnoticed. 
Singapore’s policymakers have adopted a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to 
bridge the foreign-local schism. In line with the government’s approach in managing com-
plex social problems, this is also how Singapore tackled racial and religious divisions in the 
1960s. The social integration mandate is currently overseen and coordinated by the National 
Population and Talent Division, which falls under the purview of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
All ministerial agencies are expected to work together closely to ensure that the policies and 
programmes are implemented effectively on the ground. 
On the whole, the state’s response to bridging the affective divide can be classified along 
six fundamental thrusts: (1) Influx calibration, (2) Provision of infrastructure and social se-
curity, (3) Policy differentiation, (4) Housing policies as an instrument for integration, (5) 
Promoting grassroots activism, and (6) Leveraging on identity policies. The six-prong strategy 
focuses on the key problem areas observed in the integration discourse and serves as a guiding 
framework in the formulation of public policies. 
1. calibrating influx of immigrants and transient Workers
In response to the groundswell of resentment and the watershed 2011 General Election where 
the incumbent People’s Action Party received the lowest popular votes post-Independence, 
a slew of changes were made to regulate the entry of immigrants and foreign workers. The 
minimum qualifying salary for the S-Pass and the Employment Pass work visas were raised 
in July 2011: from a monthly income of S$1,800 to S$2,000 for S-Pass holders, and from 
S$2,500 to S$2,800 for EP employees. The criteria for EP were further revised within the 
year, with the minimum monthly income going up to S$3,000, and a further tightening of 
educational qualifications requirement. 
With effect from September 2012,22 non-resident workers face tighter restrictions in 
bringing in their spouses, children and extended families. Only S-Pass and EP holders who 
earn at least $4,000 may sponsor their spouses and children to stay in Singapore; and EP hold-
ers with a minimum income of S$8,000 are entitled to sponsor their parents. Prior to this, 
all S-Pass holders who earn more than $2,800 and EP holders could bring in their spouses 
20  “4,000 protest against White Paper” by Asia One, accessed via http://www.asiaone.com/News/Latest%2BNews/
Singapore/Story/A1Story20130217-402603.html
21  “6.9 million people and an emotional hump” by Calvin Cheng, published Feb 20, 2013 on Singapolitics, accessed 
via http://www.singapolitics.sg/views/69-million-people-and-emotional-hump
22  See Ministry of Manpower, Employment Pass – Before you apply (Guidelines) http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-
manpower/passes-visas/employment-pass/before-you-apply/Pages/default.aspx
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and children. The new measures are meant to curb population growth as the infrastructure 
struggles to support the growing number of people on the island. 
In addition to the qualifying criteria for work visas, there is also a marked reduction in 
the number of foreigners granted permanent residency and citizenship since 2009 (see Table 
2). The calibration of entry curbs the “demand” side of the equation, by ensuring a more 
sustainable rate of population growth. 
2. provision of basic infrastructure and the broadening of social 
security
This principle addresses the perceived sense of insecurity by stepping up the provision of 
social infrastructure to cope with the rising demand for public services. The urgency to 
enhance basic amenities can be seen in the building and retrofitting of railway lines (cf. 
Singapore Budget, 2012), construction of new hospitals (cf. Lim & Lee, 2012), widening 
of roads (cf. Singapore Budget, 2011), state subsidisation for a new fleet of bus services (cf. 
Musfirah, February 17, 2012), and a ramping up of public housing supply (cf. Ramesh & 
Tan, September 27, 2012). 
In addition to enhancing the physical capacity, the social support system has been broad-
ened to engender a greater sense of security and assurance for the citizenry. This includes 
making healthcare more affordable and accessible (cf. Lim & Lee, 2012), providing greater 
support for childcare, eldercare, and families with special needs children (cf. Ministry of 
Education, March 8, 2012; Ministry of Health, February 20, 2012; Ministry of Social and 
Family Services, August 13, 2012), and allowing a larger percentage of Singaporeans the 
opportunity to earn a degree from publicly funded universities (cf. Ministry of Education, 
August 28, 2012). 
By enhancing the quality and quantity of public infrastructure, and by putting in place a 
more robust social safety net, the intended outcome is to encourage Singaporeans to be more 
inclusive towards foreigners. Such measures are aimed at building greater confidence and 
deeper psychological resources for Singaporeans to deal with competition from the influx of 
immigrants. 
3. “singaporeans First”: policy differentiation between citizens, 
prs, and non-residents
Beyond upgrading social infrastructure, policymakers are actively encouraging qualified 
non-Singapore residents and permanent residents to sink their roots in the Republic. Using 
a “Singaporeans First” approach, the intention is to differentiate the amount of benefits ac-
cruing to the different categories of citizens, PRs and non-residents. As a rule of thumb, 
citizens are entitled to receive more state subsidies and given priority in policy administration 
vis-à-vis PRs; and PRs, in turn, receive more support compared to non-residents. Ostensibly, 
non-residents and PRs will be motivated to apply for residency and citizenship if they stand 
to gain financially from the conversion. This distinction has, over the last few years, been 
gradually sharpened in favour of the citizen population. 
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The strategic thrust percolates all public sectors and this paradigm of thinking is evident 
across a wide spectrum of social, economic, and educational policies. Singapore citizens, for 
instance, have absolute priority over PRs and non-residents in the enrolment of their chil-
dren to their preferred primary school; enjoy greater healthcare and education subsidies; are 
eligible to purchase a subsidised flat directly from the Housing Development Board at a sig-
nificant market-rate discount; and have the political rights to vote and to stand in national 
elections. The residential distinction serves more than just a reward for taking up Singapore 
residency. It also reassures Singaporeans that the interest of the citizenry lies at the heart of 
policymaking. 
4. building Mutual trust through housing policies 
In order to appreciate how housing policies influence harmonious social relations, it is impor-
tant to know the backdrop of Singapore’s residential landscape. The two defining hallmarks 
of public housing policies in Singapore are: (1) Relative affordability, and (2) High levels of 
home ownership. These two characteristics are unique features in Singapore society as much 
as they are exemplars of nation-building success. Based on the Population Census Report in 
2010, 87.2% of all residential households in Singapore are homeowners with the large major-
ity, or approximately 80%, residing in public housing built by the Housing Development 
Board (HDB), a statutory board under the purview of the Ministry of National Development 
(cf. Department of Statistics Singapore, 2010). 
This remarkable achievement is a quintessential feature of the social compact between 
the state and the people. Singaporeans who are gainfully employed are promised state support 
to help them become homeowners. This is made possible with the plethora of social assistance 
schemes such as priority allocation of units, special subsidies, utilisation of retirement savings 
for mortgage repayment, and a low interest rate. These policies collectively ensure that quality 
housing remains affordable for the masses. The idea behind home ownership is that people 
will have a feeling of belonging, a home they can identify with and a sense of rootedness. This 
makes them stakeholders in Singapore and gives them something to fight for here (cf. Yuen, 
2005, p.16-17; Zur Lienen, 2002, p. 5). 
The public housing programme does not just aim to provide affordable accommodation; 
it also strives to promote a harmonious and cohesive living environment, integrating residents 
socially and spatially, and forging a communal identity at the same time (cf. Siddique, 1993, 
p. 45). In the immediate post-Second World War years, Singapore’s housing landscape was 
characterised by the existence of strong, separated ethnic enclaves, segregated along socio-
economic lines. The spatial segregation was a potential breeding ground for conflict and was 
believed to be one of the causes of the violent racial riots during the 1950s and 1960s (cf. 
Mutalib 2004, p. 59; Ooi, 1993, p.10; Van Grunsven, 2000, p. 120). One objective of the 
HDB policy is to break up ethnic enclaves and enhance social integration through a spatial 
mixture of the races in public residences. The management of ethnic relations through resi-
dential integration follows the belief that a spatial mixture will lead to more contact between 
races which would then result in greater awareness of other cultures, religions and norms (cf. 
Mutalib 2004, p. 55, 59-60; Ooi, 1993, p. 6, 10-11). 
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With this in mind, the Ethnic Integration Policy (EIP) was introduced in 1989, which 
requires the ethnic composition for each block of HDB flat and the surrounding neighbour-
hood to follow the national ethnic ratio (Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others categories) as 
closely as practicable (see Table 4, on ethnic ratio in each block and neighbourhood). This 
ensures that no single-race blocks exist and residents interact with people of other races in 
their daily commute (cf. Yuen, 2005, p. 10-11). The policy effectively ended the spatial con-
centration of races and social segregation in public housing. Each block now represents a 
small microcosm of Singapore. The EIP is thus in line with the goals of the HDB policy 
to foster greater tolerance and understanding (cf. Lai, 1995, p. 122; Ooi, 1993, p. 4-15, 20; 
Siddique, 1993, p. 47; Sim, et. al, 2003, p. 297). 
More importantly, EIP forms the de facto integration framework to enhance intercultur-
al relations and social harmony in the home environment. In March 2010, a new residential 
quota for Singapore PRs was introduced for HDB estates. This policy is intended to prevent 
the formation of new immigrant enclaves, given the tendency for PRs from the same na-
tionality to congregate in HDB flats, which are increasingly becoming more popular among 
foreigners. Under the new policy, each block of HDB flats shall not have more than 8% of 
non-Malaysian PR households, and within a given precinct, not more than 5%. Malaysian 
PRs are exempt from the quota as they are culturally similar to Singaporeans and hence, the 
threat of an ethnic-national enclave is less of a concern. Given that there are now more than 
half a million PRs, representing nearly 15% of the total resident population, there is a politi-
cal imperative to ensure that new immigrants blend in well within the home environment. 
While studies (e.g., Lai, 1995; Rueppel, 2011) have indicated that successful integration 
among the races and between foreigners and locals are not always guaranteed under EIP 
and PR residential quota, a mixture between native-born and naturalised residents is, at the 
very least, a pre-requisite condition for intercultural contact to take place. From the perspec-
tive of policymakers, racial or nationality quota remains one of the main tools to achieving 
a cohesive, multi-ethnic society in Singapore, and is consistent with “the state’s policy of 
nation-building based on multiracialism” (Lai, 1995, p. 18), as a result of which people have 
developed a preference for multi-racial living.
table 4: Racial Limits of the eIP
Race Block limit Neighbourhood limit
Chinese 87% 84%
Malays 25% 22%
Indians/others
Note: Ethnic “Indians” & “others” form one 
category in the EIP due to their small population 
13% 10%
source: ZUR lIENEN 2002, p. 5 edited by Patrick Rueppel.
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5. grassroots Activism
There are many types of community-driven, grassroots organisations in Singapore. In view 
of the scope and limitation of this chapter, the paper will focus solely on government-linked 
grassroots bodies. These are volunteer committees located in the housing estates coordinated 
by the People’s Association – a statutory board under the purview of the Ministry of Social 
and Family Development – to build social capital and promote neighbourliness. Grassroots 
members typically stay in the same estate that they serve and regard themselves as facilitators 
for neighbourhood interactions. They serve as a conduit of exchange between policymak-
ers and residents, and in particular, between the Member of Parliament and the electorates 
that come under his or her ward. The grassroots outreach programmes are performed mainly 
through block parties, recreational programmes, house visits, and periodical town hall meet-
ings with political office holders and ministry representatives. 
Grassroots activism is a cornerstone to promoting social interactions between people of 
different ethno-national origins. Within the broader nation-building narrative, the grassroots 
movement is seen as a state-funded apparatus to advance inter-racial understanding, mini-
mise social fractures, and reinforce social resilience and trust between residents from different 
backgrounds. Many grassroots measures that promote integration are also closely connected 
to the HDB policy, where they aim to complement spatial integration and foster social com-
munal bonding within the neighbourhoods. Most of the grassroots entities are assigned 
ownership to some kind of provincial facilities, such as the Resident Committee Centres 
and Community Clubs, where they serve as common touch points for the residents. These 
centres and clubs offer an affordable range of programmes for everyone, including social and 
academic enrichment classes for school pupils, interest groups, and the elderly. Moreover, 
there are sporting and recreational amenities that are available for public rental, some of 
which could be used for special occasions such as marriage and festive dinners. Overall, the 
multi-racial grassroots movement offers an inclusive platform for the different ethno-cultural 
groups to engage each other and consequently foster greater intercultural participation and 
appreciation. 
Beyond local grassroots activism, there are grassroots-driven national initiatives that en-
courage foreign-local interactions. The National Integration Council (NIC) is an example. 
The Council was established in April 2009 to foster foreign-local integration and it is un-
der the purview of the National Population and Talent Division. The NIC consists of four 
working groups, with each addressing a different facet of the integration discourse, namely 
Community, Media, Schools and Workplace relations. The role of the NIC is mainly that of 
an enabler. It aims to create a collegial climate that bridges the foreign-local chasm, by build-
ing a sustainable and active network for social integration, and facilitating both foreigners 
and locals to internalise Singapore’s core values. The NIC is presided by a governing board 
consisting of eminent professionals and public intellectuals. 
NIC also provides financial assistance in the form of the Community Integration Fund 
(CIF) for projects that enhance intercultural understanding. Singapore-registered organisa-
tions and companies registered with the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority of 
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Singapore (ACRA) may apply for up to S$200,000 from the CIF. Under the CIF, up to 80% 
of project costs can be co-funded after approval by a panel of four NIC members (cf. National 
Integration Council, 2012).
To further strengthen immigrants’ commitment to the Republic, the Singapore 
Citizenship Journey was launched in February 2011 to formalise the citizenship conversion 
exercise. All new applicants for Singapore citizenship are required to complete an induction 
programme prior to finalising their citizenship. The Singapore Citizenship Journey consists 
of three compulsory components: First, an online learning portal that introduces Singapore 
history, its political system, national symbols, and the major races and culture. Second, the 
Singapore Experiential Tour requires prospective new citizens to visit the important historical 
sites in Singapore to gain first-hand experience on the ground. Third, a Community Sharing 
Session in which new citizens will meet and interact with the local grassroots leaders and 
volunteers to learn about life in a multi-racial environment and the various possibilities for 
participation in the community. The Singapore Citizenship Journey offers a comprehensive 
induction programme to the new immigrants as it promulgates the different facades of soci-
etal norms, values and ethos embraced by the majority of Singaporeans. 
6. identity policies, a View from the top
Like all other young sovereign nations, Singapore seeks to forge a distinct national identity 
that every citizen can identify with and be proud of. At the same time, the city-state is cog-
nisant that historical and cultural identities (such as race, language and religion) are important 
psychological markers of heritage, and the discourse on integration and belongingness cannot 
be divorced from these personal attributes. As much as immigrants are expected to abide by 
the local cultural norms and embrace the shared values and local national identity, they are 
also encouraged to hold on to their heritage, be that of racial, linguistic, or religious identi-
ties (cf. Rueppel 2011, p. 41). The majority of Singaporeans are not looking for hegemonic 
assimilation, but an overlapping identity that emphasises positive engagement with the host 
community and the retention of original heritage culture (cf. Leong, in press).
Cultural maintenance and national rootedness are therefore not antagonistic but mutu-
ally complementary. Empirically, the two dimensions are positively correlated as a high degree 
of ethnic affiliation is matched with a strong sense of connectedness to the nation-state (cf. 
Ward and Leong, 2006). Social policies such as the EIP are thus not incompatible with the 
broader objective of foreign-local integration – a society that celebrates multi-racialism, and 
one that is confident and proud of its ethnic heritage and diversity will also engender an 
inclusive and tolerant attitude towards foreigners. 
In addition to the identity of multi-racialism, there is another unique though incon-
spicuous social institution that quietly lends itself to the fostering of a strong Singaporean 
core – the conscription policy, otherwise known as National Service (NS). All male Singapore 
citizens and second-generation PRs are mandated by law to serve in a regimental unit for a pe-
riod of two years full-time, during which they will receive military training and be immersed 
in ethos that emphasises collective interest above the self. The enlistment policy has been in 
place since 1967 and it is widely recognised as a rite of passage for Singapore men and their 
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families. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicate that fulfilling the NS obligation is a 
critical marker of identity and integration, especially within the context of acculturation (cf. 
Goh & Chow, Oct 23, 2012; Leong, in press; May 10, 2012). There is little argument that 
NS forges a sense of camaraderie between immigrants and their local-born compatriots; it 
is a common social denominator and a hallmark of the Singapore identity. Immigrants who 
embrace the NS institution can better appreciate Singapore’s social terrain and become a full 
participating member of the community. 
WhithEr intEgrAtion? 
Singapore’s immigration and integration approach represents a good mixture of hard (recali-
brate influx of foreigners, HDB ethnic and PR quotas) and soft (grassroots activities, identity 
politics) factors, both of which are complementary and closely intertwined. While some of 
the impacts are easily measurable (e.g., PR ratio in HDB estates), the mindset and attitudes 
of people are difficult to analyse (e.g., immigrant perceptions and social inclusiveness). The 
topic on integration is a current political hot potato and Singapore’s policymakers are only 
too aware of the challenges at stake. This provides a strong impetus for a comprehensive 
approach in managing migration and integration. 
Although most policies that are in place have gained some traction and are poised to ac-
complish the intended objectives, there is clearly room for policy refinement. First, the current 
discourse has given excessive attention to the politics of comparison. Using the “Singaporeans 
First” principle has engendered the impression that Singaporeans receive more state subsidies, 
and are accorded higher status and priority than PRs and non-residents. While some form of 
positive differentiation is inevitable, there is a concern of over-reliance in using this frame-
work to promote integration. In certain instances, the differences in policy has ironically 
reinforced rather than bridged the “us-versus-them” divide. Similarly, while the EIP and PR 
quota has contributed to strengthening communal bonding, the differences in racial and resi-
dential status should not be over-emphasised. It may be advisable to switch from a narrative 
that centres on diversity towards one that stresses on what people have in common. 
Second, non-government linked grassroots organisations should take the lead in driving 
engagement between new immigrants and native-born residents. Many of the current initia-
tives are managed by the People’s Association-led committees. While these are exemplar event 
organisers, there is a perception that policymakers are trying to bring them into their fold 
for political gains. Non-government linked civil society organisations, including the ethno-
cultural associations and religion-based organisations, can do more to facilitate interactions. 
In the same vein, the recently introduced Singapore Citizenship Journey is a good project 
which could be broadened. Besides applicants for citizenship who are co-opted in this initia-
tive, those who have applied for permanent residency should also be required to learn about 
Singapore and attend such learning events before being granted PR status. Furthermore, ap-
plicants for citizenship should be made to pass a written test on aspects of Singapore’s history, 
political system and values.
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Finally, there is a need to re-visit the current strategic framework used for achieving eco-
nomic growth – in particular, balancing the trade-off between growth and the maintenance 
of social harmony. The tensions that have surfaced in recent years are mainly the products 
of yesteryears’ policies where the emphasis was tilted towards economic growth rather than 
labour productivity or social inclusion. As the economy matures and available resources in 
public infrastructure and amenities operate at the maximum capacity, there is increasing 
socio-political pressure to focus on social cohesion rather than the economic imperatives. 
Policymakers will have to be discerning and re-examine their priorities in light of these 
challenges. 
In summary, Singapore’s approach to bridging the foreign-local schism has proven to be 
successful and could be emulated by other countries. First, the holistic, whole-of-government 
approach has enhanced intergroup understanding and harmony at all levels of society, and 
this in turn helps to reduce distrust among the diverse communities. Second, confronting 
locals with foreigners in a tension-free environment and at an early stage will helped to fos-
ter understanding and reduce prejudices. Third, community activities at the local level have 
enabled people to get to know foreigners as neighbours rather than as strangers and vice-
versa. Fourth, governments have to establish certain rules that everybody has to respect and 
make immigrants aware of these rules through measures such as the Citizenship Journey 
programme. With the interweaving of international economies, transnational labour move-
ment is set to be the norm rather than the exception. Singapore can be a role model in this 
area of governance.
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Immigration Policies in South Korea:
On the Focus of Immigration 
Requirement and Incorporation to 
Korean Society
Dong-Hoon Seol 
Chonbuk National University
1. intErnAtionAl MigrAtion FloWs in korEA
For Koreans, the 20th century definition of international migration meant Koreans emi-
grating to other countries. Yet, recently, international migration for Koreans has also come 
to mean the reception of foreigners into their homeland. All throughout the 20th century, 
Korea has been a migrant sending nation. It was only after the 1980s that foreigners gradually 
began entering Korea.
Though 1987 marks the first year of the transition to democracy for South Korea, it is 
also the year that the course of direction for migration changed in Korean society. As Koreans 
began to taste the fruit of their nation’s economic growth, the number of Korean migrant 
workers leaving to find employment overseas rapidly decreased. With Korea’s economic boom 
in 1986 also came, for the first time, the avoidance of jobs referred to as difficult, dirty and 
dangerous. Headline articles in major newspapers in Korea reported survey results show-
ing that Koreans, though usually known for their workaholic tendencies, preferred leisure 
to overwork (see Seol 1999). With this new phenomenon came a rise in Korean workers’ 
wages, and consequently, several openings in the Korean labour market. At the same time, 
garment, and footwear manufacturing, and other labour-intensive companies moved their 
factories to several Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
Since these were all low-wage industries there was hardly any opposition from Korean work-
ers regarding this decision. During the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, 
the success of Korea’s economic development became widely known in countries in Asia as 
well as abroad. Moreover, with the collapse of the Cold War regime in the late 1980s, China 
and South Korea were able to resume both personal and economic exchanges. Joseonjok, the 
ethnic Koreans living in China, especially, began visiting Korea more frequently. During this 
period, migrant workers from China and Southeast Asian countries began to come to Korea. 
While the Korean government had no program to import foreign labour, migrant workers 
74
Migration and Integration
from underdeveloped countries in Asia came to Korea and began to fill vacancies in the la-
bour market.
Since the early 1990s, foreigners began marrying Koreans for the purpose of immigrating 
into the country. Indeed, international marriages between Koreans and foreigners occurred 
prior to that time; however, it wasn’t until the 1990s that the government began to statisti-
cally record and present data regarding the matter. Accordingly, since then, the dynamic of 
international marriages in Korea can be more keenly grasped. In 1995, the migration transi-
tion with respect to international marriages took place. Prior to 1994, international marriages 
between men from developed countries and Korean women were normal; nevertheless, the 
number of couples that actually fit this composition was few. Since 1995, the number of mar-
riages between women from underdeveloped countries and Korean men has overwhelmingly 
increased. Until 1994, international marriages usually involved Korean women leaving the 
country with only a small proportion deciding to reside in Korea after marriage. However, 
since 1995, the number of foreign women immigrating and settling down in Korea is gradu-
ally increasing, along with the rapid increase in international marriages.
In 1999, the National Assembly enacted the Overseas Koreans Act, which gave overseas 
Koreans with foreign citizenship opportunities to visit their country of origin more freely. 
In 2001, the government developed a comprehensive plan to attract foreign students, known 
as the Study Korea project. As a result, visa holders of overseas Koreans and foreign students 
increased. Further, with hopes of revitalizing the economy in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis, regulations regarding marriage broker businesses were lifted, and marriage brokers be-
gan practicing freely. As the year 2000 passed, numerous marriage brokers appeared and thus 
dawned the beginning of international matchmaking. With this, the number of international 
marriages in Korea significantly increased.
As a new influx of immigrant groups entered South Korea, the nature of its society be-
gan to change from a homogenous society to a multiethnic one. Table 1 shows, by year, 
the number of immigrants who exceeded their 90-days period of stay from 2000-2011. The 
significant increase in immigrants in 2000 was a temporary phenomenon. In 1997, as a re-
sult of the Asian financial crisis and severe economic recession experienced by South Korea, 
as well as several other Asian countries, Korean companies greatly reduced the number of 
their foreign employees. From 2001-2005, as the economy recovered, Koreans began heading 
overseas again, causing the rate of emigration to far exceed that of immigration. The number 
of foreigners immigrating to Korea increased. Following the year 2006, the number of immi-
grants in Korea exceeded emigrants. Though Koreans continued to make their way abroad, 
the number of foreigners entering Korea became larger. Indeed, the year 2006 marks a turn-
ing point for Korea—a nation formerly known as a predominately sending nation became in 
a relatively short period of time, a primarily receiving one.
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According to Table 2, the number of immigrants who resided in Korea in 2009 was over 1.1 
million. In 2012, the number of immigrants rose to 1,325,348. It is 2.6% of total population. 
The share of immigrants in Korea is not much in comparison to Europe and other advanced 
countries; however, the rate of increase is very high. Such a sudden increase in an immigrant 
population is certainly worthy of attention.
In 2012, the number of minor children belonging to immigrants was 156,522. Out 
of this group, 146,072 of them were children of marriage immigrants. They have Korean 
citizenship by birth. The remaining 10,451 were children of foreign couples. The number of 
immigrant households was 256,891, 1.3% of the total household population.
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To summarize, the predominant groups of immigrants currently living in Korea are migrant 
workers, marriage immigrants, overseas Koreans, and foreign students. This paper intends 
to enumerate the immigration control and social incorporation concerning the previously 
stated four predominant groups; discuss various phenomena regarding exchanges between 
immigrants and Koreans; and finally, explore the distinct characteristics of the immigration 
experience in Korea as well as possible implications for other countries.
2. iMMigrAtion rEQuirEMEnt And incorporAtion 
policiEs oF korEAn goVErnMEnt
The Korean government refers to immigration policy as “foreigner policy” or “multicultural 
policy.” In Korean, the word for both immigration and emigration is the same—yimin. As 
Korea was a primarily sending nation for about 100 years, Koreans only thought to use the 
term emigration when referring to yimin. However, since the situation has changed, rather 
than using the term yimin when referring to immigrants, Koreans use foreigners or multicul-
tural citizens.
legal grounds
The short-term goals of immigration policies in Korea include the prevention of discrimina-
tion against foreigners, the protection of human rights, and the provision of Korean language, 
basic information, and education tools needed to adapt to life in Korea. Regarding mid- and 
long-term goals, the government aims to engender a cohesive sense of national identity among 
all citizens. As shown in table 3, laws applicable to immigrants can be divided into six main 
categories. Looking at the time of implementation, laws with respect to legal status guar-
antees, immigration, and naturalization were implemented quite a long time ago. However, 
statutes relating to the social incorporation of immigrants weren’t implemented until the late 
1990s.
The main content of each statute are as follows: First, regulations regarding foreign status 
are stipulated in the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Korea. The Labor Standards Act and 
the National Human Rights Commission Act ensure the prohibition of discrimination based on 
nationality.
Second, laws about immigration control, the recognition of refugees, the social incor-
poration of immigrants, and the naturalization of foreigners are extant. The Departures and 
Arrivals Control Act determines whether foreigners are qualified to enter and stay in the coun-
try, while the Refugee Act sets forth procedures for the recognition of refugee status. The Basic 
Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea stipulates the basic provisions concerning the treat-
ment of foreigners in Korea; to help foreigners in Korea to adjust themselves to the Korean 
society to reach their full potential and to create a society where Koreans and foreigners in 
Korea understand and respect each other with the aim of contributing to the development of 
Korea and the social integration. The Nationality Act includes the naturalization of foreigners.
Third, the Act on Foreign Workers’ Employment, Etc. enforced laws regarding the legal em-
ployment of less-skilled migrant workers in Korea. The 2001 amendment of the Enforcement 
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Decree of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act ensures minor children of illegal aliens 
the right to education.
Fourth, the Marriage Brokerage Business Management Act regulates the conduct of inter-
national matchmaking agencies, while the Support for Multicultural Families Act regulates 
with respect to marriage immigrant families. The Support for Multicultural Families Act con-
tains policies that support couples of marriage immigrants and their Korean spouses and 
their children in Korea. The National Basic Living Security Act of 2006 and the Single-Parent 
Family Support Act, as amended in 2005, states that minor children of marriage immigrant 
families are entitled to public assistance of the Basic Life Guarantee System.
Fifth, in regards to overseas Koreans, the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of 
Overseas Koreans stipulates laws concerning Korean visitation. 
table 3. selected Acts and an enforcement Decree in Korea
laws Enforcement
Basic status
Constitutional law 1948
labor standards Act 1953
National Human Rights Commission Act 2001
Immigration control, incorporation and naturalization
Departures and Arrivals Control Act 1963
Refugee Act 2013
Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea 2007
Nationality Act 1948
Foreign workers
Act on Foreign Workers’ Employment, Etc. 2004
Enforcement Decree of the Elementary and secondary Education Act 2001*
Marriage-based immigrants
Marriage Brokerage Business Management Act 2008
support for Multicultural Families Act 2008
National Basic living security Act 2006*
single-Parent Family support Act (former single-Parent Family Welfare 
Act) 2006
*
Overseas Koreans
Act on the Immigration and legal status of overseas Koreans 1999
Note: * The revision year of the Acts or the Enforcement Decree articles regarding the treatment 
of foreigners in Korea.
In the development decades 1960-1990s, the Korean government established and promoted a 
five-year plan for economic and social development. In the same way, the government intends 
to use the Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea and the Support for Multicultural 
Families Act as a means to create a more cohesive multicultural society. Yet, not only central 
and local government, but also businesses, media, schools, religious institutions, social insti-
tutions etc. are actively involved in this unique move of civil society.
80
Migration and Integration
Foreign Workers
Foreign employees working in South Korea are classified into two groups depending on their 
skills: professional workers and less-skilled workers. The Korean government actively tried 
to attract professional workers while, at the same time, worked to recruit less-skilled workers 
only to fill vacancies in the labour market.
Professional Migrant Workers
As many Koreans did not have the same specialized knowledge and technical skills as profes-
sional migrant workers, the Korean government authorized the recruitment of foreign workers. 
The variation of visa types distributed to such migrant workers is as follows: Professor (E-1), 
Foreign Language Instructor (E-2), Research (E-3), Technical Guidance (E-4), Professional 
Employment (E-5), Arts and Entertainment (E-6), and Special Occupation (E-7). Upon sub-
mitting a written employment contract, professional migrant workers were granted visas and 
could receive employment in the Korean labour market. The Korean government showed 
preferential treatment towards professional migrant workers by enforcing certain immigra-
tion regulations upon only less-skilled migrant workers. Unlike less-skilled migrant workers, 
a quota was not placed on the amount of visas issued to professional migrant workers. Also, 
labour market tests weren’t enforced. Additionally, there was no limitation on the number of 
times professional migrant workers could extend their stay in the country whereas obvious 
limitations existed for less-skilled migrant workers.
Out of the total number of foreigners having professional visas, foreigners from devel-
oped countries such as America, Japan, Canada, etc. accounted for the largest group. Filipino 
women significantly outnumbered the number of foreigners holding entertainment visas, 
which was quite peculiar for that particular period of time (see Seol and Han 2011). With 
regard to visa conditions, it was assumed that professional migrant workers would not receive 
public assistance as it would lead to increased costs in welfare. Thus, accordingly, this group 
can join social insurance programs.
The Korean government, hoping to attract talent for the “brain gain” dimension in 
Korea, actively developed policies that supported professional migrants. In Korea, however, 
immigration procedures ceased to provide conveniences for workers and social integration 
policies stopped offering special programs. Using the theme “Global Talents,” policies en-
couraging foreigners to settle in Korea were pervasive, yet failed to lead to the development of 
any specific programs.
Less-skilled Legal Migrant Workers
Aware of the terms of the rotation principle provided in the Employment Permit Program (EPP) 
for Foreigners, less-skilled workers agree to return to their home countries upon completion of 
their employment contract, yet the number of workers entering the country far exceeds the 
number that are leaving. There are also industrial trainees and other employees who work 
as sailors; however, the EPP stipulates that they be treated in the same manner as migrant 
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workers. Less-skilled migrant workers are subject to the Act on Foreign Workers’ Employment, 
Etc. (Seol and Skrentny 2004).
The less-skilled foreign labour policy of Korea has five basic principles (Seol 2005, 2012). 
First, the supplement the domestic labour market principle. In essence, this means calling for 
the help of foreign labour to fill vacancies in the domestic labour market. The employment 
of foreign workers should not cause indigenous Korean workers to lose their jobs and lead to 
a reduction in wages and decent working conditions. Considering the sentiments of native 
Korean workers, this principle could also be referred to as the “hire locals first” principle. 
Second, the anti-discrimination based on nationality against foreigners principle. This prin-
ciple protects migrant workers from mistreatment. It is also known as the “principle of equal 
treatment.” The EPP protects the rights and interests of foreign workers legally employed in 
the country.
Third, the prevention of settlement principle. The government attempted to stop foreigners 
from settling down in the country by limiting their time of employment to only three years. 
Re-employment of foreign workers was only possible six months after their departure. After 
an employment period of three years, workers requested permission for re-employment to 
the Minister of Employment and Labour. Consequently, since June 6, 2010, a clause stating 
that workers can extend their employment contract for a period of about two years has been 
established. As a result, the employment period is extended to a maximum of four years and 
ten months. With the extension of foreign workers’ employment period and the removal of 
the “re-employment after departure” regulation, the effort being made to meet the needs and 
interests of migrant workers can clearly be seen. However, as Korea disallows the accompani-
ment of family members with migrant workers, it is likely that it will receive criticism from 
the international community (see Seol and Skrentny 2009b).
Fourth, the anti-corruption and transparency in the recruiting process of foreign workers 
principle. This principle ensures transparency in the recruitment process of migrant workers 
and aims to prevent corruption. In order to ensure the effectiveness of this principle, the 
Korean government and sending countries have signed the MOU contract. Migrant workers 
from sending countries along with recruitment agencies and government or public institu-
tions have made an agreement to act within the terms put forth in this contract.
Fifth, the prevention of hindering industrial restructuration principle. This principle seeks 
to ensure that the employment of migrant workers does not adversely affect the domestic in-
dustry and corporate restructuring. When companies use migrant workers for cheap labour, 
company restructuring is delayed and declines in the competitiveness of not only companies, 
but also the country as a whole results.
Less-skilled migrant workers under EPP can be classified into two groups: ethnic Koreans 
and non-ethnic Koreans. They have different visas – Visit and Employment (H-2) and Non-
Professional Employment (E-9), and are applied to different sub-programs of EPP. Ethnic 
Korean migrant workers with the Visit and Employment (H-2) visa can work in almost all 
the sectors, and transfer workplaces freely. However, migrant workers with Non-Professional 
Employment (E-9) visa, are mostly non-ethnic Koreans, and can work in only some desig-
nated industries. They can transfer their workplaces only after the government’s permission. 
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They can join the social insurance programs; however, they are not subject to the same public 
assistance as other workers because of visa limitations.
Table 4 displays the number of migrant workers employed in Korea. Using statistics 
from the Foreign Residents in Korea released by the Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security, there were 673,298 migrant workers in the year 2012. Another data source is the 
Korea Immigration Service (KIS). The KIS statistics for migrant workers were recorded with 
respect to their skill level, ethnicity, and legal/illegal visas status. In 2012, there were 44,264 
professional workers and 647,177 less-skilled workers. If the summation of both groups is 
calculated, the total number of foreign workers in Korea is 691,441. Ethnic Korean foreigners 
are issued the Visit and Employment (H-2), while the Non-Professional Employment (E-9) 
visas are issued to non-ethnic Korean foreigners seeking unprofessional employment. There 
were 299,710 ethnic Korean migrant workers and 197,552 non-ethnic Korean migrant work-
ers in 2012.
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If the employment of less-skilled migrant workers is examined by sector, foreigners of Korean 
descent are primarily employed in the service, construction, and manufacturing industry, 
while most non-ethnic Korean foreigners work in the manufacturing industry. With respect 
to company size, the rate of both foreigners with and without Korean descent entering 
small businesses with less than 30 people is very high. According to nationality, foreigners 
with Korean descent is overwhelmingly higher than Chinese. There are also some from 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and the former Soviet Union. Among foreigners with no Korean 
descent, migrant workers are mostly from Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, etc. Gender-wise, there are an equal number of ethnic Korean men and women, while 
men with no Korean descent accounts for approximately 90%, and women 10%. Lastly, simi-
larly to ethnic Koreans, there are an equal number of Korean men and women from overseas.
The government established Support Centres for Foreign Workers, which provides lim-
ited social incorporation services to legally employed less-skilled migrant workers. The social 
incorporation services offered to less-skilled workers under the EPP are: conflict mediation 
between employers and migrant workers, support for victim of industrial accidents, support 
for transferring workplaces, shelter services, migrant workers living grievances and counsel-
ling legal problems, support for early return to country of origin, and administrative services 
for employers and migrant workers. Since the government initially wanted to deter foreigners 
from settling in Korea, courses on Korean language education and culture adaptation were 
not offered.
Undocumented Migrant Workers
Among the number of less-skilled migrant workers in 2012, 149,915 are employed undocu-
mented workers (see Table 4). The Korean government refers to them as “illegal aliens.” Since 
2006, the number of undocumented migrant workers in South Korea has steadily decreased. 
This is a result of the government’s strong crackdown on illegal residents as well as the estab-
lishment of stronger regulations regarding business owners and employment brokers.
The government has not only cracked down on illegal aliens, but has also stepped up 
deportation procedures and regulations. However, as undocumented migrant workers are 
subject to deportation, they remain outside the coverage of social incorporation programs. 
Yet, from a humanistic perspective, it is the government’s responsibility to guarantee basic 
human rights to migrant workers such as emergency medical care and children’s right to 
education regardless of their status. Through non-governmental organizations, social services 
such as counselling support for industrial accidents and work consultation should be offered. 
While illegal aliens may be supported under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance, 
they are not recipients of other services included within the social insurance programs. For 
example, many of them cannot apply for welfare services and public assistance programs 
such as the Korean language education and cultural adaptation training. Moreover, there 
are undocumented migrant workers with children. Since 2001, the Korean government has 
legally guaranteed children of illegal aliens in grades preschool to middle school the right to 
education.
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Marriage immigrants
As stipulated in the Departures and Arrivals Control Act, foreign spouses of Koreans are to 
be issued Marriage Immigrants (F-6) visas for purposes of settling down in the country. 
Additionally, according to the Nationality Act, foreign spouses are one step closer to becom-
ing naturalized citizens after two years of lawful stay in the country. Table 5 presents the 
number of marriage immigrants in Korea from 2006-2012. As of 2012, the number of mar-
riage immigrants is 220,687 - men 23,898 (10.8%), women 196,789 (89.2%). With regard to 
membership status: foreigners amount to 144.214 (65.3%), and naturalized citizens amount 
to 76,473 (34.7%).
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Marriage immigrants in Korea are the primary beneficiaries of a variety of social incorpora-
tion policies. Indeed, they are guaranteed recipients of social insurance and social welfare 
services. However, such public assistance only applies to the following foreigners residing in 
Korea: individuals married to a Korean citizen or carrying the child of a Korean citizen, 
individuals raising a minor child with Korean nationality, or individuals whose spouse is a 
direct descendant of a Korean national. Beginning from 2006, marriage immigrant families 
are entitled to receive public assistance from the government. In comparison to immigrants 
receiving public assistance in Europe, the welfare provision to marriage immigrants is very 
limited.
In 2004, policies with respect to marriage immigrants residing in Korea were established 
for the first time. At that time, the number of international marriages between Korean men 
and foreign women was rapidly increasing, causing a number of social problems. Several con-
cerns emerged regarding marriage immigration, family conflict, and the proper environment 
for child development. Thus, the Ministry of Health and Welfare developed and promoted 
support programs for marriage immigrant families, such as Korean language education and 
cultural adaptation training. In 2006, the government announced the Comprehensive Plan for 
the Social Incorporation of Female Marriage Immigrant Families and Multi-ethnic People. On 
this platform, the government presented policies that supported their vision for female mar-
riage immigrant incorporation and the realization of a multi-cultural society. Public policies 
adopted the concept of a “multi-cultural society” (see Seol 2006; Lee, Seol and Cho, 2006).
Pursuing this further, in 2008, there was a remarkable growth in marriage immigrant 
family policies. The government changed the term marriage immigrant family to multicul-
tural family. Government ministries coined the term multicultural family and the Support for 
Multicultural Families Act came into effect. Also, in 2009, the Prime Minister Office estab-
lished the Multicultural Family Policy Committee in order to create a better division of roles 
between the various ministries.
After President Lee Myung-Bak took office, support for multicultural family policies 
rapidly began to grow. In 2007, the overall budget for multicultural family policies, gov-
ernment and regional expenditure combined, was only 6 billion Korean won; however, in 
2011, it reached a total of 128 billion Korean won. Korean language education for marriage 
immigrants, child support, and stable settlement support are just some of the many types of 
assistance available to multicultural families in Korea.
The government worked rigorously to show support for marriage immigrants residing 
throughout the nation. In 2006, in particular, there were 21 established Multicultural Family 
Support Centres; 100 sites in 2009, 159 in 2010, increasing to 200 in 2011.
Furthermore, many policies concerning the stable growth of multicultural children were 
made. Through the active intervention of home visitation educational services, programs 
ranging from child rearing in the home to children’s academic performance at school were 
developed. Though still in its infant stage, the government has initiated a bilingual education 
program for the children of marriage immigrants. Beginning from 2011, the government 
began offering languages classes, called “Gifted and Talented Language Classroom”, to children 
of marriage immigrants. In this class, multicultural children have the opportunity to learn 
88
Migration and Integration
the language of either their non-Korean mother or father. Additionally, out of the 200 multi-
cultural family support centres, 100 centres offer elementary students above the age of three, 
Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Russian, Cambodian, and Mongolian language education 
courses. In order to develop a sense of cultural appreciation for global talent, the spouses and 
parent-in-laws of marriage immigrants can participate in a number of education programs. 
Also, since 2009, the government has implemented personalized education and bilingual 
institutions to support multicultural students – the children of immigrants. The purpose of 
such programs is to help teenagers who immigrated to Korea after their immigrant parents 
with cultural adaptation as well as Korean and native language skills.
overseas koreans Visa holders
In 1999, the National Assembly enacted the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of 
Overseas Koreans. The main objective of this law is to communicate to overseas Koreans and 
citizens alike that overseas Koreans with foreign nationality will be treated no differently from 
Korean citizens. With this law, many Koreans of the Korean Diaspora, irrespective of their 
nationality, were able to freely work while living in Korea. As the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis continued, the government tried to facilitate overseas Koreans’ investment into 
the Korean economy. As a result, ethnic Koreans who emigrated to America, Europe, etc. 
freely engaged in investment into Korea and employment opportunities in Korea.
The Act had a serious problem. The “overseas Koreans” clause covered only Korean dias-
poras departing from Korea since 1948, when the Korean government was established. Policy 
makers were fearful of the surrounding Chinese and former Soviet Union overseas Koreans 
who could see this as an opportunity for employment in Korea. Such an infiltration was 
likely to cause confusion in the domestic labour market and, thus, raised concerns. The law 
provisions provided by the National Assembly regarding this act defined overseas Koreans 
as “people with Korean nationality or their descendants,” excluding overseas Koreans who 
migrated during the Japanese colonial era. In the end, ethnic Koreans in China and former 
Soviet Union weren’t able to receive the provisions stipulated in the Act on the Immigration 
and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. After that, civil organizations claimed that the Act was 
a violation of the constitution and took the case to trial in the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court ruled the act to be unconstitutional on the basis of discrimination 
against overseas Koreans. In 2004, the National Assembly passed an amendment to include 
Chinese, and former Soviet Union Koreans along with overseas Koreans in the Act on the 
Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans.
However, even with the amendment of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of 
Overseas Koreans, the Departures and Arrivals Control Act made a regulation that foreigners 
in Korea likely to engage in less-skilled labour may not be issued the same visa as “overseas 
Koreans.” Thus, Chinese and former Soviet Union overseas Koreans still could not reap the 
benefits of the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans. In order to re-
solve this problem, the government, in 2007, implemented the Visit and Employment Program 
(VEP) for Ethnic Koreans with Foreign Citizenship. Through the VEP, overseas Koreans 
were allowed employment in less-skilled labour for a maximum period of four years and ten 
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months. Limitations such as a quota and visa renewal conditions were set to ensure that the 
system did not adversely affect the domestic labour market. The VEP was created to protect 
the labour market while providing real benefits to overseas Koreans from developing coun-
tries such as China. However, at the same time, it is criticized for discriminatory treatment 
toward such individuals (See Seol and Skrentny 2009a; Seol and Lee 2011; Skrentny, Chan, 
Fox and Kim 2007).
Meanwhile, though overseas Koreans residing in Korea are recipients of social incorpora-
tion programs based on the Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea, such benefits are 
primarily given to marriage immigrants and thus, not specialized.
Foreign students
Foreign students residing in Korea usually come for the purpose of study or training. 
According to Table 2, in 2006, the number of foreign students in Korea was only 20,683, but 
this dramatically increased to 87,221 in 2012. Nearly ten years ago, foreign students could 
only be seen at the language institutes and departments of international relations of major 
universities in Seoul. However, recently, foreign students can easily be found at universities all 
throughout the country, reflecting the great increase in numbers.
Similarly, the cause of increase in foreign students in Korea can be attributed to a num-
ber of reasons: demand for higher education in China and other developing countries in Asia, 
sweep of the “Korean Wave,” and the government’s efforts and policies to attract foreign 
students. While factors with regard to students’ native countries cannot be disregarded, the 
main cause for such an increase, unquestionably, lies with Korean universities and govern-
ment policies to attract foreign students.
Initially, Korean universities made efforts to recruit foreign students to meet two objec-
tives: attract superior students from abroad and overcome difficulties recruiting new students. 
The first objective is centred on globalization’s banner of “Exchange and Cooperation,” while 
the latter draws attention to a “new market” to solve chronic recruitment problems. In partic-
ular, since the pronouncement of reconstruction policies for universities with low recruitment 
rates, attracting foreign students has become a strategy for survival by an increasing number 
of universities.
Next, it is important to note that the Korean government is supporting the universities’ 
efforts to recruit foreign students through its policy implementation. In 2001, the Korean 
government established a comprehensive plan to recruit foreign students known as the Study 
Korea project, which is still ongoing. The basic direction of this policy is twofold: first, train 
talented students who can play a bridging role between developed and developing countries, 
and second, contribute to the globalization of the domestic education system in order to 
improve its international competitiveness; at the same time, however, foreign students are 
expected to improve the image of South Korea as they travel and study in other countries.
As a rule, foreign students cannot be employed in Korea; nevertheless, they may work for 
a limited period of time if granted permission from local Immigration Offices. According to 
the Statistics Korea survey of employment conditions as of June 2012, the labour force par-
ticipation rate of foreign students is 20.1%. More than 90% of international students come 
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from China (Statistics Korea 2012b; Seol 2013b). The number of Chinese students work-
ing part-time in Korea is increasing, reflecting the high concentration of Chinese students 
around university campuses nationwide. 
3. intErActions bEtWEEn iMMigrAnts And nAtiVE korEAn 
citizEns 
the societal relationship between koreans and Migrants
In the late 1980s, migrant workers began to be assaulted by their Korean counterparts for no 
apparent reason. Incidents occurred in small and medium-sized companies and construction 
worksites, and a few foreigners were also attacked in public places. In August 2009, a Korean 
hurled insults at an Indian migrant on a city bus. While the incident has received a lot of 
press coverage, racist assaults are not widespread. However, the importance of the issue was 
not ignored easily.
The group in Korea suffering the most serious discrimination based on nationality, eth-
nicity, and race are less-skilled foreign migrant workers. The causes of discrimination against 
less-skilled migrant workers can be separated into five elements (see Seol and Han 2004).
First, chauvinism is a concept that combines elements of nationalism and racism. 
Chauvinists are those who believe foreigners and Koreans should be separated and that for-
eigners should be removed completely. These people also believe that Koreans maintain a 
pure bloodline, and foreigners will damage this purity.
Second, some in Korean society have devised a hierarchy based on ethnicity and race. The 
hierarchy is not a simple matter. There have been instances where unrelated elements such as 
physical characteristics like dark skin have led to an assumption that the person in question 
must be from an underdeveloped country.
Third, xenophobia can be a seen as a factor. Some Koreans fear a mass influx of outsiders 
on the grounds that societal integration and harmony within their society will be threatened.
Fourth, not only does race-based discrimination occur, discrimination also exists within 
the ethnic Koreans group. For instance, the Korean government issues the Ethnic Koreans 
(F-4) visas to those applicants residing in developed countries like America or in Europe. 
However, the visas are rarely issued to those applicants residing in China or the former Soviet 
Union. Instead they are provided with a Visit and Employment (H-2) visa, and these of 
course are selectively issued. This policy that ranks minorities within ones’ own ethnic group 
is a manifestation of the hierarchical nationhood. This is a strongly held attitude amongst 
Koreans.
Fifth, discrimination exists that is based on people with less skill as being equal to lower 
social prestige. In the hierarchical status system originating from traditional society, industrial 
relations are not considered equal. The same goes for workers and employers. The notion has 
been carried down to the present day, where the tendency to look down upon manual workers 
remains.
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Marriage immigrants often originate from the same countries as the less-skilled workers, 
and the nature of their work undertaken in Korea is not dissimilar. Their experiences with 
discrimination are almost identical to the experiences of migrant workers.
It is also important to mention the racial discrimination experienced by the children of 
multiethnic families. They can be ostracized from the group, with many instances of children 
becoming outcasts. At school there have been frequent occurrences of angry and upset chil-
dren after they have been told: “Go back to your country.” Children are a society’s mirror. 
Considering the epigram, we can see that if the sense of hierarchy in Korea does not disap-
pear, problems will go unresolved.
On the other hand, while good-intentioned, the enforcement of bad policies is having an 
effect on the children of multiethnic families. Instances of distressed children are common. 
One example is the categorization of children as “children of multicultural families.” When 
learning at school that a child is from a “multicultural family,” other students may label that 
child. Up until then this fact may not have been revealed. It must be considered that some 
children may not wish to be labelled “multicultural” at all.
koreans’ Attitudes toward immigrant influx
Many Koreans hold a positive attitude about foreigners entering the country. In 2003, 
Koreans reported having a positive attitude toward immigrant reception in the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP)—a sample survey conducted on citizens from 19 countries 
on the topic of national identity. In the 2003 ISSP, the proportion of respondent answer-
ing positively to the question, “immigrants are generally good for Korea’s economy” was the 
third highest in Korea; the proportion answering negatively to the item, “immigrants take 
jobs away from people who were born in Korea” was the sixth highest; and the proportion 
of respondents that answered, “The number of migrants should be increased,”1 to the ques-
tion, “Do you think the number of immigrants to Korea nowadays should be increased or 
decreased?” was the third highest (Seok et al. 2005).
A similar result was also found in Pew Research Center’s survey conducted in 2007 on 
46 countries. The survey showed that a high percentage of Korean respondents were against 
“strict measures of entry control against immigrants,”2 thus demonstrating Korea to be the 
most open country to foreign workers out of all the nations under study. Most countries 
strongly favour the reinforcement of immigration control policies. Since Koreans barely have 
experience living in the same country with foreigners, rather than anticipate the difficulties 
and discomfort that would accompany migrant influx, they simply saw it as an opportunity 
for economic development. While contention for jobs between foreigners and Koreans do 
exist and incidences of foreign crime do take place, significant positive aspects of migrant 
influx are also present. The supplementation of a scarce workforce as well as the new vitality 
1  The answer options are: (1) increased a lot, (2) increased a little, (3) remain the same as it is, (4) reduced a little, (5) 
reduced a lot, and (6) can’t choose.
2  Only 25 percent of Korean respondents agreed with the following statement: “We should restrict and control entry 
of people into our country more than we do now” (Pew Research Center 2007: 25-26).
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given to the Korean society as a result of migrant influx are positive aspects that cannot be 
disregarded.
Nonetheless, hasty conclusions about Koreans’ openness towards foreigners and foreign 
culture should not be made. In terms of “cultural openness,”3 Korea has the lowest ranks 
in the annual World Competitiveness Yearbook published by the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland. In 2008, Korea was placed last out of 55 
countries, ranked 56 out of 57 countries in 2009, and 52 out of 58 countries in 2010. The 
reports show Korea as having the one of the most exclusive cultures in the world (IMD 2010, 
2012).
Such contradictory findings show that Koreans’ reception of foreigners, immigrants, and 
foreign culture differs depending on the context. While Koreans are eager to accept foreign-
ers for purposes of economic advancement, occasions of actual contact or communication 
with foreigners remain very low. Most of the marriage immigrants of Korean spouses live 
their lives alone, apart from the community. While they may have relationships with other 
immigrants, their social exchanges with neighbouring Koreans are rare and limited (see Seol 
2010). 
government’s Efforts to Enhance Multicultural understanding
As a result of the rapidly increasing number of immigrants in Korea, the government has 
established policies geared toward enhancing the awareness of foreign cultures. Since 2006, 
the government has developed the curriculum based on four themes: publicity promotion, 
a multicultural friendly atmosphere, civil service training, and education for social welfare 
and medical service workers. Additionally, in 2007, the government revised the elementary, 
middle, and high school curriculum to reflect elements of cultural understanding, morality, 
social studies, and home economics.
Furthermore, in 2012, the government established policies to enhance the multicultural 
understanding of the general public and create a more racially and culturally diverse soci-
ety. Accordingly, four strategic projects were developed along with policies to promote such 
multicultural understanding. The projects and policies include, but are not limited to, the 
following: education reinforcement, promotion of cultural diversity via media, reinforcement 
of tolerance through a variety of cultural experiences, and, finally, the reinforcement of a 
law-abiding society.
In short, though the government rigorously works to prevent immigrants from being 
treated as excluded members, policies seeking to preserve the cultural heritage of immigrants 
have yet to be implemented. Indeed, many organizations offer programs that cater to Korean 
language development and Korean social understanding; however, programs encouraging 
migrants to maintain the culture of their native country remain nonexistent. There is still 
quite a distance between the multicultural policies created by the Korean government and 
multiculturalism in the literal meaning of the word.
3  The statistics is based on local senior managers’ assessment of the statement “The national culture is (closed/open) 
to foreign ideas” by indicating their answer on a scale of 1 to 6.
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role of civil-society organizations in incorporating Migrants
Hundreds of Korean NGOs are working diligently to support both migrant workers and 
marriage immigrants (Seol 2013a). Some migrant workers-supporting NGOs prepare shelters 
or offer counselling services for various problems such as industrial accidents and unpaid 
wages. Legal and medical services are also provided. Additionally, a research study conducted 
on foreign workers not only confirmed the social attention of the public, but also presented 
alternative international policies. Similarly, this report showed the international cooperation 
of several migrant workers-supporting NGOs in different countries. Human rights advocacy 
groups in Korea are passionately fighting to protect the human rights of foreign workers. 
Migrant worker-supporting NGOs, in addition to carrying out their daily activities, are 
fighting to improve institutions for foreign workers. The EPP implemented in 2004 wouldn’t 
exist today if it weren’t for the efforts of foreign workers support groups.
Most marriage immigrants-supporting NGOs act as partners in enforcing govern-
ment policies. There are only a few that operate without the support of the government. 
The government, in accordance with the Support for Multicultural Families Act, established 
200 Multi-cultural Family Support Centres all throughout the country. Although these are 
government-established centres, they are operated by civil organizations. Based on the ac-
tive participation of civil society, the civil sector and the government are joining together to 
enforce governmental policies. Multicultural Family Support Centres are the driving force of 
success in the nation’s goal of social incorporation. In the hopes of providing multicultural 
families with stable policies and a stable family life, Multicultural Family Support Centres in 
partnership with various social welfare centres, offer the following integrated programs and 
services: language and culture education, family education, counselling, child support, job 
education, and multicultural awareness improvement projects. Along with these programs 
also come various forms of support such as marriage immigrants self-support groups, men-
toring, volunteer opportunities, programs for utilizing community resources, multicultural 
awareness improvement projects, and instruction on how to strengthen community ties and 
networks.
Anti-immigration crusaders
If we look at crimes undertaken by foreigners, it has been discovered there are some Koreans 
that express fear and hostility about the larger foreigner group. A few of them use extreme 
statements without hesitation, like “We must deport all the foreigners from Korea.” During 
the 2012 general election for the National Assembly, a naturalized Korean woman originally 
from the Philippines was nominated by the ruling party. She suffered personal attacks and 
a tirade of abuse on the internet. Anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalism is unfolding, 
led by far-right leaning Koreans. While the type of action is not at a worrying level, and is 
currently confined within several groups, it is worth paying attention to.
Hostile comments are posted on the internet detailing instances of crime carried out by 
illegal immigrants and demanding harsh government crackdowns. These operate in tandem 
with activities occurring offline, including attending public hearings on immigration policy 
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and debates hosted by civic groups. This right-wing faction argues that a multicultural society 
will damage the pure bloodline of the Korean race, cause confusion over ethnic identity and 
ultimately annihilate Korean ethnicity. Questions are also raised as to why foreign labour is 
being imported at a time when it is difficult for Koreans to find work. They believe migrant 
workers are the cause for youth unemployment and the problems surrounding temporary 
labour.
Of course, their assertions are not based on fact. Migrant workers on EPP do not take 
jobs away from Korean citizens. Rather, they work in jobs that Koreans do not wish to do and 
in this sense perform a supplementary role. Crimes undertaken by foreigners are also com-
paratively lower than the national crime rate (see Seol 2011). Placing the blame for personal 
problems on an entire group of people is illogical. The fact that these kind of illogical voices 
are not catching on means that Korea’s civil society is in good shape.
4. conclusion
Korea has experienced rapid economic growth and democratization. Migration transition has 
also occurred at a rapid pace. Since migrant workers and marriage immigrants began to arrive 
in Korea in the late 1980s, both institutions and operations were fraught with serious prob-
lems. At the time, the Industrial Technical Training Program (ITTP) for Foreigners deemed 
migrant workers exempt from protection by the labour laws (see Seol 1999). This incited 
fierce opposition from civil society, and in response the alternative EPP was established in 
2004. Adhering to global standards was now understood at both a systemic and cultural level.
The policy regarding marriage immigrants was no different. In the beginning, inter-
national matchmaking businesses would organize group tours overseas where Korean men 
could meet with potential wives. Marriage brokers organized group meetings and marriages 
within a week. The approach to international marriage has been changed by the Korean gov-
ernment’s intervention. The new Korean government regulations have stated that the women 
marriage brokers introduce to Korean men must be over eighteen years old, and that group 
matchmaking events and group accommodation are to be banned. Personal information must 
be presented to potential marriage immigrants in a language they understand, and interpreta-
tion services need to be provided. In addition, notarized documents must be produced and 
human rights violations are required to be reported. A policy was also introduced regard-
ing conflict between Korean national administration regulations and local laws, and the 
enforcement of punishment. Policies like these protected the rights of those directly involved 
in international marriages, and were a reflection of the Korean government’s multi-faceted 
approach to various research results.
While the programs for migrant workers and marriage immigrants has been designed 
and enforced, cooperation is needed between host countries and countries of origin. For ef-
fective international migration management, a method needs to be developed regarding the 
understanding of laws in countries of origin. In addition, countries of origin and host coun-
tries should work together in order to find solutions to shared problems.
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The Korean government has modified the immigration programs that infringed on mi-
grants’ human rights. The main cause can be seen as the deepening of democratization, along 
with external pressure regarding international norms of human rights (Seol, Skrentny and 
Lee 2002; Seol and Skrentny 2009b). When looking for an alternative to current problems 
within the existing system, the policy makers have referred to the systems of advanced coun-
tries including Europe and America. Of course, the policy makers should consider the unique 
social and historical characteristics of Korea, but they cannot be free from the pressure to 
adhere to global standards.
In actuality, a trend of policy convergence can be seen amongst various countries in re-
gards to international migration. What can be deemed a successful immigration policy in one 
country can be adopted as the benchmark for another. This has become common practice. 
It is extremely important for countries in Europe and Asia to share their experiences and 
policies related to immigration. I believe there is value in other countries participating in 
programs that Korea has initiated, like the EPP for migrant workers and the social integra-
tion program for immigrants. While it is unusual that the state takes the lead in policies like 
economic development, in order to maximize policy effectiveness in a short period of time, 
there is value in appraising one model.
If we look closely at Korea’s immigration management model, rather than it being uni-
laterally led by the state, we can see that this model is based on cooperation between the state 
and civil society. The social incorporation program for immigrants is particularly reflective 
of this. The Foreign Workers Support Centres and the Multicultural Families Support Centres 
provide support to migrant workers and marriage immigrants. The government provides the 
budget and everyday management is undertaken by civil organizations. In other words, the 
government does not have a direct role in supporting migrant workers or marriage immi-
grants. Instead, this is carried out by civil organizations.
In addition, there is a need to recognize the role of those NGOs who do not receive gov-
ernment support. As democracy has been consolidated in Korean society, purely civil groups 
have rejected government funding and have managed to undertake activities to support mi-
grant workers and marriage immigrants. Actions such as these help Koreans and foreigners 
understand one another and contribute to broader cultural understanding.
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AbstrAct1
This paper provides a comparative overview of the European policy landscape in the field of 
labour migration, focusing on six key countries in the decade preceding and throughout the 
current economic crisis. It draws mainly on data and information gathered in the framework 
of LAB-MIG-GOV, a research project coordinated by FIERI (www.labmiggov.eu). The main 
arguments in the paper can be summarized as follows:
In order to have a proper understanding of the policy dynamics in the field of labour 
migration, a broad focus on “migrant labour supply policies” (rather than on “labour migra-
tion policies”, restrictively meant as admission of foreign workers from third countries) is 
necessary. This allows the inclusion in the picture of crucial policy dimensions such as access 
to the labour markets of non-labour migrants, intra-EU mobility regime and regularisations 
of undocumented migrants.
The tone of public debates around labour migration varies significantly across different 
national contexts. However, a few important common features emerge from the main public 
opinion surveys: levels of anxiety about immigration across European countries, although 
1  This paper benefits from the research carried out in the framework of LAB-MIG-GOV (“Which labour migration 
governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe?”), a comparative research project coordinated by FIERI under 
the supervision of Ferruccio Pastore, with the support of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Programme promoted 
by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and VolkswagenStiftung. EPC is one of the partners of 
LAB-MIG-GOV, in charge of the analysis of policy developments at EU level. The preliminary research results of 
LAB-MIG-GOV are available on the website www.labmiggov.eu.
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variable, are generally high, but no upsurge has been observed with the worsening of the 
economic crisis since 2008. Furthermore, at least until 2011, a widespread awareness persists 
of the economic benefits associated with foreign labour migration, particularly in terms of 
complementariness with native labour force.
National approaches in the field of foreign labour management show little convergence: a 
strong heterogeneity was witnessed before the crisis and persists during the downturn. But the 
internal geography of such policy diversity is in deep transformation: in the pre-crisis phase, 
we have identified a process of diverging evolution with, on one hand, Mediterranean coun-
tries and the UK displaying a more open and proactive approach, and, on the other hand, the 
“continental core” (around France and Germany) sticking to a more cautious and restrictive 
line. The crisis, with its highly asymmetrical impact, is dramatically changing this landscape 
by putting the brakes on new admissions for employment reasons where expansionary trends 
where previously observed and, on the other hand, by allowing new policy dynamisms and 
openness where economies have been less affected.
In such a fragmented and unstable economic and policy context, any substantial progress 
towards a supra-national EU approach is unlikely in the short to medium term. The emphasis 
is now on national-level reforms, where priority is often given to “functional alternatives” 
to labour immigration (primarily to boost domestic activity rates, including that of settled 
immigrants). Should the reform process of EU economic governance make further progress, 
however, a renewed pressure towards more harmonized migrant labour supply policies would 
be likely.
1. A concEptuAl prEAMblE: “MigrAnt lAbour supply 
policiEs”
How many and which kind of workers are needed over a given period of time in a given coun-
try or group of countries? How many of these needed workers can be found inside national 
borders and how many should come from elsewhere? Such questions lie at the conceptual and 
political heart of the labour migration policy field, but they are seldom formulated in such 
a broad and comprehensive form. In the European context, the internal and external “sides” 
of labour market policies have for long been developed, implemented and even researched 
in separate and largely non-mutually communicating spheres. This was certainly also due 
to the scarce quantitative relevance and low political status of labour migration policies in 
Western Europe, after the general adoption of “stop policies” by all traditional immigration-
receiving states in the early 1970s. During the following two and a half decades, long-term 
admission from abroad of non-EU nationals for working purposes was virtually nonexistent. 
Consequently, research interest also declined and started to grow again only towards the end 
of the last century, when formal labour immigration policies gradually regained visibility and 
relevance, especially in some southern European countries and the United Kingdom (Menz 
and Caviedes, 2010; Menz, 2011).
The formal ban on workers’ recruitment from abroad (with limited exceptions for some 
highly skilled profiles) did not stop immigration as such (Castles, 1986). On the one hand, 
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family and humanitarian inflows – i.e., rights-based types of migration over which states 
have much more limited discretionary control – gained momentum; on the other hand, un-
documented immigration and overstaying also grew. As we will see in greater detail below, 
all these forms of migration – although not formally definable as “labour immigration” – 
indirectly fed European labour markets. In all EU member states, although to varying extents 
and on the basis of different regulations, family and humanitarian immigrants had, sooner 
or later, access to the labour market2, and large numbers of undocumented foreign workers 
were granted the opportunity to regularize their residence and work status (Pastore, 2004; 
Sciortino, 2011). These indirect labour immigration channels, however, were for long totally 
neglected: throughout the 1980s and 1990s, non-discretionary migrants were predominantly 
framed (both in the political and academic sphere) in social and cultural terms, overlooking 
their actual and potential economic role, except for the cost they represented for welfare sys-
tems. As for irregular migrants, their prevalent framing as a security or “law and order” issue 
obscured the growing weight they were gaining in European labour markets.
The lack of an integrated understanding of the complex ways in which different forms 
of international migration affect the functioning of European labour markets is not just a 
long-standing scientific lacuna, which has only recently started to be filled. The lack of at-
tention for the economic impact of non-economic immigration policies and more broadly for 
the labour market role of non-economic migrants is also a problem for policies, which risks 
distorting their evidence bases and thereby limit their effectiveness.3 These shortcomings are 
becoming more serious in the context of the protracted economic crisis, which makes the 
efficiency of labour markets increasingly important.
For these reasons, in the framework of the LAB-MIG-GOV project and in the set of 
papers that have been produced by the LAB-MIG-GOV research team for EPC’s EU-Asia 
project, we have decided to go beyond a limited focus on “labour migration policies”, restric-
tively meant as policies for the admission of third-country nationals for working purposes, 
and to base our accounts and analyses on a broader concept of “migrant labour supply poli-
cies”. We have thus taken into consideration not just the way in which selected EU member 
states directly “feed” their labour markets with immigrant workers, but also what we have 
called “indirect labour immigration policies” and even, in the cases of and to the extent these 
are relevant, active labour market policies aimed at facilitating the access of different catego-
ries of immigrant residents to the labour market.
2  EU legislation played an important harmonisation role in this field, in particular with the directives on family 
reunification and reception conditions of asylum seekers which imposed temporal limits by which family migrants 
and asylum seekers have to be recognised with full access to the labour market: in either case restrictions to full 
access to employment or self-employment cannot exceed 12 months (See art. 14, Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 
22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification and art. 11 of the Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 
2003 on reception conditions for asylum-seekers).
3  The economic function of non-economic labour migration policies and the “functional equivalences” which often 
exist between different branches of migratory policy have only recently become a subject of interest for migration 
policy scholars; see in particular the important work in this direction by Claudia Finotelli and Giuseppe Sciortino 
(2009) or by Claudia Finotelli (2012). 
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2. nAtionAl dEbAtEs And public opinion trEnds
The four country papers produced for this project and the case studies carried out in the 
framework of the LAB-MIG-GOV project clearly show that the European Union is neither a 
unified nor a homogeneous arena for public debates on labour migration.
In a general context in which a severe and protracted economic crisis is firmly putting 
economic uncertainty and occupational problems at the top of the pyramid of perceived pub-
lic concerns and political priorities, the extent to which labour immigration is losing salience 
as an issue varies from country to country. In the EU countries less affected by the crisis, like 
Germany and Sweden, where labour shortages continue to bite and there continues to be a 
call for selective import of foreign workers, it is not surprising that the issue maintains high 
visibility and policy relevance (see below, par. 4.2).
Besides the intensity, the tones in the national public debates on labour migration and 
the geography of the players also vary deeply from one country to another. Here too, the 
connection with the broader economic outlook of each country is strong, but the nature of 
the domestic entrepreneurial structure also plays an important role: where the economy fares 
better, and where large companies and multinationals are more important and vocal as public 
actors, the demand for labour immigration (and sound labour immigration policies) unsur-
prisingly tends to be more explicit and the debate more focused on the positive nexus between 
labour mobility and competitiveness. This happens in Germany and Sweden, but used to 
be the case also in Spain and the UK prior to the worsening of the crisis. Conversely, where 
migrant labour demand, although substantial, is highly fragmented and dispersed across a 
great number of micro and small enterprises or private households, employers seem to play a 
secondary role in the public debates about immigration and sound labour migration policies 
and the nexus between (labour) immigration and economic competitiveness and growth re-
mains largely overlooked. Italy has represented a relevant example in this regard (Salis, 2012; 
Pastore, Salis and Villosio, 2012). 
National variations in the intensity and dominant tones of public debates are closely con-
nected, in a complex net of reciprocal influences, with the differences in the orientation of 
domestic public opinions. A very valuable source for analysing public attitudes on immigra-
tion in some of the largest labour importing countries in Europe (and North America) is 
provided by the comparative opinion survey Transatlantic Trends Immigration (TTI). This 
poll has been regularly repeated with the same methodology for a few years and this makes 
TTI data particularly precious because they provide a diachronic perspective and allow the 
reconstruction of public opinion trends over time.4
The first important conclusion coming from the diachronic analysis of TTI data is that 
a common European public opinion on the issue does not exist and that levels of anxiety 
about immigration vary significantly from country to country. Figure 1 below, for instance, 
shows that the share of respondents who think that there are “too many immigrants” is low-
est in France and Germany (which are actually also the two countries in the sample which 
4  For more details see: http://trends.gmfus.org/immigration/about/
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experienced the lowest levels of immigration in the last few years) and highest in Italy, Spain 
and, above all, Great Britain. Nevertheless, as specific analysis carried out on the British 
sample of the TTI poll seems to show, the divide between pro- or anti-immigration respon-
dents is largely explained by intergenerational cleavages: age, education, economic security, 
and migrant heritage largely explain individual attitudes towards immigration, with the latter 
three factors being strongly related to the former. As a result of this combination, older co-
horts seem to be much more hostile to new immigration than younger cohorts (Ford, 2012). 
It should be added, however, that in none of these countries, have concerns about immigra-
tion as measured by this kind of questions experienced an upsurge in coincidence with the 
worsening of the economic crisis since 2008.
Figure 1: share of respondents that think that immigrants are “too many” (based 
on ttI 2011, table Q2a).
A second important feature of the public opinion landscape is a substantial awareness (albeit, 
here too, with deep national variations) of the overall positive economic role played by foreign 
labour. As shown in Figure 2, a more or less vast majority in all national samples believe 
that immigrants are complementary to natives in the labour market. A less homogeneously 
favourable assessment, however, emerges from another question of the survey: as a matter of 
fact, in Spain and the UK, the majority of respondents believe that immigrants are “bringing 
down the wages of citizens” (see Figure 3).
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Figure 2: share of respondents that think that “Immigrants generally help to fill 
jobs where there are shortages of workers” (based on ttI 2011, table Q18.2).
Figure 3: share of respondents that think that “Immigrants bring down the wages 
of citizens” (based on ttI 2011, table Q18.4).
105
Managing Labour Migration in Times of Crisis
Public opinion trends around emotional issues such as migration tend to be particularly 
volatile and therefore need to be interpreted with great caution; there is also a need to be 
aware that they are not immediately translated into electoral choices, which are instead the 
results of much more complex alchemies. With all these necessary caveats, the public opinion 
orientations, of which we have given a few glimpses above, remain a crucial factor for under-
standing policies.
We will come back to the relations between policy preferences expressed by citizens and 
actual policy choices at the end of this paper. Before that, however, it is worth having a closer 
comparative look at the actual contents and tendencies in labour migration policies – and 
other policies affecting foreign labour supply – in some European countries.
3. diFFErEncEs in thE coMposition oF iMMigrAtion 
inFloWs And WhAt thEy rEVEAl
It is useful, although it may sound illogical, to start our comparative analysis from what 
could be viewed as the end, namely from the outcomes of policies, i.e., from the actual size 
and composition of migratory inflows in different countries. Quantitative and qualitative 
immigration trends are obviously not determined only (maybe even not mainly) by poli-
cies. Economic conditions at home and at destination, transnational connections and social 
networks, and symbolic and cultural factors: all of these clearly play very important roles, al-
though it is extremely hard to weigh each factor in comparison with others. But, as migration 
research tends now to recognize more explicitly and consensually than in the past, policies 
(not just narrowly meaning migration policies) do count.5 In broad terms, this is confirmed 
if we look at recent immigration trends in the five largest EU countries (which are also the 
largest immigrant destinations in the continent), plus Sweden.
The first obvious thing to be noted is that the overall size of inflows varies deeply over 
time and across countries. Let us use as a reference the harmonised figures provided by 
OECD (on the basis of national data) concerning “permanent migrants”, which are defined 
by the Paris-based organisation as “persons who have been granted the right of permanent 
residence upon entry, persons admitted with a permit of limited duration that is more or less 
indefinitely renewable plus some entering persons with the right of free movement (such as 
EU citizens within the European Union)”. Based on this definition, tourists, business visi-
tors, seasonal workers, international students, exchange academics and researchers, trainees, 
service providers, etc. are excluded from the statistics on permanent immigration (Lemaitre, 
Liebig et al. 2007: 3). 
5  For a useful and updated review of the literature on policy effectiveness in the migration field, see Czaika, M. and 
H. De Haas, 2011.
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Figure 4 – Inflows of permanent migrants in selected eU countries as % of the total 
population, 2003-2010
source: oECD – sopemi, various years.
These figures clearly show that, during the recent years, the levels of permanent immigration, 
as a percentage of the total resident population, have remained constantly modest in France 
and Germany, while they have been growing in Italy and Sweden with a relative slowdown 
during the current period of crisis. In the UK, annual inflows of permanent immigration 
were significant throughout the period considered and, different from what was observed 
elsewhere, they have continued to grow during the years of crisis. Unfortunately, data on 
Spain are only available since 2007 but the trend there is quite evident: Spain has been the 
EU country with the largest inflows relative to its total population, but it is also the country 
where the impact of the rising unemployment rate on migration flows has been the most 
significant. 
Even more interesting than the actual size of immigration flows is, for the specific pur-
poses of this paper, their composition in terms of relative weight of the different channels of 
admission and of immigrants’ statuses upon entry. In Figure 5, such composition is schemati-
cally represented on the basis of the following four macro-categories used for comparative 
purposes by OECD: a) inflows which are the result of free movement, which in the case 
of EU countries consists essentially of intra-EU mobility; b) non-seasonal work-motivated 
admissions; c) family-related ones, i.e., mainly family regroupments and migration connected 
with transnational family formation (so-called “wedding migration”); and d) asylum migra-
tion and all other residual admission channels.
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Figure 5 – Distribution of permanent immigration flows by category of entry in 
selected eU countries, 2002-2006 and 2008-2009(a) (%)
source: oECD – sopemi, 2012 and previous years.
Note: 2007 data on permanent immigration by category of entry was not published in the sopemi 
reports
The substantial differences and few commonalities arising from this graph could be sum-
marized as follows:
a. The share of immigration for working purposes – although on the rise everywhere (but 
this is a pre-crisis picture, which will have to be corrected, for sure in quite substantial 
terms, as soon as more recent data become available) – varies enormously across the 
analysed countries, from the lowest level of Sweden to the highest of the UK (36% of 
total permanent inflows; average of 2008-2009).
b. “Free movement” – i.e., predominantly work-driven mobility within the European 
Union of EU citizens, mainly from the Eastern European countries having access to 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 – represents a very important component of inflows every-
where, albeit with significant differences among countries.
c. Important differences are also observed in the share of rights-based migration: asy-
lum inflows and other forms of humanitarian migration are a residual (and declining 
over time) but nevertheless sizeable component everywhere, except in Italy and Spain. 
Family-related migration is an important phenomenon in all target countries, but it 
emerges as the main component of inward long-term mobility only in France and 
Sweden.
These essential features and the fundamental heterogeneity in country-specific “immigration 
blends” are confirmed if we look at survey rather than administrative data: Figure 6 compares 
(again with regard to the six LAB-MIG-GOV countries) the composition of representative 
samples of immigrant workers on the basis of the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) 
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2008 ad hoc module (Cangiano, 2012). In this case, the categorization of immigrants on the 
basis of their status upon entry is different and more detailed than the one used by OECD6.
Figure 6: Composition of migrant workforce by status on entry, recent migrants 
(entry 1998-2007), 2008 (%).
source: Cangiano 2012, based on EU-lFs
Note: EU-15* refers to the pooled sample of immigrants resident in the EU-15 countries. 
Whether one looks at OECD or LFS data, it stands out clearly that, from a social and 
economic point of view, it makes little sense to talk about “immigration” from an undifferen-
tiated EU perspective. The phenomenon is still decisively shaped by national contexts, where 
policies play an important role. In particular, the share of work-motivated flows on the total 
varies deeply from country to country.
In stressing this, however, one should not either obliterate the fact that channels of ad-
mission and status upon entry do not pre-determine labour trajectories and that – as EU-LFS 
data analysed by Cangiano (2012) demonstrate – many family and humanitarian migrants 
do indeed take active part in the labour market. This fact has long been insufficiently consid-
ered in European debates on immigration, which have often tended to dismiss rights-based 
inflows as inevitably economically unproductive. Empirical studies show that this is not true, 
and this is the reason why we focus this paper on migrant labour supply policies rather than 
only on labour migration policies in a narrow and formal sense.
Besides, the extent to which non work-motivated immigration flows end up playing an 
active role in European labour markets is critically affected by the capacity of active labour 
6  Based on 2008 EU-LFS data Cangiano (2012) has created nine different entry status categories by combining 
variables related to country of birth, nationality and year of residence, country of birth of parents, main reason for 
(last) migration and the year of acquisition of citizenship. As a result, the identified categories were: EU15/EEA 
immigrants, Post-enlargement EU 12 immigrants, ancestry-based immigrants (i.e. individuals born abroad but 
citizens of the country of destination from birth; and migrants whose father and/or mother were born in the country 
of destination), and migrants for reasons of employment – job found before migrating, employment – no job found 
before migrating, international protection, family, study or other residual categories. 
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market policies to reach and include minorities of migrant origin. As we will see below, this is 
becoming a crucial policy challenge in the context of the crisis.
4. policy trEnds, bEForE And during thE crisis
Which are the policy choices behind the heterogeneous immigration trends described above, 
and how are they evolving? This comparative review cannot avoid assuming that the crisis is 
a watershed and a turning point in migration policy trends at the continental level. We will 
therefore structure this paragraph along this chronological cleavage. Nevertheless, it has to be 
stressed that the crisis, as it is hitting countries and regions in Europe in a very asymmetrical 
way, is also affecting differently migration policy-making. As a result, as we will see, the 
pre-crisis map of similarities and differences among national approaches is emerging deeply 
transformed by the structural changes of the last five years.
4.1 pre-crisis diverging evolution, but...
In the decade before the outburst of the crisis, the European Union as a whole experienced an 
impressive, but very uneven, immigration boom (See table below).
table 1: Foreign population as % of the total population in selected eU countries, 
2001 and 2011
2001 2011
France 5.3 5.9
germany 8.8 8.8
Italy 2.2 7.5
spain 2.9 12.3
sweden 5.4 6.6
United Kingdom 4.5 7.2
source: EURosTAT, 2012. 
Two very different areas – Southern Europe (primarily Spain and Italy, followed by Portugal 
and Greece) and the Atlantic isles (UK and Ireland) – emerged as the main motors of such 
strong expansion in immigration, largely made up of low-skilled and demand-driven labour 
flows: the share of the foreign population in Italy and Spain of the total resident population 
has more than doubled in the last decade and substantial increases have been observed in the 
United Kingdom and Sweden7, while the indicator has remained stable overall in both France 
and Germany. In both these geographical areas, the first three-quarters of the 2000s were a 
period of intensive experimentation in the field of migrant labour supply policies, aimed at 
steering – although in very different forms – the expansive migratory trend.
On the other hand, in the European core, represented by France, Germany and the 
Benelux, (but also in Northern European countries) the same period was marked by a more 
7  When considering these figures, one should also bear in mind that Sweden and the UK have more open citizenship 
laws compared to those adopted in Italy and Spain. This could determine greater naturalization rates and, therefore, an 
unknown but significant share of the foreign population may gradually disappear from official statistics.
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conservative approach, which did not depart from the restrictive management of labour mi-
gration which had been prevailing during the previous two decades.8
The policy experimentation carried out in some EU countries since the late 1990s in 
the field of labour migration management focused mainly on two fundamental technical 
challenges:
I) How to assess domestic labour shortages, i.e., labour force needs which cannot be satisfied 
properly (both in terms of quality and timing) through domestic offer and, therefore, 
require ad hoc immigrant admissions. In this field, for instance, the practice developed 
in the UK since the establishment of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) is of 
particular interest;9
II) How to single out and, if necessary, train potential labour migration candidates prior to 
migration, i.e., when they are still in the sending countries. Whereas in some of the coun-
tries we have studied – such as the UK or Sweden – this selection has been entirely 
left to market dynamics, in some Southern European countries experiments have been 
made to set up screening (and, in some cases, also training) mechanisms on the basis 
of bilateral agreements with sending countries.10
In another important policy area, however, policy innovation has been much less substan-
tial. We are referring to the design of procedures aimed at facilitating the matching between 
specific employers experiencing labour shortages and specific foreign workers/candidates for 
migration. In theory, such crucial passage can be regulated in two opposite ways: by putting 
on the employer the burden (and the opportunity) to go and look for his/her prospective 
employees abroad (employer-led, or demand-driven matching mechanisms); or, instead, by al-
lowing the job-seeking migrant to enter the immigration country in order to look for an 
appropriate employer (worker-led, or supply-driven mechanisms).
These two approaches are evidently very different in terms of both the basic pre-condi-
tions for their functioning and their broader implications. Employer-led systems can operate 
effectively and smoothly only if employers are practically able to screen and select candidates 
in the countries of origin, either by entrusting an agent there or at distance, by electronic 
means. This selection abroad can realistically be expected to take place only when the em-
ployer is a large enough company and/or when the sought-after worker is highly skilled and 
his/her skills can be assessed at distance (through a CV, an interview via computer and simi-
lar means). On the contrary, small and medium-sized enterprises, where the bulk of existing 
labour needs concentrates, typically face greater difficulties in engaging in transnational re-
cruitment activities and lack the financial and organizational resources to undertake complex 
and long-lasting procedures to bring the needed workers from abroad. 
8  For a more analytical overview of similarities and differences in the main EU countries’ approaches to labour 
migration, before and during the crisis, see Pastore, 2011.
9  See the paper on the UK case, written by Camilla Devitt on the framework of the EU-Asia Dialogue project.
10  For more details, see LAB-MIG-GOV country studies and Claudia Finotelli’s paper on Spain produced for the 
EU-Asia Dialogue project.
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On the other hand, worker-led/supply-driven systems raise the politically sensitive ques-
tion of what happens if and when the job-seeker does not find a job within a reasonable lapse 
of time (and before the expiry of the visa, in all cases in which an entry visa is required). 
In Western Europe, over the last few years, the concern that the admission of foreign job-
seekers might lead to irregular immigration through overstaying has been felt very strongly 
by political elites and policy-makers, pushing them to give systematic priority to employer-led 
matching mechanisms while increasingly neglecting the experimentation of supply-driven 
schemes.
Over the 2000s, this technical (but politically motivated) convergence on demand-driven 
systems took place in a rather wide and undifferentiated way, in countries that – as illustrated 
at the beginning of this paragraph – were otherwise diverging in their overall attitude towards 
labour migration. The growing subordination of admission for working purposes to the pre-
existence of a binding job offer (or even of a work contract, as with the Italian “contratto 
di soggiorno”, introduced in 2002) brought a general increase in the rigidity of European 
admission systems. An important consequence is that – particularly in Southern European 
countries, where the demand for immigrant labour is largely issuing from small and medium-
sized enterprises and predominantly targeting low-skilled workers – admission systems largely 
failed in their institutional task. In spite of the efforts in needs assessment and in increasing 
cooperation with sending countries, labour migration policies continued to score poorly in 
terms of their capacity to actually fill labour shortages with foreign workers admitted on an 
ad hoc basis. As a consequence, alternative channels of foreign labour supply, primarily ex post 
regularisation of undocumented immigrants and (since 2004) free movement of EU citizens 
from newly accessed Eastern European states, maintained or even increased their importance.
4.2 converging responses to the crisis, but...
The financial and economic crisis, with its heavy occupational toll, has obviously affected in 
a profound way the policy landscape sketched above. As a first response, most governments 
used their leverage on the so-called “discretionary migration” (as opposed to the sphere of 
rights-based migration, where constitutional and international legal obligations reduce the 
scope for legislators’ discretion) by reducing entry quotas (where existing), cutting shortage 
occupations lists or raising stakes for individual admission (e.g., by setting higher thresholds 
for minimum salary upon entry).
Although not central to our argument, a paradoxical, although hardly avoidable, side-ef-
fect of this sort of anti-crisis migration policy strategy is worth mentioning here: with brakes 
put on labour admission channels, the relative weight of non-labour-oriented entries on the 
total migratory inflows obviously tends to increase. Typically, the share of family reunions 
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and other categories of migration on average marked by lower activity rates11 therefore grows 
in a phase in which just the opposite would be economically desirable.
Besides tightening admission taps, a small minority of European governments has ad-
opted voluntary return schemes in an attempt to drain, at least in part, the expanding pool of 
unemployed immigrants. In most cases, as in the Spanish one, however, such schemes have 
been virtually dropped rather quickly, after having proven to be unable to attract sizeable 
numbers of candidates for repatriation, partly as an effect of the limited size of financial 
incentives, but more importantly due to the wide reach of the crisis, which is affecting heavily 
also many sending countries and, therefore, discouraging attempts to return.
Another spreading policy trend, which goes beyond the sphere of immigration policies 
stricto sensu, is worth mentioning here. Faced with high levels of unemployment, which are 
growing even faster among immigrants than among natives, public authorities are putting 
increasing emphasis on the necessity to better target active labour policies in order to enhance 
their inclusive potential with regard to foreign workers. Such a trend is particularly hard to 
map and assess because, in most EU member states, labour market policies are strongly de-
centralised and vary significantly on a regional basis. Taking the Italian case as an example, it 
is interesting to note that enhanced labour market integration of foreign workers, particularly 
through active policies such as training and re-training, has been set as one of the strategic 
priorities of recent integration policies set in 2010 (Salis, forthcoming).
Besides the reduction of immigrant workers’ unemployment, the objective to raise the ac-
tivity rate of non-discretionary migrants has also often been cited by the officials interviewed 
for this research as a growing priority in a context of crisis.
In spite of the restrictive policy trends that we have been referring to, the crisis is not 
erasing labour shortages altogether, and it is not suppressing the need for selective admis-
sions. But, as the OECD stresses, in such a difficult economic context, the approach to active 
labour migration policies is changing in some fundamental way, with growing attention and 
emphasis on selection criteria:
Migration policies as a factor of economic development also remain. 2011 witnessed many 
labour immigration schemes maintained, often with a more selective approach, giving 
less attention to “quantity” and more to the presumed “quality” of immigrants. (OECD 
2012, p. 120).
But, given this general tendency towards greater selectivity based on the individual quali-
ties of would-be migrants, the European geography of labour migration policies is shifting. 
The set of studies carried out for this project and for LAB-MIG-GOV show clearly that the 
countries less affected by the economic and occupational crisis (Germany and Sweden, among 
our case studies) are also the ones where a more persistent policy dynamism is observed, 
11  Family and humanitarian migrants or international students typically display lower activity rates and higher 
unemployment rates compared to labour migrants, with systematic gender differences within their respective 
categories. According to data of the 2008 EU-LFS analyzed by Cangiano (2012), inactivity rates of recent (i.e., arrived 
between 1998 and 2007) non-EU immigrants range from 5% for male labour migrants entered with a job offer to 63% 
for female humanitarian immigrants.
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with the landmark migration policy reform adopted at the end of 2008 in Sweden and with 
the important (although less mediatized) series of legislative and administrative adjustments 
implemented in Germany since 2010.12 On the other hand, the countries which had been 
driving policy change in the pre-crisis phase (see above, par. 4.1) are currently going through 
a restrictive phase, in which work-oriented admission schemes are being either frozen or ac-
tively dismantled.
The European political geography of labour migration management which had marked 
the 2000s, with Southern European countries and the UK standing out as the main en-
gines of policy change and a less dynamic continental core, is not actual any more. The new 
economic cleavages produced by the asymmetrical impact of the economic crisis – with a 
renewed German centrality and ever more acute challenges for European peripheries – are 
clearly reflected also in the sphere of labour migration and its regulation.
5. WAys AhEAd: EconoMic iMpErAtiVEs And politicAl 
constrAints
By deeply transforming Europe’s economic and political geography, the crisis is also high-
lighting the continent’s structurally problematic relations with labour migration.
On the one hand, it is hard to deny that some of the worst-hit countries are also those 
where some of the most migrant-intensive economic models had been gaining ground in the 
previous years (the most evident examples being Ireland and Spain, but similar arguments 
can apply to most Southern European countries). With hindsight, it is easy to state that these 
member states have been too little selective in their management of labour inflows, focusing 
more on short-term gains associated with large-scale, low-skilled immigration than on long-
term sustainability.13 In order to turn labour immigration into an ingredient for an effective 
exit strategy from the crisis, rather than let it become a worsening factor, all these countries 
need deep reforms in their migrant labour supply policies.
On the other hand, however, and somehow symmetrically, some of the countries which 
are faring better in the crisis (Germany, in the first place), are also among those which, in the 
previous phase, had adopted a more cautious and selective attitude in the field of admission of 
migrant workers. Without obviously suggesting any causal relation between these two dimen-
sions, it is undisputable, however, that precisely the better economic outlook of these latter 
countries, associated with their more or less gloomy demographic profiles, call for further 
liberalizing innovation in their labour migration management strategies. As we have shown 
in the case studies, some of these countries (e.g., Sweden) have already started picking up 
the challenge, but these reforms need constant maintenance and adjustment: as a matter of 
fact, migration policies (more than other sectoral policies, which deal with an intrinsically 
dynamic phenomenon) cannot be but a work in progress, and even more so in times of deep 
economic uncertainty.
12 See the papers on Germany and Sweden written, respectively, by Barbara Laubenthal and Monica Quirico for the 
EU-Asia Dialogue project.
13  For an application of such arguments to the Italian case, see Pastore, Salis and Villosio, 2012.
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Labour migration policy reform thus imposes itself throughout the EU, albeit in very dif-
ferent forms, with quite heterogeneous sets of priorities and constraints. These fundamental 
differences, by the way, are likely to hamper substantial progress in the EU agenda on labour 
migration also in the future, unless (or until) the deepening of common European economic 
governance reaches the stage where autonomous labour market policies at the national level 
would not be possible anymore.
Are European intellectual and political elites aware of the urgency to innovate in the 
field of labour migration? And if so, what are their strategic orientations? Unfortunately, there 
are no positive and easy answers to these questions. As already stressed (see par. 2), the crisis 
is pushing down immigration in the ladder of political priorities, although not everywhere 
to the same extent. As for the possible paths of policy innovation, the main ideas which are 
floating around in the EU are controversial and based on weak bases, in terms of both em-
pirical evidence and political consensus.
Should an observer condense the dominant European thinking on labour migration into 
three attributes, these would probably be: regular (i.e., no more regularisations)14, temporary 
(as reflected in the strong programmatic emphasis on “circular migration schemes”)15 and 
selective (meaning that highly skilled immigrants are generally welcome, unlike low- and 
medium-skilled ones).
Most scholars are suggesting caution on all these three mots d’ordre, in that regularisa-
tions are often pragmatically defended as the “least worst” solution in certain circumstances, 
circular migration is often described as a spontaneous reality which risks being hampered by 
restrictive mobility regimes, and the exclusive priority given to high-skilled migration is often 
denounced as wishful thinking at risk of backfiring (and, thus, either remains on paper or 
generates skill/brain waste).
This is not the place to discuss these important and complex issues in any detail. It is 
however useful to point out that the three normative principles synthesised above, besides 
resting on weak empirical foundations, seem to suffer also from a (still too) weak political 
legitimacy. As a matter of fact, available opinion surveys seem to show that: a) sizeable mi-
norities are everywhere in favour (or not a priori against) regularizations (see below, Figure 
7); b) substantial majorities of European citizens almost everywhere have a preference for 
permanent over temporary admission (see Fig. 8); c) Europeans tend to prefer (and probably 
feel less threatened by) a labour migration policy targeting the low-skilled (but on the basis of 
a definite job offer) rather than a supply-driven approach giving priority to the high-skilled 
(see Fig. 9).
14  See the following passage of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum of 24 September 2008: “…the 
European Council agrees: […] to use only case-by-case regularisation, rather than generalised regularisation, under 
national law, for humanitarian or economic reasons” (full text available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/jl0038_en.htm.
15  At EU level, the concept was introduced by the European Commission’s Communication of 16 May 2007 on 
“circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries”, COM(2007) 248 
final, available at page: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_
asylum_immigration/l14564_en.htm. 
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Fig. 7: Distribution of respondents to the question: “should illegal immigrants be 
required to return to the country of origin, or should they be given the opportunity 
to obtain legal status allowing them to stay?” (based on ttI 2011, table Q12).16
Fig. 8: Distribution of respondents to the question: “some people think that legal 
immigrants who come to (CoUntRY) to work should only be admitted temporarily 
and then be required to return to their country of origin. others feel that they 
should be given the opportunity to stay permanently. Which comes closer to your 
point of view?” (based on ttI 2011, table Q11).
16  In this figure and the following ones, column totals may not amount to 100, because refusals to answer and “I don’t 
know” are not included.
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Fig. 9: Distribution of respondents to the question: “In deciding which immigrants 
to admit to CoUntRY, should the government give preference to immigrants who 
have a high level of education but no job offer, or should it give preference to 
immigrants who have a job offer in the CoUntRY but a lower level of education?” 
(based on ttI 2011, table Q7).
What can be drawn from the analysis of these opinion survey data is that there is a substan-
tial and persistent gap between public opinions’ policy preferences and the dominant political 
thinking of European elites on labour migration. In order to fill this gap, and to reconcile 
economic imperatives and political constraints, a long-term work of evidence-gathering, 
policy evaluation and pedagogical communication is needed.
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AbstrAct1
Spain has been considered the most successful labour migration model among southern 
European countries. The economic crisis, however, shed a light on the shortcomings of the 
Spanish employer-oriented model and its use of labour migration to compensate for the low 
technology level of the Spanish economy. This report analyses the main components of the 
Spanish labour migration model, focusing both on its strengths and on the weaknesses that 
emerged after the economic crisis of 2008. In the first section, the report provides a general 
overview of the main recruitment mechanisms of the Spanish labour migration model, such 
as the individual recruitment, quota regulations (contingente) and special avenues for high 
skilled workers. The second part of the analysis compares the relevance of the qualitative and 
quantitative criteria in the Spanish model, devoting special attention to the role played by 
“shortage lists” to avoid any foregoing labour market check. The third section assesses the ca-
pacity of the different types of recruitment instruments to match labour supply and demand, 
devoting special attention to the relevance of the collaboration between government and 
employers and of bilateral agreements with sending countries. Finally, the report analyses the 
relevance of regularisation processes as functional equivalents in the Spanish regime, showing 
how they provided a posteriori the needed foreign labour force when official admission poli-
cies failed. The final part of the report summarizes the characteristics of the Spanish regime, 
arguing that efficient labour migration governance does not only depend on well-designed 
admission policies, but also on the dysfunctionalities of a given country’s production system.
1  This paper benefits from the research carried out in the framework of LAB-MIG-GOV (“Which labour migration 
governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe?”), a comparative research project coordinated by FIERI under 
the supervision of Ferruccio Pastore, with the support of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Programme promoted 
by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and VolkswagenStiftung. EPC is one of the partners of 
LAB-MIG-GOV, in charge of the analysis of policy developments at EU level. The preliminary research results of 
LAB-MIG-GOV are available on the website www.labmiggov.eu.
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1. introduction
The transition of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece from labour-exporting to labour-im-
porting countries was considered to be one of the most important new developments in the 
European migration landscape of the 1990s (Arango 2000). In Spain, immigration repre-
sented, without any doubt, one of the two most important social changes since the end of 
Franco’s dictatorship and the approval of the Spanish Constitution in 1978. Immigration to 
Spain already experienced sensible growth in the 1990s. However, it is only at the beginning 
of the new century that migration flows to Spain started to increase rapidly and intensively. 
Between 2000 and 2011, foreign population grew from one million to almost six million, and 
Spain became one of the major immigration-receiving countries in Europe after having been 
an emigration country for decades. During the so-called “prodigious decade” of economic 
and demographic growth (Oliver 2008), the foreign-born population in Spain reached 14.3 
per cent of the Spanish population, i.e., very close to the percentages of “older” immigration 
countries such as Germany (12.9 per cent) or the Netherlands in 2009 (11.1 per cent) (OECD 
2011). With respect to the type of migration flows, labour migration certainly plays the lion’s 
share in the Spanish migration regime. Among the third-country nationals legally residing 
in Spain at the beginning of 2012, 68 per cent already have a long-term residence permit. 
Among those with a temporary residence permit, 46 per cent have a permit for work pur-
poses, and 26 per cent have a permit for family reasons. Only a small portion of immigrants 
to Spain currently consists of asylum-seekers and students.
Nevertheless, the high number of foreign workers in Spain was not the result of an ef-
ficient immigration policy. For almost two decades, Spain lacked adequate entry channels 
to meet the growing demand for foreign low-skilled labour to meet the labour requirements 
that could not be fulfilled by natives, who preferred to wait for better employment conditions 
rather than take low-skilled and low-paid jobs (Izquierdo-Escribano 1993; Cachón 2002; 
Arango 1993). The increasing labour demand in the Spanish labour market was accompanied 
by the almost complete absence of a political debate on how recruitment of foreign workers 
should be regulated. Similar to other Southern European countries, Spain’s main commit-
ments to the European membership was to strengthen its border controls and to fight against 
irregular migration.2 With respect to foreign labour, Spanish law allowed foreign workers to 
be hired only if natives or citizens from “privileged” countries were unavailable for the same 
job. The so-called “labour market check” was meant to protect the Spanish labour market 
in times of high unemployment rates. The Spanish law also allowed for the establishment of 
yearly contingents of foreign workers under the name of the contingente, which offered yearly 
a certain number of entry slots for a predefined range of occupations in a limited number of 
economic sectors. 
2  As a matter of fact, the first socialist government approved an Asylum and Refugee Law in 1984 and the Foreigners 
Bill (Ley de Extranjería) n. 7 of 1985, which was more focused on administrative issues regarding the entry and 
residence of foreigners than on conceiving effective regulation instruments (Arango 2000). 
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All existing legal channels to recruit labour migrants required a foreign worker to be re-
cruited before his (or her) entry in Spain, which produced slow and cumbersome recruitment 
procedures. One of the most significant consequences of the lack of efficient recruitment 
channels was the growth of irregular migration and irregular employment, which were 
favoured by an extended informal economy, very weak labour market controls and a wide-
spread toleration of irregular residence (Baldwin-Edwards 1997; King, Black 1997). In such a 
context, mass regularisations became the most suitable policy instrument for addressing the 
challenge represented by irregular migration whereas the contingente was used to regularise 
immigrants who had already found jobs in the country (Arango 2000). 
Only at the beginning of the new century did several Autonomous Communities3 
and employers’ associations start to support the introduction of more efficient tools for the 
recruitment of foreign workers. Both parties had become aware that economic growth in 
Spain also depended on the creation of efficient recruitment channels for foreign labour. The 
recruitment of foreign workers was also supported by the two largest trade unions (Unión 
General de Trabajadores and Comisiones Obreras). However, the unions also claimed that there 
was a need for the protection of native workers to avoid salary dumping due to immigration 
(El País, 13/07/200). Comisiones Obreras, for instance, claimed that policy makers had to 
analyse very carefully the national employment situation before opening new entry avenues 
for foreign workers (El País, 22/07/2000). 
Despite the increasing requests proceeding from employers’ associations, Autonomous 
Communities, trade unions and the Partito Popular government (1996-2004) still presented 
immigration as a threat to national security rather than as an opportunity for the country’s 
labour market. It was only in 2004 that the new Spanish government chaired by the Spanish 
Socialist Party decided to reform the existing regulation in response to the increasing immi-
gration pressure towards Spain. The government’s aim was to design an immigration model 
able to combine the management of regular migration flows with the fight against irregular 
migration, the strengthening of border controls, the relationships with third-world countries 
and, last but not least, the integration of immigrants. In this respect, the former Secretary of 
State for Immigration, Consuelo Rumì, explained that the objective of the new regulation 
was to help prevent irregular migration by enacting efficient recruitment policies “because if 
immigration management is efficient, if immigration channels work, if entry quotas are flex-
ible and agile and the General Regime can respond to the needs […] if bilateral agreements 
work, if the trade unions and the employers’ associations collaborate, migrants will see that 
they can legally enter our country” (El País, 12/05/2004). 
Hence, the new Regulation n. 2393 of 2004, which was based on a large consensus among 
the trade unions, the employers’ associations and the Socialist government, was conceived as a 
systematic reform that included different admission channels, including an individual regula-
risation mechanism (arraigo), and recognised the prominence of labour migration. Thus, the 
3  The Spanish State is divided into 17 territorial units, the Autonomous Communities, and the two Autonomous 
Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. Since the democratic transition, the Spanish state has transferred a large number of 
competences to the Autonomous Governments.
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preamble of the Spanish immigration regulation n. 2393 of 30/12/2004 stated, “The architec-
ture of the current migration system and the admission of new immigrants into our country 
are fundamentally based on the need to fill job vacancies”.4 Additionally, the Socialist govern-
ment transferred immigration competences from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs by creating a special Secretary of State for Immigration and 
Emigration5, whereas the Ministry of the Interior maintained its competences in preventing 
illegal migration and continued to be responsible for the asylum procedure. The creation of 
the new Secretary of State reflected a clear intention to give certain priorities to the regulation 
of labour migration by turning immigration more into a matter of labour than of national 
security. In this respect, a stakeholder of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration stated, “It 
is important where migration management is located […] Spain has clearly bet, and I think 
correctly, on the Ministry of Labour and Immigration because migration flows to Spain are 
predominantly labour migration flows” (MTIN, 5/10/2011).
Clearly, the main objective of the new regulation was to provide the formal tools to 
readjust the mismatch between labour demand and supply, which is deeply embedded in 
the structure of the Spanish production system. Many of the key informants interviewed 
for this report have highlighted the relevance of this point. According to a representative 
of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, many young natives prefer to be unemployed 
rather than to take jobs below their “acceptance threshold” (MTIN, 11/10/2011). Likewise, 
the interviewed human resources manager of an important Spanish restaurant chain stated 
the following in reference to Spain: “We do not produce electronic chips. We are a service 
industry […] However, the social conditions of the restaurant business cause people to not 
want to work in this sector” (RESTAURANT, 2/11/2011). Foreign labour demand concerns 
mainly but not only low-skilled jobs. According to several observers, Spain is also affected by 
a worrying lack of native workers with specific medium-level skills, which is embedded in the 
poor performance of the vocational training provided by the Spanish education system. The 
human resources manager of a large Spanish energy business stated, “In Spain, vocational 
training is bad […] There is a very deep mismatch between the market and the education 
system” (ENERGY, 6/10/2011). 
The predominance of labour migration over other types of migration flows during an era 
of spectacular economic growth turned Spain into one of the major labour importers in the 
European Union. Things changed suddenly after the big economic crisis of 2008. In fact, in 
that year, Spain did not only experience the consequences of the global financial crisis but also 
a “national” economic crisis, which resulted from the bursting of the Spanish construction 
bubble that had boosted the economy in prior years. The economic downturn in 2008-2009 
quickly transformed one of the major labour importers in the European Union into one of 
4  “En la arquitectura del sistema migratorio actual la admisión de nuevos inmigrantes en nuestro país está 
fundamentalmente basada en la necesidad de cobertura de puestos de trabajo”. (Translation of the author). 
5  The new Secretary of State had competences that were previously shared by the General Direction for the 
Organization of Migration Flows, the Institute of Migrations and Social Services and the Government Delegation for 
Foreigners and Immigration. 
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the European countries with the highest unemployment rate of natives and foreigners (17 
and 30 per cent, respectively, in 2010). Strikingly, the recently approved Immigration Law n. 
2/2009 followed by Immigration Regulation n. 557 of 30 June 2011 did not change much 
of the existing labour migration regime. The maintenance of the status quo did not only 
reinforce the connection between immigration and the labour market, but it also revealed the 
legislature’s intention “to consolidate a model based on regularity and linked to the labour 
market”. In other words, and despite the economic crisis, labour migration is still considered 
to be the main pillar of the Spanish migration regime. The main goal of this report is to anal-
yse the major components of such a model as well as its strengths and weaknesses, especially 
considering the consequences of the economic crisis of 2008.
2. AdMission policiEs For ForEign WorkErs: thE 
institutionAl FrAMEWork
The two main recruitment channels in the Spanish labour migration regime are the General 
Regime (Regimén General) and the contingente. 
According to the General Regime, individuals are recruited based on an employer’s nom-
inative and individual application to hire a certain worker. In this case, recruitment depends 
on the “national employment situation” (Situación Nacional de Empleo) based on a prelimi-
nary labour market check. Before hiring a foreign worker, employers have to check with the 
corresponding office of the Public Employment Service in the Autonomous Community6 
whether there are Spanish or EU citizens available for the offered job. In such a case, the 
employment offer will be publicly made at the national level through all of the channels avail-
able to the Public Employment Service. After 25 days, the employer has to communicate the 
results of the selection procedure to the corresponding Employment Office. If no native or 
EU foreigner can perform the offered occupation, the office expedites a negative certification, 
which will include the number of potential workers who applied for the offered position, the 
number of unemployed people registered in the province who could perform the offered job 
and all of the workers who could be employed in the offered occupation after being adequate-
ly trained. A negative certification with the aforementioned information will be evaluated by 
the Secretary of State for Immigration, who has the final word on the employers’ applications. 
6  Please note that the competences on active labour market policies have been transferred to the Autonomous 
Communities. Thus, the Autonomous Employment Services are responsible for issuing the negative certification 
for the employment of foreign workers. Nevertheless, the work and residence permits are issued by the central 
government. The only exception is currently represented by Catalonia, where the Autonomic Government is entitled 
to issue initial work permits, as will be explained later in this section. 
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Figure 1: Individual Recruitment in the spanish Labour Migration Regime
The labour market check can be avoided only for occupations included in the “Catalogue-of-
Hard-to-Find-Occupations” (Catalogo de Ocupaciones de Dificil Cobertura). If a vacancy refers 
to a job type listed in the Catalogue, an employer can immediately start the hiring process 
without undergoing the labour market check. In this case, an employer presents a formal 
recruitment offer. Based on this offer, the immigrant has to apply for an entry visa to work 
in Spain in his or her country of origin. The Catalogue is elaborated jointly by the National 
Employment Service, the Autonomous Employment Service and the Secretary of State of 
Immigration. The Autonomous Communities elaborate a pre-catalogue that is then sent to 
and evaluated by the central office of the National Employment Service. The Catalogue has 
to fulfil fixed criteria. It will not include those occupations that could be filled by unem-
ployed people who have participated in occupational training sessions organised by the Public 
Employment Service. In the last stage, the content of the Catalogue has to be approved by the 
Tripartite Labour Commission of Immigration (Comisión Laboral Tripartita de Inmigración), 
which is composed of the representatives of the employers’ associations, the trade unions and 
the Secretary of State of Immigration. The final version of the Catalogue is published every 
three months as a resolution of the Public Employment Service.7 
7  Please note, that until 2011, the elaboration of the Catalogue was based on a top-down procedure. The central office 
of the Public Employment Service elaborated a type of pre-catalogue based on the available statistical information that 
was sent to the Employment Services of the Autonomous Communities. The provisions contained in the pre-catalogue 
were then negotiated with the employers’ associations and the trade unions. The pre-catalogue was changed according 
to the labour offers submitted to the offices of the Employment Services in each Autonomous Community and sent 
back to the central office of the Public Employment Service in Madrid, where the final version of the Catalogue was 
elaborated. 
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Figure 2: the elaboration of the Catalogue-of-Hard-to-Find-occupations
In contrast to the Catalogue, which regulates individual recruitment, the contigente allows 
Spanish companies to recruit a group of people to be employed in a specific business to per-
form a specific type of occupation. In this case, foreign workers are not selected based on 
nominal recruitment but on generic offers in the country of origin. Yearly, the contingente also 
offers entry slots for temporary jobs in the agricultural sector for a maximum of nine months 
and a certain number of stable occupations. Since 2006, the number of available stable and 
temporary occupations has been published yearly by the Secretary of State of Immigration.8 
In general, recruitment is possible only in the countries which have signed bilateral agree-
ments with Spain related to the recruitment of foreign workers (see also point 5 in this report). 
The selection process occurs in the country of origin after the interested businesses have sub-
mitted their formal requests for workers to the Secretary of State. The selection commission 
is composed of representatives of the Spanish government and delegates of the country of 
origin. Additionally, the selection commission may include (though it is not obliged to do so) 
representatives of the employer and employers’ associations. The selected workers sign a pre-
contract in the country of origin, and the real contract is then signed in Spain. The contract 
must contain the worker’s net salary provisions, which have to respect the minimum salary 
conditions established by the collective agreements signed between the employers and trade 
unions of each job category. It is also important to note that the contingente also accounts for 
the possibility of training foreign workers in their countries of origin. 
As can be seen in table 1, the number of stable occupations offered through this channel 
was relatively low compared with the initial work permits issued between 2006 and 2010: 
8  See Resolution of 30 December of 2005, Resolution of 26 December of 2006, Resolution of 26 December 2007, 
Resolution of 26 December of 2008, Resolution of 23 December of 2009, and Ordinance of 28 December 2011.
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table 1: Contingente of foreign workers (2006-2011)
Contingente Initial Work Permit
2006 16,878 101,079
2007 27,034 222,561
2008 15,731 69,020
2009 901 26,699
2010 168 18,675
2011 14 n.a.
source: Mtin
For this reason, the contingente is considered a small engine in the overall Spanish recruitment 
system. A delegate of the Public Employment Service highlighted this secondary role stating, 
“The only important thing about the contingente is the name” (SEPE, 28/11/2011). 
In contrast to other Southern European countries, the regular entry channels of the new 
Spanish admission regime have never been limited to the recruitment of low-skilled foreign 
workers. As a matter of fact, the contingente and the Catalogue can also include high-skilled 
occupations, such as doctors and engineers. Additionally, since 2007, Spain has used a special 
migration avenue to hire high-skilled workers, called the “Unit for Large Companies and 
Strategic Groups” (Unidad de Grandes Empresas). The Unit was first introduced by ministe-
rial agreement and allows Spanish businesses to recruit high-skilled workers from non-EU 
countries under certain conditions without undergoing a labour market check.9 One of the 
main reasons for creating this department in 2007 was that the negotiations concerning the 
European directive on high-skilled workers in Brussels were proceeding more slowly than 
expected. At the same time, some large Spanish firms needed a rapid supply of high-skilled 
workers for their businesses. Thus, the government created the Unit to provide large Spanish 
companies with a faster procedure for recruiting high-skilled workers during a period in 
which most of the offices of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration were overwhelmed by a 
high number of applications. As a Spanish state official noted, “The idea behind the Unidad 
de Grandes Empresas is that there are strategic groups which need a more agile recruitment 
channel. In this respect, the Spanish public administration shows its intention to collaborate 
in this task. We are talking about strategic groups which include universities, large compa-
nies, and artistic collectives” (MTIN, 5/10/2011)10. In 2009, the Unit was institutionalised as 
part of the Spanish admission system by the new immigration law n. 2/2009. Two years later, 
the Spanish government adopted the EU directive on the recruitment of high-skilled foreign 
9  This regulation is mainly addressed to large companies. Businesses that intend to recruit workers through this Unit 
must fulfil at least one of the following conditions: i) have more than five hundred workers; ii) have an international 
business volume of 200 million euros per year in Spain; or iii) not less of one million Euros of foreign investments 
in the three years preceding the application. Additionally, the businesses have to demonstrate that, in the three years 
before the application, they benefited from foreign investments of no less than one million euros. In the case of small 
and medium-sized companies, the recruitment of foreign workers is limited to the sectors of information technology, 
renewable energy, the environment, water, health, bio-pharmacy, biotechnology, aeronautics and aerospace.
10  A detailed list of the interviews conducted with Spanish and Canadian key-informants is provided at the end of this 
article. 
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workers as part of its national legislation. Under the EU system, however, the employer has 
to perform a labour market check, which makes the “Blue Card” less attractive for employ-
ers than the “Large Companies Unit”, where the absence of a labour market test favours a 
quick and less bureaucratised micro-matching between labour supply and demand (UGE, 
12/07/2011).
Besides the individual or group employment by a Spanish company or employer, the 
Spanish labour migration regulation also accounts for the self-employment option. In this 
case, however, labour migrants have to demonstrate that they have: i) the credentials required 
for the proposed activity; ii) the necessary financial funding to start their business and, since 
2011; iii) the capacity to create new jobs through their business. As noted by a Spanish civil 
servant, the self-employment option does not seem to be very appealing to foreigners will-
ing to come to Spain. The reasons for this do not only lie in the restrictiveness of the entry 
criteria, but also in the same Spanish production system, which is characterized by a high 
demand of low-skilled jobs whereas self-employment (especially the creation of business) is 
often focused on medium- and high-skilled activities (MTIN, 17/11/2011). This makes it dif-
ficult “to ground a business in a country in which the majority of the requested occupations 
are low-skilled occupations” (MTIN, 3/06/2011).
As highlighted, the recruitment of foreign workers in Spain mainly depends on the 
institutional cooperation between the Secretary of State of Immigration, the National and 
the Autonomous Employment Services, with the support of employers’ associations and 
trade unions. It was only recently that Autonomous Communities were further involved in 
what is predominantly a competence of the central state. The Generalitat (the Catalonian 
Autonomous Government) was given the competence to proceed and issue initial work 
permits for those foreign workers who will be employed in Catalonia (Art. 138 Estatut de 
Catalunya). The acquisition of this competence has been described as part of a general pro-
cess of administrative simplification, in which the immigrant deals with one administration 
only (GEN1 7/07/2011).11 In this process, the state and the autonomous administrations are 
completely independent from each another: the Autonomous Community cannot intervene 
in the state’s decision to issue a residence permit, whereas the state cannot intervene in the 
Autonomy Community’s decision to issue a work permit. Certainly, the starting phase of 
such a competence transfer was not easy. Nevertheless, the interviewed delegates from the 
autonomous administrations were satisfied with the final result of the process, which was also 
facilitated by the small volume of requests.
All in all, the Spanish case reflects an effort to establish a rational entry policy which 
combines individual and collective recruitment for stable workers, temporary recruitment 
schemes and a fast-track entry channel for high-skilled workers. In the following section, we 
will analyse whether, to what extent and on which criteria the Spanish regime succeeded in 
matching labour offer and demand at least before the crisis of 2008. 
11  For the moment, Catalonia is the sole Autonomous Community that has implemented this new procedure. The 
Autonomous Community of Andalusia also foresees implementing this competence into its autonomous regulation but 
has not done so yet. 
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3. QuAlitAtiVE VErsus QuAntitAtiVE critEriA
The Spanish labour migration regime is based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative crite-
ria. Where quantitative criteria are used, the regime’s regulations show a clear preference for 
provisional numbers of entry slots instead of caps. The contingente, for instance, determines 
a yearly number of entry slots for stable and temporary occupations, whose number can be 
changed depending on the state of the labour market. According to a high-ranking state 
official of the Spanish General Directorate of Immigration, the existence of provisional entry 
slots allows for more recruitment flexibility, whereas “the existence of caps forces you to cal-
culate efficiently the caps, which is not always easy.” Thus, caps are seen less as an instrument 
of efficient recruitment and more as an instrument of control that would stiffen the system 
as a whole (MTIN, 5/10/2011). However, there have also been state officials who criticised 
the extreme flexibility of the Spanish contingente. For instance, according to a senior advisor 
of the Public Employment Service, the absence of caps (and therefore the lack of limitations) 
reflects an unwillingness to pursue any form of planning: “To limit means to plan ahead. In 
Spain, there has been no planning in this sense […] I would prefer that the key did not lie 
in the hands of the employers, that there were planning and quotas and that the system was 
transparent. The point system is better and more democratic” (SEPE 28/11/2011). The lack of 
rational planning in the Spanish migration regime12 was also outlined by the delegate of the 
Spanish Doctors’ Trade Union: “In 2006, the increase in the number of immigrants together 
with the increasing number of hospitals built in the Autonomous Communities produced the 
sensation that more doctors were needed […]. Now that the Ministry has decided to return 
to the previous situation, the sensation is that there are too many doctors in Spain” (CESM, 
17/10/2011).
The Catalogue represents the most relevant qualitative selection criterion because it al-
lows faster employment procedures for certain occupations. As previously noted, the type of 
occupations included in the Catalogue depended on the estimations based on the national 
employment situation. However, more than one interviewed state official pointed out that 
a general policy of laissez faire, which favoured the inclusion of as many occupations as pos-
sible, existed during the years of the economic boom. Only recently have political criteria 
clearly predominated in the elaboration of the Catalogue. The length of the Catalogue and 
the number of professions included in it has been reduced considerably. Currently, most of 
the professions in the Catalogue are related to the health sector and the shipping industry.13 
For instance, lifeguards and electricians have not been included in the most recent Catalogue, 
even though demand for these occupations exists. Including these occupations would have 
12  In fact, some rough estimates for nominal recruitments were only provided by the Secretary of State in 2006 and 
2007. 
13  In this respect, the author was informed about the existence of an agreement between the trade unions and 
employers of the shipping industry which allows some professions such as boat mechanics and boat cooks, to be 
included in the Catalogue. The agreement was aimed at facilitating the recruiting procedures for those employers who 
decided to keep their boats under the Spanish flag. However, according to the information obtained, the agreement 
will be withdrawn in the near future.
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incurred high political costs at a time when Spain is experiencing one of the highest unem-
ployment rates in its history (MTIN, 3/6/2011). 
Finally, Spain has never implemented recruitment programs for specific types of occupa-
tions. The only example in this respect could be the job search visa which was introduced by 
regulation n. 2393/2004. Formally, the job search visa allowed foreigners to search actively for 
jobs in Spain for three months after their arrival. However, this type of visa was only issued 
for the sectors and occupations in which lack of labour was recognised by the government. 
Eventually, the use of job search visa was limited to a very limited number of slots in the 
domestic sector and only used for a couple of years. 
The Spanish regime also accounts for qualitative criteria based on the workers’ nationali-
ties. According to the bilateral agreements signed by their governments with Spain, Peruvians 
and Chilean citizens are allowed to access the Spanish labour market without undergoing a 
labour market check. Moreover, the children of Spanish citizens living abroad can access the 
Spanish labour market without passing through the labour market check. Finally, the limita-
tion of the contingente to the third-world countries with which bilateral agreements have been 
signed can also be considered a qualitative criterion (and positive selection for the citizens of 
these countries). By contrast, there are no explicit criteria which produce a negative selection, 
although the new employment stop for Romanian citizens in 2011 could be considered a type 
of negative selection towards Romanian workers with respect to other European citizens. 
The requirement of foreign credentials recognition seems to be particularly relevant in 
the case of high-skilled occupations in the public health sector. In the case of low-skilled and 
medium-skilled qualifications, which represent the majority of the occupations demanded 
by the Spanish labour market, foreign credentials only need to be recognised in those oc-
cupations for which a certain degree of monitoring responsibility is required. To conclude, 
language has never been a selection criterion in Spanish migration policies. Only recently 
has language become a selection criterion for the recruitment of foreign doctors who want to 
start their medical training in Spain after finishing their medical degrees in a foreign country. 
Hence, a doctor from a country whose official language is not Spanish has to demonstrate suf-
ficient knowledge of the Spanish language (Level C1 or C2) according to the classification of 
the Cervantes Institute or the Official Language Institute in the applicant’s country of origin. It 
is worth noting that the language criterion is not a consequence of the economic crisis. Rather, 
the requirement resulted from the enforcement of the European directive on the regulated 
professions. However, this innovation could also be seen as a form of positive discrimination 
because Latin Americans are implicitly favoured by the language requirement. 
4. MAtching lAbour oFFEr And dEMAnd
The Spanish migration regime is a demand-oriented regime in which labour market needs 
predominate. As stated by a high-ranking state official of the Public Employment Service, 
the national employment situation and the employer’s interests were the driving forces of the 
Spanish recruitment system (SEPE, 28/11/2011). However, the predominance of the demand 
factor is confirmed by the general request for a labour market check and the central role 
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played by the employers in the labour recruitment procedure. By contrast, there is no points-
based system, whereas the use of channels driven by formal offers, such as the job search visa, 
was limited to a few years and only possible for certain occupations and geographical regions. 
A state official of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration explained, “The job 
search visa represents a variant of the contingente and cannot be compared with the job search 
visa that exists in other countries in which the migrant looks for a job” (MTIN, 3/06/2011). 
In sum, it can be argued that, although the Spanish labour regime was more open than those 
of the other European member states to foreign labour, the regime still adhered closely to the 
European philosophy, which states that the entry of foreign workers should be closely linked 
to the employment situation and the market demand. In fact, residence permits for work pur-
poses in Spain have to be renewed two times before becoming long-term residence permits 
and renewals always depend on the pre-existence of a labour relationship. This procedure 
reflects a certain reluctance to permanent migration schemes in Spain that still characterizes 
most EU migration regimes. The lack of formal offer-oriented channels has been outlined as 
one of the system’s weaknesses. A state official of the Generalitat stated, “With respect to the 
Spanish immigration model, what is conditioning us is the inertia of our tradition. Spain has 
to understand that it is not only the labour market that sets the trend. Spain does not know 
how to compete for human capital. We still understand immigration as a problem of social 
services instead of as a resource” (GEN2, 22/06/2011). 
Employers’ and employers’ associations played a very important role in the Spanish 
labour migration regime. As the interviewed member of CECOT, the Catalan employers’ as-
sociation, explained, “Our participation in the recruitment procedure in the country of origin 
was related to our role as intermediaries for those businesses that asked us to find workers 
with a given profile. In particular, we were asked to recruit medium-skilled workers, such as 
welders, tinkers or bus drivers. We were never asked to recruit high-skilled workers. When we 
could not find the requested workers in Spain, we checked the Catalogue and went to Eastern 
European countries to search for workers. When we had a special office for this goal in the 
country of origin, as we had in Bulgaria, we also used the individual recruitment channel. 
Otherwise, we resorted to the contingente (I mean, to the ministry)” (CECOT, 21/06/2011).
Despite the significant role played by employers in the overall recruitment procedure, 
interviewed civil servants outlined that the jobs included in the contingente and the Catalogue 
did not always reflect the market demand but were much more the outcome of a political ne-
gotiation, in which the Autonomous Employment Services played a major role. For instance, 
almost all of the interviewees from the public administration and the trade unions noted 
that the first few catalogues were extremely long. This length mainly depended on whether 
and how the Autonomous Communities intervened in the construction of the Catalogue. 
According to the representative of the trade union UGT, during the economic burst, some 
Autonomous Communities “included an infinite list of occupations in the Catalogue, and 
nothing was done to stop this practice” (UGT, 27/5/2011). The Catalogue was also criticised 
for being too specific for the “generalised” needs of the Spanish labour market. In fact, the 
job categories included in the Catalogue refer to specific types of jobs, even though the greater 
part of the demand for labour in Southern Europe (including Spain) concerns unspecified, 
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low-skilled activities in agriculture, domestic service and construction. Only in the case of 
large companies does the application for very specific positions seem to allow the speeding 
up of recruitment procedures even in cases where a negative certification is necessary. As the 
human resources manager of a large communication company stated, “If you want to recruit 
somebody with a very specific professional background to do a certain job (…) it is not too 
difficult to demonstrate that we effectively need somebody with a profile that we do not have 
here in Spain (COMM, 12/11/2012)”. Additionally, the representatives of the Spanish trade 
unions have reported that the use of the Catalogue is not necessarily exempt from fraud. 
As a senior Spanish state official has noted, many employers have recruited foreign workers 
through the Catalogue specifically to avoid the labour market check, and these same workers 
have then been employed in positions that differed from the positions for which they were 
originally recruited. 
By contrast, more satisfaction was reported with respect to the implementation of the 
contingente, which “responded to the needs of large and established businesses that demanded 
special treatment” (SEPE, 28/11/2011). Even though the initial implementation phase 
was difficult, the contingente is currently considered by the public administration to be a 
“rapid instrument that goes well and is completely fitted to the needs of the labour market” 
(MTIN, 3/6/2011), where the public administration and the employers complement each 
other. On the one hand, the interviewed human resources managers were quite satisfied with 
the functioning of the contingente, particularly with the role played by the Spanish public 
administration. The CECOT delegate stated, “At that time, the advantages of the system 
offered by the Ministry were that it allowed businesses to respond to the problem related to a 
serious and quite urgent labour demand” (CECOT, 21/06/2011). Several interviews showed 
that both the public administration and employers agree on this point. The human resources 
manager of the energy business argued that, without the help of the public administration, 
recruitment in this form would not have been possible. Additionally, a delegate of the General 
Directorate of Immigration stated, “The work performed by the employers’ association is very 
important, because the employers that search in the countries of origin and create determi-
nate networks” (MTIN, 5/10/2011). In a similar vein, the human resources manager of the 
restaurant chain highlighted the positive experience of the contingente, which, in his opinion, 
reflected a “model within a legal framework which allowed us to do things in the proper way” 
(RESTAURANT, 2/11/2011). Satisfaction was also expressed with respect to the contingente 
for temporary workers. Certainly, the recruitment of temporary workers still has weaknesses 
that are mainly related to the length of the procedure. In addition, the success of these proce-
dures depends primarily on the region in which they are implemented (González-Enriquez, 
Reynes Ramón 2011). Nonetheless, employers still show quite a high level of satisfaction with 
regard to this recruitment method, which has been considered to provide a certain degree of 
security and protection for both the employers and the workers. 
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5. rEgulArisAtion procEssEs As FunctionAl EQuiVAlEnts 
in thE spAnish lAbour MigrAtion rEgiME
Regularisation processes deserve special attention in the analysis of the Spanish labour mi-
gration regime. Due to the inefficiency of formal recruitment channels for almost 20 years, 
they became a key tool for readjusting the balance between ineffective state regulations and 
the large flow of immigrants. Their function as “crisis management” policy tools must be 
embedded in the dysfunctional mechanisms that have characterised the Spanish migration 
regime in the past 20 years. During this time period, irregular migration became a structural 
component of the Spanish migration regime because of the country’s inadequate recruitment 
procedures, extended informal economy and insufficient internal controls. In fact, the infor-
mal labour market is calculated to be approximately 22 per cent of the national GDP, and it 
is particularly extended in precarious labour sectors, such as domestic work or construction 
sectors. These sectors have attracted a large number of irregular migrants. Yet, regularisations 
seemed to be the most useful tool for rebalancing the contradictions of the Spanish migration 
regime, where irregularity and informality constantly feed each other.
Since 1985, Spain has conducted six regularisation programmes. Each programme was 
presented as a special “one-off” measure. The first regularisation programme occurred in 
1985-1986 and was followed by others in 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005. Most of the pro-
cesses targeted irregular workers. However, the programmes have sometimes been extended 
to other migrant categories, such as relatives (1996, 2000 and 2001), asylum seekers (2000) 
and specific nationalities (e.g., Ecuadorians) (2001). The requirements for applying to the 
programmes were not always clear. A general condition common to all of the regularisation 
processes was that applicants had to prove that they had been living in Spain prior to a certain 
date (reference date). The lack of a criminal record was another essential condition for most 
schemes. In some cases, the application requirements included previous employment as a de-
sirable aspect, but the regularisation of 2005 made the residence permit binding dependent 
on the existence of a work contract and the foreign worker’s registration in the Social Security 
System. In contrast to previous regularisation processes, the employer had to apply for the 
regularisation of his or her employees. Legalisation only occurred if the worker had registered 
in the Social Security System and if the first month’s dues had been paid. For these reasons, 
the regularisation of 2005 has been described by state officials as a “real” regularisation.
In total, Spain regularised almost 1.2 million immigrants from 1986 to 2005. The 2005 
scheme was the most successful one, as it allowed for the regularisation of 578,375 applicants. 
This process considerably increased the size of the legal immigrant population in Spain. 
In fact, compared with 2004, in 2005, the number of legal non-EU citizens increased by 
a total of 653,050. In addition, from 2004-2005, the number of foreign workers registered 
in the Social Security System increased by a total of 616,655 to 1,757,081 (Finotelli, 2011). 
In general, the residence permits issued after each regularisation process were valid for one 
year. Thus, like immigrants in Italy during that time period, a regularised immigrant in 
Spain had a precarious status and was required to renew his or her permit regularly. In ad-
dition, the process excluded a sizeable number of eligible applicants because they lacked the 
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necessary documents, such as the official certificates of their registration to the municipal 
registry. However, the large number of immigrants who participated and obtained residence 
permits remains striking. Furthermore, data suggest that most of them could also renew 
their residence permits in the following years (Finotelli, Arango 2011). Certainly, regularised 
immigrants are often more exposed than other migrants to the risk of losing their regular 
status. Furthermore, it should also be noted that having a residence permit does not always 
prevent an immigrant from working illegally if the internal controls are weak, and there is 
high demand for labour in the informal sector. However, it can be reasonably assumed that 
regularisations also contributed to the employment stabilisation of a substantial proportion of 
the regularised immigrants.
Taking into account that most foreigners now living regularly in Spain experienced a 
more or less lengthy period of irregularity before getting their first residence permit, regu-
larisations are likely to have allowed not only the legal inclusion but also the stabilisation 
of almost half of the total foreign population. The stabilisation function of regularisation 
processes becomes even clearer when we compare the number of regular foreign residents in 
2006 in Spain with the number of regularised immigrants between 2000 and 2005 (the year 
of the last big regularisation). 
table 4: Foreign population and regularised immigrants  
in spain (2000-2006)
Regularised
Foreigners 2000-2005
Regular non-eU 
foreigners
31/12/2006
% of residents 
regularised
total 1,019,997 2,360,804 43%
Bolivia 43,197 52,587 82%
Romania 127,586 211,325 60%
Ecuador 199,152 376,233 52%
senegal 13,965 28,560 48%
Ukraine 30,576 52,760 57%
Pakistan 18,938 29,669 63%
Bulgaria 31,469 60,174 52%
Algeria 17,748 36,499 48%
Colombia 101,474 225,504 44%
Morocco 146,610 543,721 26%
China 22,397 99,526 22%
Dominican 
Republic 5,936 58,126 10%
Peru 6,250 90,906 7%
source: spanish Ministry of labour and Immigration. 
In sum, regularisations enabled governments to regain control over the presence of irregular 
foreigners, helped to stabilise foreign populations and enabled unwanted immigrants, the 
so-called “wanted but not welcome” (Zolberg 1987) immigrants, to become politically in-
tegrated into the formal labour market structures. In this vein, regularisations have helped 
governments to meet the structural needs of their respective national economies by providing 
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a posteriori the needed foreign labour force when official admission policies failed. In this 
way, regularisations turned out to be one of the most important mechanisms for repairing 
the inconsistencies of the Spanish migration regime, becoming, like what occurs in other 
Southern European countries, the main functional equivalent for active labour migration 
policies in the Spanish regime.14
Most recently, the Spanish government recognised the impossibility of completely 
preventing irregularities and it introduced the arraigo, a new regularisation procedure that 
“corrects” irregularities on an individual basis. The arraigo can be obtained by demonstrating 
either the pre-existence of a work relationship for at least one year in Spain or social integra-
tion (essentially in the form of family relationships) for at least three years. After one year, the 
arraigo can be renewed like any other residence permit under the conditions established by 
law. The connection of the arraigo to a pre-existing labour relationship turns this tool into a 
“third way” (Perez Infante 2009: 16) of obtaining a Spanish work permit. However, few work 
permits have been issued in connection with the arraigo laboral, and this number is much 
lower than the number of applications. Certainly, the volume of the individual regularisa-
tions cannot be compared with the mass regularisation processes of the past. However, the 
yearly stocks of residence permits always include a remarkable volume of permits for arraigo.15 
That is why the arraigo as an individual regularisation form can still be considered a major 
functional equivalent of the formal labour recruitment schemes in the Spanish regime.
6. thE ExtErnAl diMEnsion oF lAbour MigrAtion policiEs
The European Union certainly played a major role in the external dimension of labour migra-
tion policies in Spain. As Spanish state officials have noted, the relevance of the European 
Union can be observed both in the recent transposition of a large number of directives into 
Spanish law as well as in the recent boost given to high-skilled migration through the creation 
of the Large Companies Unit (MTIN, 05/10/2011). However, the Spanish government was 
also able to develop its own, very specific external dimension of migration policies based on the 
signing of bilateral agreements with third countries to regulate foreign workers recruitment. 
As can be seen in table 3, to date, Spain has signed four different types of bilateral agreements 
with non-EU countries: 1) The Agreements on the Readmission of Irregular Migrants; 2) The 
Agreements on the Regulation of Migration Flows; 3) The Framework Agreements on the 
14  The number of asylum seekers and family migrants in Spain is still too low to be really considered functional 
equivalents to the Spanish regime. As far as intra-European mobility is concerned, most of the Spanish migrants 
who live in Spain are retirees, while labour migration from Romania has been interrupted in 2011 after the Spanish 
government decided to re-introduce the recruitment stop for Romanian citizens. It must be noted that European 
citizenship can be of advantage in the case of double citizenship. As stated by a Human Resources manager of a 
Spanish communication business, hiring high-skilled Latin American citizens to work in Spain is much easier if they 
also have either the Spanish or another EU citizenship (COMM, 12/11/2012). 
15  According to the most recent data of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration, the yearly stocks of permits issued 
for arraigo increased from approximately from 7,200 in 2006 to 76,433 at the end of 2011. 
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Cooperation on Immigration Issues (“new generation agreements”) and; 4) The Agreements 
on Operative Cooperation. 
table 3: Agreement signed by the spanish government
Readmission 
Agreements
Agreements on 
the regulation of 
migration flows
Framework Cooperation 
Agreements in Immigration 
Matters (“new generation 
agreements”)
Agreements 
on Cooperative 
Cooperation
Morocco (1992) Romania (2001) Peru (2004)
Bulgaria (1996) Dominican Republic (2001) Mali (2007)
slovakia (1999) Poland (2002) guinea (2007)
Estonia (2000) Mauritania (2007) gambia (2006)
guinea-Bissau 
(2003) Morocco (2001) guinea-Bissau (2009)
latvia (2000) Ecuador (2001) Cabo Verte (2007)
lithuania (2000) Colombia (2001) Niger (2008)
FYR Macedonia 
(2006) Bulgaria (2003)
Mauritania (2003) Ukraine (2009)
Romania (2006)
source: Ministry of labour and Immigration
The first bilateral agreements which Spain signed with non-EU countries focused on the 
fight against irregular migration. In contrast, the first agreements directly addressing the 
regulation of migration flows were signed in 2001. However, the so-called Plan Africa (Africa 
Plan) for 2006-2009 marked “a before and afterwards” with respect to the conception of 
bilateral agreements (Asín Cabrera, 2008: 171). The Plan Africa was part of a new diplomatic 
effort to foster positive collaborations with African countries. The plan was a political reac-
tion to the clandestine migration movement from Africa to Spain, which peaked from 2005 
to 2006. The plan addressed two different groups of countries. The first was the group of 
countries of “priority interest” and included countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, 
Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania. These countries were of strategic importance, because of the 
relevance of their migration systems, their economic pre-eminence and their cultural links 
with Spain. The second group was represented by the countries of specific interest which 
needed a special cooperation scheme with Spain. These countries were “either the origin of 
or transit for irregular immigration,” had “fishing or tourism potential” or carried “intense 
historic, cultural or [cooperative] relations” with Spain. (http://www.maec.es/es/Home/
Paginas/20060605_planafricaingles.aspx).
In order to foster cooperation schemes with African countries, the Spanish government 
opened new embassies in Mali, Sudan, and Cabo Verde as well as new offices focusing on tech-
nical cooperation in Cabo Verde, Ethiopia and Senegal. In this respect, it is worth mentioning 
the creation of a new Labour Office in Dakar, which received the support of the ILO and was 
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involved in the pilot project with Senegal. In the framework of Plan Africa, Spain signed “new 
generation agreements” specifically aimed at combating irregular migration with the help of 
effective labour migration policies. The aim of these new agreements was not only to respond 
to the labour needs of the receiving country but also to limit the brain drain phenomena and 
the loss of human capital (Ferrero-Turrión, Lopez-Sala 2009). Spain signed the “new gen-
eration agreements” with Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania Mali, Cabo Verde and Niger. These 
agreements included training options in the country of origin in order to ensure the adequate 
participation of the workers in the Spanish labour market.16 
Bilateral agreements reflect a new “global perspective” on immigration, which for the 
first time explicitly linked the need to combat irregular migration with the imperative to 
pursue a positive regulation of labour migration flows. Additionally, for this reason, bilat-
eral agreements were considered to be win-win deals for all of the parties involved. A highly 
ranked state official of the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration stated: “The sign-
ing of bilateral agreements always entails political compensation for the country of origin. 
Sometimes, this compensation does not need to be explicit. Sometimes, it is simply good for 
some countries to show their own citizens that they have signed these types of contracts with 
Spain” (MTIN, 5/10/2011). Another state official of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration 
highlighted the relevance of political and business relations between two countries: “The suc-
cess and the feasibility of bilateral agreements depend on the compatibility of the two regimes 
involved. It also depends on the political relations between the countries and those between 
the two countries’ business sectors. Moreover, bilateral relations allow for more permanent 
relations. For instance, we are currently creating a joint system with some Latin American 
countries for recognising work experience. For this reason, I think that coordination between 
the Employment Services of two countries is an important factor” (MTIN, 5/10/2011). 
Finally, the relevance of good bilateral relations was also highlighted by the business manag-
ers interviewed for this report: “It is only possible to implement recruitment policies with 
countries which have good relationships with Spain. We have tried to do something with 
Mali, but the Ministry of Labour and Immigration told us to give up” (ENERGY, 6/10/2011).
To sum up, the change in the conception of international cooperation though bilateral 
agreements reflected the transformation of Spanish immigration policies from a security-
dominated idea of immigration into a view of immigration as a labour resource. However, 
the economic crisis decreased the intensity of Spain’s cooperation with non-EU countries, 
considerably weakening the external dimension of its immigration policies. No additional bi-
lateral agreements have been signed since the crisis, which might not only affect the efficiency 
of recruitment but also of the struggle against irregular migration in the times to come.
16  At this stage, it should also be noted that the increasing cooperation with selected countries also had effects on the 
visa supply trend. Due to the increasing cooperation on immigration issues between Spain and Morocco, for instance, 
the number of tourist visa supplied by Spanish consulates in Morocco has been increasing considerably since 2004.
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7. strEngths And WEAknEssEs oF thE spAnish lAbour 
MigrAtion rEgiME
For almost a decade, the Spanish labour migration regime seemed to have achieved an almost 
perfect match between labour supply and demand. Its success was embedded in a period 
of political stability and intense economic growth which was highly dependent on the avail-
ability of a cheap labour force to compensate for the low level of technological capital in the 
Spanish economy (Aja et al. 2010). Especially after 2004, the government’s openness towards 
a reform of the immigration policy which strengthened active labour governance helped to 
create a model in which the employers’ interests clearly prevailed. The “philosophy” of the 
new labour migration governance approach was based on a wide institutional consensus. In 
fact, the immigration regulation of 2004 strengthened the institutional dialogue by reinforc-
ing the Higher Council of Immigration and creating the Tripartite Labour Commission of 
Immigration in 2005. Most of the stakeholders interviewed for this report agreed that one 
of the main pillars of the Spanish migration regime was the high degree of consensus among 
the government, the employers’ associations and the trade unions: “The Spanish migration 
regime is unique, and its uniqueness lies in the consensus among the stakeholders” (SEPE, 
28/11/2011).17 Apart from a high degree of institutional consensus, the implementation of 
the Spanish labour migration model could also count on an efficient state bureaucracy and, 
particularly, on a high degree of coordination between the national and autonomous adminis-
trative machine through the different employment services (Finotelli, 2012). Furthermore, the 
effort concentrated on signing bilateral agreements should be mentioned. In fact, the Spanish 
government’s diplomatic contacts with third countries have proven to be a fundamental step 
in the correct implementation of the contigente. All of the interviewed stakeholders and busi-
ness managers have confirmed that good diplomatic relations with third countries are highly 
relevant to effective labour migration governance, especially if active immigration policies are 
combined with joint efforts in the struggle against irregular migration.
Overall, the new Spanish labour migration regime represented a praiseworthy example of 
efficient labour migration governance in Southern Europe. During a certain period of time, the 
combination of different recruitment tools was considered more efficient than more obscure 
recruitment systems such as the Italian one (Finotelli, 2012). The Spanish experiment has also 
shown that feasible labour migration governance is a cross-sectoral policy which involves other 
types of policies, such as foreign policy or labour market policy, and different types of actors. 
It was the economic crisis which eventually showed the shortcomings of the Spanish labour 
migration regime. In a very short period of time, Spain became a prime example of the effects 
of an economic downturn on a strong employer-oriented labour migration model which em-
phasised the recruitment of foreign low-skilled workers. The reasons lie in the same structure 
of the Spanish economic system. As experts have explained, one of the main characteristics 
of the Spanish economy is its elasticity and the close dependence between employment and 
17  It remains to be seen whether the creation of the Large Companies Unit in 2007 was the only unilateral policy 
measure taken “outside” the institutional consensus, as the trade unions were excluded from the decision. 
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GDP. There is, therefore, a higher potential both to create and destroy a large number of oc-
cupations in a short period of time in the Spanish economy than in other economies. In other 
words, the spectacular increase in unemployment was mainly due to the breakdown of the 
construction sector and the elasticity of the Spanish labour market, which boosts unemploy-
ment during economic downturns.
Figure 3: Loss of Jobs due to the economic Crisis (absolute values, 000s)
source: survey on Active Population (EPA)
The increase in the unemployment rate was considered the final proof of Spain’s failure to 
properly assess and admit the appropriate number and types of foreign workers over the long 
term. As a Spanish civil servant explained, “the system has failed because it was excessively 
focused on the need for employment and on the employers’ needs. Employers were happy 
because they could simply pay the minimum salary established by the collective agreements” 
(SEPE, 28/11/2011). Moreover, several stakeholders and interviewed persons have referred to 
the poor estimation capacity (or will) of the government or the tendency to estimate based 
on “sensations” (CESM, 17/10/2011). As previously noted, the booming economy, the with-
drawal of a rigid estimation criteria and the high degree of consensus among the government, 
the employers and the trade unions favoured a flexible interpretation of the contingente and 
a generous elaboration of the Catalogue. It is also worth noting that little attention has been 
devoted to human capital. In fact, most of the jobs offered in Spain were low-skilled occupa-
tions in the construction and service industries. Although this selection approach has great 
advantages if employers need a rapid supply of labour, it can also turn into a heavy burden in 
times of economic crisis. Currently, unemployment is particularly high among less-educated 
migrants, who are less flexible in times of economic change and experience greater difficulties 
than other migrants in finding new occupations. The challenge in re-employing unemployed 
foreign workers supported the arguments of those espousing an immigration model oriented 
more towards human capital, in which recruitment depends on immigrants’ skills rather than 
on the national employment situation. 
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However, it is important to observe that labour migration governance depends not only 
on well-designed admission policies, but also on the structural conditions of the production 
system in a given country. The Spanish one is characterized mainly by small and medium-sized 
enterprises and families have more difficulties than larger firms in recruiting foreign work-
ers through the official recruitment schemes. Some 51 per cent of the firms on the Central 
Register of Companies do not have more than one registered employee. In addition, 53 per 
cent of the registered firms are active in the food and restaurant business (mainly small res-
taurants) as well as transport and personal services. This “molecular” production structure 
does not only hinder official recruitment schemes based on a foregoing estimation of labour 
market needs, but it clearly favours informal employment strategies. As a matter of fact, in-
formal employment is particularly attractive for occupations which require a higher degree 
of flexibility and are located in sectors particularly difficult to control. Examples of these 
activities include domestic service or renovation of interiors, which are more protected from 
controls because of their “private” character. 
Currently, it is still too early to tell how long the current crisis will last, and what its ef-
fects on immigration regulation will be. For the time being, the new government has relegated 
labour migration governance into a secondary position. In fact, one of the first decisions taken 
by the new Spanish Prime Minister was to change the name of the Ministry of Labour and 
Immigration into the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, in which immigration is-
sues have a secondary importance. Moreover, it does not seem that the present government has 
the intention to break the close relationship between the demand for labour and immigration 
which has characterised the Spanish regime to date. However, it would be a mistake to face the 
crisis with the short-term perspective which was used to exploit the economic boom. There is 
no doubt that Spain urgently needs to undergo structural changes to increase its technology 
level and to diversify its economic structure, which was too focused on construction and 
services for a long time. If these changes are to occur, the structural need for low-skilled 
workers should be combined with increasing attention on human capital development in or-
der to respond more effectively to the needs of a more diversified and demanding economy. 
A possible strategy could be the creation of a “hybrid selection system” (Papademetriou et al. 
2010) of labour migration, able to select both low-skilled and high-skilled workers or to mix 
employer-led and offer-led elements. 
Certainly, changes will have to be negotiated with social actors which still have signifi-
cant influence on the design of labour migration policies. This is, for instance, the case for 
the Spanish trade unions, which strongly defend a demand-oriented model since a worker’s 
security is granted only “when he or she can enter the country with a contract in his or 
her hand” (UGT, 27/05/2011). Finally, the struggle against irregular migration and informal 
employment must not be abandoned. Otherwise, individual regularisations may become con-
solidated as functional equivalents to formal admission policies.
All in all, the consequences of the economic crisis pose challenges which require political 
elites who are willing to assess the real impact of immigration on a domestic labour market not 
only in the short and medium term, but also in the long term. Time will show whether the 
Spanish crisis provided the chance to seriously think about a more efficient model of labour 
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migration governance or whether it simply put the word “end” after a spectacular and (almost) 
unique decade of demographic and economic growth.
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List of Interviews
no. organization /Institution Department
Day and 
Place of the 
Interview
Quoted as
1
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
general Directorate 
of Immigration
Madrid, 
3/06/2011
MTIN, 
3/06/2011
2
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
general Directorate 
of Immigration
Madrid, 
5/10/2011
MTIN, 
5/10/2011
3
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
Commission for 
the Collective 
Negotiation
Madrid, 
11/10/2011
MTIN, 
11710/2011
4
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
Unidad de grandes 
Empresas / large 
Companies Unit
Madrid, 
12/07/2011
UgE, 
12/07/2011
5
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
general Directorate 
of Immigration
Madrid,
17/11/2011
MTIN, 
17/11/2011
6
Ministerio de Trabajo e 
Inmigración / Ministry of 
labour and Immigration
servicio Publico de 
Empleo
Madrid, 
28/11/2011 sEPE1 28/11/2011
7 generalitat de Catalunya / government of Catalonia
Catalan service for 
the Management of 
Initial Work Permits
Barcelona 
7/07/2011
gEN1 
7/07/2011
8 generalitat de Catalunya / government of Catalonia
Catalan secretary of 
Immigration
Barcelona, 
22/06/2011
gEN2 
22/06/2011
9 Unión general de Trabajadores (UgT) Immigration section
Madrid, 
27/05/2011
UgT 
27/05/2011
10 Confederación Española de sindicatos Médicos (CEsM)
Department of 
Research
Madrid, 
17/10/2011
CEsM 
17/10/2011
11 CECoT
Fundación CECoT 
Persona y Treball / 
CECoT Foundation 
People and Work
Tarrasa, 
21/06/2011
CECoT, 
21/06/2011
12 Restaurant Chain Human Resources department
Madrid, 
2/11/2011
REsT 
2/11/2011
13 Renewable Energy Business Human Resources department
Madrid, 
6/10/2011
ENERgY 
6/10/2011
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AbstrAct1
This paper focuses on the reform of the Swedish labour migration policy, passed in 2008 
by the centre-right government headed by Fredrik Reinfeldt, with the support of the Green 
Party.
The background of the reform was the debate, starting in the early 2000s and still ongo-
ing, on the challenges posed by demographic decline, labour market failures and pressures for 
welfare state sustainability.
The discussion on the need for new rules on labour migration occurred in a time of deep 
changes in the Swedish political culture and power relations, witnessed by the defeat of the 
Social Democrats (in power since 1994) in the 2006 general elections. Thus, the need for a 
reform, and the content of it, was debated in the context of a more general confrontation on 
the competitiveness and sustainability – and, therefore, on the fate – of the Swedish model.
After an examination of the driving arguments and actors pushing for new rules on la-
bour migration – and, at the same time, of the criticism from the trade unions and the Left 
− this paper analyses how the 2008 law has been implemented and what polemics this new 
policy has raised, coming not only from Swedish actors but also from the OECD, which has 
devoted an ad hoc report on the new Swedish system.
Finally, the paper raises some questions concerning the way labour migration is currently 
pursued, in the light of the ongoing global economic crisis and the growing feelings (accord-
ing to the polls) of xenophobia.
1  This paper benefits from the research carried out in the framework of LAB-MIG-GOV (“Which labour migration 
governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe?”), a comparative research project coordinated by FIERI under 
the supervision of Ferruccio Pastore, with the support of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Programme promoted 
by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and VolkswagenStiftung. EPC is one of the partners of 
LAB-MIG-GOV, in charge of the analysis of policy developments at EU level. The preliminary research results of 
LAB-MIG-GOV are available on the website www.labmiggov.eu.
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1. nAtionAl policy dEVElopMEnt And chAngEs in thE 
nAtionAl dEbAtE on lAbour MigrAtion
During the post-war years, the number of immigrants in Sweden increased rapidly. In 1940, 
the proportion of foreign-born persons of the total population of the country amounted to 
only 1%. The corresponding proportion had increased to nearly 7% in 1970 and to about 
11% at the beginning of the new millennium (Ekberg 2006:1).
Today the proportion is about 14%, which is more than 1.3 million individuals: it is 
comparable to the United States. Moreover, there is a growing group of so-called second gen-
eration immigrants (persons born in Sweden with at least one parent born abroad), who are 
nowadays nearly 1 million individuals. So, today more than 2 million individuals living in 
Sweden have an immigrant background (Ekberg 2011a:3).
In 1947, the National Board of Labour started recruiting workforce in Italy, Hungary 
and Austria, due to the labour shortage which affected the flourishing Swedish export indus-
try (LO 2006:27-28). During the 1950s, a series of liberalising changes were introduced, with 
the approval of trade unions (Frank 2005: 212), first of all the abolition of visa requirements 
for citizens of a wide range of European countries and the institutionalisation of a common 
Nordic labour market in 1954, which maintained some restrictions but nonetheless enabled 
large-scale migration during the 1950s and 1960s, with Finland as the main source country 
(Wadensjö 2010: 7-8). All of that helped bring about (from 1955 onwards) free labour im-
migration from Europe, known at the time as “tourist immigration” (as well as “laissez-faire 
system”; Frank 2005: 211): people were allowed to spend three months in Sweden seeking 
employment (Lundqvist 2004: 3).
However, apart from this form of individual migration, the recruitment carried out by 
companies and public authorities must also be mentioned (SAP 2008: 353). Besides Italy, 
companies also turned to Yugoslavia and Greece for manpower, initiating substantial migra-
tion from these countries (and from Portugal and Turkey as well; Wadensjö). The flow of 
immigrants peaked in 1970 (Westin 2006).
The employment situation for immigrants in Sweden had been favourable up to the 
mid–1970s, as numerous studies show. The unemployment rate was low and there was full 
employment for both natives and immigrants. For a long time, employment rates among 
immigrants even exceeded those of the natives. This was especially the case in the 1960s. 
Upward occupational mobility among those early immigrants was also about the same as 
among natives (Ekberg 2011a:7).
However, already in the early 1960s the large number of job-seeking foreign citizens 
(mostly coming from Southern Europe) caused social tensions; both the rise in the flows and 
their ethnical composition alarmed trade unions, due to the feeling of losing control over la-
bour migration (Bucken-Knapp 2009: 53). This concern led to criticism of the liberal system 
in force, which was abolished between 1966-1967, in spite of the opposition of the National 
Employers’ Association; work permits were required prior to entry. The new regulation pro-
vided that the domestic labour reserve (first of all married women) was to be utilised before 
labour migration could be considered and that the volume of the latter was to be determined, 
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on the one hand, by the current situation of the labour market and, on the other hand, by 
the availability of social services (house, healthcare and so on) (Lundqvist 2004: 3). The new 
requirements were codified in the 1968 Alien Act (OECD 2011: 57). The collective transfer 
of labour was reintroduced and it remained the only feasible route of entry until the early 
1970s, when it ended not because of a shift in politicians’ attitude, but due to the LO’s choice 
to turn down all applications for work permit. From the outset of the post-war age, indeed, 
trade unions had insisted on the mobilization of the domestic labour force instead of recruit-
ing foreign workers and not incidentally LO stopped the flows until a measure providing an 
incentive for married women to enter the labour market − i.e., separate taxation for spouses 
− was introduced by the first government of Olof Palme in 1971 (Bucken-Knapp 2009: 54).
From then (early 1970s) to 2008, besides intra-Nordic migration (and, since 1994, the 
EEC/EU one), Sweden allowed only the following two types of labour migration: 1) short-
term jobs (temporary hires, up to 18 months; international exchange, up to 48 months; 
seasonal workers, up to 3 months) in order to meet shortages not being filled in a short time 
by the domestic labour force; and 2) high-skilled workers, who were granted a permanent 
status. The Labour Market Board checked the labour market situation and employer and 
employee organizations were asked to issue an opinion (OECD 2011: 57-58).
When labour recruitment from non-Nordic countries was stopped in 1972, the num-
ber of new immigrants dropped considerably. However, refugees and their family members 
(spouses, minor children, and, in some cases, elderly parents) were still accepted for perma-
nent residence. Indeed, Sweden has been one of the major recipients of refugees in the past 
few decades (Westin 2006).
The issue of asylum has become politicised since the late 1980s: the 1989 legislation 
restricted asylum seekers’ chances to enter Sweden (Geddes 2003: 110-111). The timing of 
stricter asylum policy coincided with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and wars in the 
former Yugoslavia (Westin 2006).
Towards the end of the century, labour migration – which for a long time, since the early 
1970s, had not been an issue − appeared again. In the light of the recovery of the Swedish 
economy in the second half of the 1990s, and of the challenges issued by the “demographic 
threat”, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv, SN) initiated in the 
early 2000s a campaign for a less restrictive labour migration policy (Fahimi 20012; Ekenger, 
Wallen 20023).
In the 2002 general election immigration was one of the campaign issues, in a double 
form: integration policies (with the Liberal Party putting forward the proposal to introduce 
2  The author of this pamphlet preferred to avoid the term “labour migration” as it recalled the past mass immigration 
of low-skilled workers and used, instead, the concept of “recruitment immigration”, i.e., immigration as an 
individualized process (i.e., a single employer recruiting a single foreign worker) (Fahimi 2001: 7). Fahimi’s proposal 
was to find a middle way between a labour market closed to foreign workers (as the system in force at that time) and a 
completely unrestricted immigration system (Fahimi 2001: 16).
3  The authors put forward economic arguments in favour of labour migration (declining labour force and the pressures 
of globalization), yet stressed that recruiting foreign workers could not be seen as a first choice, since the process is 
more demanding and more risky compared to recruiting domestic labour force (Ekenger, Wallen 2002: 15-16).
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language skills tests as a condition for citizenship) and labour migration. The centre-right 
parties (i.e., the Moderate party, the Liberal party, the Centre party, and the Christian 
Democrats), together with the Green party and employers’ representatives, insisted on 
the need for making it easier for non-EU citizens to work in Sweden, whereas the Social 
Democrats, the Left party and the unions replied that, before turning to labour migration, 
domestic unemployment needed to be reduced. The confrontation between the opposite sides 
went on after the election (won by the Social Democrats), and, in March 2003, a biparti-
san alliance formed in Parliament by the Green party together with the centre-right parties 
charged the government with the appointment of a committee to examine how to manage 
labour migration (Borevi 2010: 111).
The Committee for Labour Migration (KAKI, after the Swedish acronym) was ap-
pointed in 2004, at a time when EU enlargement stimulated a debate on whether and how 
immigration from new member states was to be regulated; the Social Democratic Prime 
Minister, Göran Persson, raised the alarm over “social tourism” (xenophobes’ main issue), i.e., 
the danger that people from the new EU countries, at least to some extent, moved to Sweden 
with the aim of taking advantage of the generous Swedish welfare state, and, particularly, of 
the generous compensation system for those out of work (Wadensjö 2007: 2); an alarm which, 
later on, proved to be totally groundless (LO). The ruling party supported a transitional, one-
year permit regime, but it did not succeed in achieving a majority in Parliament and Sweden 
ended up as one of the very few EU countries (together with Great Britain and Ireland) which 
did not apply any transitional rules4. This debate, and its outcome, contributed to a more 
positive attitude to labour migration (Wadensjö).
The KAKI published its proposals in October 2006, just a couple of weeks before the 
installation of the new (centre-right) government. In order to fulfil the commitment to a 
regulated immigration, the committee proposed that the Labour Market Board5 verify the 
labour shortage in the concerned occupation sector prior to approving the recruitment of 
TCN workers (KAKI 2006: 130-131). While accepting many of the Committee’s recommen-
dations, the centre-right government later maintained a distance from this particular point 
(i.e., the labour market test).
The government argued that employers’ assessment of the need for recruiting TCN work-
ers should be crucial in the process, although underlining that from the employers’ point of 
view it was supposed to be easier to recruit someone from Sweden and not from abroad, when 
competences can be found inside the country (Justitiedepartementet 2007: 20 and 37); at the 
same time, work permits would be granted following an individualised assessment of foreign 
labour need as opposed to a broader sector-based assessment (Justitiedepartementet 2007: 19).
Besides the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, most political parties, starting with 
the Moderates (the party the Prime Minister and the Minister for Migration belong to), also 
4  Since 30 April 2006, migrants from EU countries do not need a residence permit to work in Sweden, although 
they have (with the exception of citizens from Denmark and Finland) to register at the Migration Board, the Swedish 
authority in charge of immigration issues (Wadensjö 2007: 1; 5-6). 
5  The Board was replaced in 2008 by the Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen).
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share the idea that, in the end, the question is not whether to give a particular job to a Swede 
who is unemployed or to a TCN, but to give the job to the one who is more fit to do the job, 
so that economic growth will benefit from that, and unemployed Swedes as well, as more jobs 
will be created. Although this is a political message not easy to sell in all political quarters, 
the Moderates decided to go along this way, together with the other small coalition partners 
(AMD2).
However, despite being able to count on its own majority, the centre-right government 
pursued a bipartisan agreement and, in the end, got the Green Party’s support (MV1). The 
latter has a cultural more than a socio-economic profile but as far as the economy is con-
cerned, the party shows a liberal attitude closer to the centre-right parties than to the Left 
(LO).
It must be borne in mind, however, that the initiative of appointing an Inquiry 
Committee on Labour Migration came from a Social Democratic government (JD2).
Several arguments were put forward to support the thesis that a new immigration policy 
was needed:
1. Demographic trends and labour shortages. They seem to have been the main driving 
force of the reform: many people will soon be leaving working life. This development 
may have negative consequences for the labour market and economic growth – and 
therefore for the sustainability of the Swedish welfare system as well. Despite fluctua-
tions in the world economy, labour shortage is already affecting several occupations 
and sectors (Minister for Migration). 
2. Changed composition of migration flows to Sweden. After the stop to labour migration, 
immigration to Sweden came to be dominated by asylum seekers. The new rules have 
changed this perspective (Minister for Migration; SN). The decision to reform labour 
migration has been influenced, in fact, also by the will to convey an image of im-
migration that is not only connected to asylum seekers but, instead, to a more active 
and positive dimension in terms of contribution to the society (both of the sending 
and of the destination country), an idea of immigration meant as a process of mutual 
development (JD2).
3. Labour market failure. The link between an unsatisfying match between demand and 
supply, notwithstanding unemployment − and the need for more labour migration – is 
clearly present in Sweden’s public debate. It is argued that the previous immigration 
policy did not provide all the workers Sweden was in need of; moreover, it could take 
years to find the right workers to fit the job descriptions. These difficulties in recruiting 
people prevented companies from expanding and ultimately from creating more jobs. 
This is where increased labour immigration can make a difference, although it is not 
to be seen as the only response to the demographic challenges: instead, it represents 
a complement to measures aiming to utilize the labour force already available in the 
country (Minister for Migration 2008: 1). 
4. Export-oriented industry. Another argument made by the entrepreneurial side is that 
many Swedish companies (not only the big ones) depend on export: Sweden is ranked 
highly in the global index of countries operating in several countries; it depends on 
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international trade and “business and people go hand in hand” (SN). The Minister for 
Migration emphasizes that the “right person” for a job is not simply someone with an 
education, but rather someone with special competences not always available in the 
domestic labour market (Minister for Migration).
5. Consistency with Swedish tradition of openness. Quite steadily, open-door migration 
policies have been supported by centre-right parties and the Green party by refer-
ring to liberal values (Spehar, Bucken-Knapp, Hinnfors 2011: 27). Minister Billström 
believes that facilitating increased opportunities for labour immigration, apart from 
being of vital importance for Sweden’s chances to meet both present and future chal-
lenges in the labour market, will contribute to a more culturally diverse and open 
society (Billström 2008: 1).
6. Will to be at the forefront. The criticism to EU immigration policy is general and cross-
party among the interviewees. The Minister for Migration emphasizes the role that 
Swedish immigration policy can play in the European context:
We hope that the Swedish reform is setting an example which others in Europe 
will follow. Southern European countries’ policies are sometimes worrying, 
when the basic principle is: well, we will let foreign workers come and work ev-
ery year, paying them very little, with no chance to get a permanent residence 
permit and to become citizens one day. This is astonishing to me, as in my 
opinion the system must work in the opposite way: labour migrants must have 
rights and, at the same time, they have to pay taxes; they must be integrated, in 
other words. Employers must accomplish their duties by paying contributions 
and so on, but, on the other hand, immigrants must also give a contribution to 
the society as a whole: this is very important if a country wants its citizens to 
accept labour migration. (Minister for Migration)
However, two of the political arguments put forward for the reform (besides the economic 
ones, which have been prevailing) − i.e., a liberal shift in immigration policy and the will to 
reduce the financial burden of asylum seekers on State budget − show that there has been an 
influence by the EU with regard to the need for introducing a more restrictive asylum policy 
and, at the same time, facilitating more active migration (Spång).
It has been pointed out that, on the one hand, Sweden wants to teach Europe regarding 
labour migration, but, on the other hand, Sweden wants to learn from Europe regarding 
asylum policy, because it is more restrictive. “Sweden aims at ‘Europeanising’ asylum policy, 
and to ‘swedify’ labour migration” (Hansen 2010: 91-93).
2. currEnt stAtE oF AdMission policy For ForEign 
WorkErs: institutionAl FrAMEWork
The Government describes the reform, which entered into force on 15 December 2008, as 
one of the most significant shifts in the history of Swedish immigration policy. Minister for 
Migration Tobias Billström sums up this turning point by saying: “Now it is the market to 
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assess its needs, not the Minister, or the Parliament, or another State authority. Of course 
politics has to make sure that rules are followed, but the starting point is that the individual 
employer best knows the recruitment needs of his business. That is why, when processing 
cases involving residence and work permits, decisions are based on employers’ own assessment 
of what kind and how much of labour force he needs, although complying with collective 
agreements and other requirements” (Minister for Migration).
Until December 2008 the Swedish law provided that, if a company wanted to employ a 
foreign person, the company had first to check if this competence was available within the 
EU; the big change after December 2008 is that the company no longer needs to look within 
the EU but can choose wherever it wants. This difference between the two laws, according to 
one interviewee, could be defined as “a change of paradigm” (MV2).
In other words, under the previous rules, when an employer looked for a foreign worker, 
the system worked in the following way: 
Those who want to work in Sweden and come from a country which is not an EU member 
state must have a work permit. In case they plan to work in Sweden for longer than three 
months, they will also need a residence permit. Those wishing to work in Sweden must nor-
mally apply for a work permit in their native country or in another country outside Sweden, 
where they are resident. They have to apply either on the Swedish Migration Board’s website, 
or at a Swedish embassy in the country they live in. However, in certain cases labour migrants 
may apply for a work permit in Sweden in case they are: 1) a student at a university or college 
in Sweden; 2) someone visiting an employer in Sweden; or 3) an asylum seeker. People plan-
ning to work in Sweden for longer than three months also need a residence permit (Migration 
Board 2011a).
The Swedish Public Employment Service was previously responsible for checking that 
the Community preference was respected (posts were to be made available to job applicants in 
the other EU/EEA countries and Switzerland). Under the new rules, the Swedish Migration 
Board has taken over this task. Cases relating to residence and work permits are, thus, all 
dealt with by a single agency (Government Offices of Sweden 2008: 2). That does not pre-
clude cooperation with other organizations (e.g., trade unions), but the final decision is up 
to the Migration Board (JD2). The Government explains that “in assessing the conditions 
offered with the employment, the main rule has not been changed, the employer is normally 
required to give the employee organisations an opportunity to issue an opinion on the terms 
of employment. The statements made by the employees’ organisations are of great importance 
when making these examinations” (Government Offices of Sweden 2008: 2). That means, 
however, that the trade unions’ statement is no longer crucial (Wadensjö).
150
Migration and Integration
The Labour Market Administration is now out of the picture: this is a huge difference com-
pared to the former regulation, where a sort of labour market test was required and, in case 
there was no labour shortage in that occupation sector, then the Labour Market Board, after 
receiving a negative opinion from the trade union, had to reject the application. Instead of the 
labour market test, under the new law employers are obliged to advertise the position for ten 
days in the EURES system (The European Job Mobility Portal), but that is more of a fig leaf, 
based on Sweden’s obligations with the EU. The Labour Market Board was also responsible 
for checking with the unions that the working conditions were at least in line with collective 
agreements. One of the most important tasks which the Swedish Migration Board has is to 
make sure that there is no salary dumping in Sweden; therefore, every application which is 
received by the Board is forwarded to the relevant labour union, which is given two weeks to 
look through the application and, then, the union can tell the Migration Board if the salary 
and the working conditions as a whole are good enough.
Time limits for work permits have been extended: they can be granted for the duration of 
the employment and, anyway, for a maximum of two years; if the person is still working after 
this, it is possible to extend the permit up to no more than four years. After this time, a per-
manent residence permit can be granted. The application for an extension of a work permit is 
processed in Sweden: the applicant will not need to return home to apply. Furthermore, sim-
plified rules have been introduced for visiting students wishing to stay and work in Sweden 
after the completion of their studies and for obtaining a visa to attend a job interview in the 
country (both categories no longer need to return home to apply, if offered employment).
Finally, an asylum seeker whose application has been refused by a final decision may be 
granted a residence permit for work without having to leave the country first; the condition is 
that the asylum seeker has had a job for at least six months. The position must be permanent 
or for a period of at least one year from the date of application, and it must fulfil the gen-
eral conditions for a work permit. The application must reach the Swedish Migration Board 
within two weeks from the final decision on the asylum application. The possibility of being 
granted residence permits without leaving the country is extended to the family members of 
the applicant (Government Offices of Sweden 2008: 2-3).
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One of the most controversial points in the reform is that, for the first two years, the 
residence and work permit is restricted to one specific employer and a particular profession. 
For this reason, one has to apply for a new work permit if s/he changes employer or profession 
during the first two years. If the residence and work permit has been extended after two 
years, it will be restricted to a particular profession. But, even here, one must apply for a new 
work permit if s/he changes profession (Migration Board 2011e).
3. currEnt stAtE oF AdMission policy For ForEign 
WorkErs: critEriA For sElEction
The rules passed in 2008 do not allow for free immigration: this is still regulated. What the 
government has taken away is the labour market test. Nevertheless, there are still conditions: 
collective agreements, and also the labour migrants’ capability to support themselves, which 
basically is a limit if one does not work full-time. To be granted a work permit a person has 
to: 1) be in possession of a valid passport; 2) earn one’s own living thanks to the job the s/he 
has been offered; and 3) work to such an extent that the wage is at least SEK 13,000 (about 
1,435 euro) per month (Migration Board 2011b).
There is no special program for the recruitment of high-skilled workers; proposals have 
been put forward in order to make it easier for international students to stay and work in the 
country for a while, but, besides this, the system is open to all groups. High-skilled workers 
have to follow the same rules as all the others: it is the employer who decides how many 
people and what kind of competencies are needed (Minister for Migration; MV1; JD2). This 
openness to low-skilled workers is definitely unusual in an international perspective, as well 
as the lack of a binding list of sectors affected by labour shortage: the idea behind this is that 
it is impossible to predict from the beginning which employments will stimulate economic 
growth (AMD1).
Actually, Sweden has an official list6 on labour shortage, which is published twice a year, 
and it is based on statistics predicting the country’s future labour needs. People looking for 
a job on the list not only have more chances of finding employment in Sweden, but they 
can apply for a work and residence permit from within Sweden, without returning to their 
home country first (SN). However, this list does not compromise at all the employer-driven 
character of the new Swedish labour migration policy: it is intended only as a way to facilitate 
those looking for certain jobs (AMD2).
What the OECD has found in its survey on Swedish labour migration policy is that 
labour migrants are overrepresented in shortage occupations, but the average permit dura-
tion for high-skilled workers on the shortage list is definitely shorter than that for low and 
medium-skilled jobs not included in the list (OECD 2011: 109-110).
The entry of labour migrants for elementary occupations in which there is a surplus is a 
possible point of concern, since there may be a risk of migrants substituting for less edu-
6  Sweden.se (The official gateway to Sweden), http://www.sweden.se/eng/Home/Work/Get-a-job/Labor-shortage-list/.
152
Migration and Integration
cated natives or prior immigrants in these jobs. Some of these occupations are taken up 
by rejected asylum seekers. On the other hand, if these occupations are in business where 
Swedish workers are unlikely to be employed – especially ethnic restaurants or business 
[…] – then labour migration into surplus elementary occupations may reflect the evolu-
tion and expansion of ethnic enterprises. The question then becomes whether expansion 
in the future will continue to be biased in favour of low skilled jobs, a trend which is at 
odd with that of economy as a whole. (OECD 2011: 113)
4. currEnt stAtE oF thE AdMission policy For ForEign 
WorkErs: MEchAnisMs For MAtching oFFEr And dEMAnd
The role of the State has been reduced to the lowest terms when compared to the system in 
force during the 1960s, when Sweden had recruitment agencies in some foreign countries 
(e.g., Italy) (Wadensjö). The Swedish Institute gets money from the State to finance a web-
site (Work in Sweden), in order to facilitate people who are considering moving to Sweden 
to work. But the Public Employment Service has no specific task in trying to get migrants 
outside the EU to move to Sweden (AMD2).
If there is no striking problem, it is more or less automatic that the Migration Board 
grants the work permit. 
Recruitment channels are diverse: sometimes, for instance, companies (especially big 
companies) benefit from their local contacts. The easiest way is to advertise the job with the 
Public Employment Service for a period of ten days. This will also provide access to EURES 
(Migration Board 2011c). Once that is accomplished, the employer has to look for the right 
person; “how” – whether to rely on local contacts or instead on head-hunters – depends on 
the employer’s network. But there is no public channel supporting employers in this task 
(SN).
To employ a TCN may be less expensive – although the job contract must be in line with 
collective agreements – but, on the other hand, it is more demanding in terms of bureaucracy, 
language, and so on. For instance, it is not possible to meet the worker before recruiting him/
her. There are many unknown factors when employing a TCN (AMD1). This is one of the 
starting points of the reform after all.
The possibility of introducing bilateral agreements does not ultimately seem to be able 
to achieve widespread consensus, mainly because of the idea of spontaneous migration as the 
basic principle of the Swedish system (IT company; SN; MV1). The only bilateral agreements 
are, besides those regarding the tax system and the portability of social rights like pensions 
(Wadensjö), international students exchange programs, with Canada, South Korea, Australia 
and New Zealand, but they do not require any work permit (JD2).
For the recruitment of berry-pickers (coming mostly from Thailand) there is a well-
established cooperation between Swedish companies and the sending country (JD2), without 
any state intervention (UD).
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However, employment agencies play an important role in the recruitment system in 
general, and particularly when berry-pickers are concerned. In 2009 and 2010, berry-pickers 
from China, Thailand and Vietnam paid a great deal of money to some of these agencies for 
working in Sweden, which promised that they would earn a lot, but things went differently 
(Andersson Joona, Wadensjö 2011: 14).
The biggest group among labour migrants is IT engineers, almost 40-50%. They are 
mostly intra-company transfer personnel; this means that when, for instance, Ericsson – 
which has employees in India − needs 500 engineers quickly, the company just calls them 
from there, there is no need “to recruit” them in the labour market (MV2; see also JD2). 
As far as non intra-company transfer personnel is concerned, big companies, which have 
production units all over the world, have campaigns for the recruitment of engineers and 
IT technicians, going to other countries but also cooperating with universities in China, 
sometimes in partnership with the Swedish Institute and sometimes on their own. Ericsson 
has its “Eric-clubs” in China, intended to attract people and make them interested in Sweden. 
Engineers are recruited in Serbia, too. In other sectors, there are temporary agencies both in 
Sweden and abroad which the employers can turn to if they do not have their own connec-
tions (AMD2: 15).
Local authorities, as well, have campaigns in order to recruit foreign doctors in specific 
countries. However, despite the emphasis put by the Minister for Migration as well as by 
some experts on the public sector (particularly, the health sector) as a potential big recruiter of 
labour migrants, a limited number of work permits have been issued to municipalities, coun-
ty councils and hospitals (OECD 2011: 91). According to the Swedish Medical Association 
(Sveriges Läkarförbund), the reason why few TCN doctors are recruited is that the certifica-
tion process of foreign education and job experiences makes it shorter and easier to recruit 
doctors from EU countries instead (Petersson 2012: 14-15).
There are also campaigns for recruiting engineers, but again with no public coordination 
(MV2). 
When it comes to labour migrants, recognition of foreign education and experiences is 
not so relevant: compared with many other countries, in Sweden there are fewer professions 
which are protected by this kind of requirement, mainly in the health sector (TCO). When 
an organization wants to hire a doctor from Iraq, for instance, the Migration Board waits 
until the Social Department has checked the doctor’s education before granting the work 
permit (MV2).
The validation system is used also with engineers, for example; the point here is con-
vincing Swedish employers that the person has the qualifications to do a specific job. The 
high education system (Högskoleverket) is in charge of this certification, but usually it is not 
enough, since the job applicant (not so much engineers, as many companies work in English, 
but rather doctors and nurses) needs some specialized Swedish language skills. And then 
comes the difficult part: getting the first experience in the Swedish labour market. Usually, 
people (for example, an engineer from Iraq) work in a company for a short period, thus com-
panies can see if s/he is the right person, and report on that. When their skills have been 
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evaluated not by an authority, but by a real employer in a real work situation, then they can 
go on (TCO).
On the whole, the certification of foreign education and experiences is one of the prob-
lematic areas of the Swedish labour migration policy (OECD 2011: 126): highly qualified 
immigrants need the special permission of the Swedish authorities in order to enter the 
Swedish labour market, but the time needed to issue that kind of permit is very long (Ekberg).
The validation system is very heterogeneous: different authorities (Swedish National 
Agency for Higher Education, the National Board of Health and Welfare and others) dealing 
with different kind of validations for different jobs in different sectors. New attempts are be-
ing made to make the system more transparent, as it currently gives a confusing impression, 
due to the lack of coordination (AMD2).
What is pointed out, furthermore, is that the Swedish validation system has worked quite 
a lot on refugees’ education, and it should now be developed in order to be effective in vali-
dating labour migrants’ competences as well (SN). But it is to be noticed that, if few asylum 
seekers find jobs, it is also because of the poor efficiency of this system (LO).
Where recruitment is carried out is, however, an unclear point, as far as the implementa-
tion of the new system is concerned. Although the law provides that TCN workers have to 
apply from their own country (with the exceptions pointed out in par. 2), perception about 
how the match between demand and supply is, in fact, achieved varies quite a lot: both in 
Sweden and in sending countries (JD1; JD2); only in Sweden (TCO; UD); usually in Sweden 
(LO); depending on the sector (Wadensjö). Actually, only 7% of the job applicants were re-
cruited in Sweden between 2009 and 2011; rejection rates are definitely higher for in-country 
applications (among rejected asylum seekers trying to switch track, 1,059 out of 1,787 were 
granted work permits; among people with visa, applying under the shortage list, 150 out of 
292) (OECD 2011: 83-84).
5. FunctionAl EQuiVAlEnts: policiEs For thE AccEss oF 
non-lAbour MigrAnts to thE lAbour MArkEt
Before the reform, the need to keep labour migration and humanitarian migration separated 
was constantly emphasized; but then the possibility to change track came about, thanks to 
the 2008 reform (see par. 2). The background of this shift is that, in Sweden, asylum seekers 
are allowed to work from the first day. There were a number of cases in which newspapers 
pointed out: asylum seekers got a job, they were working and taking part in the community 
in the small cities, but then their asylum application was denied and they were supposed to be 
sent home. By the change of track, a kind of possibility was opened in these cases. But there is 
a condition: this possibility to change track only exists if one applies for a work permit in the 
two weeks following the final decision on his or her application (TCO).
On the other hand, the argument was made that those applying in Sweden for asylum are 
not always in actual need of it, being attracted rather by Swedish generosity in terms of social 
policy; after the reform it can be expected that some of them will take, instead, advantage of 
the labour migration track (JD1). 
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In order to be granted a work permit, the applicant must prove that:
  s/he has a passport covering the whole period of validity of the permit;
  s/he has been employed for at least 6 months as an asylum seeker, and that the em-
ployment will continue for at least 12 months from the date of application;
  s/he has had the same employer;
  s/he has earned at least SEK 13,000 per month;
  s/he can earn her/his own living (Migration Board 2011).
The Migration Board acknowledges that there are not so many asylum seekers who have 
turned into labour migrants because of the current system (post-2008) being very bureau-
cratic and making it more difficult for asylum seekers to get a work permit.
The high rejection rate (40% from 2009 to May 2011) for asylum seekers trying to 
change track is due to the following reasons: working conditions (wage, working hours) not 
in line with the requirements; delay in applying; and a too-short work history (less than 6 
months) (OECD 2011: 84).
In September 2011, the Migration Board made the argument that it is unacceptable that 
asylum seekers have to wait for the final decision on their application before applying for 
a work permit; according to the proposal put forward by the Board, they should rather be 
allowed to apply on both tracks at the same time (Persson, A. 2011). The Migration Board 
believes that this would be a better system (both for the applicants and for Sweden) than the 
current one. But the Board acknowledges that it is quite a controversial suggestion (MV2). 
And, indeed, the proposal has been criticized both by trade unions and the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise, arguing that refugee and labour migration are two completely different 
channels of immigration, and they are to be kept separate: all those moving to Sweden are 
welcome in the Swedish labour market, but the point is that the refugee policy cannot be 
evaluated merely in economic terms (Sörman, Ågren, Ekström, Lindqvist, Arrius, Nordmark 
2011).
However, while the government is positive on the possibility to switch track, many 
voluntary organizations are critical about it; their argument is that the overlap between the 
two categories risks compromising asylum seekers’ rights (Spång): a fear shared by the Social 
Democrats (Yohansson). 
For some groups among the asylum seekers (e.g., those coming from Somalia), it may not 
be easy to find a job in Sweden. For doctors and engineers from Iraq, it is somewhat better 
(TCO).
A sector employing a number of asylum seekers and refugees is the home service indus-
try, which is expanding in Sweden following the decline in public expenditure, privatization 
of public services, flexibilization of labour force and tax deductions such as RUT (Rengöring, 
Underhåll och Tvätt, i.e., home services) (Gavanas 2010: 10). The latter were introduced in 
2007, with the aim, on the one hand, to stimulate the sector, and, on the other hand, to 
reduce the black labour market (Wadensjö). 
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A recent research focuses on the interchangeability of formal and informal labour in the 
home service sector: a company may offer regular work to its customers to be carried out by 
named workers, officially registered, but then the work is done by someone else, possibly an 
irregular migrant, in a shorter time and for a lower wage, paid off the books. In other words, 
companies (sometime the big ones) working in the formal sector may turn to intermediaries 
(subcontractors), who hire workers on the black labour market. Furthermore, migrants’ lack 
of language skills and needed ID documentation can be easily exploited in this sector: home 
services may be one of the few accesses to labour market for some migrants, regardless of their 
education (Gavanas 2010: 27-3124).
From the mid-1980s up to the mid-1990s, and also later on, Swedish authorities placed 
out immigrants in different areas, in order to avoid ethnic enclaves. The result was that au-
thorities spread out many refugees in areas where there was plenty of dwellings, but that 
was because many natives had to move out from the area due to lack of jobs. Studies show 
that this has been negative for the refugees and their access to labour market. Nowadays, 
politicians acknowledge that such a system is not sustainable, and that authorities have to 
find areas where refugees have good opportunities to get jobs. In this respect, the debate has 
changed. But, still, many refugees are placed in municipalities where there the chances of 
getting a job are low; the reason is that many municipalities want refugees because of the fees 
they receive from the government. If a refugee is unemployed in many years in that area, the 
municipality is compensated by the government (Ekberg).
However, the home service sector is in constant need of staff, as it has been growing con-
tinuously since the introduction of RUT in 2007. Workers are sometimes recruited through 
advertisements on Metro (a free newspaper with worldwide circulation), since the people the 
companies are looking for cannot afford an ordinary newspaper but they still read Metro. 
Besides this channel, companies turn to the Public Employment Service (Home Service 
Company).
6. thE ExtErnAl diMEnsion oF lAbour MArkEt policy
Supporters of the reform stress that immigration to Sweden contributes to increased eco-
nomic growth, for instance thanks to improved Swedish foreign trade, as has been shown 
by the “Kosmopolit” project (MV1), started in 2007 by Minister for Trade Ewa Björling 
in order “to make use of the unique skills of people born abroad to increase Swedish trade 
with the rest of the world”. A study showed, for instance, that an increase in the number of 
people born abroad by some 12,000 individuals would lead to an increase in exports by as 
much as 7 billion Swedish crowns: entrepreneurs who were born abroad have good knowledge 
of the culture of their former home countries. They are in an excellent position to conduct 
cross-border trade and can also help pave the way for other Swedish companies (Government 
Offices of Sweden 2011).
The Minister for Migration believes that, after the reform passed in 2008, a step further 
is needed, and that is why the government – once again, with the support of the Green Party 
− appointed in 2009 a Committee on Circular Migration (CIMU), with representatives of all 
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political parties (excluding the xenophobic party of the Sweden Democrats, the committee 
being appointed before the last general election). In its intermediate report, the committee 
analysed the concept of circular migration (the Minister reminded that in Brussels there are 
diverse understandings of it), and then (April 2011) it released a report with recommenda-
tions on how to facilitate the mobility of people planning to work in Sweden for a while, 
and then to return home or to move to another country (Minister for Migration). The main 
proposals by CIMU were:
  Allowing migrants with a permanent residence permit to leave Sweden for up to five 
years (under the current system, the period is one year), while holding their permits.
  Granting a time-limited work permit longer than the four-year period currently in 
force (after which, a foreign worker is allowed to apply for permanent residency), 
under special conditions (people who wish to work in Sweden but do not plan to 
settle in the country).
  Introducing the ability of fulfilling the total qualification period of four years for 
a time-limited residence permit within an eight-year period (instead of the current 
five).
  Relaxing the requirements for rejected asylum seekers wishing to change track (from 
at least a six-month employment to a three-month one, and through two employ-
ments; extension of the deadline from two to four weeks after receiving the final 
decision on the application for asylum).
  Appointing an independent economic authority to verify whether the business plans 
of TCN entrepreneurs wishing to start their own business activity in Sweden are 
reliable.
  Granting students who have completed their education in Sweden a six-month resi-
dence permit allowing them to look for a job.
  Allowing migrants who have been granted an unemployment insurance to benefit 
from it for three months, while looking for a job abroad (CIMU 2011: 32-37).
The Minister for Migration reaffirmed his commitment to circular migration in a speech at 
the London School of Economics (May 2012):
The links between migration and development is a prioritized policy area of the Swedish 
Government. We believe that if migration is managed responsibly it has the potential to 
benefit receiving countries, countries of origin and migrants themselves […]. A key aspect 
of such an approach is to promote coherent policy approaches that promote synergies 
between migration and other relevant policy areas, including development cooperation, 
trade, foreign affairs and integration […]. There are many definitions of circular migra-
tion, but in Sweden the term is used to describe how migrants that have a residence per-
mit in Sweden, can have the opportunity to return and contribute to development in their 
country of origin. Circular migration in the Swedish context is not a temporary migrant 
worker program, but a view that it should be possible for migrants to make a decision to 
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leave Sweden either on a temporary or more permanent basis, and still have the possibility 
to come back again. (Billström 2012)
However, the impact of circular migration on sending countries is a controversial issue of de-
bate in Sweden. Research shows that, while the emigration of high-skilled workers may have 
a positive effect on large sending countries, in the case of small and poor countries negative 
effects seem to prevail (Lundborg 2010: 33).
Furthermore, although some experts believe that there is no contradiction between the 
support by centre-right parties and the Green party for circular migration and the current la-
bour migration policy allowing TCN migrants to get permanent residence permits in Sweden 
(Spehar, Bucken-Knapp, Hinnfors 2011: 14), others point out that the new labour migration 
law is better compared to several other equivalent countries, but, as far as the question of 
permanent residence is concerned, there is no strong guarantee that there is a citizenship 
path and today, with Europe being affected by the crisis, no one would commit to the social 
incorporation of migrants, whether irregular or regular (Hansen).
7. strEngths And WEAknEssEs oF sWEdEn’s ApproAch to 
lAbour MigrAtion MAnAgEMEnt
Prior to the 2008 reform, the number of labour migrants was very low (with the exception of 
seasonal workers). After 2008, however, labour migrants have increased and are now the sec-
ond category of inflows after family reunification (the third being free movement migration 
from EU countries) (OECD 2011: 48)7. The number of accompanying family members being 
granted a work permit has increased as well, although it is hard to say how many of them have 
actually found a job, and in which kind of employment (OECD 2011: 77).
Experts agree that, in the first few years after the passage of the law, the number of 
foreign job seekers has not at all increased as much as some people were afraid of. The OECD 
draws some lessons from Sweden’s new labour migration policy:
The first lesson is that a shift from a restrictive to one driven exclusively by employer de-
mand with a minimal verification that the demand is legitimate does not necessarily lead 
to an explosion in labour migration […]. The second lesson is that the assumption by the 
Swedish authorities of a natural preference of employers for locally available employees 
seems to be borne out by the experience since the introduction of the reform (OECD 
2011: 132).
Despite the economic crisis, in 2009 there was a small increase in the number of applications 
to the Migration Board, but not at all a mass immigration: this shows that the system is flex-
ible enough to adapt itself to economic ups and downs (SN).
As was the case in the previous system, under the new regulation many permits are issued 
for short periods, either for intra-corporate transfers or for seasonal jobs. Moreover, employers 
7  Work permits issued in 2009: 14.481; in 2010: 13.612; in 2011: 14.722; in 2012 (up to August) 13.500 (www.
migrationsverket.se).
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may choose to offer a short-term contract in the first place, in order to be able to get rid 
of workers more easily if they do not fit the job (employment protection is quite strong in 
Sweden) (OECD 2011: 78-79). In view of these developments, one could assume that, even 
if it is too early to evaluate its impact, the reform seems to have to do mainly with circular 
migration (Spång).
Within a general satisfaction about the implementation of the reform, the Minister for 
Migration admits, however, that there are some problems – which nonetheless were put on 
the bill – but nonetheless he appears to be confident of the administration’s will and capabil-
ity to solve them: “by the new regulation it is possible to oppose workers’ rights violations” 
(Minister for Migration). 
However, the poor correspondence between the conditions promised to foreign workers 
in the offer of employment and the ones applied in fact are not only a polemic by trade 
unions, but rather a problem which officers, researchers and media – and now OECD as 
well - are fully aware of. 
The Migration Board acknowledges that there is no certainty about how a job will actu-
ally be carried out once the foreign worker has moved to Sweden. At this moment, it is very 
difficult for the Migration Board to have an in-depth look at an application, so as to assess 
whether it is a fake (MV2). Problems occur in different sectors, restaurants and the building 
industry first of all, but sometimes also in jobs covered by the “white-collar” union (TCO).
The rejection rate of permit applications was low (less than 11%) in an international 
perspective over the period 2009-2011, but nonetheless it doubled compared to the average 
rejection rate (5-6%) reported in the two years before the reform. Unsuccessful applica-
tions come mostly from small businesses and organizations (sometimes run by immigrants) 
(OECD 2011: 117-118).
The point is that the offer of employment is not legally binding: this is one of the main 
criticisms from the union (LO). Bound to the same employer for two years and with no legal 
instruments on his/her side, the worker cannot do much when the employer pledges to offer, 
for example, 16 Swedish crowns per hour in the job contract, and then pays 10 crowns only in 
reality. Another way to bypass collective agreements is to hire a foreign worker (a berry-picker, 
for instance) through a foreign company (e.g., in Thailand), based on the working conditions 
in force in that country, although the worker is granted a Swedish work permit (“posted 
workers”). The Committee on Labour Migration (KAKI) was well aware of both the dangers 
and the recommended controls, especially the fiscal ones, but not much attention seems to 
have been paid to this part (UD).
The work permit duration has been extended, and this is a positive development from 
the unions’ point of view: the employer can plan his/her business on a long-term perspective, 
the immigrant feels safer, and Sweden becomes more attractive as a labour marketplace. The 
problem is that, for some time, the residence and work permit are restricted to one named 
employer and a particular profession. This obligation brings with it an advantage and a disad-
vantage: it is not easy for irresponsible employers to hire foreign workers and then subcontract 
them; at the same time, even if the worker is not satisfied with his/her working conditions, s/
he cannot change employer (LO).
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seasonal workers
In the public discourse, polemics focus mainly on berry-pickers working in summer in 
Northern Sweden. The OECD points out that, under the new system, identification of sea-
sonal workers is complicated: they are granted the same work permit as any other labour 
migrant. The companies recruiting seasonal workers were, in 2009 and 2010, fewer than 50; 
in both years, 75% of this group of workers were sponsored by five employers only (OECD 
2011: 82).
Minister Billström talks about “secondary problems” − and anyway foreseen − related to 
berry-pickers, within a new system which is working altogether very well. What happened 
before was that those workers moved to Sweden (not with a work permit, but with a visa) and 
did their job for some months, returning home afterwards without paying any tax (Minister 
for Migration). In 2010 a new regulation came into force; berry-pickers have the guarantee of 
some basic rights (SN), including a guaranteed minimum wage (LO).
This change followed a poor berry season in 2010, when many workers were laid off and 
found themselves with no means to return home (OECD 2011: 83).
That is why, prior to the berry-picking season of 2011, the Migration Board established 
new requirements for those who want to pick berries in Sweden. In order to be granted a 
work permit, they must be offered conditions of employment which are on par with Swedish 
collective agreements or – the specification is due to the lack of collective agreements in the 
sector − “whatever is customary within the occupation or industry”. Berry-pickers are expect-
ed to earn at least 13,000 Swedish crowns (approximately 1,450 euro) a month. Furthermore, 
the employer must prove that s/he can pay the salary stated in the offer of employment and, 
in case s/he has previously hired berry-pickers, that s/he has paid their wages from the year 
before. Finally, the employer must give the trade union organisations concerned the opportu-
nity to comment on the conditions in the offer of employment (Migration Board 2011). 
Despite these requirements, what might happen, as the liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter 
has warned, is that berry-pickers are forced to sign two distinct contracts: one in line with 
law requirements, and another one by which they give up completely the official wage, prob-
ably without understanding what they are giving their consent about (Smedslund 2010). 
Moreover, there are media reports that companies in the sector have started recruiting work-
ers from Bulgaria and Romania instead of people from Asia just to get out of the new rules 
(Wadensjö).
The union has always had difficulties in organizing berry-pickers: they are often formally 
self-employed (although, in fact, they are employees), and therefore cannot be represented by 
the union (LO); and they stay in Sweden for a short time, earn some money and then return 
home and are very scared of the danger of losing their jobs in case they denounce violations 
of their rights (AMD1).
posted workers
At the same time, when EU enlargement took place, the “Vaxholm affair” raised the issue of 
foreign workers’ working conditions and, above all, of the challenges posed by “globalization” 
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to the Swedish model. In 2004, a Latvian company (Lavall un Partneri) was awarded a public 
tender in Sweden to renovate a school in Vaxholm (near Stockholm). Laval posted workers 
from Latvia; they were employed to work through a subsidiary of Laval and negotiations 
began between it and the Swedish building and public works trade union. When these ne-
gotiations broke down, Laval signed collective agreements with the Latvian building sector 
trade union, to which 65 per cent of the posted workers were affiliated. The Swedish trade 
union then took collective action by means of a blockade of all Laval sites in Sweden and 
this action was supported by other Swedish trade unions. Laval brought proceedings in the 
Swedish courts and then the case was transferred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
(Eurofund 2010; see also Persson, I. 2006). On 18 December 2008, the ECJ passed the ver-
dict on the Laval case, ruling that the right to industrial action can sometimes be justified 
under EU law to protect against social dumping, but at the same time the Court also pointed 
out that “the exercise of that right may be subject to certain restrictions”. The ECJ noted that 
industrial action aimed at obtaining terms and conditions which went beyond the minimum 
established by law made it less attractive for companies to carry out their business in the 
member state and, therefore, represented a restriction on the freedom to provide services, 
guaranteed under the Treaty. In Sweden there was no statutory minimum wage, nor were 
collective agreements universally applicable. Consequently, industrial action to impose terms 
could not be justified under EU law. The court also held that failure to take account of the 
collective agreement reached between the employer and the Latvian trade union amounted to 
discrimination against both organisations (Eurofund 2010).
Swedish laws on working conditions apply to everybody who is posted to Sweden; the ob-
ligation that foreign employers have to follow Swedish laws is based on regulations in the EU 
Directive on posting. There is also a Swedish law which is based on the EU Directive; it was 
altered in 2010 following the verdict of the European Union Court of Justice. Since then, the 
union organisations may only take industrial action against foreign employers under certain 
conditions and must hand in a copy of the conditions applying to their collective agreements 
to the Swedish Work Environment Authority (Swedish Work Environment 2011).
The blue-collar trade union, LO (LandsOrganisationen), is a strong critic of the reform 
passed in 2008, putting forward arguments that the white-collar trade union, TCO and 
SACO (the latter being the Swedish Confederation of Professions) partly agree with. The 
Social Democratic Party and the Left party were critical as well when the new rules were pre-
sented. Yet, it is noteworthy that the Social Democratic Party was not united in its opposition. 
According to the blue-collar trade union, the previous system had proved to work quite 
well and borders were not as close as the centre-right parties described them (LO 2006: 7). 
The competent authority for labour market defined the need for labour force thanks to lists 
of shortage-affected sectors and occupations, and the cooperation between social partners 
(unions and employers), who were given ten days to state their joint opinion on the single 
offer of employment, was effective, thanks to their knowledge of local labour markets (LO).
When the centre-right government proposed new rules for labour migration, the trade 
unions were rather negative, because they predicted that the system would be misused, as 
labour force coming to Sweden can slow down wages; today this is an argument made by the 
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xenophobic Sweden Democrats as well. Trade unions also pointed out the problem with low-
educated labour force such as berry-pickers. LO was and is afraid that if such low-educated 
immigrants enter the labour market, there will be competition for LO members. 
The proposals put forward by the Social Democrats and the unions in order to improve 
the implementation of the reform are the following:
  The offer of employment ought to be legally binding. As long as it is perfectly legal to 
write one thing in the offer of employment and then a different thing in the employ-
ment contract, what follows is that the individual cannot base his rights on the offer 
of employment, and that is abused by the system (TCO).
  An employer who was responsible in the past for workers’ rights violations should not 
be allowed to hire labour migrants (SAP).
  The Tax Agency should check if the employer’s contributions do correspond to the 
wage s/he promised (this would be a very easy thing, if the Tax Agency and the 
Migration Board just exchanged information by computer) (TCO).
  Controls would be easier if labour migrants moved to Sweden only after being grant-
ed the work permit; with a visa it is the opposite, and this increases the danger that 
the worker, once in Sweden, becomes more willing to accept unsatisfactory working 
conditions, just to stay in the country (LO).
  The Migration Board is not competent in the field of labour market; hence its dif-
ficulties in preventing workers’ rights violations; the responsibility for ensuring that 
the actual working conditions are in line with collective agreements should be trans-
ferred to another authority, as it was in the previous system (LO).
  The labour market test (and the cooperation between social partners) should be re-
stored in order to avoid labour migration being absorbed by sectors with bad working 
conditions (which make it difficult to recruit domestic labour force) (Larsson 2010).
The unions concerned with the tourism and restaurant sector complain that the presence of 
a cheap foreign labour force makes collective bargaining difficult because responsible compa-
nies have to compete with employers who underpay workers; and that implies as well that free 
competition is undermined (SAP; LO).
Nevertheless, it is not only the unions and the Left who express their concern over the 
shortcomings of the new labour migration policy. In the long run, difficulties are to be ex-
pected when it comes to monitoring working conditions (i.e., whether the employer follows 
what he has promised in the offer of employment or not). In Sweden it is mostly up to the 
unions to accomplish this task and it is not easy for unions to monitor sectors/areas where 
they do not have members or with workers whose language they do not speak, and/or who 
are scared of or prevented from getting in touch with trade unions: this is a remark also made 
by the OECD (OECD 2011: 126). Thus, maybe in the long run, a public monitoring system 
will be needed. In the service sector, for instance, the rate of unionization is going down, and 
this may mean that, in the future, the public authority will be forced to be more inquisitive 
compared to today (AMD2).
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However, in the face of these controversies, in December 2011, the Board introduced 
tighter rules for granting work permits in certain industries: 
The goal is to prevent people from being exploited on the Swedish labour market as much 
as possible within current legislation. The new rules mean that businesses in the cleaning, 
hotel and restaurant, service, construction, staffing, trading, agriculture and forestry, and 
automobile repair industries, as well as all newly-started operations, must show in con-
nection with a work permit application that wages can be guaranteed for the time that an 
offer of employment is valid.
Businesses in these industries that previously employed people from outside the EU must 
show documentation of wages paid. In the event the employee is hired by a foreign busi-
ness (outside the EU) conducting operations in Sweden, the company must have a branch 
office registered in Sweden. Furthermore, the company must show that the employee has 
received information on the conditions of the employment offered. (Migration Board 
2011d) 
The new controls have gone into effect on 16 January 2012.
At the same time as when unions and left parties complained that the new rules on labour 
migration have weakened workers’ position in the labour market, what is mostly criticized by 
the employers is the Migration Board’s ineffectiveness and, particularly, its handling of time. 
The Minister actually acknowledges that this is a problematic area (Minister for Migration).
The waiting time for recruiting a foreign worker is lower than in most other countries; 
nevertheless, it adds one month for Swedish firms to the hiring time, compared with hiring 
on the domestic labour market (OECD 2011: 121).
What the Migration Board is doing is to modernize and strengthen its IT system, mak-
ing it easier to apply for a work permit through the internet8. The Board is also reflecting on 
how to increase knowledge of the Swedish labour migration policy abroad (MV1).
Furthermore, in autumn 2011, the Board started a certification system, which would 
make it easier for companies which the Board – and the unions – trust (big companies like 
Ericsson mostly) to get a decision within twenty days (or five days, when the application also 
includes the statement from the concerned union). This certification system is both qualita-
tive and quantitative: a company can be part of it if it applies for at least 25 work permits for 
TCN citizens per year (the reference year is not only the current one, but the past one as well), 
if it fulfils all the legal requirements, and if it has a good relationship with the union. When 
all this is met, the Migration Board issues a certificate which means that the applications will 
be given a priority line (Migration Board 2012).
8  About four out of ten applicants apply online. The amount of the application fee, which can be paid either by 
the employer or by the employee (usually the latter) is 2,000 Swedish crowns (about 220 EUR), while for a permit 
extension it is 1,000 Swedish crowns (about 110 euros) (OECD 2011: 64). In an international perspective, the Swedish 
fee is low, but when it comes to seasonal workers – who have to pay the same amount – it is in the upper range 
(OECD 2011: 125).
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In the end, neither the xenophobic party (Sweden Democrats) gaining representation 
in the Parliament in 2010 nor the ongoing recession are likely to threaten the open-door 
labour migration policy formulated by the centre-right coalition. The open question in the 
Swedish public debate is, rather, whether and how the government will be able to improve 
the implementation of the reform, getting rid of unnecessary red tape, but in the first place 
safeguarding employees’ rights in a more effective way. 
It is to be stressed, on the other hand, that the tighter regulations introduced by the 
Migration Board and in force since January 2012 show the government’s will to agree on at 
least some of the recommendations made both by domestic and international organizations 
on this point.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect that the degree of this commitment to improve the 
policy will also depend on the understanding of labour migration, i.e., whether it is meant in 
a traditional sense (and, as such, one entailing measures promoting immigrants’ social and 
economic inclusion) or instead more as circular migration, which – despite all the emphasis 
on it as a key factor in international cooperation, benefiting destination as well as sending 
countries – resembles closely the old “guest workers” system.
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Managing Labour Migration in Times of 
Crisis – The UK Case
Camilla Devitt 
Trinity College Dublin
AbstrAct1
The UK regime aims to bring in foreign skills from outside of the European Economic Area 
in order to ensure economic growth and international competitiveness. While UK labour 
immigration policy has traditionally been biased towards skilled foreign workers, this basic 
aim has become more emphasised over the past fifteen years.
Foreign workers have also long found employment in low-skilled occupations in the UK. 
Indeed, the massive movement of A8 nationals after the 2004 enlargement and their employ-
ment in low-skilled work is the most recent example of the sourcing of workers for low-skilled 
jobs outside the formal labour immigration regime. 
The UK labour immigration regime remains a demand-led one, in which the primary 
criterion for entry is a job offer. 
The Points Based System (PBS), introduced between 2008-9, represents an attempt to 
objectify decisions on the entry of foreign workers. The PBS is made up of 5 Tiers, four of 
which are for labour immigrants. The most used route of the system is the Intra Company 
Transfer route in Tier 2.
Evidence-based policy has become the byword of UK policymaking since Labour 
came into office in 1997. The historic opening to labour immigration in the early 2000s, 
the creation of the PBS and the recent re-introduction of restrictions on immigration are all 
ostensibly based on publicly available scientific evidence.
1  This paper benefits from the research carried out in the framework of LAB-MIG-GOV (“Which labour migration 
governance for a more dynamic and inclusive Europe?”), a comparative research project coordinated by FIERI under 
the supervision of Ferruccio Pastore, with the support of the “Europe and Global Challenges” Programme promoted 
by Compagnia di San Paolo, Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and VolkswagenStiftung. EPC is one of the partners of 
LAB-MIG-GOV, in charge of the analysis of policy developments at EU level. The preliminary research results of 
LAB-MIG-GOV are available on the website www.labmiggov.eu.
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1. introduction
During the past decade, the UK received historically high levels of net immigration and a 
larger proportion of labour immigration, as a result of strong economic growth and a liberal 
immigration policy. Since the mid-1990s, net immigration has exceeded 100,000 people per 
year, rising above 200,000 in some years since 2000. The largest inflows came from within 
the European Union (EU). On the accession of eight Eastern European countries (the A8) 
to the EU in May 2004, the UK, Ireland and Sweden were the only three member states to 
give workers from these states immediate unrestricted access to their labour markets. About 
1.3 million A8 nationals arrived in the UK between May 2004 and May 2009; though it is 
estimated that about half left by the end of that period.
The British labour immigration system can be described as a hybrid system; it is histori-
cally demand-led and while supply-side schemes have been introduced over the past decade, 
they remain marginal. The work permit system, which granted work permits to a specific 
employer for a particular skilled foreign national for a specific job and has accounted for 
the majority of non-EEA workers entering the UK for work purposes, was introduced in 
the aftermath of the First World War. While it has been subject to many revisions, the basic 
principles underpinning the system have remained the same, at least until the rolling out of 
the new points-based system (PBS) in 2008. 
During the Labour governments, in office between 1997 and 2010, and the current 
Coalition government, in office since May 2010, the labour immigration system has been the 
object of constant reform. There have been three main phases of reform: phase 1 (1998-2004) 
involved liberalising and expanding the existing demand-led system, as well as introducing 
some new supply-side channels; phase 2 (2005-2008) was one of restructuring and consoli-
dating previous policy innovations into a “points-based system” (PBS), which was aimed at 
better control of immigration and increased objectivity in admission decisions; and phase 3 
(2009-) has involved qualitative adjustments to entry criteria and quantitative restrictions on 
entry, both with the pronounced aim of reducing the levels of non-EEA labour immigration. 
The broad thrusts of policy have reflected a cross-party consensus based on shared views 
of Britain’s rightful place in the global economy, the complexity of “race relations” and public 
opinion on immigration. Indeed, a restrictive stance has dominated British labour immi-
gration policy over the past half century and most stakeholders have supported this. The 
short-lived and much hyped liberalisation of labour immigration policy in the early 2000s 
was also largely supported by the main parties and stakeholders, including the trade unions, 
which were historically adverse to inflows of foreign workers (Krings 2009). The return to 
a more restrictive stance over the past five years has generally been viewed as a necessary 
response to what are perceived to have been excessive levels of inward migration over the past 
decade and to the economic downturn and rise in unemployment since 2008. Another aspect 
of continuity is the restrictive stance towards non-European immigration. Non-European 
immigration has been heavily restricted since the 1960s, while Irish and, following the UK’s 
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accession to the EU2 in 1973, nationals of most EU member states have benefited from free 
movement (Somerville 2007). UK labour immigration policy has thus long held a European 
bias, despite the fact that it has stronger linguistic, and one could argue cultural ties, with 
ex-colonies such as India and Jamaica than it does with the rest of Europe bar Ireland.
In the late 1990s, British labour immigration policy underwent a radical reform. Labour 
governments decisively broke with the previous policy regime, emphasising the contribution 
that economic migration can make to the economy. References to the need for skilled foreign 
workers, particularly for the booming ICT sector, emerged in 1998/9 in the Treasury, the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Cabinet Office, in the context of a gen-
eral focus on increasing the UK economy’s international competitiveness (Glover, Gott et al. 
2001). 
The new policy approach which developed was based around the concept of “managed 
migration” as introduced in the 2002 Home Office White Paper “Secure borders, safe ha-
vens: Integration with diversity in modern Britain” (Home Office 2002). Managed migration 
involves strong controls on unauthorised and non-economic migration, in particular asylum, 
and the facilitation of economic migration. This White Paper argued that “developed econo-
mies are becoming more and more knowledge-based and more dependent on people with 
skills and ideas. Migrants bring new experiences and talents that can widen and enrich the 
knowledge base of the economy” (Home Office 2002, 11). 
This change in approach to labour immigration can be explained by sustained eco-
nomic growth, labour shortages and international human capital competitiveness concerns. 
Employers lobbied the government to open up to labour immigration, with high profile cam-
paigns for high skilled foreign workers in sectors like ICT, and the trade unions preferred a 
managed system of labour immigration than irregular migration and work, which would 
result from a combination of restrictive policy and labour shortages. There was thus a con-
sensus around opening up to regular labour immigration. Between 2000 and 2004, the work 
permit system was eased and new schemes were introduced for high and low skilled workers. 
The opening up to labour migration resulted in a rise in the number of work permits issued; 
work permit holders and their dependents increasing from 62,975 in 1997 to 137,035 in 2005 
(Somerville 2007; Boswell 2008; Menz 2009). 
Due to strong and sustained economic growth and the pervasive ideology of economic 
liberalism, introduced by the Conservative party in the late 1970s, the Labour government’s 
liberalisation of labour immigration to the UK did not immediately have to confront op-
position from the political opposition or the media. Indeed, while there was some concern 
regarding the social impact of opening up to foreign workers, the economic arguments for 
immigration were accepted by the Conservatives. 
The decision not to impose restrictions on the free movement of workers from the new 
EU member states on their accession on the 1st of May 2004 turned out to be the most 
significant decision taken by the Labour government in the arena of labour migration gover-
nance. In keeping with the traditional bias towards European immigration, the strategy was 
2  Then called the European Economic Community (EEC).
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to fill low skilled labour needs with workers from the A8 and restrict non-EU migration to 
the highly skilled. Prior to the decision, the debate was focused on how many migrants would 
come and the potential for an increase in the welfare burden as EU citizens have the same 
rights to welfare as UK citizens. 
The numbers were far greater than expected; between May 2004 and December 2006, 
579,000 A8 migrants registered in the UK. The gradual return to a more negative, restrictive 
approach to labour immigration emerged in the aftermath of the enlargement with concerns 
regarding the impact of the large inflow of Eastern Europeans on local public services. The 
Conservative party criticised the government for underestimating the extent of migration 
from the A8 and for a lack of planning in terms of the impact on public services and lo-
cal communities and proposed putting an annual cap on immigration. Public opinion polls 
generally showed an increasingly negative stance on immigration, with a majority preferring 
a reduction in inflows. Labour received particular criticism from the right wing tabloid press 
and a technocratic policy debate developed, with government opposition questioning the ef-
ficiency of the system and the accuracy of government research (Boswell 2009).
Immigration policy is always a balancing act between opposing interests. The Labour 
government was under pressure to give the appearance of better control over labour immigra-
tion, while at the same time giving employers the certainty that they could continue to source 
highly skilled migrants. As the government could not control inflows from the A8 – though 
it decided not to give labour market access to workers from Romania and Bulgaria, on their 
accession to the EU on the 1st of January 2007 – the main response to growing concerns re-
garding labour immigration was to reform the non-EEA labour immigration system. The role 
of the state was reinforced, while at the same time externalising some of the responsibility for 
decision-making and implementation in this area to outside experts, employers and agencies. 
Labour’s third term saw a major consultation on how to manage economic migration, the 
outcome of which was the PBS, which was rolled out from 2008 and which I discuss below in 
more detail. The PBS represents an attempt to maximise the economic benefits of immigra-
tion and to establish better government control over it by means of clear objective qualitative 
admission criteria. The new system was relatively well received by opposition parties and the 
main stakeholders and received relatively little attention in the tabloids. 
The approach to labour immigration changed definitively as the economic crisis set in 
in 2008. In that year, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs published 
a report on the “Economic Impact of Immigration”, which argued against the positive con-
sensus regarding the benefits of immigration. It maintained that there was a risk that too 
much migration would reduce incentives for training, and was contributing to the increase in 
housing prices among other problems (Devitt 2010). The Labour government began to make 
qualitative adjustments to the PBS in order to reduce inflows, for example, strengthening the 
resident labour market test in 2009. 
The far right made significant gains in European and local elections; however, the anti-
immigrant British National Party did not achieve its expected breakthrough in the 2010 
general election (Murray 2011). Indeed, just as Thatcher’s Conservative party won the 1979 
elections, the Conservative party, which is now in a Coalition government with the Liberal 
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Democrats, co-opted extreme Right votes in 2010 due to its tough line on immigration. In 
line with the Conservative electoral commitment, the government has introduced an annual 
cap on some categories of non-EEA economic migrants. In an apparent quid pro quo, the 
Liberal Democrats have accepted the more restrictive stance on numbers in return for an 
assurance that migrants’ rights are to be protected (Interview HL2). 
As noted above, there seems to be a general acceptance of the Conservative “tough line” 
on immigration among the main parties and stakeholders with little appetite to oppose the 
general thrust of policy. While the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties did not support 
the idea of a cap on non-economic labour inflows, qualitative restrictions appear to be less 
controversial. In any case, the changes introduced by the Conservatives are far less influential 
than might appear from the party rhetoric. Only a few employer associations that are affected 
by the restrictions, in particular the ethnic catering industry, have been vociferously critical 
of the current policy. The trade unions have also tempered their pro-migrant perspective and 
have begun to put more emphasis on the need to upskill local workers (Interviews HO, BIS, 
BHA, TUC). 
2. AdMission policiEs For ForEign WorkErs: thE 
institutionAl FrAMEWork
Unlike many other West European states, where labour immigration was under the jurisdic-
tion of Labour Ministries in the post-war period, the UK Home Office (HO) – the equivalent 
of European Interior Ministries – has been responsible for immigration since the 1793 Aliens 
Act. The Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) comprises around 80 per cent of 
HO staff. In Spring 2007, under the Labour government, the IND was transformed into a 
separate executive agency, the Border and Immigration Agency (BIA), within the HO. This 
agency was renamed the UK Border Agency (UKBA) in Spring 2008 (Boswell 2008). The 
current Coalition government has since moved policy staff back into the HO, while opera-
tions remain in the UKBA (Interview HO). 
The other main departments involved in the policy arena are Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS),3 the Treasury, the Department of Health (DH), the Department for Education 
(DE) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). Since late 2007, a new actor has 
entered the debate, which has quickly become extremely influential. The Migration Advisory 
Committee (MAC) is an independent advisory committee of economists, which the govern-
ment consults on specific questions related to immigration policy. 
Prior to the introduction of the PBS in 2008, there were a number of schemes which 
granted non-EEA workers temporary permits for employment in the UK; the largest of which 
was the work permit system. Non-EEA skilled labour migrants were granted work permits 
for skilled jobs with UK-based employers in particular locations.4 The prospective employer 
3  Previously Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and before that Trade and Industry.
4  “Work permits” were granted if an immigrant was abroad and “first permissions” were granted if the immigrant was 
already in the UK.
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applied for the work permit to Work Permits (UK), which was part of the UKBA. The em-
ployer had to attest that the migrant worker would fill a genuine vacancy for an additional 
role being created in the UK, in order to ensure against the displacement of resident workers. 
Employers had to show that the role could not be filled from within the resident labour mar-
ket (resident labour market test (RLMT)) and that the migrant would be paid the going rate 
(not just the minimum wage) for the job in the UK. Furthermore, within the work permit 
system a shortage occupation route allowed employers rapid access to foreign skills identified 
as being in short supply in the UK (MAC 2008). 
While skills have always been important criteria for gaining entry to the UK as a labour 
migrant, the focus on skills has been further emphasised since the turn of the millennium. 
A Labour government policy innovation during the early 2000s, which has received much 
attention, was the introduction of supply-side points-based schemes. With the Innovator 
Scheme, introduced in the summer of 2000 and the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme 
(HSMP), introduced in December 2001, migrant workers gained access to the British labour 
market solely based on their skills. 
The HSMP was a scheme for attracting highly skilled migrants without a specific job 
offer in the UK. Candidates had to reach 75 points based on the following attributes: quali-
fications; previous earnings; age; prior UK experience; and successful completion of an MBA 
programme from a specified list. The threshold for entry was eased over the years and the 
numbers gaining entry grew from just over 1,000 in 2002 to over 17,000 in 2005. A HSM 
would be granted a year’s leave and a three-year extension if they could show that they had 
taken all reasonable steps to become economically active in the UK. After four years they 
would be granted permanent residency if they could show that they were economically active. 
In the face of evidence of abuse of the programme, in 2006, the Government extended the 
required period of residence from four to five years and tightened the requirements for an 
extension of leave (Somerville 2007; MAC 2008).
In 2005, within the framework of the five-year strategy on immigration and asylum, 
the Labour Government launched a consultation on a more selective points-based system for 
immigration (Home Office 2005). The government aimed to create a system which would 
fulfil the following objectives: improve public confidence in the system; fill skills gaps; attract 
highly productive and highly skilled workers and students; attract investment and increase 
productivity and flexibility in the labour market; and ensure that people left at the end of 
their stay. In 2006, the Government published more detailed proposals in “A Points Based 
System: Making Migration Work for Britain” (Home Office 2006). Explicitly based on the 
Australian points-based system, the key outcomes of the new system were to be better iden-
tifying and attracting of migrants who have most to contribute to the UK; a more efficient, 
transparent and objective application process; and improved compliance and reduced scope 
for abuse. The government also aimed to make the system simpler to use, as it had emerged 
that many users found the work permit system too complex and bureaucratic. 
Between February 2008 and March 2009, the government rolled out the new PBS for 
admitting non-EEA workers and students, which was said to consolidate over 80 existing 
work and study routes into five main categories or “tiers” (see section 3 for details).
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3. QuAlitAtiVE VErsus QuAntitAtiVE critEriA
3.1 Qualitative selection
The UK labour migration system has always been based on qualitative selectivity; both the 
skill of the migrant and the wage of the job being criteria for issuing work permits to foreign 
workers. This was based on the historic tradition of importing key skills from the British 
Empire and Commonwealth, notably for the health and education sectors, and the assump-
tion that skilled well-paid foreign workers were less likely to displace resident workers. The 
qualitative criteria for admission have been subject to revisions over the years with the aim 
of easing or increasing restrictions on inflows. More recently, the system was translated into 
the PBS in which a minimum threshold of points must be met based on various qualitative 
criteria including wage, skill, linguistic competence and maintenance funds. 
The criteria for admission under the various tiers of the PBS have been the object of 
almost constant reform. I present the system as it was initially set out as well as the qualitative 
reforms made to it by the Labour government (between 2008 and 2010) and the current 
Coalition government.
  Tier 1: Highly skilled migrants to contribute to growth and productivity. The “en-
trepreneurs” category must have at least £200,000 of disposable capital in a regulated 
financial institution; “investors” must hold at least £1,000,000; “graduate students” 
must have a qualification from a UK institution.5 The “general highly-skilled”6 are 
admitted on the basis of points for age, qualifications, previous earnings (weighted to 
reflect the distribution of salaries around the world) and previous work experience or 
qualifications gained in the UK, English language ability and maintenance require-
ments. This category replaced the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme. Entrants 
under this category have unlimited labour market access, and are allowed to bring 
dependents with them. After a two-year period, the points will be re-assessed and, 
if the person has high earnings or a highly skilled job, they will have their leave 
extended. For recent reforms to this category, see section on quantitative selection 
below.
  Tier 2: Medium and highly skilled workers with a job offer. This tier replaces the 
work permit system and covers the majority of skilled migrants entering the UK. See 
the Tier 2 focus section below for details on this tier.
  Tier 3: Quota-based low-skilled schemes for filling specific temporary labour short-
ages. This tier is currently suspended based on the view that A8 nationals currently 
meet demand. The schemes will only be with countries with which the UK has ef-
fective return arrangements. Two low-skilled labour schemes, the seasonal agricul-
tural workers scheme (SAWS) and the sector-based schemes (SBS), remain open to 
5  This post-study route ceased to exist from April 2012.
6  This general route was substituted with an “exceptional talent” route in 2011.
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Romanian and Bulgarian migrants, who do not yet have unrestricted access to the 
UK labour market. 
  Tier 4: Students, covering the period of study at a specified and registered institution 
in the UK. 
  Tier 5: Youth mobility and temporary workers, permitted to work for a limited peri-
od of time, for primarily non-economic objectives. This covers the previous Working 
Holiday-Maker scheme, as well as the au pair scheme. These migrants gain entry for 
cultural, charitable, religious or international development reasons or to satisfy the 
UK’s obligations under certain international treaties.
Employers are requested to meet certain conditions before hiring non-EEA workers. 
Employers and educational institutions must apply to a register of sponsors to acquire a cer-
tificate of sponsorship from the Home Office (except under Tier 1, where immigrants do 
not gain admission for a specific job). Recognized sponsors are attributed either “A-rated” 
or “B-rated” sponsor status, based on their compliance with various reporting and record-
keeping duties. Certificates can be withdrawn based on non-compliance. A-rated sponsors 
have the “full confidence” of the Home Office, while sponsors are B-rated based on evidence 
of abusing the system or not putting the correct systems in place. The B-rating is a temporary 
status while measures are put in place in order to gain full accreditation. Unlike the previous 
work permit system, the migrant, rather than the UK employer, applies to come to the UK. 
The sponsor issues the certificate of sponsorship to the migrant worker, who then makes an 
application via the points-based system.
In April 2012 the UKBA launched a new two-tier premium customer service programme 
which offers sponsoring employers an enhanced level of customer service for a fee. To qualify 
for premium service, an employer must be A-rated and have received no civil penalties in the 
preceding three years. 
To qualify for each tier, individuals must earn a given number of points. Points are 
awarded through different combinations of “attributes tests” such as English language, skills, 
qualifications, previous salary, age and a “control test” regarding the likelihood of compliance 
with conditions of leave, such as availability of funds, compliance with immigration condi-
tions, and, for Tiers 2-5, a recognized sponsor. For Tiers 1 and 2, points are awarded on the 
basis of attributes and control tests; for Tiers 3-5, points are solely based on control tests. 
The UK PBS can be described as a hybrid demand-supply-led system. Tier 1 is supply-
led, as applicants are not required to have a job offer in the UK. However, Tier 2, the largest 
route of entry, is largely demand-based as a job offer is required and provides the most points. 
The other tiers are only nominally points-based (Murray 2011).
Tier 2
The majority of non-EEA labour migrants are admitted through Tier 2. Tier 2 migrants are 
entitled to three years leave in the UK, which can be extended by two years if the migrant 
still meets requirements. Points, with an overall pass mark of 70, are awarded for a sponsored 
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job offer, prospective earnings (and qualifications or equivalents until April 2011), as well as 
the maintenance requirement and competence in English. 
Following changes introduced by the current Coalition government, Tier 2 is now di-
vided into four routes: Tier 2 general, which includes the shortage occupation list and the 
Resident Labour Market Test (RLMT), Intra-company transfer (ICT), Sportspeople and 
Ministers of Religion. Qualitative changes have been made to the points criteria by the 
Coalition government in order to reduce the number of applicants; raising the job skill 
threshold first to National Qualifications Framework (NQF) level 4 (diploma level) in April 
2011 and then to NQF level 6 (graduate/professional certificate level) in June 2012, rais-
ing the language requirement for entry from basic to intermediate English and raising the 
minimum pay threshold to £20,000. A significant change from the previous rules is that the 
qualifications of the migrant are no longer assessed, only the skill level of the job.
table 2: PBs tier 2 general 
Attribute Points available
Assigned a certificate of sponsorship, because:
1. the job has an annual salary of £150,000 or more;
2. the job is on the shortage occupation list;
3. your sponsor has completed a resident labour market test;
4. you are switching from a post-study category; 
5. or you want to extend your stay and continue working in the 
same job for the same employer
30
Appropriate salary and allowances: Minimum £20,000 20
English language ability 10
Maintenance (funds) 10
source: UKBA website
With the increase in minimum skill levels, 27 occupations will no longer qualify. To lessen 
the impact on employers, Tier 2 will remain open to NQF 4 occupations that appear on the 
UK’s Shortage Occupation List and to various occupations in creative fields, such as artists, 
authors, actors, dancers and designers. 
ICTs accounted for 60 per cent of applications under Tier 2 between November 2008 
and May 2009. The RLMT accounted for 32 per cent, while shortage occupations accounted 
for just 8 per cent. The MAC is charged with drawing up shortage occupation lists, to be 
reviewed at six monthly intervals. The committee uses a three-stage approach in drawing 
up the shortage lists. First, they determine whether particular occupations or categories of 
jobs are sufficiently skilled to be included on the lists. Second, they assess whether these oc-
cupations are experiencing a shortage. Third, they consider whether it is sensible to fill these 
shortages with non-EEA workers. The MAC uses both “top-down” quantitative national-
level data and qualitative “bottom-up” evidence relating to particular jobs or sectors from 
individual employers and sectoral/occupational representatives.
The RMLT is the second largest channel within Tier 2 of the PBS after the ICT route. 
This route already existed under the work permit system. It is notable that the test was more 
stringent under the work permit system than it is under the PBS. Previously, the RLMT 
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involved providing Work Permits (UK) with documentary evidence that no resident worker 
could be found for the vacancy, including details of the vacancy, the recruitment methods 
used to advertise the post, responses to advertisements, an explanation for why the resident 
workers who applied were deemed inappropriate,7 as well as showing how the requested for-
eign worker had the necessary skills and experience for the job. The job had to be advertised 
in English and in a publication that was available throughout the EEA, no more than six 
months before the work permit application was submitted. The process of attempting to re-
cruit an EEA resident worker was to be given four weeks. 
Within the PBS RMLT route, employers were initially required to advertise the vacancy 
for at least two weeks, at earnings levels deemed reasonable by the UKBA for that job. For jobs 
paying in excess of £40,000 the advertising period was reduced to a single week. In December 
2009, the advertising period was increased to four weeks through the public employment 
services, Jobcentre Plus and through another channel as set out in a sector “code of practice”. 
However, the sponsor must simply attest to the UKBA that the test has been conducted and 
does not need to show evidence unless s/he is the subject of an infrequent spot check. 
Since June 2012, RLMT requirements have been eased for the highly paid (over £70,000 
per annum) and select PhD positions. For example, for these positions, employers will no 
longer have to advertise in Jobcentre Plus (public employment agency, which mainly caters 
for low-skilled positions).
Unlike under the work permit system, there is no requirement for employers to confirm 
that the ICTs have company-specific knowledge and experience required for the post on offer 
that could not be provided by a resident worker. The requirement for six months’ previous 
employment with the company is held by the UKBA to be a proxy for this. In response to 
complaints that the ICT route accounts for most entrants within Tier 2 due to the relatively 
lax restrictions, the Coalition government has introduced a new minimum salary of £40,000 
for firms using ICTs for more than a year. Staff earning at least £24,000 will still be able to 
come for up to 12 months. 
Tier 2 differs from the old work permit system in various ways, in particular the inclu-
sion of English language competence, the role of the MAC in defining shortage occupations 
and the easing of the ICT and RLMT routes (House of Lords 2008). 
3.2 setting qualitative criteria
As noted above, in June 2007, the government established the MAC, an independent advi-
sory committee of five economists headed by Professor David Metcalf, Emeritus Professor of 
the London School of Economics. The MAC was to some extent modelled on the Low Pay 
Commission, which makes recommendations to government on the minimum wage level 
(Interview MAC). The committee includes a representative from the UK Commission on 
Employment and Skills (UKCES) and the UKBA and has a permanent secretariat. The MAC 
was set up to provide “transparent, independent and evidence-based advice to the Government 
on where shortages of skilled labour can sensibly be filled by immigration from outside the 
7  Resident workers could only be judged on the basis of the skills requested in the advertisement.
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EEA” (MAC 2008 p.11). Despite the Conservative Party’s “bonfire of the quangos”, the remit 
of the MAC has continued to be expanded by the Coalition government. The remit is now 
rather broad; for example, over the past four years, the committee has been asked to assess the 
economic impact of dependents, whether to abolish the Worker Registration Scheme for A8 
migrants and what the limits should be on non-EEA skilled worker inflows.
The MAC is generally given three to six months to respond to government questions and 
its response is generally based on academic research and a formal consultation process. The 
government decides whether or not to take onboard MAC recommendations; however, the 
majority have been adopted. The consultation documents and recommendations are all avail-
able to the public online; which makes the process transparent. The economic rationale used 
by the MAC in making recommendations makes for clear, apparently unbiased, arguments. 
The MAC does not work in isolation; however, members underline its independence 
from political influence. The MAC secretariat is physically based within the Home Office 
building and informal discussions between Minister, Home Secretary, Home Office officials, 
MAC economists and officials regularly take place. 
The Migration Impacts Forum (MIF) set up by the Labour government to focus on 
the impact of immigration on local communities and public services, in particular on crime 
and housing, failed to institutionalise itself. It did not meet after June 2009 and has been 
disbanded by the Coalition government.
3.3 Quantitative limits
The UKBA consultation on the “Limits on Non-EU Economic Migration: A Consultation”, 
published at the end of June 2010, asserted that the government’s aim was to reduce net 
migration to the “tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands” during this Parliament. The 
target of tens of thousands is based on the level of immigration in the 1990s, prior to when 
Labour were in office. The government has explicitly based its new quantitative approach to 
immigration on policy in Australia, Canada and the US (Murray 2011). 
Restrictions on intra-EU mobility, family and asylum migration as well as ICTs are 
constrained by EU membership, human rights law and international treaty obligations. 
Furthermore, non-EEA labour and student inflows are not easily reduced due to influen-
tial interests, namely employers and educational institutions. The government is focusing 
on restricting three inflow channels for non-EEA nationals – work, study and family – and 
increasing outflows of non-EEA nationals by taking away the automatic right to settle in the 
UK for those resident for more than five years. 
As regards non-EEA labour immigration, the coalition government introduced an in-
terim cap in July 2010 of just over 24,000 until April 2011 – a reduction of 5 per cent on 
the previous year – and asked the MAC “at what levels should limits on Tier 1 and Tier 2 
of the Points Based System be set for their first full year of operation in 2011/12, in order to 
contribute to achieving the Government’s aim of reducing net migration to an annual level 
of tens of thousands by the end of this Parliament, and taking into account social and public 
service impacts as well as economic impacts?” (MAC 2010 p. 7). In their report, published in 
November 2010, the MAC provided a general analysis of the impact of labour immigration 
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– not Tier 1 and Tier 2 migrants, on which there is no data – on the UK economy, society 
and public services.8 This analysis did not appear to be directly related to the calculation 
of the figure for the cap, which was based on the “tens of thousands” target. As students 
accounted for around 60 per cent of non-EEA immigration in 2009 and the work and family 
routes accounted for approximately 20 per cent each, the MAC recommended a proportion-
ate cut in numbers; for Tier 1 and Tier 2 a limit somewhere in the 37,400 to 43,700 range. 
However, the government set the cap at 21,700 – 20,700 for Tier 2 and 1,000 for Tier 
1 – far below the MAC recommendation. This annual cap on Tier 1 and Tier 2 entries came 
into operation in April 2011. ICTs are not subject to the cap, despite the MAC recommenda-
tion to the contrary, due to the employer lobby, in particular MNCs, and diplomatic pressure 
from the Indian and Japanese governments (Interview MAC). The government also decided 
to close Tier 1 (General) category and limit the Tier to investors, entrepreneurs, and people of 
“exceptional talent.” The exceptional talent route is capped at 1,000, while investors and en-
trepreneurs will not be capped. Businesses had made it clear in the UKBA consultation that 
they were in the main interested in Tier 2 and the government further justified the closure of 
Tier 1 (General) by referring to a UKBA survey of some Tier 1 migrants applying for family 
reunion in June 2010, which argued that about a third of Tier 1 migrants are employed in low 
skilled jobs (Interview HO).9 The Tier 2 limit will not apply to those who apply from within 
the UK (in-country applicants), dependents or to the sportspeople and ministers of religion 
routes. Those who will earn over £150,000 per annum are also excluded from the cap. Tier 2 
permits are issued on a monthly basis. If a month’s allocation is oversubscribed, the govern-
ment will use a ranking system to determine which applicants receive a permit, based around 
the shortage list, qualifications and prospective earnings. The cap on Tier 1 and Tier 2 entries 
was expected to reduce net migration by 6,000 or less than 3 per cent compared with 2010. 
The cap on some Tier 1 and Tier 2 routes introduced in April 2011 was substantially un-
dersubscribed. In the first five months of the cap, which releases Certificates of Sponsorship 
(CoS) to employers of non-EEA workers on a monthly basis, a total of 10,200 certificates 
were made available, but only 4,323 were applied for by employers. The annual cap on Tier 
2 will remain at the level of 20,700 for 2012-13 and 2013-14. The UKBA introduced a two-
year cap cycle based on feedback from employers, who asked for fewer and less frequent policy 
changes.
4. MAtching lAbour oFFEr And dEMAnd
Apart from the 1,000 entries under the “exceptional talent” route of Tier 1, non-EEA labour 
migrants enter the UK on the basis of a job offer. Recruitment takes place in countries of 
8  The analysis took into account the impact on Gross GDP and GDP per capita, inflation, pay, employment, net fiscal 
contribution, provision and consumption of public services, housing market, crime, congestion, social cohesion and 
population. 
9  A MAC survey of December 2009 found that 90 per cent of entrants via the Tier 1 general route were in 
employment and 90 per cent of these were in highly skilled work.
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origin and in the UK. Most migrants are recruited abroad, though over one-third of certifi-
cates of sponsorship used under Tier 2 have been for immigrants already in the UK. 
In-country applicants include those with an existing work permit applying to extend 
their stay, as well as those who are switching from a post-study category. In-country applica-
tions (i.e., applications from non-EEA migrants already resident in the UK) are not subject to 
the constraints of the cap. A high proportion of those applying from abroad are ICTs (MAC 
2009). 
There is no requirement for employers to recruit via public or private intermediaries and 
agencies cannot act as sponsors. The role of private agencies depends on the sector and oc-
cupation. For example, while the recruitment of doctors for the UK’s National Health System 
(NHS) is centrally coordinated by the Department of Health and recruitment specialists play 
a limited role (as many doctors draw on personal contacts and the examination and registra-
tion process is clear), NHS trusts and the private health sector often use recruitment agencies 
in sourcing nurses (Bach 2008). 
5. FunctionAl EQuiVAlEnts to ForEign MigrAnt lAbour 
AdMission 
5.1 A8 workers
A8 workers have been the main “functional equivalent” to non-EEA low-skilled labour 
migrants in the UK since 2004. In the context of sustained economic growth in the early 
2000s, it was decided to source low-skilled labour needs from within the expanding EU. This 
choice was very much in keeping with UK labour immigration policy, which has traditionally 
favoured European immigration. The UK, Ireland and Sweden were the only EU member 
states to grant immediate labour market access to nationals of the A8 on their accession to 
the EU on 1 May 2004. The UK and Ireland received a disproportionate number of A8 
migrants, partly due to their flexible labour markets and proliferation of low-paid, low-skilled 
employment (Tamas and Münz 2006; Devitt 2010).
A8 nationals can work in any occupation in the UK. They are simply requested to reg-
ister with the Workers Registration Scheme (WRS), which was introduced in the UK as a 
transitional measure, which monitors A8 nationals’ access to the UK labour market. The 
registration scheme collects information about A8 migrants’ employment in the UK until 
12 months of continuous employment have elapsed. The A8 migrant must pay a one-off 
registration fee. 
As noted above, the number of A8 migrants entering the UK following accession was far 
greater than expected. A total of 1.24 million National Insurance numbers were allocated to 
A8 nationals between April 2004 and September 2008. The evidence tends to suggest that 
A8 migrants often stay in the UK for a temporary period before returning home. They are 
generally young, educated and are gainfully employed in the UK. Indeed, they have higher 
employment rates than UK-born workers.
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A8 workers have filled low-skilled labour shortages (as well as taking up newly created 
jobs in the expanding economy) and are often over-qualified for the work they engage in. 
Over three-quarters of A8 migrants are employed in lower skill occupations, compared to less 
than half of UK-born workers and other immigrants. They are mainly employed in elemen-
tary occupations and process, plant and machine operative occupations. The main sectors of 
employment for workers registering with the WRS in 2008 were hospitality and catering, ag-
riculture, manufacturing and food processing. A8 migrants are distributed across the country 
in both urban and rural settings; they are disproportionately resident in areas like Wash and 
Herefordshire (Anderson, Ruhs et al. 2006).
Member states could only maintain transitional measures beyond the 1st of May 2009 
(five years following the 2004 accession) if they could demonstrate that their removal could 
generate or exacerbate a serious disturbance to the domestic labour market. On the basis 
of a MAC recommendation, the UK government chose to retain the Workers’ Registration 
Scheme (MAC 2009). Labour Force Survey (LFS) data suggests that the stock of A8 citizens 
decreased slightly towards the end of 2009, but began to increase again during the second 
quarter of 2010 (Vargas-Silva 2011). 
UK governments took a different stance on the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to 
the EU in 2007; transitional arrangements were placed on the access of nationals from these 
states to the UK labour market, based on the fact that larger than expected numbers had 
arrived from the A8 and that there was a decline in demand for low-skilled labour (Interview 
MAC). Romanian and Bulgarian nationals are, however, prioritised in terms of sourcing 
additional temporary low-skilled labour in the agricultural and food-processing sectors as 
discussed above in section.
5.2 Family migrants
The number of work permit holders given leave to enter the UK in 2006 was 97,000. The 
total number of National Insurance numbers issued to foreign nationals from outside the 
EEA in the same year was 289,000. The difference between the work permit numbers and 
National Insurance numbers is explained by the fact that the latter covers workers on the 
Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (new Tier 1), the self-employed, working holidaymakers, 
students working part-time and dependants of migrants eligible to work without a permit, 
among other non-economic migrant categories (MAC 2008). This data shows the impor-
tance of “functional equivalents” to labour migrants in the UK; indeed, a larger number of 
non-EEA migrant workers enter via non-labour migrant routes than the work permit channel.
An important source of functional equivalents to non-EEA labour immigrants are non-
EEA labour migrants’ spouses/partners. Allowing the employment of PBS migrants’ spouses/
partners provides employers with additional labour and reduces demand for an opening of 
Tier 3 of the PBS for temporary low-skilled workers.
Dependants (children, spouses, civil partners, same-sex partners, and unmarried part-
ners) can participate in the labour market provided that the PBS immigrant has been granted 
more than 12 months’ permission to stay in the UK. However, there is a prohibition on 
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undertaking employment as a doctor in training and family members of Tier 4 immigrants 
granted less than 12 months’ leave to enter or remain are not allowed to work. 
There is a lack of data on dependants’ participation in the UK labour market. According 
to Control of Immigration statistics, in 2007, 37,700 dependants of work permit holders were 
admitted to the UK, while 86,300 entered with a work permit. The majority of dependants 
were connected to permit holders from wealthier countries. Most dependants have come 
through Tier 1 and 2 of the PBS, in particular Tier 1 general and Tier 2. According to the 
2008 Q1 ad hoc LFS module, in the second quarter of 2008, 27.3 per cent of the total immi-
grant stock had entered the UK in the previous five years to join a family or spouse; a larger 
percentage than those entering for work or study or any other reason. Between 80 per cent 
and 92 per cent of Tier 1 and Tier 2 dependent spouses/partners are female. 
The MAC maintains that LFS data on qualifications held by immigrants are highly un-
reliable. Based on this data, it appears that 17 per cent of spouses/partners have a bachelor’s 
degree and over 50 per cent of spouses/partners maintain that they have “other qualifica-
tions” (i.e., not PhD, master’s, bachelor’s, A levels, NVQ3). Equally, the evidence on spouses/
partners’ jobs is weak. It appears that the employment rates of spouses/partners fall following 
migration to the UK. LFS data record that 59 per cent of spouses/ partners were employed, 
while 33 per cent of spouses/partners were inactive and 9 per cent were seeking work. 81 per 
cent of spouses/partners were employed in unskilled occupations, compared with 38 per cent 
of principal immigrants and 26.8 per cent were employed in personal service jobs. 
In the context of rising concern regarding unemployment and displacement of resident 
workers by migrant workers, the MAC was asked to assess the economic contribution made 
by the dependants of PBS migrants and their role in the labour market in February 2009. In 
its report in August of that year, the MAC maintained that there was no reason to conclude 
that greater restrictions on working rights for dependants would lead to improved outcomes, 
either for UK workers or for the UK economy (MAC 2009).
5.3 Foreign students 
Since around 2007, student migration has constituted the largest category of migration to the 
UK. Foreign students are another source of labour in the UK, and is effectively a functional 
equivalent to labour migrants. However, a smaller proportion of them participate in the la-
bour market than family migrants. Note that asylum-seekers do not have access to the labour 
market in the UK. 
According to LFS data, only about 1 in 4 foreign-born students (both EU and non-EU 
nationals) have paid employment. This percentage has not increased over the past 15 years; 
the figure has been between 22 per cent and 29 per cent since 1995 (observatory on students). 
It is important to note, however, that LFS data probably undercount students, especially those 
living in dormitories and other communal dwellings.
In 2009, 75 per cent (156,000) of student inflows were from outside the EU and over the 
past few years there have been sharp increases in inflows from the Indian sub-continent and 
the Middle-East and rest of Asia. Just over half are male. Over half are in universities with 
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another 40 per cent in Higher Education or Further Education institutions. Only 7 per cent 
are in English language schools (Blinder 2011).
Concerns over abuse of the system prompted the Labour Government to introduce a 
number of changes, including restricting the work rights of students on courses below de-
gree level and raising the minimum level of English language study permitted under Tier 
4. Without seeking the approval of UKBA, students on a course at or above NQF 6/QCF 
6/SCQF 9 at a UK higher education institution, or a short-term study abroad degree pro-
gramme at an overseas higher education institution, are allowed to work for up to 20 hours 
per week during term time and work full-time during vacations, while those on a course 
below this level at a UK higher education institution or publicly funded further education 
college are allowed to work for up to 10 hours per week during term time and work full-time 
during vacations. Students are not allowed to work in the UK if they are studying with an 
education provider that is not a UK higher education institution or a publicly funded further 
education college (unless they are on a short-term study abroad degree programme at an over-
seas higher education institution). However, the 2009 LFS suggests that there is significant 
working in breach. For those studying below degree level, 53 per cent reported working more 
than 21 hours per week (UKBA 2010).
In March 2011, following a public consultation on the student immigration system, the 
Government announced that the Tier 1 (Post-study Work) visa category would close from 
April 2012. The Post-study work visa enables foreign students to remain in the UK for up 
to two years after obtaining a UK degree. If they find skilled or highly skilled work during 
the two years they can “switch” into Tier 1 or Tier 2 of the points-based system, which can 
lead to permanent settlement. After April 2012, international graduates will only be able to 
remain in the UK by “switching” into Tier 2 of the points-based system or if they have a 
strong business proposition (under new provisions for “student entrepreneurs”). 
5.4 undocumented foreign labour
Estimates for the irregular migrant population in the UK range between 417,000 and 
863,000; comparatively high figures in terms of Western Europe. London is argued to be 
home to a large proportion of the total (Somerville, Sriskandarajah et al. 2009; Vollmer 2011). 
Migration scholars often argue that irregular foreign workers are a functional substitute to 
legal labour immigration as they represent cheap, vulnerable labour and allow governments 
to give the impression of an apparently restrictive labour immigration policy (Guiraudon and 
Joppke 2001). 
However, the political attitude towards undocumented migrant labour has become less 
tolerant over the past decade in response to security and human rights concerns. Regarding 
the latter, the death of twenty-three Chinese cockle pickers in Morecambe Bay in February 
2004 was a key focusing event which emphasised the need to create channels for safe le-
gal labour immigration – namely providing access to workers from the A8 – and to enforce 
controls on undocumented immigration. Indeed, the level of interest in contrasting undocu-
mented immigration and the employment of undocumented migrants is in stark contrast to 
attempts to reduce illegal work in general (Scott 2007; Ruhs and Anderson 2008). 
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Despite the fact that the majority of irregular migrants in the UK are visa over-stayers, the 
UK has traditionally emphasised border control in contrasting undocumented immigration, 
as opposed to internal controls. However, biometric identity cards for non-EEA nationals 
working in the UK for six months or more have been rolled out from 2008 onwards in order 
to aid employers and the authorities in checking residence and work status (Boswell 2008). 
As sponsors, employers are obliged to keep records of their migrant workers and inform the 
UKBA if the latter do not turn up for work or even if they change their mobile number. The 
UK has also increased the penalties for employing undocumented migrants, with fines of 
£5,000 per illegal employee, and enforcement appears to have been reinforced (Somerville, 
Sriskandarajah et al. 2009).
In the main, the Conservative and Labour parties are against the idea of regularisation 
while the Liberal Democrat Party is generally the most open to it. At the same time, the 
government has regularized between 60,000 to 100,000 people over the past decade by 
means of administrative changes and ad hoc decisions. Those regularized have tended to be 
in the country for 13 years or more (seven if in a family), and are often failed asylum seekers 
(Boswell 2008; Somerville, Sriskandarajah et al. 2009).
6. thE ExtErnAl diMEnsion oF lAbour MigrAtion policiEs
The UK government is not a member of the Schengen Area and negotiated an “opt in” ar-
rangement for all areas of cooperation on borders, immigration and asylum under the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty. While the UK seeks cooperation in the control of undocumented immi-
gration and asylum system harmonisation, the policy has been to protect national sovereignty 
in the area of labour immigration management and integration. 
Based on a concern with maintaining control over its borders, the UK has opted out of 
any measures on legal immigration (Boswell 2008; Menz 2009). As a result, EU policy-mak-
ing in this area is not on the radar of UK policymakers and stakeholders. The Conservative 
Party has a strong anti-EU element, which may use the current negative public sentiment 
towards A8 immigration – which cannot be restricted by the UK government – to further 
their cause of exiting from the EU (Interview HL1).
UK labour migration policy is in the main not based on bilateral agreements with source 
countries. However, Tier 3 of the PBS, which is currently suspended, will allow for temporary 
low-skilled labour migration from source countries which have signed return agreements with 
the UK; this is a similar policy to the Italian one, which offers labour migration entry quotas 
to key source countries on the condition that they readmit undocumented migrants. Another 
programme, which is based on international agreements, is the Youth Mobility Scheme with-
in Tier 5. This scheme replaces the Working Holiday scheme and is for young people from 
participating countries who would like to come and experience life in the UK. The countries 
currently involved in the scheme are Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Monaco; 
“low risk” countries, with which the UK has return agreements and which offer the UK a 
similar scheme (Interview HO).
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The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the first binding multilateral 
trade agreement to explicitly address the movement of persons. GATS Mode 4 service suppli-
ers gain entry for a specific purpose, are normally confined to one sector and are temporary. 
Mode 4 commitments have priority in any national labour migration considerations. An EU/
India Free Trade Agreement is currently being negotiated, and the key aspect demanded by 
India is “Mode 4”. The UK is expected to be the main recipient of Indian Mode 4 migrants, 
about 25,000 out of a total of about Indian 40,000 ICTs who will be able to come to Europe. 
This has caused a certain tension between government aims of promoting UK trade interests 
and reducing levels of immigration (Interviews HO, MAC, TUC). 
7. strEngths And WEAknEssEs oF thE uk lAbour 
MigrAtion rEgiME
In order to measure the effectiveness of labour immigration governance systems, we can 
attempt to assess whether they are successful in meeting set goals. These goals include re-
sponding to the needs of clients – employers, migrants and the resident labour force as well 
as public opinion – ensuring compliance with immigration regulations and responding to 
broader socio-economic goals, such as increasing productivity and investment levels. In the 
case of labour immigration policy, different clients’ interests are often in complete opposition 
(i.e., employers and the resident labour force). Furthermore, the meeting of some objectives 
(e.g., migrants’ contribution to increasing productivity) is harder to assess than others (e.g., 
the objectivity of the admission system).
The PBS is widely viewed as an efficient system for admitting non-EEA labour migrants. 
A HO survey of PBS users published in January 2011 found that satisfaction was high among 
both applicants and sponsors; around 8 out of 10 applicants and sponsors were very or fairly 
satisfied with the process. The same proportion maintained that the PBS was meeting its 
objectives of being easy to understand, open/transparent, user-friendly, efficient and fair. Of 
those applicants and sponsors who had experience of previous immigration systems, they 
generally believed the PBS was an improvement on those systems (Home Office 2011). A 
HO official maintained in October 2011 that after a natural teething period, employers have 
come to prefer the PBS to the previous system, due to its objectivity: “Nobody likes change 
so it has taken a while, but I think employers prefer the PBS, it’s more objective so you don’t 
have a person in Sheffield saying ‘hum I don’t like you and I don’t see why you should come 
here’, which is what could happen in the work permit system. Under this system the employer 
issues the potential employee with a certificate of sponsorship, which contains all the infor-
mation on the job, the applicant submits supporting evidence and if everything is in order 
and if the person doesn’t have a poor immigration history, then that person is in” (Interview 
HO). A BIS official was equally positive about the system: “What’s clear to me is there is no 
such thing as a perfect system because of the variety of needs in terms of business, the variety 
of skills and salary levels, there is such a range of them that the PBS seems to go a consider-
able way to addressing the disparities between for example research where you’ve got high 
skills but perhaps salaries which don’t compare at all to the private sector. No, it’s not perfect 
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and we’re always working with different areas of business to make sure that their specific ar-
eas are not damaged by the fact that it’s not nuanced enough without creating a system which 
becomes so complex because we have to balance the system with UKBA’s focus on controlling 
borders” (Interview BIS). A recent House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report 
also maintained that decisions are reached more quickly than under the work permit system 
(Public Accounts Committee 2011). However, in the above-mentioned HO survey, applicants 
were evenly split over whether the PBS was faster or slower than pre-PBS routes. 
Furthermore, according to the same Public Accounts Committee, applicants to the PBS 
have needed more support than expected in understanding how the system works, with half 
of them using the helplines. Moreover, the policy of “evidential flexibility” whereby case-
workers can request additional information rather than simply rejecting applications is not 
used consistently. 
Employers also complain about the cost of fulfilling sponsor obligations. Since UKBA 
can remove sponsorship with no recourse to appeal, employers are obliged to pay for legal ad-
vice throughout the process. As the House of Commons HAC asserted in July 2009, “There 
is clearly great nervousness amongst sponsors over the possible penalties attached to any fail-
ure, even unwitting, to report changes in circumstance of their migrants”. The CBI estimates 
that it costs £500,000 to meet sponsorship rules, which may make Tier 2 route unfeasible for 
small and medium-sized firms (Home Affairs Committee 2009). 
In general, the establishment of the MAC has elicited positive responses from the main 
stakeholders. Employers present a rosy picture of the MAC, which is contrasted with UKBA 
and the Conservative Party’s restrictive tendencies: “The complaints we hear from members 
are about delays and a slightly ‘wrong door no door’ approach that UKBA takes occasion-
ally, like if there is a problem and somebody doesn’t fit the criteria, there is a tendency to 
say ‘no’, not ‘how can we work around this’. But on the positive, I think the involvement of 
the MAC is really important, we are very supportive of their role; members really value a 
sound economic evidence base for policy; this is a political commitment that’s been taken 
as regards the cap but the economic recovery has to take priority, so for us the role of the 
MAC is important” (Interview CBI). In its 2009 report on the PBS, the HAC found that 
most interested parties considered the MAC to be doing a good job; including witnesses with 
preferences as diverse as Sir Andrew Green of Migration Watch and Jabez Lam of the Chinese 
Immigration Concern Committee. The latter did suggest that the MAC should include a 
social policy expert, however, in order to ensure that the social aspects of migration were 
explored adequately.
The system can be said to be rather efficient as regards facilitating the entry of skilled 
foreign workers. The numbers of work permits increased steadily since the late 1990s, which 
reflects sustained economic growth and skill shortages. It has been emphasised, however, that 
the PBS overemphasises quantifiable skills and does not give due emphasis to ability or work 
experience. Indeed, as in Australia and Canada, previous professional experience could be 
used as a proxy measure (Murray 2011). In terms of ensuring that the needs of another client 
group, the resident labour force, are met, the system is supposed to ensure that the latter have 
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a chance to take up the available jobs before employers request non-EEA migrant workers.10 
The UK employment rate has declined since 2003, while those of other countries such as 
the Netherlands and some Scandinavian countries, with relatively high employment rates, 
continued to rise. The fall in employment appears to involve the low qualified as the gap 
between the employment rate of the low qualified and the average working age population is 
continuing to widen; only 46 per cent of those without qualifications are in work compared 
to 86 per cent of people with a degree or equivalent (UKCES 2009).
There is no evidence that there is any relationship between non-EEA labour immigra-
tion and the declining UK employment rate; indeed, most non-EEA labour migrants are 
employed in skilled jobs and thus would not be directly competing with low qualified resi-
dent workers. Nevertheless, the PBS system imposes relatively weak employer obligations in 
terms of attempts to fill vacancies with resident labour before requesting workers from outside 
of the EEA. Furthermore, it is notable that such requirements for the RLMT and ICT routes 
were relaxed in the PBS and have not been made more stringent by the current Coalition 
government, despite its restrictive rhetoric.
Regarding the RLMT, in the UK, employers are expected to attest that they have adver-
tised the job in the UK for the required amount of time (currently four weeks) in two outlets, 
JobsCentrePlus and a sector outlet. However, there is no public certification of the process or 
pre-admission checks and post-admission checks on employers are infrequent. In 2009, the 
MAC asserted that there may be a case for introducing certification; however, governments 
have not done so due to the cost it would entail and a political antipathy towards red tape and 
regulation (Interview MAC). As noted above, the ICT route, through which about 60 per 
cent of Tier 2 applications are made, does not require any form of RLMT. Moreover, while 
in many countries, ICTs are required to have worked for 12 months in the company abroad, 
the requirement in the UK is 6 months (MAC 2009). The size of this route can partly be 
explained by the fact that the UK is the location of a large number of MNCs; in fact, it is the 
second largest destination for foreign direct investment after the US. However, despite the 
fact that the MAC found that it was, in the main, more expensive to bring in people via the 
ICT route than hire a local worker, the Public Accounts Committee has expressed concern 
that ICT migrants may be displacing resident workers with IT skills; also because the number 
is not capped (Public Accounts Committee 2011). The HAC had voiced similar concerns 
in July 2009: “We were presented with conflicting evidence on the requirements of the in-
formation and communications sector in the UK and internationally. On the one hand, the 
global businesses we met in India argued persuasively for the need to allow skilled workers to 
transfer between their different international offices…On the other hand…the Sector Skills 
Council for IT denied the existence of any serious shortage, and the Professional Contractors’ 
Group suggested to us that the use of intra-company transfers was removing jobs from the 
UK workforce” (Home Affairs Committee 2009). 
10  Furthermore, a high employment rate is not only a question of responding to the labour force’s need for paid work, 
it also contributes to economic growth; according to UKCES, a one-percentage point increase in the employment rate 
adds between £8–11 billion to GDP. 
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Public opinion in the UK is generally for a reduction in levels of immigration, which is 
to some degree reflected in the Conservative Party’s electoral commitment to reduce inflows 
from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands. On the other hand, employers have ex-
pressed concern about shortages of skilled labour in the recovery due to the cap. The business 
community has also voiced concern that the cap on some Tier 1 and 2 routes and more 
restrictive migration rhetoric may give the impression that the UK is closed for business. In 
this sense, responding to clients’ needs in terms of labour immigration is always a delicate 
balancing act. Is the coalition government’s attempt to reduce inflows over the course of this 
Parliament expected to be effective? According to most commentators, this is unlikely. This 
is largely due to the fact that the government cannot control UK/EU mobility and the reduc-
tions made to non-EEA immigration and settlement will not achieve the targeted reduction. 
Indeed, net emigration of British citizens fell from 130,000 in the year to March 2007 to 
just 30,000 in the year to March 2010, which is one of the main reasons net migration rose 
in 2010 (Murray 2011). The Migration Observatory estimates that in order to achieve the 
target of tens of thousands, net migration would have to be cut by 142,000. This means cut-
ting non-EEA labour, family and student migration by this figure at a minimum. However, 
the government’s forecasted reductions in work, student and family inflows only constitute 
about half of the reduction in non-EU net migration required to meet their target by 2015 
(Migration Observatory 2011). 
In terms of compliance with immigration regulations, the House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee 2011 report on the PBS work routes highlighted the concern that the 
UKBA is not adequately ensuring that migrant workers and employers comply with immigra-
tion rules. It argued that the Agency does not monitor whether migrant workers leave when 
they are supposed to (and estimates that there are 181,000 migrants in the UK whose permis-
sion to remain expired in December 2008). Furthermore, the UKBA visits less than a fifth of 
employers before granting licences. Finally, the UKBA does not have adequate management 
information to manage inflows and ensure compliance and the committee welcomed plans to 
introduce an integrated casework system by 2013 (Public Accounts Committee 2011).
The contribution of skilled non-EEA labour migrants to the UK economy, for example 
as regards productivity growth, is of course rather difficult to determine. Whilst the level of 
UK productivity is relatively moderate, its growth has been relatively strong in recent years, at 
least up to the current economic recession. In 2009, productivity had increased by more than 
the OECD average in 10 of the past 14 years, and had increased by more than the Euro Area 
average in 12 of those years (UKCES 2009). We could correlate increased levels of productiv-
ity with rising inflows of skilled non-EEA labour immigrants, but a causal relationship and 
its direction is hard to assess. The difficulty of generating any overwhelmingly positive or 
negative conclusion regarding the impact of labour migrants, in particular certain categories 
of labour migrants, on the economy and society is exemplified by the MAC’s response to 
the government’s request of a numerical limit to be placed on Tier 1 and Tier 2 labour im-
migration. The MAC reviewed the data and academic literature on economic, public service 
and social impacts of migration and took evidence from stakeholders. In terms of economic 
impacts, it was maintained that it is likely that Tier 1 and 2 migrants, on average, have a 
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positive impact on GDP per-head and that they are less likely to exert downward pressure on 
wages than low-skilled migrant workers. While they assert that these skilled migrant workers 
are unlikely to reduce the employment of resident workers in general, there is some anecdotal 
evidence of negative effects in certain sectors and occupations. Tier 1 and 2 migrants are 
expected to make a positive net fiscal contribution, especially in the short-term, while they 
are young. They are argued to contribute to public services by filling skill shortages, particu-
larly in health and education and to be light consumers of health services. In terms of social 
impacts, they are expected to contribute to higher rents and as they settle, housing prices. 
Their impact on crime is expected to be negligible; however, they are expected to generate 
more congestion as they tend to live in London. It is considered that the fact that Tier 1 and 
2 migrants are skilled, have good English skills and are often employed in the public sector 
tends to make it more likely that they will have less problems integrating into UK society 
(MAC 2010).
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list oF intErViEWs With policyMAkErs, stAkEholdErs And 
rEsEArchErs (sEptEMbEr-octobEr 2011)
no. of 
interview organisation
Place of 
interview
1 Home office (Ho) Croydon
2 Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) london
3 Business Innovation and skills (BIs) skills and Migration division london
4 Business Innovation and skills (BIs) Migration division london
5 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) london
6 Department of Health (DH) Telephone
7 Confederation of British Industry (CBI) london
8 British Hospitality Association (BHA) london
9 Engineering UK london
10 Intellect london
11 Trade Union Congress (TUC) london
12 Migrant Rights Network (MRN) london
13 Conservative MP (Hl1) london
14 liberal Democrat MP (Hl2) london
15 Dr. georg Menz (Menz) london
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AbstrAct
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is entitled to intervene in the field of integration but 
only through coordination. However, developments that have taken place at EU level over 
the last 10 years show a different picture. On the one hand, the EU has adopted rules, the 
effects of which have been to force Member States to harmonise national rules and policies in 
fields which fall within integration policies. On the other hand, and in order to circumvent 
“the harmonisation prohibition”, the EU and Member States have developed a series of “soft 
law tools” which create the conditions of de facto harmonisation. At the end of the day, it is 
possible to claim that an integration policy is taking place at EU level which influences the 
convergence and, to a certain extent, the harmonisation, of national policies. This paper tries 
to give an overview of this blurred picture.
introduction
Discussing immigration and asylum policies involves addressing, at some point, the issue 
related to the integration of third country nationals legally residing in the receiving society. 
However, this question is intricate as it is sometimes hard to clearly delineate what integration 
covers and who is responsible for its management and proper implementation. It goes from 
questioning the role of the state, the receiving society and the migrants in this process as 
well as the definition of fields involved in this policy. In other words, addressing the issue of 
integration policy is all but simple.
Amsterdam treaty and tampere European council conclusions
The picture is even more complicated when trying to identify these questions at EU level. 
Indeed, the development of an EU immigration and asylum policy since the entry into force 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, in May 1999, has not been accompanied by the development of a 
clear and fully fledged integration policy. 
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This derives from the Treaty provisions as well as political orientations. With respect to 
the Treaty provisions, the Amsterdam Treaty is silent on this issue. With the exception of one 
provision addressing the issue of family reunification, the Treaty does not contain any legal 
basis granting the EU any specific competence to intervene in the field of the integration of 
legally residing third country nationals. This lack of legal entitlement is somehow reflected in 
the Tampere European Council conclusions adopted in October 1999. 
In a paragraph entitled “fair treatment of third country nationals”, the heads of State and 
government declared, “A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them [third 
country nationals legally residing in the EU states] rights and obligations comparable to those 
of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural 
life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia”. When looking more closely to 
the conclusions, the picture related to integration policy is divided into two main types of 
actions. 
The first one is based on the fight against racism and xenophobia and the development 
and implementation of non-discrimination rules.1 In these domains, the EU has already acted 
and is able to further take decisions, in particular on the basis of article 13 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty2. However, policies related to these fields are mainly national policies which are dealt 
with within the national ambit. This means that EU action in this field is mainly based on 
the coordination of national policies. 
With respect to the objective of granting comparable rights, the conclusions are in fact 
more narrow. Indeed, the scope of third country nationals who may be entitled to benefit 
from comparable rights is limited to the category of long term residents, i.e., those who have 
already resided for some years (almost five) in the EU Member State. Those rights, which 
should be as close as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens, are to be granted in the fields 
of residence, education and work. In practice, the objective enshrined in the Tampere conclu-
sions reflected an already existing situation where the idea of granting more rights to long 
term residents was shared by the vast majority of Member States3. 
To sum up, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not define any specific legal basis to act in the 
field of integration of third country nationals. On the other hand, the highest EU political 
body, i.e., the European Council, composed of heads of State and governments, called for fur-
ther action in this field but in a restricted way. Indeed, and given the Treaty limitations, these 
1  With respect to the principle of non-discrimination, see in particular, E. Bribosia, “Les Politiques d’Intégration 
de l’Union européenne et des Etats membres à l’Epreuve du Principe de Non-Discrimination”, in Y. Pascouau & T. 
Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
2  Article 13, paragraph 1: “Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers 
conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”.
3  Groenendijk K., Guild E., Barzilay R., “Le statut juridique des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue durée 
dans un Etat membre de l’Union européenne”, Commission européenne, Direction générale de la justice et des affaires 
intérieures, OPOCE, Luxembourg, 2001.
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actions should address the coordination of national policies in the field of racism, xenophobia 
and non-discrimination and enable the approximation of national legislations but with re-
spect to long term residents in targeted fields (residence, education and working conditions). 
This situation reflects a quite intricate picture which is basically grounded on the fol-
lowing question: how could the EU act in the field of integration without having received 
any clear-cut competence? From the outset, the role of the EU with respect to integration is 
unclear. This is somehow misleading as “legal migration and integration are inseparable and 
should mutually reinforce one another”4. 
lisbon treaty, coordination and subsidiarity 
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, brought some clarification 
in this policy field. Article 79.4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) states: “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support 
for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country 
nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States”.
This provision is highly important because it indicates that the EU can intervene in the 
field of integration but only in order to support, or coordinate, national policies. This means 
that the competence in this field is limited to the minimum and may not in any case go 
further than the coordination of national policies, i.e., EU institutions are not entitled to 
adopt for instance a Directive, for which the transposition would impose the modification or 
adaptation of Member States legislations and/or regulations5. 
The solution developed in the Lisbon Treaty is consistent. Indeed, when considering 
the fields covered by integration policies and corresponding EU competences, it looks evi-
dent that the EU is not embedded with the appropriate legal means of action. Integration of 
third country nationals covers the following fields: access to employment, education, voca-
tional training, healthcare, public services, housing and culture. While all of these fields are 
addressed by the Treaty, EU competence in all of these fields is limited to supporting or 
coordinating national policies and does not harmonise them.
This initial assessment is reinforced by another element: subsidiarity6. Integration poli-
cies cover a wide diversity of fields but involve as well an impressive number of actors. In 
4  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of 
Third-Country Nationals in the European Union”, COM(2005)389 final, 1.09.2005.
5  On this issue, see J. Handoll, “Integration Policy in the European Union: the Question of Competence”, in Y. 
Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member 
States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
6  According to article 5, paragraph 3, Treaty on European Union: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which 
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but 
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level”.
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the Member States, these policies are defined and implemented by several levels of national, 
regional and local players. This then implies the involvement of a myriad of political, ad-
ministrative and private actors. At the end of the day, one can wonder whether the European 
Union is the appropriate level to deal with the issue.
Finally, historical reasons may also be taken into consideration when it comes to con-
sidering how an EU integration policy could be set up. More precisely, it is not entirely clear 
whether Member States share the same history, views and experiences with respect to immi-
gration and integration policies. Hence, some States may portray themselves as immigration 
countries whereas others consider themselves as emigration countries7. This may consequent-
ly have an effect on integration policies as some States may have opted for a “multicultural” 
policy where others have opted for a so called “assimilationist” policy8. In the end, could the 
EU find its way out in this system without breaching the principle of subsidiarity? 
simple but…still complex
At first sight, the Lisbon Treaty has made things clear: the EU is entitled to intervene in 
the field of integration but only through coordination. However, when looking at several 
developments that have taken place at EU level in the last 10 years, this legal frame fails to 
convince for at least two main reasons. 
First, the EU has adopted rules, the effects of which have been to force Member States to 
harmonise national rules and policies in fields which fall within integration policies. Second, 
in order to circumvent “the harmonisation prohibition”, the EU and Member States have 
developed a series of “soft law tools” which create the conditions of de facto harmonisation. At 
the end of the day, it is possible to claim that an integration policy is taking place at EU level 
which influences national policies.
This paper tries to give an overview of this blurred picture. It will first show that EU 
directives have been adopted with the effect of harmonising national policies linked with the 
integration of third country nationals (I). Second, the paper will enumerate the huge diversity 
of “soft law instruments” that have been put in place in the last couple of years (II). Finally, 
some conclusions will be drawn to try to outline trends that have been followed by some 
Member States with respect to integration in the field of immigration (III). 
i. Eu rulEs hArMonising nAtionAl intEgrAtion policiEs
The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty gave the EU the ability to adopt EU rules, i.e., 
Directives and Regulations, in the fields of visa, asylum and immigration. While some rules 
are clearly devoted to border management, visa policy, irregular migration or asylum issues, 
others do concern integration of third country nationals. 
7  R. Penninx, D. Spencer & N. Van Hear, “Migration and Integration in Europe: the State of research”, COMPAS, 2008.
8  R. Garbaye, “Emeutes vs Intégration. Comparaisons franco-britanniques”, Les nouveaux débats, Les Presses de 
Science-Po, Paris 2011.
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Two categories of rules may therefore be identified. The first one is made of Directives 
that are clearly aimed at facilitating the integration of third country nationals (A). The second 
set of rules is composed of Directives that are initially aimed at defining rules of admission 
but contain also a series of rights which contribute to better integration of aliens (B).
A. rules aimed at fostering integration of third country nationals
Two different instruments have been adopted in this field: the family reunification Directive9 
(1) and the Long term residents Directive (2).
1. Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification
a. Family reunification as a condition for integration 
Point 4 of the Directive’s preamble states: “Family reunification is a necessary way of making 
family life possible. It helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third 
country nationals in the Member State, which also serves to promote economic and social 
cohesion, a fundamental Community objective stated in the Treaty”. 
According to this point, family reunification serves integration in many different ways. 
Social stability is highlighted as the first point. Here, the sponsor, i.e., the migrant already 
residing in the EU and entitled to ask for his/her family to join, gains in social stability as his/
her family joins. This creates a stable emotional environment. But this social stability focus 
may also be used to exercise some “social control” over migrants. This was for instance the 
case in some Member States where the possibility to benefit from family reunification was 
kept open in order to keep migrant workers “at home”. In these cases, family reunification 
aids the social inclusion of migrants. 
The promotion of economic and social cohesion is also highlighted as an added value. 
The fact that migrants are able to live with their families releases emotional tensions and 
eases their ability or capacity to take part in social life. With respect to economic cohesion, 
the more people are entitled to reside legally in a country, the more they are also inclined to 
take part in economic life, such as using services or buying goods. 
In this sense, family reunification should contribute to enhancing the integration of third 
country nationals legally residing in the EU Member States. 
b. Integration as a condition for family reunification 
The Directive contains several provisions which condition or make family reunification de-
pendent on integration skills. These provisions are of three kinds. 
For minors
Family reunification of minors may be limited in two specific circumstances. Article 4, para-
graph 1, indicates: “where a child is aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the 
rest of his/her family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and residence under 
this Directive, verify whether he or she meets a condition for integration provided for by 
9  Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003.
200
Migration and Integration
its existing legislation on the date of implementation of this Directive”. This derogation is 
explained as follows in the Preamble of the Directive (point 12): “The possibility of limiting 
the right to family reunification of children over the age of 12, whose primary residence is not 
with the sponsor, is intended to reflect the children’s capacity for integration at early ages and 
shall ensure that they acquire the necessary education and language skills in school”.
This provision has been challenged before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the 
European Parliament (EP)10. The latter has considered that the provision “renders family 
reunification unachievable and negates this right”. The ECJ did not follow the EP. The pos-
sibility of limiting family reunification intends to reflect children’s capacity to integrate at 
early ages and to ensure they acquire the necessary education and language skills in schools. 
On the other hand, the Court stresses that Member States are not entitled to implement this 
derogation in a manner that would be contrary to the right to respect family life. This means 
that Member States are not able to use an “unspecified concept of integration” but have the 
duty to apply integration conditions provided for by existing laws. They also have to examine 
each specific situation with respect to the best interest of the child and the nature and solidity 
of the person’s family relationship. Such an assessment should make sure that the right to 
family life is respected. 
Article 4, paragraph 6, states: “Member States may request that the applications con-
cerning family reunification of minor children have to be submitted before the age of 15, as 
provided for by its existing legislation on the date of the implementation of this Directive. If 
the application is submitted after the age of 15, the Member States which decide to apply this 
derogation shall authorise the entry and residence of such children on grounds other than 
family reunification”. 
According to the Council, the objective of this provision is to encourage immigrant 
families to have their minor children come at a very young age, in order to facilitate their 
integration. This article was also challenged by the EP. The ECJ dismissed the EP’s action. 
Following the lines previously drawn, the Court states that article 4, paragraph 6, should 
be read in the light of the principles to have due regard to the best interests of minors, and 
to take account of a number of factors, one of which is the person’s family relationships. As 
long as Member States proceed with an examination of the application in the interests of the 
child, and with the view to promote family life, the possibility to ask for the application to 
be introduced before the age of 15 does not run counter to the fundamental right to respect 
family life. 
In both cases, integration concerns may allow the possibility for Member States to re-
strict the reunification of minors. This possibility is however framed by the ECJ. When using 
the derogation, Member States must proceed to an individual examination, and take into ac-
count the best interest of the child and the family relationship. In other words, the Court did 
not cancel the provisions of the Directive and has instead defined a framework within which 
the use of derogation is admissible. While in practice the Court’s decision has had little effect 
– as only two Member States are using the 12 years old derogation, and none is implementing 
10  ECJ, 26 June 2006, European Parliament vs. Council of the European Union, Case C-540/03.
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the 15 years old one – it has shown how the ECJ has decided to interpret leeway given to the 
Member States by the Directive. In other words, the Court considers that Member States are 
allowed to use derogations insofar as those derogations are implemented with respect to strict 
requirements.
For the spouse
Article 8 of the Directive opens the possibility for Member States to “require the sponsor to 
have stayed lawfully in their territory for a period not exceeding two years, before having his/
her family members join him/her”. According to the Member States, a waiting period which 
may last up to two years pursues the objective of enhancing integration. Indeed, it ensures 
that “family reunification does not take place until the sponsor has found in the host State a 
solid base, both economic and domestic, for settling a family there”11.
This provision of the Directive was also challenged by the EP. The ECJ did not consider 
that this article runs counter to the right to respect family life. However, and as was already 
pointed out previously, the Court has underlined that the implementation of a waiting period 
does not preclude national authorities to take into account other relevant factors such as the 
family ties and the best interest of the child. 
Here again, the Court dismissed the EP’s action but set clear lines within which national 
authorities actions should be conducted.
Integration measures to be satisfied in the country of origin
Finally, Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Directive contains the option for Member States to 
accompany the family reunification procedure with the possibility of requiring applicants for 
family reunification to comply with integration measures. The fulfilment of such measures 
may be requested before entering the Member State, i.e., in the country of origin, or after. 
The term “integration measures” is somehow misleading. It does not help to define the 
content of those measures. On the other hand, it does not define either the regime of those 
measures12, i.e., does the requirement to comply with integration measures enable national 
authorities to refuse family reunification because the applicant did not properly fulfil the 
requirement? 
In practice, such integration measures have been implemented by some Member States 
and have mainly been linked with language and civic knowledge. They have also been put in 
place in migrants’ country of origin and have led to some legal problems, which we will come 
back to later. 
The Directive on the right to family reunification is a legal instrument which principally 
aims to facilitate the integration of third country nationals legally residing in the EU Member 
States. However, this Directive bears in its own provisions a paradox: the main derogations 
are based on the purposes of integration. In other words, the right to family reunification 
11  ECJ, 26 June 2006, European Parliament vs. Council of the European Union, Case C-540/03.
12  See on this issue, Groenendijk K., “Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law 2004.
202
Migration and Integration
may be refused or limited due to considerations based on integration. This portrays a certain 
ambiguity with respect to integration. 
2. Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third country nationals 
who are long term residents13
In the Tampere conclusions, the paragraph devoted to integration of third country nationals 
paid specific attention to long term residents. In the Tampere conclusions, the paragraph 
devoted to integration of third country nationals paid specific attention to long term resi-
dents. The long term residents were quoted as a category of persons who should be granted 
“rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens”. This objective is linked to the 
shared idea of enhancing the rights of migrants with respect to the length of their stay in 
the Member States14. Where presenting the legislative proposal, the Commission emphasised: 
“with this proposal, the Commission is giving practical expression to its intention and to 
its commitment to a matter that is crucial in terms of securing the genuine integration of 
third-country nationals settled on a long-term basis in the territory of the Member States”15. 
In other words, the improvement of migrants’ rights with respect to employment, education, 
vocational training, social protection and assistance as well as enhanced protection, as op-
posed to expulsion, contributes to their better integration. 
Directive 2003/109/EC follows that path in its articles 11 and 12, respectively deal-
ing with “equal treatment” and “protection against expulsion”. In order to give long term 
residence added value, the Directive organises also the conditions under which long term 
residents acquire the right to reside in another Member State for a period exceeding three 
months in order, for instance, to exercise an economic activity in this second State. 
In short, holders of an EU long term residence permit are granted a reinforced status and 
enhanced freedom of movement. This confirms the long-standing idea that the more people 
reside in a country, the more their rights are reinforced and the more their integration into 
that society is secured. The long term resident Directive gives this idea an EU echo as intra-
EU mobility is open to this category of migrants which was not the case beforehand. 
However, and along the same line as what has been said for the family reunification 
directive, the procedure for a migrant to be granted an EU long term residence status, and 
therefore enter the process of enhanced integration into the society, may be conditioned to 
the fulfilment of integration requirements. 
Article 5 of the Directive, establishing the conditions for acquiring long term resident 
status, contains a second paragraph which reads as follows: “member states may require 
13  For an analysis of the Directive, see in particular D. Acosta, “The Long Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary 
Form of EU Citizenship. An Analysis of Directive 2003/109”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2011
14  K. Groenendijk , E. Guild , R. Barzilay, “Le statut juridique des ressortissants de pays tiers résidents de longue 
durée dans un Etat membre de l’Union européenne”, Commission européenne, Direction générale de la justice et des 
affaires intérieures, OPOCE, Luxembourg, 2001.
15  Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, 
COM(2001)127 final, 13.3.2001.
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third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with national 
law”. 
This provision is different from the ones laid down in the family reunification directive. 
The text deals with “conditions”, whereas it was dealing with “measures” with respect to 
family reunification. This entails major consequences as it derives from this provision that 
the EU long term resident status may be conditioned to the fulfilment of integration require-
ments16. The latter are, most of the time, linked, as previously underlined, with language and 
civic knowledge as well as knowledge of the receiving country’s values17. 
Such a requirement is also applicable for the exercise of the right to reside in another 
Member State. But here requirements related to “integration” are worded in a different 
manner and has a different effect. As a principle, any long term resident wishing to reside 
in another Member State has to apply for a residence permit in the second State. Within 
this procedure, authorities of the second States may ask the applicant to fulfil some condi-
tions among which the fulfilment of “integration measures” could be requested. Article 15, 
paragraph 3, nevertheless indicates that this condition is not applicable where the persons 
concerned have been required to comply with integration conditions in order to be granted 
the long term residence status in the first Member State. Nevertheless, the provision adds that 
the applicant may in any case be required to attend language courses. 
To sum up, persons holding an EU long term residence status in one Member State can 
apply for a residence permit in another Member State. The application can be accompanied 
with the obligation to fulfil “integration measures” insofar as the applicant has not previously 
been requested to comply with “integration conditions” where he/she applied for the EU long 
term status. But, the second Member State may ask the applicant to attend language classes 
despite the fact that attendance of such classes was already mandatory in the first State…
This looks quite intricate. In order to clarify things, the situation may be summarised 
as follows: integration requirements may condition the granting of the long term residence 
status in the first Member State but the application for a residence permit in the second 
State may not be dependent on the fulfilment of such conditions. The only possibility left 
to Member States is to ask applicants to comply with measures, i.e., actions that may not 
hamper the right to reside in the second State. 
The idea that the longer and more secure the stay in a State is, the more integration 
is improved, is reflected in the long term residents Directive. It grants additional rights to 
migrants and improves protection against expulsion. However, the possibility to benefit from 
enhanced protection is conditioned by integration requirements, i.e., proving that the ap-
plicant for the status and resulting rights has the required skills and/or knowledge (language, 
civic, etc.). Where he or she is not able to fulfil integration conditions, the possibility to 
16  See, K. Groenendijk “Integration of Immigrants in the EU: The Old and the New Way?”, in Y. Pascouau & T. 
Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012. 
17  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2003/109/
EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, COM(2011) 585 final, 28.09.2011.
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continue the path towards better integration on the basis of a reinforced status will not be 
awarded. Here again, the Directive seeks to enhance integration but contains integration pro-
visions aimed at limiting this process. 
The family reunification directive and the long term residents Directive both pursue the 
objective of enhancing integration of third country nationals legally residing in the Member 
States. This therefore shows that the EU has been able to adopt rules directly linked with 
integration, despite the limitation now introduced in the Lisbon treaty. 
It should be emphasised that EU action in this field is not limited to these Directives. 
Other legal instruments do have an indirect effect on foreigners’ integration in the Member 
States. 
b. rules helping integration of third country nationals
The action of the Union in the field of immigration and asylum is mainly devoted to the 
adoption of rules defining conditions of entry and residence of specific categories of per-
sons, i.e., migrants, asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection. In all of the 
Directives adopted in this regard, one can find provisions which help to improve the integra-
tion of third country nationals in the Member States. These provisions are mainly related to 
the status of admitted persons and concern mainly the possibility for migrants to have access 
to work (1) and to have access to a series of rights (2).
1. Access to work
Access to employment and self-employment is an important part of integration into the re-
ceiving society. With this in mind the Common Basic Principles for Integration, adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 200418, designate access to employment 
as a top priority. Employment is described in this political document as “a key part of the 
integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions 
immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible”. 
It is clear that access to work allows migrants to gain in autonomy and independence 
and enhances their ability to interact with other individuals at work as well as in society as a 
whole. In this view, employment or self-employment is to be considered a principle to be put 
into action ahead of language, history knowledge, education, and even access to institutions.
The question relating to the adoption of EU rules related to the admission of migrant 
workers has always been and remains highly sensitive. In practice, Member States have 
proven reluctant to adopt general EU rules in this field. Desiring to keep control over the 
admission of migrant workers, Member States have opted for the development of a limited 
and piecemeal approach. Existing directives in this field are related to specific categories of 
18  Council Justice and Home Affairs, 19 November 2004, Doc. 14615/04.
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migrants – such as students19, researchers20, highly skilled workers21, seasonal workers22, intra-
corporate transferees23 and remunerated trainees – and have a low harmonising effect over 
Member States rules24. 
However, it would be limiting to consider that access to employment is, with the excep-
tion of the abovementioned Directive, only regulated by national legislation. When looking 
more closely to the enormous number of rules adopted at EU level, it can be seen that some of 
them deal with migrants’ status and therefore define rules regarding their access to employ-
ment and self-employment.
Hence, family members, asylum seekers, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protec-
tion have the right to have access to work under EU law and under defined conditions. In 
some cases, access to work is automatic, as in the case of refugees. In other cases, access to 
work is made conditional upon a labour market test or a waiting period, or both. 
With respect to family members for instance, the exercising of an employed or self-em-
ployed activity may be conditioned by a time limit which shall in no case exceed 12 months. 
The Directive adds that during this time frame Member States may examine the situation 
of their labour markets before authorising family members to exercise an employed or self-
employed activity.
Directive 2003/9/CE, laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seek-
ers, contains a provision on employment. It states as a principle that Member States determine 
a period of time, starting from the date on which an application for asylum was lodged, 
during which an applicant shall not have access to the labour market. The Directive adds 
however that access to the labour market should be allowed where no decision on the applica-
tion has been taken after one year and where this delay cannot be attributed to the applicant. 
In the end, both examples show that EU rules impose specific conditions on Member 
States to open access to their labour market to some categories of legally residing third coun-
try nationals. Under such a scenario, it can hardly be asserted that EU law does not concern 
19  Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service; OJ L 375, 23.12.2004.
20  Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for 
the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289, 03.11.2005.
21  Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155, 18.06.2009.
22  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purpose of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 final, 13.07.2010.
23  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, COM(2010) 378 final, 13.07.2010.
24  Y. Pascouau, “la politique européenne d’immigration de travail. Etat des lieux et perspectives”, Policy Paper, 
Fondation Roi Baudouin, 2012.
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migrants’ access to labour market. As a consequence, EU laws have also had an impact on the 
ability of third country nationals to properly integrate into the labour market and society25. 
2. Access to rights
Directives adopted in the field of asylum and immigration consider various scenarios where 
third country nationals, according to their specific needs and condition, are entitled to ben-
efit from rights which contribute to the integration of third country nationals. 
A first series of rights comprises access to education and vocational training. Access to 
education is recognised in almost all of the Directives. It is mainly addressed to children 
of migrants legally residing in the member states. Alongside access to education, Directives 
recognise the right to have access to vocational training 
Other social rights are also recognised in different Directives. These rights depend on 
the specific situation of the persons concerned as they may be applicable to asylum seek-
ers, family members, refugees or workers. Hence, different rights are open to third country 
nationals such as inter alia access to medical screening, social assistance, equal treatment 
covering working conditions, recognition of diplomas and qualifications, branches of social 
security, tax benefit, access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services made 
available to the public.
All of these rights contribute to the sound integration of third country nationals in the 
receiving society. They serve the purpose of including migrants into society. 
When analysing the potential number of persons covered, from family members to refu-
gees and workers, the existence of EU rules obliging Member States to grant equal treatment 
or other rights to foreigners is significant. EU law may be considered an important frame-
work granting third country nationals with basic rights which they would perhaps not benefit 
under national law. Hence, EU law is not disconnected from the possibility of harmonising 
national rules related to the integration of migrants. 
The assertion included in article 79, paragraph 4, from the Lisbon Treaty may therefore 
be reconsidered. More precisely, it looks like the EU will not develop a specific and defined 
set of rules related to access to healthcare or social services. However, when it comes to deter-
mining the conditions of entry and in particular residence of third country nationals, it may 
prove difficult to ignore individuals’ basic rights. Indeed, in the framework of common rules 
and in the perspective of the single market and the establishment of a single European labour 
market, EU law may not leave the decision to grant full or partial social protection and inclu-
sions rights solely to the Member States. Therefore, minimal harmonisation is in this context 
needed. In the end, the EU is intervening in the field of integration. 
The possibility to grant a set of rights to legally residing migrants must be put into per-
spective with respect to the global discussions around migration policies. Indeed, in the last 
couple of years the idea to develop temporary migration, or circulation migration schemes, 
25  For an overview, see K. Groenendijk, “Access of Third-Country Nationals to Employment under the New EC 
Migration Law” in F. Julien-Laferriere, H. Labayle, Ö. Edström (sous la direction de), La politique européenne 
d’immigration et d’asile : bilan critique cinq ans après le traité d’Amsterdam, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005.
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has gained in importance. But this project runs counter to the basic philosophy of Member 
States in the field of immigration, where they have agreed to award basic rights to migrants, 
such as family reunification and long term residence status, the effect of which is basically to 
incentivise for permanent migration. Put differently, it is unlikely that migrants will decide to 
move when their family has joined and where children are registered at school. Moreover, the 
possibility of obtaining a long term residence permit after five years of legal residence is also 
an encouragement to settle for some time in a Member State. 
Article 79.4 should therefore be understood as preventing the Union from adopting 
specific rules on integration which would for instance harmonise conditions for accessing 
education or healthcare systems. This situation is nonetheless circumvented as the Union has 
developed an impressive number of soft law instruments, the effect of which is to coordinate 
national integration policies.
ii. thE dEVElopMEnt oF soFt lAW instruMEnts
Alongside EU legal instruments that, directly or indirectly, address issues related to migrants’ 
integration, the EU has developed an impressive series of soft law instruments aimed at better 
coordination of national policies. These instruments could be divided into two categories: 
instruments and tools setting up the political orientations (A) and instruments and tools en-
hancing the exchange of information between stakeholders or a wider audience (B).
A. political orientations
As the issue of migrants’ integration falls primarily within the remit of the Member States 
competence, orientations are defined in political documents adopted during meetings where 
Member States are represented (1). The European Commission is not side-lined in this pro-
cess. Its contribution is linked with the putting into effect of these orientations (2). 
1. Member States in the driving seat
The coordination of integration policies on the basis of EU guidance has been framed in 
three main types of documents.
a. Common basic principles of integration
The first document, which remains a basis in this field, is the Common Basic Principles of 
Integration26. Adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in November 2004, these 
principles pursue three main objectives. First, to assist Member States in formulating integra-
tion policies by offering a non-binding guide of basic principles against which they can judge 
and assess their own efforts. Second, to serve as a basis for Member States to explore how EU, 
national, regional, and local authorities can interact in the development and implementa-
tion of integration policies. Third, to assist the Council to reflect upon and, over time, agree 
26  Council Justice and Home Affairs, 19 November 2004, Doc. 14615/04.
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on EU-level mechanisms and policies needed to support national and local-level integration 
policy efforts, particularly through EU-wide learning and knowledge-sharing27.
The document then defines a series of 11 Common Basic Principles to be developed in 
this perspective. The 11 Common Basic principles are:
1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immi-
grants and residents of member states.
2. Integration implies respect for the basic values of the EU.
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process.
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable 
for integration.
5. Efforts in education are critical for preparing immigrants to be more successful and 
active.
6. Access to institutions for immigrants, as well as to public goods and services, on a basis 
equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is an essential foundation.
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens is a fundamental 
mechanism.
8. The practices of diverse cultures and religion as recognized under the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights must be guaranteed.
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of 
integration policies, especially at the local level, supports their integration.
10. Integration policies and measures must be part of all relevant policy portfolios and 
levels of government.
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms to adjust policy, evalu-
ate progress and make the exchange of information more effective is also part of the 
process.
It derives from these principles that national authorities as well as migrants have together in 
their respective capacities a duty to improve migrants’ integration into the receiving society. 
While those principles are still quoted on a regular basis, documents adopted afterwards 
and developments at national level have shown some modifications aimed at increasing the 
burden on migrants’ shoulders rather than on the State28. This is for instance the case with 
language knowledge which has become mandatory in some Member States and conditions 
27  For an evaluation of the Common Basic Principles, see M. Illamola Dausá, “Les Principes de Base Communs: 
Le Cadre de la Politique d’Intégration de l’Union Européenne”, in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration 
Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
28  K. Groenendijk, “Integration of Immigrants in the EU: The Old and the New Way?”, in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik 
(eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
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the residence of migrants. In the same vein, some Member States are requesting migrants to 
take language classes but do not provide for any financial or material support29. 
b. Ministerial conferences
Ministers in charge of integration issues has met on a regular and informal basis since 2004 
to discuss integration issues. The first conference of that kind was organised in Groningen 
under the Dutch presidency in November 2004. Entitled “Turning Principles into Actions”, 
this two-day conference aimed to give practical relevance to the vision for integration in two 
areas: introductory programmes and youth with a minority/migrant background. 
The second conference was held in June 2007 in Potsdam under the German presidency. 
During this conference, ministers were invited to discuss how European cooperation and the 
exchange of experience within the EU regarding integration policies can be improved and 
how the intercultural dialogue can be strengthened. 
The third conference was organised by the French presidency in November 2008 in 
Vichy. This conference was devoted to specific concerns shared by several Member States, i.e., 
language learning, promoting Member States values and access to employment. 
A fourth conference took place in 2010 under the Spanish presidency in Zaragoza. 
Discussions during this conference encompassed several issues, such as the development of 
human capital through employment and education, social cohesion in neighbourhoods and 
areas with a high rate of immigrant population, the role of civil society in the mutual ad-
aptation process that the integration of immigrants entails, and the general evaluation of 
integration policies. 
The Conferences’ conclusions were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Councils 
respectively in November 2004, June 2007, November 2008 and June 2010. These confer-
ences are designed to ease the debate among ministers on integration issues. In this regard, 
they might improve common understanding or, conversely, serve some States running the six 
months’ presidency to highlight some issues they would like to discuss and push forward on 
the agenda. 
c. European Council Conclusions: The European pact on immigration and asylum
Normally, heads of States and governments intervene in this field to define multi-annual 
orientations once every five years on the basis of programmes (Tampere 1999, The Hague 
2004 and Stockholm 2009). In each of these multi-annual programmes, Member States have 
devoted some sections to integration issues. 
The French presidency of the Council of the European Union made clear that migration-
related issues were on the top of the presidency’s agenda. After negotiations that were at times 
29  See for instance Y. Pascouau, “Mandatory Integration Schemes in the EU Member States: Overview and Trends”, 
in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member 
States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
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hard, French authorities successfully convinced their counterparts to adopt the European 
Pact on Immigration and Asylum during the October 2008 European Council30. 
Focused on migration management issues, the European pact did address integration is-
sues in a quite detailed manner. It stated on the one hand, that the European Council agreed 
“to invite Member States, in line with the common principles approved by the Council in 
2004, to establish ambitious policies, in a manner and with resources that they deem appro-
priate, to promote the harmonious integration in their host countries of immigrants who are 
likely to settle permanently; those policies, the implementation of which will call for a genu-
ine effort on the part of the host countries, should be based on a balance between migrants’ 
rights (in particular to education, work, security, and public and social services) and duties 
(compliance with the host country’s laws). They will include specific measures to promote 
language learning and access to employment, essential factors for integration; they will stress 
respect for the identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fun-
damental values, such as human rights, freedom of opinion, democracy, tolerance, equality 
between men and women, and the compulsory schooling of children. The European Council 
also called upon the Member States to take into account, through appropriate measures, the 
need to combat any forms of discrimination to which migrants may be exposed”. 
On the other hand, the European Council emphasized “the importance to promote 
information exchange on best practice implemented, in line with the common principles ap-
proved by the Council in 2004, in terms of reception and integration, and on EU measures to 
support national integration policies”.
The Pact portrayed concerns shared at that time by a number of Member States, princi-
pally by France, the Netherlands and Germany, to enhance the focus of integration polices 
on migrants’ knowledge of the host country language and values. To put it differently, the 
two-way process called for by the Common Basic Principles is endangered by the willingness 
of some States to link the migrant’s status, i.e., the security of his/her residence, to his/her 
capacity to prove his/her language or civic skills. In this view, migrants are becoming ever 
more the main actors of the integration process and States are more engaged in an evaluation 
of their willingness or capacities to properly show active integration through language and 
civic knowledge. 
All in all, these documents, the Common Basic Principles, the informal ministerial 
conferences and the European Pact are several steps which enable Member States to discuss 
integration issues but also to highlight priorities31. The analysis of the documents and the 
priorities deriving from them highlight a shift in the sphere of integration towards greater 
30  European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, Doc. 13440/08
31  Y. Pascouau “Mandatory integration provisions in EC and EU Member States Law” in S. Bonjour, A. Rea & D. 
Jacobs (eds), The Others in Europe, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2011.
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demands on migrants. This is more precisely the case regarding the development of language 
learning duties which are becoming more and more important in Member States’ schemes32. 
2. Implementing orientations
There are two main ways to put into effect orientations agreed upon by Member States. The 
first one is to leave the European Commission the duty to precisely define the steps to be 
taken on the basis of so-called “Integration Agendas”. The second way is to allocate specific 
funding, managed by the European Commission, in order to reach targeted objectives. 
a. Commission’s agenda on integration
The Commission has adopted two communications dealing respectively with a common33 
and an European agenda for integration34. 
The first communication, adopted in September 2005, followed the adoption of the 
Common Basic Principles less than one year earlier. Hence its main objective is to present 
concrete measures to put the Common Basic Principles into practice together with a series of 
supportive EU mechanisms. 
The document takes the 11 Common Basic Principles one after the other, and provides 
some guidance, i.e., proposes actions to be undertaken, for both EU and Member State’s 
integration policies. For instance, the communication puts an emphasis on integration pro-
grammes as well as pre-departure measures such as information packages and language and 
civic orientation courses in the country of origin.
The second “Integration Agenda” was published nearly six years later, in July 2011. 
Recognising that all EU actions presented by the Commission in the 2005 Common Agenda 
for Integration had been completed, the Communication also highlights that not all integra-
tion measures have been successful in meeting their objectives and that integration policies 
also require the will and commitment of migrants to be part of the society that receives them. 
The Commission also points out that some pressing challenges need to be addressed, such as:
  the prevailing low employment levels of migrants, especially for migrant women,
  rising unemployment and high levels of “over-qualification”,
32  For a broad view see, R. Van Oers, E. Ersbøll & D. Kostakopoulou, “A Re-Definition of Belonging? Language 
and Integration Tests in Europe”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2010; Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), 
Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, 2012. For specific examples, see S. Bonjour, “Between Integration Provision and Selection Mechanism. 
Party Politics, Judicial Constraints, and the Making of French and Dutch Policies of Civic Integration Abroad”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 2010.
33  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Common Agenda for Integration. Framework for the 
Integration of Third Country Nationals in the European Union”, COM(2005) 389 final, 01.09.2005.
34  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country 
Nationals”, COM(2011) 455 final, 20.07.2011.
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  increasing risks of social exclusion,
  gaps in educational achievement, and
  public concerns with the lack of integration of migrants.
On this basis, the Commission identifies three key areas of actions: integration through par-
ticipation; more action at local level; and involvement of countries of origin. All of these key 
areas are covered by the Communication and accompanied with specific recommendations. 
In addition to this, the Agenda also underlines the necessity to intensify the coordination 
between Member States’ policies. To do so, it proposes to develop a flexible European toolbox 
which should allow Member States to choose the measures which are most likely to prove ef-
fective in their context. This “Toolbox” should be made of “European Modules” which would 
constitute a European reference framework for the design and implementation of integration 
practices in Member States. “European Modules” are developed in three thematic areas: 1) 
introductory and language courses; 2) strong commitment by the receiving society; and 3) 
active participation of migrants in all aspects of collective life.
The Commission’s Agendas for Integration are important documents for at least two 
main reasons. First, they translate the orientations agreed upon by Member States into 
concrete actions. Second, these concrete actions should, in a coherent framework, receive 
financial support from the European Integration Fund. 
b. European Integration Fund
The EU has created a European Integration Fund for Integration35. This Fund, which ben-
efits from a budget of 825 million Euros for the period 2007-2013, aims at assisting Member 
States in their effort to support third country nationals’ integration. The Council decision 
establishing the Fund defines the objectives of the Fund, the available funding, as well as 
conditions under which funding is awarded. 
Alongside the substantial amount of money made available for migrants’ integration, the 
Fund underlines where priorities are identified. In this view, pre-entry measures and integra-
tion programmes for newly arrived migrants including language and civic acquisition are 
high on the list of priorities. In other words, funding also point to political priorities which 
are outlined by Member States and then implemented by the European Commission on the 
basis of financial support. 
Guidelines adopted by Member States are reflected in the series of implementing instru-
ments adopted and/or managed by the European Commission. This consistency also reflects 
issues which are becoming even more important in Members States’ views, i.e., pre-entry 
measures and introductory programmes. This trend is also fully taken into account in the 
development of new tools such as the “European Modules”, one of which is devoted to intro-
ductory and language courses. 
35  Council Decision 2007/435/EC of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the Integration of third-
country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the General programme “Solidarity and Management of 
Migration Flows, OJ L 168/18, 28.06.2007.
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Alongside political orientations, an impressive number of tools have been set in motion at 
EU level in order to enhance exchange of information between stakeholders.
b. the exchange of information between stakeholders
The field of migrants’ integration has seen the creation of an impressive network of bodies 
and tools aimed at enhancing exchange of information to serve a wide spectrum of stakehold-
ers. Exchange of information may take two different routes: a formal one where stakeholders 
meet and discuss integration issues (1); and an informative one where good practices could be 
brought to the attention of anybody interested in, or who is dealing with the issue (2).
1. Exchange of information based on formal meetings
The EU has developed two types of formal “arenas” where relevant stakeholders meet to 
exchange knowledge about integration rules and practices. 
a. National contact points on integration 
Regular meetings are organised between national officials, also called “national contact 
points on integration”. The network of national contact points on integration was set up 
by the Commission as a follow-up to the Justice and Home Affairs Council conclusions of 
October 2002. 
The main objective of the network is to create a forum for the exchange of information 
and good practice between Member States at EU level, with the purpose of finding suc-
cessful solutions for integration of immigrants in all Member States and to ensure policy 
co-ordination and coherence at national level and with EU initiatives.
b. The Integration Forum
The European Integration Forum is a platform for dialogue involving all stakeholders active 
in the field of integration. The objective of the European Integration Forum is to provide a 
voice for representatives of civil society on integration issues, in particular relating to the EU 
agenda on integration, and for the Commission to take a pro-active role in such discussions. 
More precisely, the integration forum provides an opportunity for civil society organisations 
to express their views on migrant integration issues and to discuss the challenges and priori-
ties with the European institutions. 
The development of the European Integration Forum is undertaken in co-operation 
with the European Economic and Social Committee and financed by the European Fund for 
the Integration of Third Country Nationals. The Common Basic Principles on Integration, 
agreed by the Council in 2004, serve as a reference for the activities of the Forum.
Eight forum sessions have been organised so far. While the three first meetings addressed 
different issues, the following ones have focused on one specific topic. Issues discussed within 
the eight meetings were the following: 
  Integration – an EU approach: What consequences can the economic crisis have on 
the integration of immigrants? & What could be the European Integration Forum’s 
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working methods and how can civil society organisations and migrants’ associations 
be better involved at EU level? (April 2009)
  Taking stock and looking ahead: working together for Integration, Common EU 
priorities for a cross-cutting integration policy & The European Integration Fund: 
progress to date and future developments (November 2009)
  The Civil Society Input to the Second European Agenda for Integration & The 
Relation between Migrants and the Media (June 2010)
  Active participation of migrants and strong commitment by the host society: The 
two-way process beyond words (December 2010)
  Integration through local action (May 2011)
  The involvement of countries of origin in the integration process (November 2011)
  Public hearing on the right to family reunification of Third Country nationals living 
in the EU (May/June 2012)
  The contribution of migrants to economic growth in the EU (October 2012)
The integration forum should help the EU institutions engage in discussions with a broad 
spectrum of civil society representatives deeply involved in integration-related issues. It allows 
the European Commission to get feedback from “the ground” and assess whether the policy 
choices meet the needs of the integration process. 
2. Exchange of information on the basis of various tools
Last but not least, the exchange of information, which forms the basis of policy coordination, 
is ensured through the publication of integration handbooks, the creation of a specific website 
and the development of integration indicators. 
a. Integration handbooks
Integration handbooks are primarily a source of information for policy-makers and practitio-
ners. The main objective of the handbooks is to act as a driver for the exchange of information 
and good practice between integration stakeholders in all Member States. So far three hand-
books on integration have been published.
The first edition of the handbook, published in 2004, covers introductory courses for 
newly arrived immigrants and recognised refugees, civic participation and integration in-
dicators. The second edition, released in 2007, focuses on integration mainstreaming and 
governance, housing and economic participation. The third edition, published in 2010, covers 
the following topics: the role of mass media in integration, the importance of awareness-rais-
ing and migrant empowerment, dialogue platforms, acquisition of nationality and practice of 
active citizenship, immigrant youth, education and the labour market.
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b. The Integration website
The European Web Site on Integration36 was created with the view to becoming a unique 
EU-wide platform for networking on integration through exchange about policy and prac-
tice. It aims especially at integration practitioners and policy-makers in both governmental 
and non-governmental spheres and offers a series of inputs: 
  A vast document library containing reports, policy papers, legislation, impact assess-
ment and evaluations 
  A collection of good practices, presented in a clear and comparable way for easy ex-
traction and import 
  Country information sheets, with the latest information concerning national legisla-
tion and policy programmes 
  A repository of links to external websites 
  Community tools such as the “find-a-project-partner-tool”, which supports network-
ing between stakeholders and the development of common projects 
  Information on financial opportunities through grants and public tenders 
  Regularly updated news and events 
By acting as a bridge between integration practitioners and policy-makers, the Web Site 
should help to overcome the vertical fragmentation that exists between actors at different 
levels. It aims to provide high-quality content from across Europe that responds to actors’ 
needs and builds a community of integration practitioners.
c. Integration indicators
The Stockholm Programme adopted by the Heads of State and Government in 2009 empha-
sised the need to establish core indicators to help monitor the results of integration policies 
and also increase the comparability of national practices. Such indicators, established in a 
limited number of relevant policy areas such as employment, education and social inclusion 
would also strengthen the coordination process taking place at EU level. 
Following these orientations, the Swedish presidency organised an experts’ meeting at 
the end of 2009 where the results of a process identifying European core indicators were pre-
sented. In April 2010, EU ministers responsible for integration issues adopted the Zaragoza 
declaration which was further approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 
201037. 
More precisely, ministers agreed “to promote the launching of a pilot project with a view 
to the evaluation of integration policies, including examining the indicators and analysing 
the significance of the defined indicators taking into account the national contexts, the 
36  http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/index.cfm. 
37  Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Integration as a 
Driver for Development and Social Cohesion, doc. 9248/10, 4 May 2010.
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background of diverse migrant populations and different migration and integration policies 
of the Member States, and reporting on the availability and quality of the data from agreed 
harmonised sources necessary for the calculation of these indicators”.
The aim of the proposed common indicators of migrant integration is to support the 
monitoring of the situation of immigrants and the outcome of integration policies. Policy 
areas identified are: employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship. 
On the basis of the initiative, Eurostat prepared a first pilot study on “Indicators of 
Immigrant Integration” in 201138. The report consists of methodological notes, a synthetic 
description of the results and a tabular section with calculations of indicators. To maximise 
the added value of the indicators, information for different target populations has been pro-
vided for broad groups of country of birth and citizenship, different age groups and gender. 
The development of integration indicators between member states is a key tool for en-
hancing the coordination of national policies. This will enable Member States to learn from 
each other, allows for the evaluation of those policies, and consequently, promotes the devel-
opment of useful measures.
The extraordinary development of tools and places promoting exchange of information 
and practices between Member States’ experts and other relevant stakeholders plays an im-
portant role in establishing a framework for further coordination in the field of integration. 
This enables national and European actors to develop benchmarking strategies in order to 
define where convergences between national policies are possible and needed. 
EU rules and soft law instruments form the pieces of an outstandingly intricate puzzle 
relating to integration policy at EU level. However this intricate picture does not prevent the 
identification of some of the strong trends that accompany the development of integration 
issues at EU and national level. 
iii. conclusions
This overview of EU integration policy illustrates how the EU and its Member States have 
overcome legal limitations deriving from a lack of competence, which were confirmed by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
On the one hand, some EU rules do have a direct or indirect effect on Member States’ 
integration policies as they impose the harmonisation of national rules. In other words, EU 
Directives have been adopted with the effect of imposing upon Member States the require-
ment to adapt, and sometimes modify, their national rules in fields which are directly or 
indirectly linked with the integration of third country nationals. 
On the other hand, an impressive set of soft law instruments has been developed in or-
der to facilitate the coordination of national policies. This coordination is based, firstly, on 
common orientations adopted by the Member States and put into effect by the European 
Commission and, secondly, on an extensive network of tools and bodies enabling the ex-
38  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-11-009/EN/KS-RA-11-009-EN.PDF
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change of knowledge and practices which facilitate coordination strategies among Member 
States. 
These phenomena frame the emergence of an “EU” integration policy taking place 
alongside the EU immigration and asylum policy. Initial commitments regarding integra-
tion looked quite balanced as they underlined the role of every key actor in the process, i.e., 
migrants, authorities and citizens, as well as the importance of granting rights to migrants 
and their family members in order to assist social integration. However, some trends have 
taken place in certain Member States and at EU level showing an increasing tendency to put 
the burden of integration on migrants rather than authorities39. 
Some examples demonstrate how the two-way process, which formed the basis of this 
policy, has progressively shifted towards a policy where migrants have been asked to carry the 
biggest part of the burden of integration requirements. One of the most topical examples is 
the emphasis put on language and civic requirements since 2005. The obligation for migrants 
to prove language and civic skills has become widespread throughout the migration process. 
From requesting family members to take the language test in the country of origin in order 
to benefit from family reunification to the increasing number of language requirements at-
tached to citizenship procedures, these requirements have become one of the cornerstones of 
national and European policies40. 
This movement triggers a set of questions and concerns. First, it has overturned the 
logic governing integration. Indeed, and for a long period of time, equal treatment, secure 
residence, family reunification and access to employment and education were considered as 
elements helping migrants’ integration. Now, integration skills, such as language and civic 
ones, are required to allow migrants to have access to the territory or a secured legal status, 
i.e., when language requirements condition the renewal of a residence permit41. The linkage 
between integration and the loss or the preservation of the legal status of migrants makes the 
migrant’s status far more fragile and aims at creating the conditions for facilitated exclusion of 
migrants from the national community42. Here, the rules have a radically different purpose.
Put differently: “it is at this point that the nexus between the two policy fields of migra-
tion and integration becomes clear. Previous assumptions about restrictive immigration being 
a necessary precondition for success of integration policies have been joined by new ways of 
39  K. Groenendijk “Integration of Immigrants in the EU: The Old and the New Way?”, in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik 
(eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
40  R. Van Oers, E. Ersbøll & D. Kostakopoulou, “A Re-Definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests 
in Europe”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2010; Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration 
Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012; S. 
Bonjour, A. Rea & D. Jacobs (eds), The Others in Europe, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2011. 
41  Groenendijk K., “Pre-Departure Integration Strategies in the European Union: Integration or Immigration Policy?”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 2011.
42  Y. Pascouau, “Mandatory Integration Schemes in the EU Member States: Overview and Trends”, in Y. Pascouau 
& T. Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between the EU and its Member States, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
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thinking: integration policy measures are used to select those immigrants that are able and 
willing to integrate and deter those who are not. Making first admission dependent on tests 
in the country of origin, extension of residence permits on success in integration courses, and 
naturalisation on ever more elaborate requirements of integration are examples of measures 
that fit this inversion”43.
Second, these rules are mainly directed towards a specific category of migrants, i.e., low 
skilled migrants coming from countries with different cultures. This clearly derives from cer-
tain national rules where some specific “western” citizens are exempted from taking language 
or civic test44. On the other hand, the growing emphasis on Member States and/or European 
values, among which equality between men and women is often underlined, demonstrates 
that these rules are applicable to migrants coming from countries where the overall culture is 
different from the European one. Muslims fall within the category of migrants to whom such 
schemes are implemented for. 
Finally, the development of schemes where integration duties are borne by migrants has 
the effect of portraying a negative picture of Europe. In other words, EU countries do not 
appear as welcoming countries – in fact the opposite is true. It is not sure whether this option 
is suitable in the medium and long term. Indeed, the EU and its Member States will need, 
in the short run, to have recourse to an external workforce due to shrinking demographic 
trends45 and growing labour and skills shortages in some specific sectors. In a context where 
the EU is showing a reluctance to openly welcome migrants, will the latter prefer to avoid 
the European labour market? In the end this could run counter to the EU’s interest in social, 
economic and political terms.
In the end, questions related to integration policies are really difficult ones from a techni-
cal point of view and a political one. While the EU has apparently limited powers in the 
field, Member States have demonstrated a growing willingness to use integration schemes to 
make immigration more difficult. Such a phenomenon is now being echoed at EU level due 
to the increasing importance of migration issues and the development of instruments and 
bodies where integration is discussed. This trend is also fuelled by the development of anti-
immigrants discourses and policies in some Member States46. 
The possibility of addressing integration issues at EU level could have been an opportu-
nity to move ahead and to provide for greater inclusion of migrants into European societies. 
The content of the emerging EU integration politics looks rather different. The growing link-
43  R. Penninx , D. Spencer & N. Van Hear “Migration and Integration in Europe: the State of research”, COMPAS, 
2008.
44  E. Bribosia “Les Politiques d’Intégration de l’Union européenne et des Etats membres à l’Epreuve du Principe de 
Non-Discrimination”, in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction between 
the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
45  J. O. karlsson & L. Pelling (eds), “Moving beyond Demographics. Perspectives for a Common European 
Migration Policy”, Global Utmaning, 2011.
46  N. Trimikliniotis, “The Instrumentalisation of EU Integration Policy: Reflecting on the Dignified, Efficient and 
Undeclared Policy Aspects”, in Y. Pascouau & T. Strik (eds), Which Integration Policies for Migrants? Interaction 
between the EU and its Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2012.
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age between immigration and integration plays into the favour of a selective policy where 
integration requirements weigh on migrants’ shoulders. Such a movement may run counter to 
integration expectations and help to create the conditions for social exclusions. Is this really 
what an integration policy should look like? 
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1. WorldWidE MigrAtion – A kEy chAllEngE oF thE 21st 
cEntury
Demographic change has become one of the crucial challenges in the past decades1 and will 
continue to be one as the population is still in the middle of a severe change process. While 
two hundred years ago only one billion people inhabited the world, the number had increased 
to two billion by 1950. By the end of the 21st century the population is estimated to grow up 
to 10 billion people.2 At the same time a number of states with a high level of industrializa-
tion are facing a decreasing population. 
This dichotomist development requires different and context-specific strategic planning 
as well as measures in the demographic field. The population growth of some countries de-
mands more achievable and sufficient capabilities for all, while other countries are concerned 
by their demographic losses and have to tackle the challenge of recruiting adequate human 
capital supply for the labour market and social welfare depositor for the aging society.
The nations in Asia are at different stages of demographic development. As in Europe – 
and particularly in Germany – some Asian states see the need for establishing a demographic 
management strategy to tackle the challenge of aging societies and a growing lack of labour 
force potential. This paper focuses on the measures introduced to cope with this development 
and its direct impacts on the social and welfare-state.
It is acknowledged that a high quantity of labour force is needed to cover the social 
and welfare costs for the whole society. Furthermore, it is a fact that the success of an enter-
prise depends on its ability to attract and the availability of the necessary human capital. In 
times of a globalized economy and transnational relations, success in economy, science and 
administration depends also on the possibility to recruit employees with international and 
intercultural competences (multilingual, flexible, ethnic open). 
1  UNCSD Secretariat (2012).
2  United Nations (2013).
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2. thE iMpAct oF iMMigrAtion And WElFArE on An 
industriAlisEd rEcEiVing sociEty
From the German government’s, corporates’ and industrial associations’ perspective, the cur-
rent and future need for skilled workers, especially in the health, crafts and IT sectors, cannot 
be met entirely through additional training and requalification measures for people living 
in Germany. Due to expected demographic developments, immigration of qualified workers 
from the EU and other countries is also required (Fortschrittsbericht 2012, 48 ff.).
It has been recognised that the attractiveness of the German labour market and the suc-
cessful integration of immigrants depend to a considerable degree on an effective welcoming 
culture.
The OECD study published in February 2013, “Recruiting Immigrant Workers: 
Germany 2013”, concludes that, although the Federal Republic of Germany is now among 
the OECD countries with the least restrictions on labour migration for highly-skilled profes-
sionals, immigration so far has been low compared with other countries and in relation to the 
size of the German labour market.3
One of the key reasons for this comparatively low level of labour migration is that 
German companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), have put little 
effort into recruiting foreign workers. According to the OECD, another barrier for migrants 
is poor or non-existent German language skills. 
The results show that the required increase in immigration cannot be achieved by 
improving only legal and administrative conditions, but will also require welcome-based 
immigration management by companies and civil society, in cooperation with the state 
authorities. 
Recent studies prove that migrants do not compete with locals for jobs. In fact, they 
create new jobs.4 In addition, it can be seen that increasing immigration has a positive effect 
on the “well-being” of a region.5 Thus, migrants are “enhancing the demographic balance 
and improving the gross domestic product”.6 This indicates that the impact of immigration 
should not be evaluated only by its influence on the labour market. Policies and administra-
tive measures should take into account to appreciate the welfare effects of immigration.
3. contExt oF iMMigrAtion And intEgrAtion in gErMAny
The nature of migration varies greatly between countries. While countries such as Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand have been widely recognized for their migration policies and 
system, other countries are just beginning to think of a process to open its doors.
3  OECD (2013).
4  Guilietti, Corrado (2009).
5  Akay, Alpaslan/Constant, Amelie F./Gulietti, Corrado (2012).
6  Zimmermann, Klaus F./Kahanec, Martin/Guiletti, Corrado/Guzi, Martin/Barrett, Alan/Maitre, Bertrand (2012). 
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In order to tackle the issue of migration successfully in the future, we need to know the 
historical background of this topic in Germany to understand its starting conditions.
3.1. historical overview of Migration Movements in germany
For many centuries, Germany was a destination country for people fleeing their home coun-
tries. In the 17th century, Huguenots fled France and moved to Prussia, which offered them 
asylum. In the second half of the 17th century, one third of the population in Berlin belonged 
to the Huguenots. In the 19th century, Jews from Eastern Europe escaped to Germany and 
established a new powerful ethnic minority, also centred in Berlin. However, at the same time 
(16th-20th century), millions of mostly young Germans emigrated to America or Australia to 
escape the consequences of long war époques, mostly between France and Germany. 
Under the rule of Adolf Hitler from 1933-1945, millions of people emigrated due to 
politics, religious, ethnic and cultural reasons. More than 80 nations offered asylum to the 
280,000 Jews who escaped from Germany. The year 1945 saw the peak of migration move-
ment: 12 million Germans had to leave their homes, which were now under the control of 
other countries as Poland or Russia, along with two million Poles and Ukrainians who had to 
search for new homes.
Thus Germany faces a more-than-hundreds-of-years-old tradition of migration move-
ments. From the early centuries until the 1950s the direction of migration in Germany and 
the countries previously existing on its territory happened in two directions: in the beginning, 
the region was an immigration destination. Since the 16th century, this structure changed 
and the German states confronted a period of high emigration due to poverty and political 
reasons. However, special groups like Huguenots or Jews could find still a new home mostly 
in the city of Berlin.7
3.2. Migration Movements since the 1950s
In the aftermath of the Second World War, refugees and displaced persons were high on the 
international agenda and this resulted in the passing of the International Convention for the 
Protection of Refugees, in 1951. The first German laws tackling the displacement of people 
in the context of the Third Reich came into force in 1953. The Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees (BAMF) was founded in 1952 and started to work on these topics with 40 
employees.
As a result of the demographic changes through the war and the emigration as well as 
deportation during the Third Reich, the growing German economy lacked substantial labour 
forces for industrial production. This was the beginning of the decade of recruitment agree-
ments for foreign workers (Gastarbeiterabkommen), in order to attract low skilled people 
from countries like Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960), and later Turkey (1961) to sup-
port the new industrial production, mostly in the car sector.
7  Bundeszentral für Politische Bildung (2007).
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Germany signed special agreements also with Morocco in 1963, South Korea in 1963, 
Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and the former Yugoslavia in 1968.8 In total, Germany 
recruited 280,000 employees from Greece, Spain, Italy and Turkey in the sixties. Rules to 
facilitate the longer stay of the employees and their families were introduced in 1971, but at 
the same time the so-called recruitment ban agreement (Anwerbestoppabkommen in 1973) 
to stop recruiting came into force. It was later replaced by the ordinance on exemptions from 
the recruitment ban (Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung), taking into account the need of 
migrant workers who resided in Germany with their whole family. It was in this context that 
in 1978 Mr. Heinz Kühn was appointed as the first Federal Commissioner for Foreigners’ 
Affairs (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung zur Förderung der Integration der ausländischen 
Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen). He also launched the “Kühn Memorandum” 
in 1979, where Germany was called a “Country of Immigration” for the first time.
Since the 1990s, the influence of European rules have became more and more important; 
mostly the establishment of the Schengen agreement, but also the rules for foreign affairs. 
The contract of Maastricht in 1993, the Dublin agreement in 1997, and the contract of 
Amsterdam in 1999 and Stockholm have designed the collectivization of rules for asylum and 
visa affairs.9, 10
The German Green Card, established in 2000 to attract engineers from abroad, led to 
the official end of the recruitment ban. Due to the demographic change and lack of skilled 
labour force in the same period, the independent Commission “Immigration” began to draft 
recommendations for a reform of the German immigration act. This shift came at a time 
when the UHNCR counted 15 million refugees worldwide and 20-25 million internationally 
displaced people. Thus, there was an interest for new regulations in this field and Germany, 
the EU and other countries were ready to shift towards a more liberal and welcoming im-
migration regulation. 
These measured were abolished after the 09/11 terrorist attack in the United States which 
resulted in tighter control measures and the concentration on security policies with regard to 
migration control.
Recent challenges following this development can be seen in the United States and 
Europe. Despite surveys in the US showing the benefits of immigrants, President Obama has 
yet to realize his legislation act for 11 million immigrants in order for them to be recognized 
as citizens to become an official part of US society.11 
Frontex is the European Union’s agency for external border security; it became opera-
tional in 2005 with a budget of 8.5 million Euros. Its budget has now grown to 9.0 million 
Euros in 2013 as it takes on more responsibilities.12 The implementing of “smart borders” 
in the European Union as a blueprint of the United States’ system and the enhancement of 
8  IBID 2007 and Bundeszentral für Politische Bildung (2005).
9  European Council (2010).
10  Angenendt, Steffen/Parkes, Roderick (2009).
11  Plumer, Brad (2013).
12  Frontex’ Programme at Work (2013), p. 34.
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“mobility partnerships”, which are in fact focused on defence against immigration to the EU, 
are effective in border management. 
Thus, the German approach towards improving immigration of special groups due to 
demographic change with the goal of better integration and “living together” always has to be 
seen in this general context of a security-orientated, and not welcoming, approach. However, 
in the past few years, the German government has introduced a number of reforms and new 
integration measures.
The new German immigration law Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), planned for 2002, 
finally came into force in 2005. It regulates the entry of foreigners as well as their residence 
in Germany and laid the foundation for the introduction of new integration measures.13 In 
2006, the first German Integration Summit was held. This annual conference takes place 
in the German Chancellery and is attended by representatives from the political sector, me-
dia, civil society, migrants associations, employer associations, unions and sport associations. 
Through intense discussion the participants try to identify challenges with regard to integra-
tion of immigrants and suggest solutions.14 Also in 2006, for the first time, refugees got the 
right to stay if they were able to find employment.
In addition to the Integration Summit, the German Islam Conference was introduced in 
2006 to address challenges concerning the integration of Muslims. The aim is the establish-
ment of a long-term dialogue to achieve better living together independent from religious 
backgrounds.15
In 2008, an official naturalisation test was introduced. This test consists of a number 
of questions on the legal and social systems of Germany and on living conditions in the 
country. Although the individual Federal States are responsible for naturalisation, the test was 
delegated to the BAMF. The BAMF is also responsible for integration courses as well as the 
development of nationwide integration programmes.16
In 2007, reforms of the Residence Act were implemented to strengthen, among oth-
ers, the right of family integration and the implementation of eleven EU directives.17 The 
first National Integration Plan was introduced in 2007.18 This plan includes more than 400 
measures and self-responsibilities of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. Key 
aspects are education, language, sports, media, employment, academia, women and children 
as well as integration at the local level.19
In 2011, Lower Saxony was the first Federal State in Germany to appoint a Minister of 
Social and Integration Affairs with a migration background, Ms Aygül Özkan.
13  Federal Foreign Office (2012).
14  Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2013c).
15  Federal Ministry of the Interior (2013).
16  Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2011).
17  Federal Foreign Office (2012).
18  Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2007a).
19  Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2007b) and IBID (2013a).
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During the 5th Integration Summit in January 2012, a new National Action Plan on 
Integration was announced which will replace the National Integration Plan.20
In August 2012, another reform of the Residence Act, as demanded by an EU directive, 
has been implemented. This facilitated crucial changes in the policies for the immigration of 
highly qualified migrants (Blue Card Directive) as well as family reunions.21 In recent times, 
new topics such as poverty migration from Eastern and Southern European countries and 
the need for the implementation of a “welcome structure” were discussed. The new rules for 
working conditions from July 2013 are the results of such discussions and are being tackled 
under the current German challenge of “good and fair migration”. 
The organization of the Soccer World Cup in 2006 was very important from the so-
ciological perspective. This event not only demonstrated the open-mindedness and tolerance 
for different religions and ethnic groups in Germany, but also portrayed Germans in a new 
emotionally friendly light. The crucial role of sports to promote better understanding was 
confirmed in 2010 when the new national soccer team had a clearly multicultural character. 
This resulted even in short films on television showing how, despite the different ethnic back-
ground of the players, they jointly fight for a common goal and how their families support 
the team together.
3.3. thinking migration as a holistic affair: the new approach of 
zAV and giz
A really new approach to migration, combining “good migration and mobility” and “labour 
force recruiting”, is being implemented in the recent so-called “Triple Win pilot project” of 
the German International Placement Service (ZAV) of the Federal Employment Agency and 
the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). This project develops 
new and sustainable tooIs for international recruiting of qualified workers for the German 
labour market to balance the demographic shift in Germany.22 
International human resources will be recruited for job vacancies in German companies. 
This form of job matching supports other forms of German government activities to address 
the  increasing human capital needs with better qualified people, higher retirement age and 
enhancement of women labour. In this project, the main focus is on combining the interests 
of the German labour market, the country of origin and the migrants themselves to achieve a 
win-win situation.
The employees receive the chance to improve his or her employability skills through train-
ing. In a lot of cases, these new skills can still be applied after they go back to their countries 
of origin and help the migrants to establish new innovation structures in their home coun-
tries’ economy. Furthermore the recruitment process abroad can be helpful in cases of high 
unemployment rates in the nation of origin. Another benefit for the country of origin is the 
remittances sent home by the migrant workers. The recruitment process follows international 
20  Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2013b) and The Federal Government (2012).
21  Federal Foreign Office (2012).
22  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (2013).
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agreements such as the WHO-Codex for the international recruitment for qualified labour 
forces. However, while the project focuses on nurses, e.g., from the Philippines, the healthcare 
sector is not the only target field. 
In the implementation of these mobility partnerships to recruit human capital abroad, 
the agencies always work in accordance with the agreements with the ministries and depart-
ments in the country of origin. It also helps to fight corruption, irregular migration, human 
trafficking, and salary dumping. The project tries to avoid too much emigration and brain 
drain which might even result in a lack of manpower in the country of origin. In addition, 
the process works towards the goal of good integration in the destination country.
The project has developed a holistic approach targeting the implementation of a fair, 
sustainable and for all sides beneficial mobility-structure which can tackle the new challenges 
of demographic and labour market changes in developed countries.
4. thE Mobility pArtnErship ApproAch in thE contExt oF 
thE EuropEAn union
The developed approach reflects a long period of thinking and drafting on how to combine 
the different challenges of demographic change and globalisation tendencies in a holistic 
and sustainable mobility and migration framework. It is thus a measure to tackle migra-
tion in Germany in accord with the European Union’s approach and criteria. A survey of 
the European Reflection Group23 pointed out that the “demographic, welfare and economic 
perspectives” in the European Union require a long-term implementation of tools to ensure 
sufficient labour supply and that reforms should be started independently from short-term 
situations and needs:
Moreover, despite the current economic crisis and unemployment rates, European 
countries are facing labour market shortages and vacancies that cannot be filled by the 
domestic workforce in specific sectors, e.g. in health, science and technology. Long-term 
population ageing in Europe is expected to halve the ratio between persons of working 
age (20-64) and persons aged 65 and above in the next fifty years. Migration is already of 
key importance in the EU, with net migration contributing 0.9 million people or 62 % 
of total population growth in 2010. All indicators show that some of the additional and 
specific skills needed in the future could be found only outside the EU.24
The holistic output of these consolidated findings has formed the Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility of the EU: 
The Global Approach should, therefore, reflect the strategic objectives of the Union bet-
ter and translate them into concrete proposals for dialogue and cooperation, notably with 
the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, Africa, enlargement countries and with other 
strategic partners. In order to reap the benefits that well-managed migration can bring 
23  Reflection Group on the Future to the EU (2010), p. 24. 
24  European Commission (2011).
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and to respond to the challenges of changing migration trends, the EU will need to adapt 
its policy framework. This Communication puts forward a renewed Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) designed to meet that objective.25
In order to achieve successful development, agreements between the supranational depart-
ments and the Member States as well as national policies are needed. This approach is also 
integrated in the Stockholm Program:
Migration and mobility in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy aim to contribute 
to the vitality and competitiveness of the EU. Securing an adaptable workforce with the 
necessary skills which can cope successfully with the evolving demographic and economic 
changes is a strategic priority for Europe. There is also an urgent need to improve the 
effectiveness of policies aiming at integration of migrants into the labour market.26
In this context, the implementation of mobility partnerships has been identified as the 
most important tool to achieve a balanced exchange of interests between the sending and 
receiving countries and the interests of the individuals.27 
This target is also reflected in the new rule tackling the so-called “blue card”. The blue 
card facilitates the immigration of highly-skilled employees. The law itself (in Germany §19a 
Residence Act) points out that the residence permit can be limited or prohibited in case of a 
lack of these professions in the country of origin. This is to ensure the sustainable impact of 
the migration process after the return.28
Another aspect is the structured dialogue with the economy and companies in order to 
ascertain their needs. In this context the question of saving welfare claims, particularly retire-
ment benefits, is essential to facilitating mobility:
There must also be a dialogue with the private sector and employers to explore why some 
vacancies are difficult to fill and the potential for a more demand-driven legal immigra-
tion policy. Portability of social and pension rights could also be a facilitator for mobility 
and circular migration, as well as a disincentive for irregular work, and should therefore 
be improved. Closer cooperation between Member States on social security coordination 
with non-EU countries will promote progress in this area.29
The German-Brazilian social security agreement, which came into force in May 2013, can be 
seen as a best practice example.
Finally, the European approach tends towards a “migration-centred” orientation similar 
to the ones of Canada or New Zealand and regards the process of migration from a migrant’s 
perspective: 
25  ibid (2011). 
26  See above Footnote 23.
27  Angenendt, Parkes, 2009, 1, see 8.
28  Bundesgesetzblatt (2012).
29  See above Footnote 23.
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The GAMM should also be migrant-centred: In essence, migration governance is not 
about “flows”, “stocks” and “routes”, it is about people. In order to be relevant, effective 
and sustainable, policies must be designed to respond to the aspirations and problems of 
the people concerned. Migrants should, therefore, be empowered by gaining access to all 
the information they need about their opportunities, rights and obligations. The Com-
mission has set up the EU Immigration Portal to provide such information together with 
other measures.30
The recent resolution of the European Parliament on 14 March 2103, on the integration of 
migrants, its effects on the labour market and external dimension of social coordination31, 
underlines the need for qualified migration. 
It points out that “the working-age population of Europe will decline from 2012 onwards 
and, in the absence of immigration, will fall by 14 million over the next 10 years”32. In a 
long-term context, this would have a negative impact on the balance of the retirement systems 
and will result in a lack of labour force. Furthermore, since 2000 about a quarter of the new 
job offers have been created by the productivity of migrants and their contributions. The 
Parliament proposes the implementation of a points system similar to the one in Australia, 
the establishment of service offices in the country of origin, language as well as skill trainings 
and the signing of social security agreements to enhance the attraction of immigrants to the 
EU, especially those with good skills. 
The new holistic approach is also shown in the shaping of European rules regarding 
migration from abroad: The recent directive 2011/98/EU (13.12.2011) on the improvement 
of the rights of international employees33, directive 2011/51/EU (11.5.2011) on the enhance-
ment of rights for people who have to be protected internationally34, directive 2011/95/EU 
(13.12.2011) on the recognition of migrants from abroad, particularly protection-needing 
people and refugees35 are part of the GAMM.36 
The obligation to adapt these directives into German law can influence the shaping 
of a welcoming culture for migrants towards a sustainable and holistic approach. Such an 
approach has to involve all groups of migrants: students, working migrants, family mem-
bers and migrants due to emergency reasons (refugees). In particular, directive 343/1, EU 
23.12.2011 (13.12.2011)37 strengthens the right of equal treatment as EU members for human 
beings coming from abroad. 
30  See above Footnote 23.
31  European Parliament (2013a).
32  European Parliament (2013b).
33  Official Journal of the European Union L343/1 (2011).
34  Official Journal of the European Union L132/1 (2011).
35  Official Journal of the European Union L337/9 (2011).
36  European Commission (2012), p. 17.
37  Official Journal of the European Union L343/1 (2011).
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This offers the chance to actively shape a knowledge-culture for immigration in 
Germany and can be seen as an important step towards tackling the intranational challenge 
of demographic change. The first measure taken in this context was the implementation of 
the website “Make it in Germany”38 which contains job offers. This website also provides 
guidance and information on the opportunity for starting a new life in Germany. The website 
“Welcome to Germany” of the BAMF39 and the new virtual guidance on the recognition of 
foreign qualifications, run by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training 
(BIBB), are additional sources of information. All tools recognize the situation in the country 
of origin but are also accessible and useful for people who are planning to stay in Germany 
for a longer period. Thus, they are able to be involved in the whole process of migration – the 
pre-departure time, the arrival and the time of integration.
Against the background of a Europe-wide need for labour migration – despite the current 
crises in particular countries – the necessity for such a holistic and migration-appreciating 
approach has been confirmed by current figures. In 2013, the European Commission, DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion published the European Vacancy Monitor. The 
results show an increasing need for qualified employees in administration, teaching, busi-
nesses and healthcare (European Vacancy Monitor, 2013, 1). These shortages are especially 
true for Germany. 
5. rEcoMMEndAtions
The current situation in Germany requires effective measures for enhancing immigration. 
The need is not only concerning labour shortage, but also stabilizing the welfare and retire-
ment system of Germany. 
Despite a long tradition of migration, governance of migration and integration has 
started only in the last years. The first step was to recognize immigration as a possible benefit 
and to tackle migration affairs from a more holistic and migrant-centred approach. Second, 
the government started to concentrate on special groups of migrants. But until now there 
is no official commitment from the decision-makers that Germany is a multicultural and 
immigration nation. Such commitments can be found in the official policies and laws of 
other receiving countries like Canada, Australia or New Zealand. However, from a practical 
administrative perspective, the following recommendations can support the implementation 
of “good migration” structures and measures:
  Implementing fair and sustainable mobility partnerships as a “good migration 
framework”
A really new approach, involving the sustainable and human-orientated strategy of 
the European Union, is the “triple win” project of the ZAV and GIZ. This model 
could work as a prototype for other initiatives. The advantage of this approach is the 
migrant-centred orientation. Moreover, with this approach, side effects such as the 
38  Das Willkommensportal für internationale Fachkräfte - Make it in Germany.
39  Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2013).
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reduction of irregular migration, human trafficking and expensive defence action 
addressing “not-wanted-migration” could be avoided.
  Establishing Information and Matching Centres abroad
A centre on migration affairs needs to be established which will gather information 
on immigration and job opportunities in the country of origin as the first step of the 
migration process. A structured implementation of service offices run by countries 
or the European Union would be a helpful measure to create a positive influence on 
the decision about migration, and provide information on new chances available and 
how to prepare.
  Involving practical requirements of “good migration”
Furthermore, immigration affairs should be offered to immigrants in a holistic and 
individual way. The stakeholders of this approach are the political sector, the admin-
istration, and also the economy and society. The following description shows the 
main recommendations for these groups on how the process of “good migration” 
could be shaped in the future.
5.1. starting points for welcome-based immigration management 
Welcome-based immigration management needs to start at the very first stage of the integra-
tion process, known as “pre-integration”, in the potential migrant’s home country. At that 
point, the first step is to make Germany more attractive to migrants by offering them a clear 
outlook after they migrate. It will be hard to raise the number of qualified foreign nationals 
actively looking to migrate to Germany without providing concrete knowledge of their op-
tions upon migrating and prospects of a job or training place. It is thus of central importance 
for German companies to carry out active recruitment work abroad. 
At the next stage, initial integration, the immigrant enters the host society. One particu-
lar point where welcome-based immigration management can step in is by providing support 
with language acquisition and finding a home. Indeed, language acquisition regularly starts 
at the pre-integration stage. Integration into the host society in terms of both the social sys-
tem and social inclusion is a crucial prerequisite both for migrants’ initial entry and their 
long-term integration (“acknowledged integration”). Welcome-based immigration manage-
ment can play an important part in this through active “society matching”.40 
5.2. the immigration process needs a facilitator
Immigrants’ readiness to migrate, and their integration in the long term, depends crucially 
on the extent to which they are offered concrete prospects in Germany and are supported 
during the first two stages of integration. Many companies, especially small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), have little experience in recruiting skilled workers from abroad and 
helping them to integrate. They thus frequently lack the knowledge and means to promote 
and facilitate the immigration process. The resources available to the relevant state authorities 
and their legal remit generally only allow for limited advice and support to immigrants on 
40  Steller/Kuhn (2013).
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issues extending beyond aspects relating purely to residence and employment. In this respect, 
a kind of facilitator is needed to actively help immigrants, companies and civil society during 
the immigration and integration process in cooperation with the authorities.
In principle, larger companies with human resource departments could take on the tasks 
of the facilitator themselves. In the case of managers, this is already taking place to some 
extent with relocation services being hired. SMEs, however, will generally not be able to take 
on this task without support. With regard to recruiting initiatives abroad, some initial steps 
have been taken by the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, taking the role of a facilitator 
in that respect. Setting up a facilitator organised on a non-profit basis is one way of offering 
advice and coordination which is both efficient and cheap. Another conceivable way would 
be to set up a public-private partnership for this purpose, jointly operated by the state authori-
ties and private companies.
5.3. Active recruiting abroad and coordination of entry process
When it comes to looking for a job or a home in Germany, potential immigrants are still 
largely left to their own devices. Even companies which are interested in foreign skilled work-
ers, especially SMEs without any foreign branches, often lack the knowledge and experience 
of how and in which countries they can recruit potential skilled workers to work in their 
companies.41 Despite a noticeable lack of skilled workers, many companies have thus proven 
very reticent in their efforts to recruit staff abroad. The German government and the Federal 
Employment Agency have recognised the need to provide advice in this matter and have 
introduced some initial forms of assistance in the form of internet platforms set up as part of 
their drive to attract skilled workers in the summer of 2012.42 These two internet platforms 
offer information on the application process and the labour market to EU citizens, higher 
education graduates from third countries and companies, plus serve as a job exchange for 
direct placement. 
There is, however, a lack of comparable programmes for third-country nationals without 
an academic degree, who are, for example, in high demand in the health sector as nurses 
for the sick or elderly. So far, experiences with general advertising campaigns, for example 
in Spain or Portugal, have not proven very efficient. They do, however, show people’s huge 
interest in the German labour market. 
In future, information programmes and online job exchanges will channel this inter-
est better. Furthermore, providing points of contact for interested skilled workers and for 
companies from Germany in situ, in the immigrants’ country, can address employment offers 
in a country-specific manner, with target groups being approached more specifically via local 
multipliers. Some multipliers which might be involved in particular are foreign chambers of 
commerce, foreign partners linked to industrial and business associations, and educational 
establishments. Organising career fairs with representatives from interested companies and 
41  OECD (2013) (footnote 4 above), p. 161 ff.
42  For the Federal Government’s programme regarding skilled workers see the most recent progress report of 
December 2012, available on the BMAS website at http://www.bmas.de.
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carrying out the selection process in situ could also help make the prospect of working in 
Germany seem more concrete to potential immigrants. 
In the case of skilled workers from non-EU states, especially those not falling under the 
Blue Card legislation for highly qualified academics pursuant to Section 19 of the German 
Residence Act (AufenthG), impediments and delays regarding entry and the granting of resi-
dence permits could be reduced if obligatory administrative procedures could be coordinated 
and prepared in advance, in cooperation with the authorities. The same applies to the process 
for recognising professional qualifications gained abroad. 
In this case, immigration management is already linking up to the pre-integration stage. 
The facilitator can support the application and selection process by acting as a point of con-
tact for applicants and companies, as well as supporting the residency application procedure 
by providing advice and coordination on consultation with the authorities. Immigrants’ con-
crete experience of being supported and valued at this early stage will help them to integrate 
and give them a feeling of being welcomed from the very start. 
5.4. specific need for job-related language acquisition
Another obstacle apart from the lack of effort put into recruitment is candidates’ inadequate 
German language skills. With few exceptions, most jobs and training places require a cer-
tain level of language skills, e.g., specific to the job. Very few immigrants from the EU or 
third countries are likely to have achieved this level upon application or entry. The integra-
tion courses offered under Section 43 of the Residence Act are aimed exclusively at foreign 
nationals already living in Germany and requiring authorisation for a permanent residence 
permit. They thus only apply to foreign skilled workers already living in Germany. Due to the 
recession, the Goethe Institute is currently registering increased demand for German courses 
in some EU countries, but when the economic situation improves in those countries this 
demand will probably fall again. Thus, migrants’ willingness to learn and the chances of 
acquiring the level required depend crucially on the specific language courses on offer and 
their funding. Active immigration management ideally combines specific jobs or training 
places with a chance to take part in language lessons or integration courses. In principle, 
the language courses can take place either in learners’ home countries or in Germany. The 
facilitator can encourage the integration process by providing advice and helping people find 
the perfect language course. Their motivation to learn the language rises the more concrete 
the prospects of a job become. 
5.5. help finding a home
In built-up areas in particular, with rising rents and a lack of living space, it is becoming 
especially important for immigrants’ long-term integration to provide them with active help 
in finding a home. Their background and language barriers often mean that immigrants are 
considered low priority when homes are allocated, so they are particularly reliant on support. 
When large groups of trainees migrate for corporate training one option worth consideration 
can be renting or providing residential accommodation places. The facilitator can gain les-
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sors’ trust by accompanying and advising immigrants as they look for their first home, giving 
them a far better chance of finding appropriate accommodation.
5.6. the need for society matching
For a warm welcome, helping people to settle in the long term and to feel at home in the host 
society, institutional help is still required in the form of society matching. 
5.6.1. Tandem and partner projects 
One way in which countries such as Canada support society matching is with tandem projects 
revolving around people’s careers, neighbourhoods, schools or communities. They organise 
hosts who invite the newcomer at least once a month in the first six months after arrival to eat 
or do something together, to get to know their new surroundings or the cultural scene, or to 
show them typical leisure activities. 
This tandem partnership can then continue, develop or stop, depending on the person’s 
needs and whether a friendship evolves. This encounter can also benefit the people offering 
a tandem and their families. They visit a “foreign” world and take part in something like an 
Erasmus or Leonardo da Vinci exchange without actually having to travel themselves.
If newcomers (and their families) need further help, they can be provided with another 
partner. Private initiatives, associations and foundations are all possible organisations which 
can arrange or facilitate this. Society matching follows the principle of “civil society helping 
civil society”. It relieves the pressure on the state, and at the same time motivates the host 
society to become open to intercultural dialogue, seeing this openness as a natural part of 
everyday life in civil society. 
5.6.2. Intercultural community centres 
In Canada, community centres for intercultural exchange have also been set up in residential 
areas. At these Welcome Centres language courses are run, information is provided about the 
typical structures and mentality of the country, community evenings are held and people 
of various different nationalities cook their home specialities together. Intercultural courses 
involve the local police and staff from schools, kindergartens and the authorities.43 
If the exchange of ideas and meetings are organised in a targeted manner, this can reduce 
both sides’ prejudices and fears and appreciative transcultural contacts can develop, enriching 
people’s biographical experiences. This can add a more positive aspect to the range of experi-
ences connected with immigration and in turn make the host society more open. 
These kinds of approaches and arrangements in particular could also be the key to suc-
cess in the case of immigrants with a difficult migration history and can become a source 
of motivation for integrating into their new home country. Thus, mentors could specifically 
be sought out to give them a good welcome from the start; they should show interest in the 
migrants’ background and the culture they bring with them and eloquently introduce them 
to the local culture.
43  Welcome Centre Immigrant Services (2013).
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5.6.3. Acknowledgement in the form of community welcoming festivals
Municipalities and district councils can support people’s appreciation of diversity by holding 
“welcoming festivals” or “diversity days” – as offered by the cities of Stuttgart, Hamm or 
Frankfurt, for example – when city representatives ceremoniously pay tribute to the work 
done by volunteers and expressly welcome newcomers. Schools, youth clubs and sports clubs 
can also be involved.
Foundations and fundraising societies, the chambers of commerce and industry or com-
panies with an interest in immigration could lend financial support to these initiatives and 
programmes. After all, this would be a way to invest in well-integrated skilled workers for the 
future.
5.6.4. Promoting intercultural encounters from an early stage
“Society matching” can begin even in childhood. One persuasive step in that direction, for 
example, is the Hamburg “switch” project run by Kulturbrücke Hamburg e.V., which in-
volves children staying with a family from another cultural background during the holidays. 
In many large towns, the private initiative Internations runs regular events and networking 
activities for students and expats to foster intercultural encounters.
Setting aside needs based on demographic trends and the labour market, immigration 
can, in this way, increasingly become a socially accepted, even a desirable and thus supported, 
win-win reality both for the host society and for the immigrants. One point which inspires 
confidence is that young people, who anyway tend to move in intercultural circles more than 
older people, are already convinced that migration can provide added value.
5.6.5. Welcoming programmes for all migrant groups
The approaches described above, especially that of providing support with language acquisi-
tion, finding a home and society matching, could and should find increasing use with other 
groups of migrants, including refugees, in line with the new European approach to immigra-
tion. One example of an approach moving in this direction is the integration scheme currently 
run by the city of Hamburg44, which also offers integration courses to refugees.45
6. conclusion
Tackling “Good Migration” will be one of the most important targets worldwide in the 21st 
century. For many industrial nations, such as Germany, the demographic change requires a 
combination of measures to answer the demand for human capital and the implementation 
of sustainable immigration structures in a smart way. Surveys indicate the bigger context 
of the impact between immigration and positive influence on the welfare state and “well-
being” of the receiving society. The history of Germany shows the long-term experience with 
44  Behörde für Arbeit, Soziales, Familie und Integration (2013).
45  Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural (2013).
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migration affairs. Ever since the early centuries, immigration and emigration have always 
been present in the region. Particularly since the 1950s and 1960s, immigration management 
has attempted to match the demand for labour force. Nevertheless, until now the political 
handling of immigration is generally done in an uncertain and heterogeneous way. Recently, 
an attempt to promote “good migration” can be recognized in the field of administration 
through the establishment of more welcome-orientated and sustainable, fair measures. A 
good example is the current “triple win” project of the ZAV and GIZ, which aims to establish 
mobility partnerships with beneficial effects for all sides. The current European approach 
to migration and mobility shows a sustainable and migrant-centred orientation which offers 
a helpful vision for the implementation of guidelines in the national immigration manage-
ment. Thus, the recommendations concerning the building of structures such as mobility 
partnerships, the provision of information as well as offices abroad and the introduction of a 
holistic migration chain for potential immigrants coming to Germany should be taken into 
serious consideration. In order to make this work, administration, economy and society have 
to cooperate and work together to achieve together the goal of “good migration”.
The success of the current programme “Welcome to Germany” will depend on how 
much is learned from that experience and how well the errors of the past are avoided. This 
new welcome-based immigration policy is designed for all kind of migration and focuses on 
people with their specific needs. In this context, companies and civil society can play a cen-
tral role alongside politics and government in the form of active immigration management. 
Welcome-based immigration management should ideally accompany the entire integration 
process in a “door-to-door” capacity. 
The first moves towards a successful and fair immigration management in Germany 
have been taken and the process receives positives influences through the directives of the 
EU. This shift in policies now has to be accompanied by administrative measures and visible 
changes in policy-making. However, the process has just started and time will tell whether 
Germany is able to achieve a sustainable exchange mobility.
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AbstrAct
The integration process of immigrants in Italy is extremely complex because of the structural 
features of the Italian labour market, which differ according to the local realities and im-
migrant groups. Moreover, the issue of integration was embedded in the conflicts of Italian 
politics. Over the last twelve years, the political context has largely influenced integration 
policies (and their absence): the Italian model of “reasonable integration” suggested in 2000 
has not been implemented, while, in the meantime, migration policies have been character-
ised by a populist approach, which has been abandoned only recently. In 2011, the Monti 
government made a first attempt to reintroduce the issue of integration of migrants as part of 
a national policy, establishing a new Ministry for International Cooperation and Integration, 
headed by Andrea Riccardi. This decision was hailed as a major turning point, a signal that 
immigration was finally seen as a resource for Italy. The new Letta government has even 
appointed a Minister for Integration – Cécile Kyenge, an Italian citizen born in Congo. The 
appointment of Cécile Kyenge signifies that parts of the political elite have recognised that 
immigration is not an emergency or occasional phenomenon, but one of the structural char-
acteristics of the Italian society. 
At the moment, integration policies are still mainly the task of the local authorities and 
the civil society. An outdated citizenship legislation and racism are not the only problems the 
new Ministry of Integration has to face. An ineffective system matching labour supply and 
demand, lack of resources even for urgent integration policies, and costly policies of deporta-
tions will also have to be reconsidered.
The Italian case can be interesting for other countries with regard to the experiences 
accumulated by the private-social sector. The public sector cannot be expected to solve the 
integration problem without relying extensively on, and leveraging on the resources of, the 
private and non-governmental sector. These sectors – i.e., employers’ and workers’ groups, 
religious groups, civic, ethnic and immigrant organisations, private foundations, and the vari-
ous community-based non-profit entities – have extensive experience with various aspects of 
newcomers’ integration and can serve as crucial resource for immigrants. They should not, 
242
Migration and Integration
however, take over the responsibilities from the state concerning crucial tasks such as hous-
ing, employment, health or education. But positive cooperation between these two sectors 
should be developed.
introduction
Italy became an immigration country at the end of the 1970s, after one hundred years of emi-
gration; it is estimated that, between 1870 and 1970, 26 millions Italians left, directed mainly 
towards the American continent and, after World War Two, towards Northern Europe. This 
shift took place because of major changes in the international division of labour and the 
passage from the “Fordist” era to “Post-fordism” in developed societies. In spite of contro-
versial definitions, Fordism and post-Fordism represent different industrial models that can 
broadly describe the changes that took place in the Italian economy in the 1970s and 1980s: 
large-scale mass production, concentrated in the so-called industrial triangle (Turin, Milan, 
Genoa) were progressively replaced by a cluster of small firms and workshops scattered in the 
Central and Northeast regions of the country, producing a vast range of products suitable to 
new consumption models. Arriving in the middle of this economic change, migrants to Italy 
didn’t respond to the labour force needs of a declining heavy industrial sectors: migrants, 
reaching Italy under the pressure of “push factors” and of the restrictive migratory policies 
imposed by Northern European countries, filled manual and unqualified jobs, recently re-
jected by nationals, either in services to private persons (domestic work) or in small and very 
small enterprises, active in traditional productive activities, tourism, and agriculture (many of 
these jobs being part of the informal sector of the economy, which is especially relevant in the 
country, being estimated at between 25 and 30 per cent of the GDP)1.
This type of incorporation into the receiving country’s labour market characterizes what 
the sociologist Enrico Pugliese (2006) and the geographer Russell King (1999) defined as the 
“Mediterranean model” of migration. Other features of the model are: the importance of the 
female migratory component (fuelled by a strong demand in domestic service and especially 
elderly care); the high number of migrants’ nationalities, originating from different continents 
and expressing highly differentiated migratory trajectories; the absence of a clear legislation 
and, finally, poor management of migratory processes by national or local authorities, at least 
in a first phase. In the Italian case, this last aspect (inadequate legislation and policies – both 
in flow management and integration) has been particularly resilient (in comparison, e.g., 
with the Spanish case). A sign of this inadequacy has been the persistent “stock” of irregular 
migrants – difficult to estimate in quantity – that has forced the governments to implement 
regularisations or amnesties every four to five years (1986, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2006, 
1  According to the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and the Bank of Italy (Banca d’Italia), the informal economy 
accounted for 14-16% of the GNP in 1998-2000. Other sources have estimated it at between 27-29%, with the 
highest rate 29.4% in 2003 (Eurispes). Today it could reach around 30% of the national product, according to various 
estimates of scholars and international organisations. See The World Bank data: http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/
PapersLinks/informal_economy.pdf. See Gabriele Battaglia, tesi on line, available at: http://www.tesionline.it/default/
tesi.asp?idt=8003, accessed on 15th September 2009.
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2009 and 2012). In fact, many of the present-day legal immigrants gained their regular status 
by resorting to regularisation, at some point during their stay in Italy.
Migratory policies have been introduced slowly, and too late, to respond to a changing 
international context (namely the fall of the Berlin Wall and the shift of Eastern Europe to a 
market economy); have lacked a coherent approach (namely because of the different political 
majorities that have ruled the country and the exploitation of racism for electoral reasons 
by some political forces) and, last but not least, have failed to match labour force supply 
and demand. As for integration policies, they have only partly accompanied local processes, 
partly been spontaneous, and partly been due to a number of various agents (mostly from 
civil society). The recent appointment of a Minister of Integration – a lady, Cécile Kyenge, 
of Congolese origin and of Catholic religion – represents a shift in the political will to deal 
with the issue, but it does not reflect a clear vision for what concerns the role and the future 
of immigration in Italy nor a well-defined program for integration policies. As pointed out by 
Mr. Alessandrini – head of national coordination for Politics Social Integration of Foreigners 
at CNEL (National Council for Economy and Labour) – a “lack of a policy with a compre-
hensive approach that covers, at the same time, immigration, education and labour” can be 
recognised.2
This paper aims to offer a broad analysis of the integration policies and the integration 
processes in Italy, placing them in the complex economic and political context that has char-
acterized the country in the last thirty years. Many dimensions have to be taken into account: 
structural factors (economy, regional differences, North-South dualism and institutional 
decentralisation); recent Italian political history, marked by a long populist season under the 
centre-right governments directed by Mr. Berlusconi and supported by the xenophobic party 
of Mr. Bossi, the Northern League; the role of the civil society (namely secular and Christian 
NGOs and trade unions) and of the Catholic Church.
thE MigrAtory FloWs toWArds itAly: A lAndscApE thAt 
chAngEd oVEr thE yEArs
The shift of Italy from emigration to immigration country dates from the late 1970s; however, 
it was in the second half of the 1980s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformation 
of Eastern European societies and economies, that the immigrant population had a spectacu-
lar growth, from a few hundred thousand to the five million of today3. The changes in the 
international context have conditioned the origins and the typologies of the flows: during the 
1990s, migrants coming from Africa and Asia – predominant during the 1970s and 1980s 
2  Alessandrini spoke at the presentation of the IX° “Rapporto sugli indici di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia”, 
Report on the indicators of integration of immigrants in Italy, prepared by the CNEL (National Council for Economy 
and Work) in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (General Direction of Immigration and 
Integration Policies), 22 July 2013. Sociali (Direzione Generale dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di Integrazione). 
As for the CNEL, see note 26. http://voce.com.ve/2013/07/23/immigrazione-il-difficile-percorso-dellintegrazione/ 
3  Over the last twenty years, and before the crisis, Italy, with Spain, received the largest number of immigrants 
among all the European countries. 
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– were replaced by Eastern Europeans. After EU enlargement, flows from non-EU member 
states were replaced by those from EU member states – namely Romania and Bulgaria. Since 
a few years ago, Romanians – with around one million people (997,000 in 2011, accord-
ing to the Caritas Dossier 2012) – represent the biggest immigrant group in Italy4. They 
are one fifth of the around 5,000,000 registered foreigners at the end of 2011 – about the 
same number as in 2010, when they were 4.919 million residents (Caritas Dossier, 2010). It is 
curious to note that variations in flows have provoked an interesting semantic change in the 
definition of the immigrants, who, until the end of the 1990s, were called “extra-comunitari” 
(non-communitarians). The term was used both as an official definition and in popular dis-
course, having even become an insulting remark in xenophobic speeches. Following the entry 
of Eastern European countries in EU – with the consequences that this had in relation to the 
typologies of migratory flows – the terminology was revised. Today, EU migrants represent 
an estimated number of 1,373,000, 87% of whom come from the 12 countries which became 
EU members after the enlargement process.
Europe is now the most represented source of origin among foreign residents in Italy: 51% 
with a breakdown between EU (27.4%) and non-EU (23.4%) citizens. Europe is followed by 
Africa (22.1%), Asia (18.8%) and America (8.3%)5, the last ones constantly dropping. Among 
the non-EU European residents (1,171,163), Albanians are the most numerous (491,495), 
followed by 223,782 Ukrainians; 147,519 Moldavians; 101,554 Serbs and Montenegrins; 
82,209 Macedonians; 37,090 Russians, and between 20,000-30,000 Bosnians, Croats and 
Turks (each). With regard to the African continent, at the end of 2011, Moroccans turned 
out to be the largest immigrant community, with 506,369 residents (the most numerous one). 
The other large African communities come from Tunisia (122,595), Egypt (117,145), Senegal 
(87,311), Nigeria (57,011), Ghana (51,924), followed by Algeria (28,081) and Ivory Coast 
(24,235), with about 15,000 residents, and Burkina Faso, with 10,000 residents or less from 
Cameroon, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritius and Somalia. In total, there are 1,105,826 African 
residents (Caritas Dossier, 2012).
All these groups present very different demographic features with respect to male/women 
ratio and the presence of children. The balance between the presence of women and of men 
is completely uneven: at the two extremes, we find Ukrainian nationals (women are by far 
the majority: 25 and 26 males per 100 women) and Senegalese residents (369 males per 100 
females in 2009; 329 in 2010). Other “feminized” national groups are Poles (42 and 41 males 
per 100 females), Moldovans (50 and 51 males per 100 females), followed by Peruvians, 
Ecuadorians and Filipinos (ISTAT data). The “feminization” (or the opposite “masculiniza-
tion”) of national groups is linked to the type of incorporation into the Italian labour market. 
Domestic work has, in fact, attracted most of the female immigration since the late 1970s. 
This trend could eventually be reversed in the next few years, for two reasons: the family 
4  For a couple of years, the Italian government has tried to reduce the free movements and to introduce special laws 
allowing deportations of EU citizens, without succeeding.
5  A few thousand people from Oceania and stateless persons do not reach 0.1%.
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reunification processes that follow the settlement of some groups; the economic crisis pushing 
Italian women to return to domestic work. 
We do not have accurate statistics dividing migrant women coming for family reunifica-
tion from those settling in Italy for reasons of work. However, other data offer a picture of 
the presence of families and of migrants alone. According to Caritas, in 2009, migrants who 
lived in families with a spouse were 44.4% and single parents with children were 4.6%. This 
means that only 50% of the migrants lived in families6. Of the other 50%, 19.7% lived alone, 
12.6% cohabited with friends, while over 17% lived in co-residence with employers. The 
latter group mostly consisted of women in domestic works. This trend continues: just a little 
bit more than 50% of the immigrants live with their families. Migrants living alone are still a 
considerable number, partly because of the high percentage of immigrant women in domestic 
work, who leave their families in home country. However, in spite of the difficulties migrants 
face when leaving their families, the number of minors of foreign origin, born or socialized 
in Italy, is constantly growing7. Estimations include 933,000 minors of foreign origin, of 
which 570,000 were born in Italy. Pupils and students of foreign origin in Italian schools 
are 673,592 (Caritas Dossier 2012; Repubblica8; MIUR9, 2011). The MIUR data show the 
spectacular growth of children of immigrants in Italian schools during 1990s: they were only 
30,000 in 1992-1993. They are around 670,000 nowadays, experiencing a growth of 25% per 
year.
Migrants are not equally distributed all over the national territory. Over 60% are cur-
rently living in the North, 25% in the Centre and less than 15% in the South. The regions 
with the highest immigrant presence are Lombardy and Lazio, due to the two big urban 
concentrations of Milan and Rome. The North-South dichotomy in national economic de-
velopment affects immigrants’ distribution on the Italian territory.
The employment rate is difficult to evaluate because of the weight of the shadow econ-
omy. However, it has been and still is higher for both immigrant men and women than for 
Italians of both genders. The labour market participation rate of immigrant women is about 
6  From 1970s until early 1990s, immigration in Italy was predominantly composed of men and women in their 
active age, who came on their own and stayed alone, having extremely different national origins, from Sri Lanka to 
Morocco, from the Philippines to Senegal, from Tunisia to Poland, working in services and in the informal economy. 
A few groups represented an exception: Chinese in Tuscany and Tunisians in Sicily, who migrated in families, but 
both communities were quite separated from the Italian society. Nowadays, the number of immigrants living in 
families is growing.
7  As far as the second generation is concerned, this presence is extremely diversified, including children born and 
grown in the receiving society, teenagers reunified after having completed their socialisation process in their country 
of origin, children of mixed couples, etc. No simple definition can include them all; for this reason, Italian scholars are 
very sceptical about the notion of “second generation”. While most experts agree that this is made up of children of 
immigrants, either born in the receiving or sending country, but joining parents in early age and having an important 
part of their socialisation and schooling in the receiving country, scholars also insist on the need to distinguish among 
different typologies.
8  See also: www.repubblica.it/solidarieta/immigrazione/2012/01/27/news/la_cittadinanza_ai_figli_degli_
immigrati_e_una_follia_e_un_assurdit_non_darla-28850095/
9  Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca (Ministry of Education, University and Research).
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53%. This is well below that of migrant men (82%), but is higher than that of native-born 
Italian women (46%). Data on labour participation of immigrant women10 are higher in Italy 
than in most European countries. This situation may change quickly as the crisis is strongly 
affecting the Italian economy: very recent data (June 2013) show that unemployment is 
growing among foreigners, reaching the number of 318,000 persons in the second half of 
2012 and 385,000 in the first half of 2013 out of 2.334 million active foreigners11. Moreover, 
this indicates that the percentage of unemployment is now higher among foreigners than 
among Italians. This is a recent trend as until 2010 the opposite was true. At the same time, 
the demand for domestic work force has been growing after a brief and limited decline in 
2010 and 2011.
During the 1970s and 1980s, migrants have mainly been employed in tertiary (peddling, 
domestic work, small cleaning enterprises and catering) and primary sectors (fisheries and 
some agricultural activities), often in the black labour market (Travaglino-Reyneri, l99l; 
Ambrosini, 1999). Over the years, however, migration has progressively become a structural 
factor in the Italian economy and, more generally, in Italian society, where demographic 
turnover is only guaranteed by immigrants’ presence. Due to the demographic changes that 
have been taking place since the 1990s (ageing population and low birth-rates in the North 
and the Centre), immigrant labour force is needed not only in the informal economy, but also 
in small and medium-sized factories (especially in the North-East and North-West) as well 
as in construction (both formal and informal). The entire Italian economy would be para-
lyzed nowadays if it weren’t for immigrants: construction and agricultural industries, small 
industries in the North-West and North-East and care services (for children and, increasingly, 
the elderly) strongly need an immigrant labour force (Ambrosini, 1999). However, sectors 
where immigrants are employed mainly need low-qualified and low-paid workers. Sociologist 
Maurizio Ambrosini contends that immigrants’ subordinated position is functional to the 
Italian economy and presents the concept of “subordinated integration” as a key to under-
standing the acceptance of immigrants in Italian society. In spite of growing unemployment 
among foreigners, the crisis has not radically changed the situation: unqualified jobs are 
still needed, while the informal economy, very present in the sectors where migrants are em-
10  With respect to women’s employment, differences among groups are very important: women of some nationalities 
have only come for work and have a labour rate similar to that of men, while other national groups, who came through 
family reunification, remained out of the labour market.
11  Rapporto semestrale sull’andamento del mercato del lavoro degli immigrati in Italia,  Direzione Generale 
dell’Immigrazione e delle Politiche di Integrazione, Ministry of Labour. Based on Istat (National Institute of Statistics) 
these data – published in June – have been then incorporated in the publication of the Annual Report on the labour 
market of immigrants in Italy (see Note 2) that is scheduled in July. 
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ployed, is constantly growing as a consequence of the austerity policy imposed by the EU12 
that have perverse effects, such as the closing down of small and medium-sized enterprises 
through excessive taxation. For many companies and for many workers, the black labour 
market has become the only solution to surviving.13 So far, the crisis has not pushed Italians 
to accept the existing jobs in domestic services: “The service sector continues to show a grow-
ing demand. In fact, the comparison between the third quarter of 2012 and the same period 
of the previous year shows that the number of foreigners employed in domestic services has 
grown by 75 thousand units while the employment of Italian nationals has decreased by 12 
thousand units.”14 
However, growing unemployment has had an impact on the indicators of integration. 
According to the CNEL15, “Compared with 2009, the reference year of the previous report, 
the geography of the Italian regions with the highest potential of integration has changed 
considerably, and not only because the grid of indicators has expanded and has been further 
refined, but mainly because two years later – during which time the economic and employ-
ment crisis has gradually worsened, with a more and more systemic character – in Italy the 
conditions of social integration and employment of immigrants (as, indeed, of the Italians) 
have experienced a general and widespread deterioration.” (CNEL. 2013)16 
12  There is now a big debate in Italy about the negative impact of the austerity policies imposed by the European 
Commission; however, the voices that are critical against austerity policies represent the majority of the political 
forces. The action of the Monti government is seen more and more negatively both by economists and politicians. This 
analysis by Paul Krygman is now shared both by the Five Stars Movement of Beppe Grillo and by the mainstream 
parties such as Sel, sinistra, ecologia e elibertà, Gauche, Ecologie and Freedom of Nichi Vendola: “For Mr. Monti was, 
in effect, the proconsul installed by Germany to enforce fiscal austerity on an already ailing economy; willingness to 
pursue austerity without limit is what defines respectability in European policy circles. This would be fine if austerity 
policies actually worked — but they don’t. And far from seeming either mature or realistic, the advocates of austerity 
are sounding increasingly petulant and delusional.” Paul Krugman, Op-Ed Columnist, Austerity, Italian Style by Paul 
Krugman, published: February 24, 2013. The Popolo delle Libertà –Freedom’s People of Silvio Berlusconi, opposes 
as well austerity policies. 
13  http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/News/Pagine/Ires-Il-mercato-del-lavoro-immigrato.aspx
14  “In controtendenza il comparto dei servizi alla persona continua a manifestare una domanda nettamente in crescita. 
Sempre nel confronto tra il terzo trimestre 2012 e lo stesso periodo dell’anno precedente, infatti, gli occupati nei 
servizi domestici ed alle famiglie crescono di 75 mila unita considerando i lavoratori stranieri mentre diminuiscono di 
12 mila unità considerando gli occupati di nazionalità italiana. http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/statistiche-2_4_milioni_
di_lavoratori_stranieri_sono_il_10_degli_occupati_16869.html
15  http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/archiviodocumenti/indici-di-integrazione/Pagine/IX-rapporto-indici-di-
integrazione.aspx
16  “Rispetto al 2009, anno di riferimento del Rapporto precedente, la geografia dei territori italiani a più alto 
potenziale di integrazione è sensibilmente mutata; e non solo perché la griglia degli indicatori si è ampliata e 
ulteriormente perfezionata, ma soprattutto perché a due anni di distanza – durante i quali la crisi economico-
occupazionale è andata progressivamente acuendosi, sempre più un carattere sistemico – in Italia le condizioni di 
inserimento sociale e lavorativo degli immigrati (come, del resto, degli italiani) hanno conosciuto un generale e 
diffuso peggioramento”. IX Rapporto del CNEL sugli Indici di integrazione degli immigrati in Italia, Realizzato dal 
Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS su incarico dell’ONC-CNEL - Luglio 2013.
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thE iMplEMEntAtion oF A rEstrictiVE MigrAtory policy: 
thE QuotA systEM
All Italian governments which have been in power since 1980s have been unable to “manage” 
the migratory flows and to implement integration policies for immigrants in the country. The 
measures that were taken before 1998 mainly focused on regularisation of irregular migrants 
and border control: the word “integration” is mentioned here and there in two laws enacted 
from 1986 onwards, i.e., Law 943/198617 and Law 39/199018 (Campani, 1999). In 1998, the 
centre-left government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi attempted to define an effective na-
tional migratory policy to respond to the new challenges created by migration: the issuing of 
Law 40/98,19 called Turco-Napolitano after its promoters, represented the promise for a new 
season. In the introductory report of the bill, the three goals of Law 40 are defined as follows: 
“counteracting illegal migration and the criminal exploitation of migratory flows; imple-
menting precise policies concerning legal entries, which must be programmed and regulated; 
setting up realistic integration paths for new immigrants and foreign residents in Italy”20.
As far as management of the flows is concerned, Law 40 introduced the principle of an 
annual quota system, administered by the Ministry of Labour – for new immigrants, as well 
as an annual quota for temporary workers entering the country from 20 days to 6 months. 
This quota system should have corresponded to the needs of the labour market in a profitable 
meeting of supply and demand. An innovative aspect of the Law was the “sponsor system”, 
inspired by the Canadian model, which should have allowed the entry of a limited number 
of foreign citizens (a percentage foreseen in the quotas) for a six-month period for job-search 
purposes, provided that another individual (an Italian citizen or a foreign citizen regularly 
residing in Italy) – the “sponsor” figure – guaranteed accommodation and coverage of living/
health costs throughout the foreign citizen’s stay. Another new feature introduced by the Law 
was the “Centre for Temporary Stay and Assistance” (CPT), a structure for the detainment 
of irregular migrants (i.e., undocumented/improperly documented migrants), in which they 
could be held for a maximum of 30 days before being expelled from Italy. The Law searched 
in fact for a balance between a relatively open approach towards new arrivals (via the sponsor) 
and the repression of irregular migration (through the CPT).
In 2001, the arrival into power of the centre-right government marked a shift towards 
a public discourse against migration and caused the abandonment of the “rational” poli-
cies attempting to match the supply and demand of labour force and combining repression 
of irregular migration and integration (Campani, 2001). “Populism” – that is, using high 
17  Law no. 943 of 1986 “Norms related to the employment and treatment of foreign working immigrants and against 
illegal immigration” focused mostly on work matters and introduced, for the first time, procedures for the legal 
registration of workers (divided, from then on, into “regular” and “irregular” cases).
18  Law no. 39 of 1990 “Urgent norms and regularization on the political asylum, entry and residence of foreigners”.
19  Law no. 40 of 1998, which became the Unified Act on Migration, Law Decree n. 286/98, Testo Unico 
sull’Immigrazione.
20  From the report to the D.D.L. n.?, introduced in the Chamber of Deputies on 19 February 1997. It subsequently 
became Law 40/98.
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emotional topics to obtain consensus – is the notion that can better describe the features of 
the Italian centre-right government: finding an external enemy is a traditional instrument to 
build consensus. That is what Berlusconi did, indicating as enemies, communists, judges and 
immigrants. A member of the leading coalition at that time, the Northern League – a party 
born around the idea of defending the interests of Northern Italy and evoking “secession” 
(later transformed into “federalism”) – used and abused the anti-immigrant rhetoric to catch 
votes.
One of the first actions of the newly elected government was to change Law 40, introduc-
ing a restrictive interpretation of the quota system21. Law 189 of 2002, i.e., “Modifications to 
the regulation on asylum and immigration”, maintained the core policy of the quota system, 
but tightened the measures, making it extremely difficult to obtain a regular stay and work 
permit. On the basis of Law 189, which is still in force and is the main piece of legisla-
tion regulating the incoming flows, entry for employment reasons is limited to those cases 
in which an employer explicitly requires the worker. The possibility of legally residing in 
Italy (the “residence permit”) must be acquired in the country of origin and depends on the 
possession of a work contract and from the employer’s guarantee that the migrant has an ac-
commodation in Italy and that his/her travel expenses for returning to his/her home country 
at the end of the work contract are already paid. The Sportello Unico per l’Immigrazione, 
(Single Immigration Desk, SUI), based in Police Headquarters, is the only service authorized 
to grant the permit. This can take several months, given the fact that the office has to ensure 
that no Italians all over the national territory are willing to take on that job. The maximum 
duration of the residence permit is two years in case of indefinite employment contracts. In 
case of renewal, the same time-span of two years must be respected22. Only after six years of 
un-interrupted residence in Italy, is it possible to apply for a longer stay permit23.
The number of new work permits that can be given every year is established through a 
quota system that defines the maximum number of entries of foreign workers in Italy on an 
annual basis. Labour shortages are identified by a specific system (the Sistema Informativo 
Excelsior), while additional input is given by employers’ associations. However, it is the 
21  Other policies of the right-wing government concerned bilateral agreements both on labour-readmission with 
“partner” countries (e.g., Albania and Morocco) and border controls. The penalization of both illegal entry and direct 
or indirect facilitation of the entry of undocumented persons in Italy has been introduced in 2008.
22  The renewal of the residence or stay permit (permesso di soggiorno) has also become more strict. Previously the 
renewal of the “between jobs” residence permit had no time limits and was left to the relevant police Offices. With 
the law 189, the renewal is possible only if the immigrant has an employment: “in an economic system characterised 
by a large quota of informal economy – such as the Italian one – the link between employment and renewal of the 
residence permit represents a continuous risk of relapse in the field of illegality. According to the data of the work 
inspectorate, 26.1 percent of migrants employed in the black economy would have a regular position as regards the 
residence permit” (Zincone, 2001, p. 28).
23  There are in fact three kinds of stay permits: a) the short term residence permit (permesso di soggiorno) whose 
length depends on the duration of the job contract held by the migrant; b) the long-term residence permit (carta 
di soggiorno), which can be obtained after six years of regular residence in Italy; c) the family reunion permit for 
spouses and children. All three are renewable. Prior to 2002, immigrants could obtain the carta di soggiorno after five 
years of regular residence in Italy, instead of the six years that are now required.
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government, namely the Ministry of Labour and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
which annually sets the maximum number of workers that may enter the country in the 
following year and issues one or more official decrees establishing quotas and distributing 
them among working categories and geographic areas. Moreover, specific nationalities are 
privileged as a “reward” (through bilateral readmission agreements and cooperation projects) 
for being “partner” countries that assist Italy in the fight against irregular immigration. 
Priority is also given to foreigners with Italian origins and to foreigners who have participated 
in Italian-sponsored training courses in their home countries. It must be stressed that, dur-
ing the years of the centre-right government, the quota numbers were always kept below the 
estimations of the Excelsior and employers’ requests.
This restrictive legislation was severely criticised by the manufacturers’ association when 
it was implemented. They asked the government for more flexible procedures to hire foreign 
workers in a period of strong decline of local available workforce24. However, their requests 
were not met. The rigid legislation continued: it didn’t allow a rational match between sup-
ply and demand in the Italian labour market, but it satisfied the xenophobic and populist 
approach of the Northern League who was in power at that time. Moreover, this rigid legisla-
tion did not discourage irregular migration, which continued and even increased. In fact, one 
of the consequences of what can be considered the general “mismanagement” of migratory 
flows through Law 189, has been the constant presence of a “stock” of irregular immigrants25. 
This has obliged the anti-immigrant centre-right government to grant two new amnesties in 
2006 and 2009.
The contradiction between a strict entry system and periodic use of regularisations was 
explained by the centre-right coalition through blaming the widespread, undocumented pres-
ence of migrants on the mistakes of previous governments. “In fact, regularisation has always 
been a provision of Italian immigration policy reform. Each change in legislation since 1986 
– at roughly four-year intervals – has been accompanied by mass regularisation, although in 
each case the government thunders that ‘this is the last regularisation’” (Chaloff, 2005, p. 4). 
In fact, governments usually deny that further regularisation is foreseen and dismiss rumours 
about further amnesties. It should be noted that regularisations are common in Italy in areas 
other than immigration. “There have been numerous tax amnesties, employment ‘emersion’ 
regularisations for undeclared workers, and even amnesties for illegally constructed build-
ings” (Chaloff 2005, p. 4). Aware of contradictions produced by this rigid legislation, the 
present government, which has a limited political mandate being a technical government, 
proposed a new amnesty in October 2012.
24  Severe criticism was expressed by the manufacturers of Veneto. “Our businesses do not only need workers, but 
specialised workers which could be introduced in our country easily and not through complicated and bureaucratic 
procedures as our country’s present ones” (Rossi Luciani: ecco perché la Bossi-Fini non ci piace. An interview with 
Mr. Luigi Rossi Luciani, President of the Manufacturers’ Association of Veneto, published in Cittadini dappertutto, 
October 2002).
25  In the end, the difference between quotas and the labour market needs is solved by irregular migrants working in 
the shadow economy. 
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intEgrAtion policiEs: An uncErtAin pAth
Before 1998, integration was not an issue for national policies: nevertheless, it could not be 
avoided by local administrations. Since 1970s, local institutions (regions, provinces and mu-
nicipalities) had started to co-operate with networks of NGOs, both secular and religious 
(such as CARITAS), which were active in the reception of migrants (managing centres, soup 
kitchens, etc.), services for information and counselling, organisation of training courses and 
programs of intercultural education for Italian schools.
By issuing Law 40/98, the national government expressed the ambition to outline a 
national frame for integration and to centrally coordinate policies implemented by local insti-
tutions, on which, by the way, depends on the structural policy of integration (e.g., housing, 
and assistance) (Campani, 1999). The crucial role of local authorities and voluntary associa-
tions was not questioned: on the contrary, the Decree of the President of the Republic (DPR) 
of 5 August 1998, implementing Law 40, gave them an important role in the field of assistance 
for immigrants. The State, however, wanted to be a point of reference: the Ministry of Social 
Affairs was charged with establishing priorities for integration policies with the Regions. In 
this document, integration is defined as: “a process of non-discrimination and recognition of 
differences, that means a process of hybridisation and an experimental tool of new forms of 
relationships and behaviours in the continuous attempt to maintain universal principles and 
specificities, in the constant and everyday attempt of keeping together universal principles 
and specificities, of preventing situations of marginalisation and ghetto that threaten social 
equilibrium and cohesion, and affirms the universal principles as the value of human life, 
dignity of the individual, the recognition of women’s freedom, protection of childhood, to 
which there are no possible exceptions, even for the sake of differences” (CNEL26, 2001).
The DPR created a National Fund for Migration Policies Resources – the financial in-
strument for the implementation of integration policies, appointed an existing institution to 
monitor the integration policies and processes, and created a new institution for advising 
the government on integration policies. The already quoted CNEL, a Constitutional institu-
tion, composed of representatives of the civil society, was officially in charge of monitoring 
integration policies. The new institutions were the National Commission for Immigrants’ 
Integration Policy, composed of a group of well-known scholars, aimed at proposing a set 
of integration policies adapted to the Italian context and developing an “Italian integration 
model”. The Commission for Integration Policy made the attempt to develop a specific model 
of integration for Italy, taking into account the experiences of other countries and the speci-
ficities of the Italian context. The members of the Commission, called the Italian “model” of 
26  The Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro -CNEL-(National Council of the Economy and the Work, 
CNEL) is foreseen by the Italian Constitution that defines it in article 99: “Organ for counselling to the Chambers and 
the Government in the subjects that are foreseen by the Law. It has the initiative of proposing laws and can contribute 
to the elaboration of social and economic laws according to the principles established by the Law.” It is composed 
of 121 counsellors: twelve experts, chosen among the representatives of the economic, social and juridical cultures; 
44 representatives of the workers, the working class, 18 representatives of self-employed, 37 representatives of the 
enterprises and companies and 10 representatives of NGOs. 
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integration “reasonable integration”. The pillars of reasonable integration are two fundamen-
tal interconnected principles: recognition of individual integrity and a low conflict-potential 
integration27 or the prosecution of positive interaction with local population (Zincone, 2000, 
2001).
The general elections in 2001, bringing the centre-right coalition into power, marked 
the end of “reasonable integration”. Even if Law 40 was not suppressed, but just amended 
(most of the rights granted to regular migrants were not questioned28), the integration project, 
which the law aimed to implement, was de facto abandoned. The new government’s approach 
to migration was years away from reasonable integration: cultural pluralism was rejected in 
the name of assimilation. A sign of the scarce interest for integration policies by the new 
government was the severe reduction in the budget for integration measures in the National 
Fund for migration policies, whose scarce resources were all consecrated to counteract illegal 
migration flows, practically to finance deportations. The indiscriminate compulsory escort-
ing of expelled migrants to the border meant an investment of huge financial resources and 
the massive employment of police forces.
Reduction of funding also concerned the sector of education for the integration of im-
migrants’ children. Law no. 189 of 2002 did not change the basic articles of Law 40 on 
education of foreign children, but the centre-right government cut the necessary funding to 
implement them and, through the Ministry of Education, put obstacles against schools and 
teachers who wanted to implement them. The articles of Law 40, still in force, represent 
however a good basis for the integration of foreign children in Italian schools. Article 36 
explicitly refers to the right of education for foreign children and to preservation of languages 
and cultures of origin: “School community receives linguistic and cultural differences as a 
value to establish a basis for reciprocal respect, exchange among cultures and tolerance; in 
order to reach this goal, it promotes and encourages initiatives aimed at reception, protection 
of culture and language of origin and implementation of common intercultural activities” 
(art. 36, comma 3).
Art. 38 (paragraph 1, U.T.), according to which all foreign minors living in Italy, inde-
pendently from the fact of being regular or not, are subject to mandatory education. The 
same legislation applies to the right of education for Italian students.
Art. 42 explicitly refers to language courses and the culture of origin organised by im-
migrants’ associations, which should be supported by local authorities (for example financing 
immigrants’ associations). The same article for the first time introduces and recognises the 
“cultural mediator” in order to simplify relations between administrations and foreigners 
belonging to different ethnic, national, linguistic and religious groups. Art. 45 states that 
27  Committee for Migrants’ Integration Policies, Second report on migration in Italy, edited by G. Zincone, year?
28  Migrants with a regular residence permit are entitled to enjoy civil rights (Art. 2) and some social rights as well. 
Migrants with a regular residence permit are granted equal access to the medical assistance of the National Health 
Service (Art. 32); equal pension conditions and the possibility to maintain social insurance contributions even in 
case of repatriation (Art. 40). However, social rights are still not really equal to the ones of the Italians: There are a 
series of institutional discriminations that do not allow equal access to the welfare, for example the unemployment 
treatment, maternity, disability and accident on work. 
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foreign minors in compulsory education must attend the classroom corresponding to their 
age29. 
intEgrAtion policiEs: locAl VErsus nAtionAl
The attempt of Law 40 to inaugurate a national Italian migratory policy failed. Because of 
the political change, the Law was not implemented – both in the part concerning a rational 
management of immigration flows as well as the part on integration policies. During the 
years of the centre-right government, national integration policies were virtually “frozen”. 
As a consequence of that, as before 1998, local authorities30 became (and still are) the main 
agents for processing some forms of local integration through the Assessorati alle Politiche 
Sociali (Town Boards for Social Policies), or the Assessorati al Lavoro (Town Boards for Labour 
Policies) which have been given competence in immigration. 
Local administrative actions towards immigrants may vary from one place to another, 
but they are centred on common issues and tend to give similar answers: the need for living 
quarters (hostels) for newcomers, attempts to help families on housing, support to associa-
tions and offer of meeting spaces, specific counselling on health problems (mainly for women 
on contraception, abortion and pregnancy), training of cultural mediators, and promotion of 
intercultural activities in cooperation with schools. One of the main tasks of local authorities 
consists of transferring limited resources coming from the State31 or in giving financial help to 
NGOs active in assisting immigrants, like CARITAS, or immigrants’ associations. This has 
certainly encouraged the development of an associative life among immigrants. Several local 
authorities tried to frame a coherent policy, based on synergies between the public services 
and NGOs. With respect to the relationship with NGOs and associations, there are differ-
ent approaches: one that considers migrants as vulnerable groups that have to be supported 
mainly by Italian NGOs, and another one that insists on active participation by immigrants’ 
associations. In the last years, many Regions have passed laws on immigration which are 
often in contrast with national policy. For example, Regions such as Emilia Romagna and 
29  This article intends to fight against the practice, which unfortunately is quite common in Italian schools, to insert 
foreign children who don’t speak Italian, in the first class of the primary level, independently from their age. Article 
45 of the Realisation Regulation (D.P.R. 349/99), named “School enrolment” (“Iscrizione scolastica”) establishes that 
the foreign student must be registered in the class corresponding to the personal age. This registration can happen at 
any time of the school year, as reaffirmed by the following M.M. 311/99 and 87/00. However, the same legislation 
gives the Teaching Body (Collegio Docenti) important evaluating and proposal powers in this issue. Among others, 
these include the possibility to register students in a class which doesn’t correspond to their age, with a previous 
evaluation of the academic curriculum of the minor in the country of origin, the degree obtained or his individual 
ability. Foreign minors who are irregular or lack personal documents are registered with reserve, without limiting their 
educational path to obtain a degree. 
30  For example, the municipality of Florence organized a full system for teaching Italian to foreign children. Some 
municipalities also organized elections to choose immigrants’ representatives in Municipal Council etc.
31  Work integration is a domain in which the Regions are particularly called to act in line with the Ministry, because 
localities differ greatly regarding labour insertion and have specific needs. Each region receives funds for social 
policies and decides what to do/where to apply them. 
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Toscana – historically managed by left-wing administrations – have approved regional laws 
on social integration of foreign immigrants based on the principles of equality of rights and 
duties, acknowledgement of citizenship rights and the goal of “encouraging trajectories of 
democracy and of representation for immigrants”. These Regions are also pushing for the 
recognition of immigrants’ right to vote in administrative election.
An important debate exists in Italy on the importance of the local dimension of integra-
tion. In the absence of national policies, some scholars like Mr Giuseppe De Rita, Director 
of the Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali (Centre for Social Investment Studies, CENSIS32), 
wondered whether it would be possible to talk about a particular model of integration: would 
it not be easier to renounce it, given the variety of interactions between Italians and im-
migrants, as well as labour integration according to territorial differences? According to Mr 
Giuseppe De Rita, the absence of national integration policies is certainly a factor that has 
been put on the shoulders of the local authorities. However, the difficulty in defining an 
integration model also depends on the specific features of the Italian nation-state such as 
the importance of regional and cultural differences, the complex relationship to the idea of 
the nation after the experience of fascism, the inefficiency of the state apparatus and the 
bureaucracy.
Other scholars insist on the fact that local experiences vary according to immigrants’ 
communities. In Italy, there is a high number of immigrants’ nationalities, incorporating dif-
ferent forms of integration according to their positions in the labour market. The interaction 
between specific communities and local reality can be defined through various typologies: for 
example, as “non-conflicting integration” or “subordinated integration” (Ambrosini: 2003).
Not all scholars agree on the extreme fragmentation – territorial and communitarian – of 
the experience of immigrants’ integration in Italy; however, the local dimension is generally 
recognized in Italy. Some experts consider, in fact, that, even in spite of the absence of na-
tional integration policies, common processes of integration have taken place at national level 
through NGOs, associations and trade unions. In fact, the integration process in Italy would 
be the result of interaction between immigrant communities and civil society, represented 
by secular and religious NGOs, associations and trade unions. According to some scholars, 
namely Franco Pittau of the CARITAS, the Italian “model” of integration would be then 
characterized by the prevailing role of the civil society versus the public institutions, espe-
cially for what concerns the national state. It would indeed be possible to talk about processes 
of national integration, even if the state has not organised systematic integration policies, 
precisely because civil society has taken a role.
The Monti government made a first attempt to reintroduce the issue of integration 
of migrants as part of a national policy, establishing the new Ministry for International 
Cooperation and Integration, headed by Andrea Riccardi, founder of the Community of Sant 
32  Censis, Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali, is a centre for socio-economic research, founded in 1964. Since 1973, it 
has become a Foundation, thanks to the participation of big institutions, both private and public. Since 30 years ago, it 
has developed studies, counselling, evaluation and proposals in the main sectors of social life, such as work, education 
welfare, environment, economy, local and urban development, public governance, communication and culture.
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‘Egidio, a Christian organization active in international cooperation projects. This decision 
was hailed as a major turning point, a signal that immigration was finally seen as a resource 
for Italy. However, while the Monti government introduced a new approach to immigration 
that was no longer representing immigration as a threat or as an emergency (which was the 
case during the years of the center-right governments), it failed to reach any concrete result 
in terms of integration. In the context of budget reduction and spending reviews, the Monti 
government was not able to make investments in integration programmes for immigrants.
The Monti government represented a shift with regard to the acceptance of the need 
for a reform of the Italian citizenship law towards recognition of the jus soli for immigrants’ 
children. This was possible as consensus between the center-left and some members of the 
centre-right is growing on this issue. This is also the first matter on which the new Minister 
for Integration, appointed by the Letta government and nominated in May 2013, has engaged 
her Ministry.
The appointment of a Minister of foreign origin signifies the acknowledgement that im-
migration does not constitute an emergency or occasional phenomenon, but is instead one of 
the structural characteristics of the Italian communities. Together with changing the citizen-
ship law, the new Minister wants to fight against racism.
However, on-going racist attacks and discrimination against foreigners, even the Minister 
herself, suggest that racism is a deep-rooted problem in parts of the society and abused by 
some political forces. Thus, it will take a long time to resolve this challenge to integration.
sEcond gEnErAtion, Jus sanguinis And EducAtion 
problEMs
The integration of the second generation in Italy is debated in connection with two main 
issues: citizenship legislation and school education. Acquisition of Italian citizenship is gov-
erned by a 20-year-old law (Law no. 91 of 1992), which is based on “ius sanguinis” (bloodline) 
and is one of the most restrictive in Europe. In order to be eligible to apply for citizenship, a 
foreigner must prove continuous residence in Italy for ten years, and to show an income of 
around €8,000 a year (€11,000 with a dependent spouse, plus €516 for each child), which 
is considered enough to ensure self-sufficiency. Citizens of the EU need only four years of 
residence, while five years are requested for stateless persons and refugees. According to the 
law, proceedings should not last more than two years. In practice, the number of years the 
applicant has to wait before receiving citizenship is at least four. 
For immigrants’ children who are born in Italy, the only possibility to get Italian citizen-
ship is to wait for the age of the majority, when they can apply, hoping to get it after a short 
delay. The well-known soccer player Mario Balotelli is an example of this procedure: despite 
being born in Italy, having attended Italian schools and having played in the youth teams 
of his city, he was not allowed – as a foreigner – to play in the national soccer team until 
he was over 19 years of age. Frustration vis-à-vis obtaining Italian citizenship is one of the 
main problems second-generation immigrants face. With the present government, there are 
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hopes that the law will be changed because there is a certain agreement among the moderate 
political parties.
However, another problem is represented by the scarce capacity of Italian schools to deal 
with diversity: the consequences are the bad results of foreign children in comparison with 
natives – even in the case of communities such as the Chinese, who generally show brilliant 
school results in most immigration countries – both in Europe and North America. 
Since 1989, when the number of foreign children in Italian schools was limited, the 
Ministry of Education has paid attention to language issues and intercultural approach, by 
enacting several memorandums stressing the linguistic needs of foreign students and fix-
ing guidelines for intercultural education. For example, the memorandum “Intercultural 
dialogue and democratic living together: the projectual participation of the school” (Dialogo 
interculturale e convivenza democratica: l’impegno progettuale della scuola), Ministerial 
Memorandum 73 of 2 March 1994, starts from an idea of intercultural education as the 
best answer to a multicultural society, and it indicates all steps that a school must take in 
a diverse context. Effective strategies span from creation, inside the school, of a relational 
atmosphere that will favour integration among students and between them and teachers, to a 
new didactic organisation both in methodology and contents. Law 40/98 incorporated these 
suggestions, in different articles, making explicit reference to the right to education of foreign 
children and to preservation of languages and cultures of origin.
Since 2001, however, under the centre-right government, the Ministry of Education 
has stopped promoting intercultural education. Good practices survived at the local level, 
in some schools and thanks to individual teachers, who could count on networks such as 
the Intercultural Centres (Centri Interculturali), promoted by local authorities, associations 
and NGOs. There are three “historical” Intercultural Centres: Cidiss in Turin (Centro 
Interculturale Città di Torino), supported by the Municipality; the CDLEI in Bologna 
(Centro Documentazione e Laboratorio per una Educazione Interculturale), a cooperation 
between the University, the Municipality and the Provincial Governments; and the COME 
Centre in Milan, linked to CARITAS. These three centres “paved the way” for other inter-
cultural centres, working to gather documentation, provide orientation, train teachers and 
promote networking on the territory. Intercultural centres have thus become a focus for docu-
mentation, training, intercultural mediation, networking and, at the same time, production 
of didactic materials providing fundamental support to educators dealing with immigrant 
children on a daily basis. Local authorities (Municipalities, Provinces and Regions) contrib-
ute to most of the funding guaranteeing the survival of these centres and allowing them to 
operate. Occasionally, centres manage to obtain funding from the European Union by par-
ticipating in its programmes. During the last few years, teaching of Italian as a second langue 
and the production of the relevant didactic materials have absorbed much of the resources of 
Intercultural Centres.
Teaching of Italian as a foreign language also concerns adult immigrants, who can study 
in one of the 389 CTPs throughout Italy. These centres are part of a national policy of the 
Ministry of Education, but the quality of their work strongly varies at the local level, as it de-
pends on the “vitality” of local context and on relationships established with local authorities. 
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CTPs are very flexible in their programs and can establish conventions and agreements with 
local agencies. Immigrants are important users of CTPs’ services, though their presence var-
ies regionally: in Northern Italy they represent up to 35% of users, while in Southern Italy 
the majority of users are local unemployed Italian citizens. The main requests by immigrant 
users concern the development of Italian language skills, compulsory education diploma and 
vocational training. Cécile Kyenge has often declared that she considers school as the funda-
mental starting point for integration.
MigrAnts And locAls: typologiEs oF intEgrAtion
From the mid-1990s onwards, various studies analysed the settlement processes of different 
immigrant communities and their interaction with Italian society, investigating outcomes in 
terms of integration. These studies were both qualitative and quantitative and data became 
increasingly accurate. From 1991 onwards, CARITAS has produced an annual statistical dos-
sier annually, by which existing data sets were presented and the main trends in the migratory 
process in Italy were interpreted.
According to national groups and the local Italian context, processes appear to be ex-
tremely differentiated, as Italy has received a very large number of nationalities. The same 
community may have different migratory trajectories and, consequently, diverging integra-
tion processes, on the basis of local labour market or attitudes of local population. Neither 
immigrants nor the receiving society are opposite, homogeneous blocs: paradoxically, every 
immigrant, in every reality has a different trajectory towards integration. Moreover, the in-
tegration process, in its totality, is influenced by co-presence, within the same community, 
of regular and irregular migrants. The status of being a legal resident or irregular migrant is 
extremely important for integration. 
Empirical researches focussing on specific communities in local realities have shown 
multiple dimensions of integration, referring to different spheres of social life: work and 
culture seem often to be different dimensions in relationship with integration processes. In 
order to interpret the variety of interaction between local realities and immigrant groups, 
together with individual trajectories empirical research shows, a complex idea of integration 
should be used. Variety in meanings reflects, on the one side, the empirical analysis, show-
ing the multiple trajectories in the processes of settlement and in the interaction with the 
receiving society, and, on the other, it corresponds to “models”, which are the expression of 
political approaches, discourses and interests. Pushing analysis to its end, some Italian re-
searchers wonder if the concept of integration may have a “core”, being independent from the 
political discourse and the interplay between various actors. On the basis of a few empirical 
studies, Erika Cellini (2002) has tried to systematize a few typologies of integration (and 
interaction with the Italian society): “non-conflictual communitarian integration”, “par-
tially conflictual communitarian integration” and “subordinated integration”. The first two 
concepts refer to two communities presenting a high level of communitarian cohesion, such 
as the Senegalese and the Chinese. The Senegalese community was studied by the Trade 
Unions’ Research Institute (IRER) in Lombardy (Marchetti, 1994): it is characterised by the 
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preservation of cultural traditional elements and by the vitality of traditional social forms and 
economic organisation. A variety of researches have pointed out the importance of the Murid 
Brotherhood, an Islamic sect that has a high level of control of its members and also plays an 
economic role, helping the social promotion of its members. The research considers that co-
presence of the tendency to reconstruct forms of organisation and sociability of the country of 
origin with some openness towards Italian society represents a feature of the Senegalese com-
munity, which cannot be found in other communities. The tendency to reconstruct forms of 
organisation and sociability of the country of origin can, in fact, produce conflicts with the 
Italian society. For this reason, the form of integration of the Senegalese is defined as “non-
conflictual communitarian integration”. 
The “partially conflictual communitarian integration” concerns, on the other hand, the 
Chinese community. The Chinese also tend to develop a process of integration on a com-
munitarian basis, centred on the family enterprise. This strategy has not been especially 
favourable to interaction with Italian local communities as a variety of researches in the areas 
where Chinese are settled (Milan and Tuscany especially) have showed. Conflicts have been 
common, even if there has been, through time, a progressive adaptation (Campani, Carchedi 
and Tassinari, 1994). If, in Tuscany, conflicts have not developed, this has been due to intel-
ligent policies developed by Tuscany Region and the Municipality of Prato. “Subordinated 
integration” refers to the Filipino community in Milan, which is mainly composed of women 
doing domestic work and who have developed very low autonomy. 
An interesting case showing how typologies of integration should be referred, both to 
specific groups and local realities, is represented by Tunisians, who, in the towns of Northern 
Italy, have a high presence of immigrants with deviant behaviours (mainly as drug-dealers). 
On the contrary, the Tunisian immigrant community in Mazara del Vallo, Sicily, where they 
are fishermen and live with their families, experience positive interactions with local people. 
The same national group may have heterogeneous or even completely different migratory 
trajectories and, consequently, integration processes on the basis of local labour market or 
attitudes by the local population. 
ciVil sociEty orgAnizAtions And ngos: thEir rolE in 
intEgrAting thE MigrAnts
The role of the organisations of the so-called “private social” sector has been crucial in the 
field of assistance and aid given to immigrants in Italy, not only before laws on migration had 
been passed, but also after a certain number of laws had been issued (respectively in 1986, 
1990, 1998 and 2002). This has to do with the fact that, traditionally, the Italian State has 
delegated many welfare activities to the private social sector, linked to the Catholic Church 
and, less frequently, to other religious or secular associations. This tradition has been para-
doxically reinforced by a reform of welfare in 1990s which aimed to be “modern”, applying 
the liberal idea of “light state”. The role of NGOs is quite crucial in legal assistance: NGOs 
have provided assistance during amnesties. They also assist with residence and work permit 
procedures, family reunification and access to all public and private services, even if legal 
259
Integration Policies in Italy: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach
casework, including representation at court, is seldom offered. Only cases of migrant women 
forced to prostitute and minors waiting for rehabilitation are being taken up. Another sector 
where NGOs have played an important role is health. In theory, healthcare is guaranteed 
for all by law. Still, not all immigrants, especially irregulars, can deal with the bureaucratic 
Italian health system. There have been important efforts by hundreds of voluntary doctors 
and social workers, who set up special surgeries treating more patients than the public health 
system. They have also raised awareness among medical and nursing staff in public structures. 
As for housing, NGOs responses have been insufficient. While a few organisations (mostly 
Catholic) offer temporary accommodation facilities, no general action to help immigrants in 
one of the crucial problems has been taken. As for employment, NGOs make use of networks 
of relations and acquaintances to help immigrants who are looking for jobs. Catholic NGOs 
are the most active, taking on a role of selection and guarantee for the employers. 
However, while it is true that NGOs and associations of religious or non-religious in-
spiration have played and continued to play a leading role in assisting immigrants in Italy, 
many immigrants have not benefited from any help. They have often relied upon their own 
resources or small groups which were formed through local networks or chains of support, 
mainly along ethnic or national lines (Ambrosini, 2001). 
conclusions And rEcoMMEndAtions
The integration process of immigrants in Italy is extremely complex because of the structural 
features of the Italian labour market, which differ according to the local realities and im-
migrant groups; moreover, the issue of integration was embedded in the conflicts of Italian 
politics. Over the last twelve years, the political context has largely influenced integration 
policies (and their absence): the Italian model of “reasonable integration” suggested in 2000 
has not been implemented, while, in the meantime, migratory policies have been character-
ised by a populist approach.
The civil society, through NGOs and associations, in collaboration with the local au-
thorities, has certainly played an important role in the integration of the migrants. However, 
the absence of a national framework had, and has, many negative effects: ineffective system 
matching labour supply and demand, which produces irregular migration; lack of resources 
even for urgent integration policies; costly policies of deportations; and outdated citizenship 
legislation. All these points will have to be reconsidered by a future government that will 
abandon the populist approach to migration. The whole system of quotas has to be reformed, 
going back to the original project of Law 40/98; sponsorship should be reintroduced; and 
the “reasonable integration” agenda should be re-started, after a lost decade. Citizenship leg-
islation should be urgently changed; this is a priority, finally allowing children born and 
socialized in Italy to become Italian citizens.
The Italian case can be interesting for other countries with respect to the experience 
accumulated by the private social sector. The public sector cannot be expected to solve the in-
tegration puzzle without relying extensively on, and leveraging on the resources of, the private 
and non-governmental sector. These sectors – i.e., employers’ and workers’ groups, religious 
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groups, civic, ethnic and immigrant organisations, private foundations, and the various com-
munity-based non-profit entities – typically present extensive experiences with various aspects 
of newcomers’ integration and can serve as crucial resource for immigrants (Papademetriou, 
2003). They should not, however, take the place of State functions in respect to crucial tasks 
such as housing, employment, health, and education, but a positive articulation between 
these two sectors should be developed.
The recent choice of creating a Minister for Integration means that, beyond the great 
efforts made by local institutions, territorial and civil society, there is a need to start a discus-
sion on national policies. The racist reactions against the minister show that disrespect for 
foreigners is now very present in Italy, legitimized by the political discourses and practices 
that have been implemented in the last twenty years.
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The Netherlands: Putting the Dutch 
Integration Policy to a Test
Tineke Strik
Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen
AbstrAct
In the Netherlands, a certain level of integration is required by immigrants at each of their 
applications for admission to the country, for a permanent or independent residence permit, 
and for Dutch citizenship. 
A number of requirements have been introduced in the last decade. Their effects at the 
different stages show a clear relationship and relevant similarities. Migrants value the offer 
of language and integration education, but the link between passing the test and a certain 
residence right can become counter-productive.
The applicants who are relatively more often affected by requirements are: elderly and 
low-educated migrants, immigrants with an asylum-related background and migrants from 
least-developed or developing countries. While tests serve as a selection on age, education and 
nationality, these migrants are relatively more often in need of support for their integration.
The government could emphasize that integration is a reciprocal process by offering lan-
guage and integration courses, while obliging migrants to participate. The shift from a shared 
responsibility to the sole responsibility of the migrant was already the case in the admission 
policy, but will now be extended in the integration policy in the Netherlands, due to the 
amendment of the “Act on Integration”.
By cutting public organisational and financial support of integration courses, the govern-
ment risks fewer migrants strengthening their positions in the Dutch society. By not taking 
care of the most positive elements of the Integration Act, the government might fail the test 
on effective integration policies.
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introduction1
In the Netherlands, a certain level of integration is required by immigrants at three stages: 
at their application for admission to the Netherlands, at their application for a permanent or 
independent residence permit and, finally, at their application for Dutch citizenship.2 The 
required language level in the admission procedure is A1; in the other two procedures, the re-
quired level is A2. Furthermore, immigrants are obliged to pass the integration examination 
at level A2 within 3.5 years after their arrival. If they fail the test, a fine can be imposed or 
their social security can be cut. From 1 January 2013 onward this timeframe will be 3 years 
and withdrawal of the residence permit will be added to the possible sanctions for failing the 
test.
These requirements have all been introduced in the last decade, in order to promote 
integration of immigrants. This report tries to give an overview of the political development 
towards these requirements, their content and the way they are applied and, finally, the extent 
to which they promote integration.
policy development
In the Netherlands, the discussions regarding a more demanding integration test for naturali-
sation started in the early 1990s. Since 1985 the immigrant has had to fulfil the requirement 
of being “sufficiently integrated” to become a Dutch citizen. A “reasonable knowledge” of the 
Dutch language and a certain level of integration into Dutch society served as indications for 
this criterion.3 A civil servant from the municipality of registration of the immigrant assessed 
the fulfilment of this requirement on the basis of a short conversation with the immigrant 
on “everyday issues”.4 Proof of written skills was explicitly excluded. Proof of having social 
contacts with Dutch citizens also served as an indication of being integrated. The instruc-
tions for the civil servants rejected a uniform application and prescribed that, with regard 
to elderly, low-educated, illiterate and handicapped immigrants, insufficient knowledge of 
the Dutch language should not be a reason for the rejection of the naturalisation applica-
tion. According to the instructions, the requirements for women could also be less severe.5 
The instructions were based on the basic principle that naturalisation fits into the process of 
1  This paper is largely based on Strik, Luiten and Van Oers 2010. The INTEC Project: Country Report the 
Netherlands. Integration and Naturalisation tests: The new way to European Citizenship. This formed part of a 
comparative study in nine Member States on the national policies concerning integration and naturalisation tests and 
their effects on integration, financed by the European Integration Fund and published in December 2010. See for the 
synthesis report: Strik, Böcker, Luiten & Van Oers 2010.
2  Since 1 April 2007 the tests for permanent residence and naturalisation have been similar. Hence, once someone has 
passed the integration examination, he/she can apply for either permanent residence or naturalisation. Those exempted 
from passing the integration examination within the framework of the Integration Act will, however, need to pass the 
examination when applying for naturalisation. 
3  Article 8 (1) sub d Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap 1985.
4  Until 1990 each applicant had an interview with a public prosecutor and a police officer (Groenendijk, 2010).
5  Handleiding Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap, A1, pp. 10-21.
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increasing participation in Dutch society. This process, however, did not need to be accom-
plished at the moment of naturalisation.
This principle was part of the view laid down in the integration policy at that time, the so-
called “‘Minorities’ policy”, that a strong legal position would further immigrant integration. 
Naturalisation was seen as a means of achieving integration, and as a step towards complete 
integration.6 In 1995, the Christian Democrats (CDA) started to oppose this notion. They ar-
gued that the demands on future Dutch citizens should be increased, and therefore proposed 
to add the requirement of written language skills and knowledge of Dutch society. Instead of 
a means for integration, this party saw naturalisation as the “legal and emotional completion 
of integration”, thereby deviating from the position the government had so far held.7 This 
idea was opposed by the other political parties (i.e., the Liberal Democratic D66, the Green 
Left and the Social Democratic PvdA).8 Also, the Christian Democratic Minister of Justice 
was not in favour of adding the requirement of written language skills. He expressed the wish 
for Dutch nationality to remain open to “weaker” groups living in the Netherlands.
In 1998, the introduction of the Newcomers Integration Act (Wet Inburgering 
Nieuwkomers, hereafter WIN) emphasised the immigrant’s own responsibility to integrate. 
The new act obliged newcomers to attend a civic integration programme (inburgeringspro-
gramma), which included a test both at the beginning and the end, in order to measure the 
progress the participant had made. Although the tests were intended simply as a measurement 
of the level of Dutch language knowledge that had been attained, the first step in subjecting 
immigrants to formalised integration tests had been taken. 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of Pim Fortuyn’s right wing party (LPF) and 
his subsequent murder shortly before the 2002 elections, a centre-right government came into 
power. This government decided to reform the 1998 act, the results of which they referred to 
as disappointing (Groenendijk, 2010). A parliamentary commission was established to evalu-
ate the results of the integration policies.9 In its 2004 report, this commission concluded that 
the integration of many immigrants had been successful, but that it remained questionable to 
what extent this was due to pursued integration policy. The commission also concluded that 
only a small percentage of the participants in the integration courses had attained level A2, 
the level intended by the WIN. The commission, however, did not regard this failure as proof 
of the immigrants’ unwillingness to integrate, but pointed to failure factors such as the slow 
development of courses and the existence of long-waiting lists.10 These balanced conclusions, 
however, led to the demand in parliament and government for a radical change in the integra-
tion regime by strengthening the responsibility and obligations of the migrant regarding his/
her integration. The government announced that, in future, immigrants would be required to 
6  Rijkswet op het Nederlandschap 1985, A1– Article 8, p. 19.
7  Handelingen TK, 16 February 1995, no. 49, p. 3150.
8  Handelingen TK, 21 February 1995, no. 50, p. 3200.
9  “Building Bridges”, report of the temporary research commission integration policy, TK 2003-2004, 28 689, nos. 
8-9.
10  TK 2003-2004, 28 689, no. 9, p. 522.
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first pass a basic examination in the country of origin, as a condition for family reunification. 
Furthermore, all immigrants who desired to stay in the Netherlands on a permanent basis 
would have to attend integration courses, for which they would have to pay themselves. Not 
passing the integration examination at the end of the course would entail financial sanctions 
and keep the residence right of the migrant on a temporary basis. 
At the same time, the government installed a commission which was requested to define 
the concept of integration and to assess the most appropriate level of integration require-
ments.11 In September 2005, a proposal for a new WI, which was meant to replace the WI 
of 1998, was introduced in parliament.12 According to the centre-right government, a more 
obliging and result-oriented integration policy was required in order to combat the suppos-
edly failed integration of “large groups” of immigrants.13 In the explanatory memorandum 
to the bill, the government stated that, in order “for immigrants to catch up and to allow 
them to successfully participate in the social markets”, they would need to have knowledge 
of the Dutch language and to know and accept Dutch norms and values.14 The new WI 
emphasised the responsibility of the migrant to meet these criteria. Hence, courses would no 
longer be organised and financed by the government or municipalities, but left to the market 
and the immigrants. The WI came into force on 1 January 2007, introducing the integration 
examination as a condition for permanent or independent residence.15 Since the level of the 
integration examination was equal to the level of the naturalisation test, it was decided that 
the integration examination would replace the naturalisation test. Hence, since 1 April 2007, 
the Netherlands has required newcomers to meet the same standards as future citizens. This 
development again led to a call by the Christian Democrats, the Christian Union and the 
Conservative Liberals to raise the language level of the naturalisation test, in order to empha-
sise the difference between a permanent residence permit and citizenship. So far, this political 
desire has not been fulfilled. 
The Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland, hereafter WIB) entered 
into force on 15 March 2006.16 The act sets an additional condition for obtaining a regular 
temporary residence permit, namely that people must first have a basic knowledge of the 
Dutch language (listening and speaking skills) and the Dutch society.17 The WIB was meant 
to force migrants to start their integration from their country of origin in order to improve 
their position in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the government intended to make migrants 
more aware of their responsibilities and to select the motivated ones among them for admis-
sion. Since 1 April the integration requirement has been strengthened with the rise of the 
11  Advice regarding the level of the new integration examination by the Franssen Commission, The Hague, June 
2004. For the advice, see http://www.degeschiedenisvaninburgering.nl/ docs/advies-franssen. 
12  TK 2005-2006, 30308, nos. 1-2.
13  TK 2005-2006, 30308, no. 3, p. 13.
14  TK 2005-2006, 30308, no. 3, p. 14.
15  WI of 30 November 2006, Staatsblad 625.
16  Staatsblad. 2006, no. 94.
17  Article 16 (1) sub h Vreemdelingenwet jo. Article 3.71a Vreemdelingenwet.
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required language level to A1 and the extension with a reading test. Candidates must achieve 
a higher score in order to pass the test. At the same time, the hardship clause for the integra-
tion requirement was extended in cases where a combination of individual circumstances 
makes it permanently impossible for the applicant to pass the test. In May 2011, the Dutch 
Ombudsman criticised the government for applying the hardship clause too rigidly: in the 
past five years, the government had only used this clause in five cases.
This outline of the developments regarding integration requirements in the last 15 years 
shows that the principal idea that a strong legal position of a migrant promotes his/her inte-
gration has been replaced by the conviction that this position serves as a reward for having 
reached a certain integration level. This shift in thinking illustrates the shift from an equally 
shared responsibility by the authorities and the migrant to the sole responsibility of the mi-
grant regarding his/her integration.
The integration requirement was first introduced as a condition for citizenship, and 
secondly as an obligation for admitted migrants. The introduction of a test for migrants 
(although it did not include an obligation to pass) led to an increase in the required level 
for naturalisation. The evaluation of the integration courses and tests (and the political 
conclusion that the integration policy had failed) became the reason for the introduction of 
integration requirements for admission, as well as for independent and permanent residence 
rights. Although in 2003 the government warned that language tests should not serve as a 
selection criteria for new Dutch citizens, nowadays a general political acceptance has emerged 
that integration tests should function as a selection criteria for admission and for permanent 
and independent residence rights.
1 intEgrAtion tEst AbroAd
1.1 description of the test
The Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland, hereafter WIB) entered into 
force on 15 March 2006.18 The act sets an additional condition for obtaining a regular tem-
porary residence permit, namely that people must first have a basic knowledge of the Dutch 
language and the Dutch society.19 This basic knowledge will be tested in the Basic Civic 
Integration Examination in the country of residence of the applicant. The proof of having 
passed this examination must be handed over during the application for admission.20
The level of knowledge that is tested in the examination has been laid down in the 
Vreemdelingenbesluit.21 Listening, speaking and reading skills in the Dutch language and 
knowledge of the Dutch society will be tested in the integration examination abroad. The 
examination consists of two parts: knowledge of Dutch language and knowledge of Dutch 
18  Staatsblad. 2006, no. 94.
19  Article 16 (1) sub h Vreemdelingenwet juncto Article 3.71a Vreemdelingenbesluit.
20  Article 3.102 (1) Vreemdelingenbesluit.
21  Article 3.98a Vreemdelingenbesluit.
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society. The knowledge of both parts is tested by an oral examination conducted over the 
phone from Dutch consulates and embassies abroad, using a voice recognition software, 
based in the US. This computer programme also decides whether the candidate has passed 
the examination.22 If there is no Dutch consulate or embassy in the country of residence, the 
examination will be held at the nearest Dutch representation in a neighbouring country.
Knowledge of the Dutch language
The required basic level is A1 of the Common European Framework for Modern Languages. 
The language test consists of repeating sentences (the sentences presented become increas-
ingly more difficult), answering short questions on basic information, responding to words by 
saying a word with an opposite meaning, retelling a short story and answering questions on a 
text that the applicant had to read. The topics dealt with are randomly selected from an item 
bank of 50 items, in order to present a different set of items to each candidate.
Knowledge of Dutch society 
The required knowledge of Dutch society consists of “elementary practical knowledge” 
on the Netherlands, including geography, history, legislation and political science, housing, 
education, labour market, the system of health care and civic integration. Furthermore the 
required knowledge covers the rights and duties of migrants and citizens in the Netherlands 
and the accepted norms in everyday life and in society.23 The knowledge is tested on a level 
not higher than A1 minus. This part of the examination includes 30 questions which cor-
respond to images selected from the film “Coming to the Netherlands”. The questions vary 
between yes/no questions, open questions and closed questions with two options.
Costs and preparation
Applicants are charged €350 each time they take the examination.
Passing the examination is a condition for being granted an authorisation for temporary 
stay, which is, for certain nationalities, a necessary document for entering the Netherlands. 
This authorisation is known as “Machtiging Voorlopig Verblijf ” (hereafter MVV).24 The mi-
grant must apply for a MVV within one year after having passed the examination.25 After 
this period, the result of the examination becomes invalid and he/she must take a new test in 
order to be admitted. 
The Dutch government does not provide either courses or learning material. It has how-
ever compiled a practice pack which can be purchased at €70.40 and which consists of the 
film “Coming to the Netherlands”, a picture booklet about Dutch society, an exhaustive list 
of questions that may arise during the society knowledge test, and a set of mock language 
tests. 
22  Article 3.98c Vreemdelingenbesluit.
23  Article 3.98 (6). Vreemdelingenbesluit.
24  Article 16 (1) a juncto h and Article 16a Vreemdelingenwet. 
25  Article 3.71a (1) Vreemdelingenbesluit.
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1.2 Who has to take the examination?
This entry condition applies to those persons aged between 18 and 65, who:
1. apply for admission to the Netherlands with a view to settling permanently,
2. need to have a MVV,26
3. and are obliged as newcomers, under the terms of the WI, to participate in a civic 
integration programme after arrival in the Netherlands.27
In practice, this obligation primarily concerns applicants for family formation or family re-
unification with a citizen of the Netherlands or with a migrant originating from a non-EU 
country.28 Furthermore, the WIB applies to religious leaders coming to the Netherlands in 
order to enter the labour market.29
Exemptions 
As persons with certain nationalities are not required to apply for a MVV, they are exempt-
ed from taking the test. These are citizens from the Member States of the EU and EEA, 
Surinam, Australia, Canada, US, Switzerland, New Zealand, Iceland, Japan and North 
Korea.30 Furthermore, migrants coming to the Netherlands for a temporary reason, such as 
study, au pair work, exchange or medical treatment, are exempted, as well as persons with a 
working permit, self-employed persons and highly educated migrants. In addition, migrants 
who were granted a status on the basis of the Long-term Residence Directive (2003/109/EC) 
in another Member State and who fulfilled an integration condition for this purpose, are 
exempted.31 Finally, family members of a migrant with an asylum-related residence permit do 
not need to take the test, unless the marriage was concluded after the sponsor was granted a 
residence permit (family formation).32
Exemptions for medical reasons
Migrants belonging to the category to which the act applies are exempted if they have demon-
strated (to the satisfaction of the Ministry of Integration) that they are permanently unable to 
take the examination due to a mental or physical disability.33 The legislation refers to the situ-
ations where the applicant is blind or deaf, or has difficulties in hearing, seeing or speaking, 
26  Article 17 (1) Vreemdelingenwet mentions the exemptions for the requirement of a MVV.
27  Detailed information on this act is to be found in paragraph 3.
28  Family reunification means that the marriage was concluded before the applicant was admitted to the Netherlands; 
in other cases (including marriages to Dutch nationals) the definition “family formation” is used.
29  Article 3.71 (3) Vreemdelingenbesluit.
30  Article 17(1) a and b Vreemdelingenwet.
31  Article 3.71a (2b) Vreemdelingenbesluit. 
32  Artikel 3.71a (2a) Vreemdelingenbesluit.
33  Article 3.71a (2c). 
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and is not in possession of audio-visual aids.34 Proof of this disability consists of a declaration 
by a doctor or an expert appointed by the head of the embassy or consulate. This medical 
assessment takes place at the expense of the applicant.35 
Being functionally illiterate does not constitute a ground for exemption. During the leg-
islative process, the Minister of Immigration Affairs and Integration pointed out that the test 
is taken orally, which should therefore be possible for illiterates to pass.36 The administrative 
law section of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State), the highest 
court in this regard, did not consider this assumption unreasonable, and therefore confirmed 
that being illiterate was no reason for exemption.37 
Consequences of failing the test
If the immigrant fails, he/she will not be granted a MVV, and will thus not be admitted to 
the Netherlands. There is no legal remedy for the outcome of the examination.38 The ap-
plicant is allowed to take the test as many times as necessary, as long as he/she pays €350 for 
each examination.
1.3 case law
One year after the coming into force of the Integration Abroad Act, the District Court of 
Middelburg judged that the government was allowed to make the migrant fully responsible 
for the preparation of the examination. According to the judge, the legislator had deliberately 
chosen to make the migrant responsible for meeting the integration requirements, thereby 
taking the possible obstacles into account. In this case, the judgment implied that the Eritrean 
applicant first had to learn the English language, in order to be able to use the preparation 
package, as this was only developed in a limited number of languages. Also the claim by some 
applicants that the requirement is only applied to certain nationalities, which constitutes 
discrimination on the basis of nationality, was rejected by the courts.39 At the end of 2008, 
the Legal Division of the Council of State judged that illiteracy is not a ground for exemp-
tion from the integration requirement, since, according to the government, the examination 
should be eligible for illiterates as well.40 Although, since then, the integration requirement 
has been raised by the introduction of an additional reading test (1 April 2011), this judgment 
has not been questioned afterwards.
In the same month when the integration requirement was raised, the European 
Commission took the position that denying family reunification for the sole reason that the 
applicant had not passed the integration examination, is not in compliance with article 7 
34  Article B1/4.7.2 Vreemdelingencirculaire.
35  Article 3.10 Voorschrift Vreemdelingen.
36  TK, 2004-2005, 29700, no. 6, pp. 40-41.
37  ABRS, 200806121/1, 9 February 2009, JV 2009/151.
38  Article 3.98d Vreemdelingenbesluit.
39  Rechtbank Den Haag, nevenzittingsplaats Rotterdam, 13 april 2008, AWB 07/35128.
40  ABRvS, 2 December 2008, LJN: BG6209, JV 2009/29.
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(2) of the Family Reunification Directive. The Commission took this position in the Imran 
case, in which the Dutch District Court of Zwolle requested the EU Court of Justice to give 
a preliminary ruling.41 The underlying case of this request concerned an Afghan illiterate 
mother who took the test at the Embassy of Pakistan several times, but failed to pass it. Her 
husband and her eight children resided in the Netherlands. A week after the Commission had 
sent its position to the Dutch government, the mother was granted permission to reunite with 
her family. With this decision, the Dutch government succeeded in avoiding a judgment of 
the EU Court of Justice on the compatibility of the Dutch integration requirement with the 
Directive on the Right to Family Reunification. Interestingly, the Commission emphasized 
that its position applies to all applications for family reunification. Thus, factors like educa-
tion level, small children or closed embassies are not relevant: in all cases, failure to pass an 
integration test cannot be the sole reason for denying family reunification. As a matter of 
principle, the Commission made clear that Article 7 (2) of the Directive and the effectiveness 
principle do not allow excluding people from family reunification on the sole ground that 
the test abroad has not been passed. Article 7 (2) aims to promote integration, but cannot 
be used to undermine the objective of the Directive, i.e., promoting family reunification.42 
In November 2012, the Dutch District Court of Den Bosch fully endorsed the position of 
the Commission taken in Imran, concluding that applying failing the test abroad as a refusal 
ground for family reunification is in violation of the Directive.43 The Minister has appealed 
in this case at the Council of State. This appeal is still pending. 
2 intEgrAtion tEst in thE country
2.1 description of the test
The Civil Integration Act (Wet Inburgering, hereafter WI)44 came into force on 1 January 
2007. This act replaces the Civil Integration Newcomers Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, 
hereafter WIN) and extends the obligation to integrate to migrants already living in the 
Netherlands for a long time (including holders of a permanent residence permit). On 1 April 
2010, the integration examination, introduced by this Act, replaced the naturalisation test. 
This means that, since that date, passing the integration test has been a condition for natural-
isation. Since 1 January 2010, passing the test has been a condition for permanent residence. 
The integration examination consists of two parts, a central part and a practice part. The 
examination has to be passed within a time frame of 3.5 years.45 
The first contact point for information on migration courses in the Netherlands is the 
municipality. All migrants who are bound by a civic integration requirement under the WI 
41  Rechtbank Den Haag, nevenzittingsplaats Zwolle, Imran, 31 March 2011 (Awb 10/9716).
42  European Commission, “Schriftelijke opmerkingen aan het Hof van Justitie in de zaak C-155/11 PPU”.
43  Rechtbank Den Haag, nevenzittingsplaats Den Bosch, 23 November 2012, AWB 12/9408, LJN:BY4171.
44  Staatsblad. 2006, 625, entry into force Staatsblad. 2006, 645.
45  See Article 7(1) WI.
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receive a letter from the local authorities of their place of residence. This letter informs the 
migrant about this obligation and it also contains an invitation to make an appointment at 
the local government offices, the local civic integration units. If an appointment has been 
made, the officer at the local civic integration unit explains the procedure. Subsequently, an 
interview on admission is conducted and a screening is done. This results in a programme for 
the migrant, including a timetable for the course offered and the concluding test.
The test consists of two parts: a practice part, assessing the language skills, and a central 
part, assessing certain knowledge of the Dutch society. Below, both parts are described.
2.2 the practice part of the examination
In the practice part, candidates will have to use the Dutch language in a situation based on 
practice in daily life.46 According to the Minister for Integration and Immigration Affairs 
Verdonk, this part of the examination would be “more suitable for testing lower educated per-
sons than standardised tests, which generally appeal to someone’s general cognitive capacities 
rather than his skills to apply his knowledge”.47 In the practice examinations, a distinction 
is made between those who will perform paid labour and those who will primarily focus on 
raising children. There are some domains which can be distinguished: “citizenship”, “work”, 
“education and healthcare”, “entrepreneurship” and “social participation”. Candidates can 
pass the practice part of the integration examination by submitting a portfolio, taking part in 
an assessment, or choosing a combination of both.
In the assessment route, candidates will have to re-enact four different situations which 
might occur in practice (initially six situations had to be re-enacted). Each assessment consists 
of a number of assignments in which attention is paid to reading, writing and speaking. The 
speaking exercises are carried out in a role-play.
A portfolio consists of 20 proofs (initially 30 proofs were required), collected by the 
candidate, of written and oral language skills obtained in practice.48 Candidates can choose 
from four different portfolios: “work”, “education, healthcare and upbringing”, “entrepre-
neurship” and “social participation”. Model portfolios for each domain can be found on 
www.inburgeren.nl. The model portfolios contain lists of proofs that need to be gathered 
in order to confirm that the immigrants have spoken Dutch or written something down 
in Dutch. Proofs can be gathered only for situations mentioned in the model portfolios. To 
collect proofs of oral language skills, the conversation partner will need to complete and sign 
46  See Article 3.7 and 3.8 Integratie besluit on the content of the practice part of the examination.
47  TK 2005-2006, 30 308, no. 16, p. 51.
48  It is not specified how many proofs of either written language skills or oral language skills a portfolio must 
contain. But a portfolio containing only proofs of written or oral language skills will be rejected (answers obtained 
from the Servicecentrum Inburgering [Service Centre Integration] of DUO [the Service Implementation Education] 
to author’s questions). For each portfolio, different proofs need to be gathered. But there are also similarities. Every 
portfolio requires 12 proofs regarding “citizenship” that need to be gathered. Furthermore, each portfolio requires 
proofs that the candidate knows how to look for work. The model portfolio “social participation” requires six proofs 
that the candidate knows how to look for voluntary work.
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a form that can be found in the model portfolio, which also contains a letter of explanation.49 
Situations for which proofs can be gathered are: registering a child’s birth at a municipality 
(citizenship), looking for vacancies (looking for work), talking to a client about work that 
needs to be conducted (having a job), talking to a parent of a school mate of one’s child to 
make an appointment for the children to play together (education, healthcare, raising chil-
dren), talking to other participants in an activity in the neighbourhood (social participation), 
completing an intake form for voluntary work (looking for voluntary work), and talking to 
an advisor from the Chamber of Commerce (entrepreneurship). Once the portfolio has been 
completed, it can be sent to the Service Implementation Education (DUO) or a designated 
private examination agency, where it will be judged. If a portfolio contains sufficient proofs 
which are of high enough quality, the candidate will need to take a final test consisting of a 
conversation with an examiner and a written language test.
Lastly, the candidate can pass the practice part of the examination by following a 
combination route of submitting a portfolio containing ten proofs and taking part in two 
assessments.
2.3 the central part of the examination
The central part can be taken in seven different locations.50 It consists of three parts: an elec-
tronic practice examination, a spoken test in Dutch, and an examination on knowledge of the 
Dutch society.51 The level of the examination is A2.52 The exact content of the examination is 
not publicly available and there is no possibility of getting access to it.
The electronic practice examination operates as a check on the level of language skills, as 
assessed in the practice part of the examination. As in the practice part of the examination, 
a candidate needs to show he/she has sufficient language skills to cope with situations with 
which everyone in the Netherlands has to deal with (domain for “citizenship”), and in situ-
ations which are important for him/her (domain for “work” or “education and healthcare”). 
Examples of electronic practice examinations can be found on the Internet.53
In the spoken test in Dutch, a candidate’s oral language skills are assessed. This examina-
tion is taken via a telephonic connection with a computer equipped with programmes for 
speech recognition and automatic result calculation.
49  On the form, the conversation partner has to fill out his/her name, telephone number, function (e.g. “neighbour”, 
“employer”, “municipal official” etc.), conversation date, conversation place, and answer the following questions: did 
the person who is integrating (de inburgeraar) speak Dutch? Yes/No; Did the person who is integrating understand 
what you were saying? Yes/No; Did you understand the person who is integrating? Yes/No. There is room for 
clarifications.
50  Examination centres can be found in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, Rijswijk, Utrecht and Zwolle.
51  See Article 3.9 Integratie besluit for the content of the central part of the examination.
52  See Article 2.9 Integratie besluit. Settled migrants (so-called oldcomers, see footnote 122) have to pass speaking 
and listening at level A2 and writing and reading at level A1.
53  http://www.inburgeren.nl/inburgeraar/examen/oefenen_met_examens/voorbeeldexa men_elektronisch_
praktijkexamen.asp, Site accessed 8 January 2010.
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In the test “Kennis van de Nederlandse Samenleving” (“Knowledge of Dutch Society” 
examination, hereafter KNS examination), a candidate’s knowledge of the Dutch society is 
tested in about 43 questions.54 This part of the examination is taken on a computer. In the 
test, three main subjects can be retrieved: factual knowledge, norms and values (how are 
citizens supposed to behave in the Netherlands) and functional knowledge (how not to “be 
off target” in contacts with Dutch citizens and the Dutch society).55 In the curriculum for the 
examination (final achievement levels), mentioned in Article 2.10 of the Vreemdelingenbesluit, 
the following topics are listed: work and income; manners, norms and values; housing; health 
and healthcare; history and geography; authorities; polity and the constitutional state; and 
education and upbringing.56 For each topic, so-called “crucial acts” have been determined.57 
Each crucial act concerns behaviour which the person who is integrating is required to be able 
to show. Subsequently, for each crucial act, crucial knowledge and norms indicating when the 
act can be considered to be successful, so-called indicators have been formulated. Not only 
is knowledge of social norms expected, test candidates are also required to indicate which 
behaviour deals with differences in norms, manners and values in a socially accepted way 
(Klaver & Odé 2009: 68). The KNS examination, hence, also aims at testing actual behav-
iour, rather than merely factual knowledge.
2.4 Who has to do the test?
All immigrants with a residence permit (hence, the Act is not applicable to asylum-seekers) 
from outside the EU and EER, between the ages of 18 to 65, who are here for a non-tempo-
rary purpose of stay (hence, most labour migrants fall outside the scope of the Act), have to 
pass an integration examination. The integration obligation applies to “newcomers”58 as well 
as to “oldcomers”.59 The integration obligation also applies to religious ministers.60
54  Each question starts with a short film in which a situation is addressed. After the film, question and answer 
possibilities, among which the candidate has to choose the correct answer, are shown. Depending on the length of the 
films, some examinations consist of less than 43 questions.
55  TK 2005-2006, 30 308, no. 25, p. 2.
56  See Article 2.10 Integratie besluit.
57  For each topic, four crucial acts have been determined, except for the topic “health and healthcare”, for which nine 
crucial acts have been formulated.
58  These are migrants who came to the Netherlands after 1 January 2007.
59  Oldcomers are immigrants who already resided in the Netherlands before the entry into force of the Act, but not 
during the eight years of school age and who do not possess any diploma proving a sufficient knowledge of the Dutch 
language (Odé et al 2010: 21).
60  See Article 3(1)(b) WI.
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The possibility exists to pass the integration test voluntarily.61 The municipality may of-
fer an integration facility to the volunteer.62 The possibility of voluntary integration came 
into existence after the Council of State63 stated that an integration obligation for Dutch 
naturalised persons would violate the principle of equality. The target groups for voluntary 
integration were hence Dutch naturalised, EU citizens or EER nationals and persons from 
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (Odé et al 2010: 25).64
2.5 immigrants who are exempted from taking the test
Migrants can be exempted from taking the test because they are incapable of taking it or 
because they have attained a sufficient level of integration. 
Article 6 of the WI exempts immigrants who have an integration obligation from tak-
ing the examination if he/she has proved that he/she is mentally or physically disabled and 
hence is permanently unable to pass the integration examination.65 Migrants can also apply 
for release from the obligation if they are not capable of passing the test. In order to ensure 
that they have made a serious effort to reach the required level, the application for exemption 
can be made no earlier than six months before the time frame for passing the examination 
has passed. A release can also be decided upon by the Minister without an application by the 
migrant (ambtshalve).66 An “oldcomer” aged 60 years or older is also exempted from the WI.67
Immigrants who are already obviously integrated into the Dutch society – i.e., having 
sufficient Dutch language skills and knowledge of the Dutch society – and who can prove 
this with a diploma or a certificate are exempt.68 Only diplomas at secondary school or higher 
educational level qualify for exemption. It is possible to be exempted from a part of the ex-
amination, either for the language test or for the KNS part.69 Since 1 April 2007, immigrants 
with a Flemish or Surinamese diploma (high school or higher) have not had to pass an inte-
gration examination in order to become a Dutch national, if the education followed was in 
61  A volunteer is a Dutch national or a migrant within the meaning of Article 5(2) who is: older than 15 years, has 
resided for less than eight years during his/her school age in the Netherlands; has no diploma, certificate or other 
document; has no education duty or qualification duty or follows an education which will eventually lead to a 
diploma, certificate or other document. See Article 1(q) WI.
62  See paragraph 3 of chapter 5 of the WI. In the first half of 2010, 27 per cent of the facilities were given to 
volunteers. 
63  Advice of the State Council of 3 August 2006.
64  Despite the fact that the integration will be voluntary, the municipalities will have the opportunity to use sanctions 
and instruments to obligate immigrants to follow a language course (Odé et al 2010: 26).
65  Article 2.8(4) of the decree speaks of a period of five years after application for exemption.
66  Article 5.5 Integratie besluit.
67  According to Article 63 of the WI.
68  See Articles 2.3 and 2.4 of the Integratie besluit. The two articles list the possible diplomas and certificates. For 
example, a diploma for the State Examination in the Dutch Language at Programme I or II.
69  See Article 2.4 of the Integratie besluit. For example, a certificate within the meaning of Article 13(2) of the 
Integration Act Newcomers.
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the Dutch language and the subject “Dutch language” was passed with a sufficient grade.70 
Persons from the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are exempted from the integration obliga-
tion (Odé et al 2010: 21).71
According to recent case law, Turkish nationals are exempted from passing the integra-
tion examination. The court ruled on 12 August 201072 that putting an integration obligation 
on Turkish nationals is contrary to the non-discrimination provisions in Articles 9 and 10 
of the Association Agreement EEC-Turkey because according to Article 5(2)(a) of the WI, 
citizens of the EU are exempted from the integration obligation. Furthermore, according to 
the judgment, the requirement to pass the integration examination is contrary to Article 13 
of Decision 1/80 because it is dated after 1 December 1980 and restricts entry into the labour 
market.73 Despite this judgment, the integration obligation is still applied on Turkish citizens: 
the government has lodged an appeal against this decision at the Council of State.
Short exemption test
Immigrants who are “evidently” integrated, but who do not possess the required diploma 
or certificate necessary for an exemption, can prove their level of integration by passing the 
so-called “short exemption test”. Passing this test releases the immigrant from the obligation 
of taking the integration examination. The possibility of passing the short exemption test has 
been introduced along with the possibility of passing the State Examination in the Dutch 
language. The short exemption test consists of an electronic practical test and knowledge of 
Dutch society test. The level of the short exemption test is higher than that of the integration 
examination, B1 instead of A2, and can only be taken once. The Minister explicitly chose 
the possibility to exempt persons after they successfully passed a test, instead of giving the 
municipalities the possibility to exempt evidently integrated persons, with the argument that 
it would limit the administrative burden for the municipalities.74
In a judgment of 16 September 2009, the Central Council of Appeal (Centrale Raad van 
Beroep) declared Article 2.7 paragraph 1 of the Integration decree, which provides that the 
level of the short exemption test be higher than that of the integration examination, non-
binding, for its incompatibility with the principle of equality.75 The Council judged the short 
exemption test to be unreasonably onerous since it demanded language skills at level B1, 
instead of level A2, which is the level of the integration examination. The Council based its 
judgment inter alia on the explanatory memorandum of the WI, which stated that level B1 
70  Article 2.3 paragraph 1 sub d and e Integratie besluit. Exemption is only provided if the subject “Dutch” was 
passed.
71  See, for the discussion concerning this group, also paragraph 3.2.
72  Court of First Instance, Rotterdam, 12 August 2010, AWB08/4934 LJN BN3934 and AWB 09/3814 LJN BN3935.
73  The Court refers to case of 29 April 2010, C-92/07, European Commission v Kingdom of the Netherlands, ECR 
2010, p. 0000.
74  TK 2005-2006, 30 308, no. 73, p. 4.
75  Centrale Raad van Beroep 16 September 2009, LJN BJ9330.
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would form an unreasonable barrier for many immigrants with an obligation to integrate.76 
Until now, the government has not reacted to this judgment, nor has it changed the required 
level of the short exemption test.
2.6 consequences of not participating in or failing the test
Failing the test has consequences for the residence rights of the immigrant. Since 1 January 
2010, the first application for a permanent residence permit77 and the application for an in-
dependent residence permit can be refused if the candidate has not passed the examination. 
This implies that immigrants remain in the Netherlands on a temporary basis, which is a 
less secure position relative to a permanent residence status, because the grounds for with-
drawal are less restrictive. For holders of a residence permit on asylum grounds, it means 
that they can be expelled the moment the government declares their country of origin to be 
safe. If they have a permanent residence permit, the situation in their country is no longer a 
ground for withdrawal of their permit. The more insecure position of immigrants can have 
consequences for their attitude towards the Dutch society and the need to integrate. Also the 
practical consequences of a permit for temporary stay can hinder integration: most of the im-
migrants are not able to buy a house, as banks do not grant them a mortgage. Furthermore, 
the temporary character of their residence permit makes employers more hesitant to offer an 
employment contract.
There can also be financial sanctions for the immigrant for not passing the integra-
tion examination within the given timeframe. He/she will receive an administrative fine.78 
However, the WI contains a few exemptions: (1) the immigrant is not to blame for not pass-
ing the integration examination, (2) the immigrant can prove that he/she follows/followed a 
literacy course and therefore the given time frame was prolonged, and (3) the immigrant can 
prove that he/she is reasonably not capable of passing the examination. Together with the fine 
a new deadline for passing the examination is set, with a maximum time frame of two years.79 
This system of fines and new time frames can be repeated every two years.80 Another possible 
sanction is a lowering of the level of social assistance.81
76  TK 2005-2006, 30 308, no. 3, p. 19.
77  See Article 21(1)(k) Vreemdelingenwet.
78  Article 31(1) WI. For most migrants with an integration obligation, the timeframe for passing the examination 
has not yet expired, so municipalities did not have much reason to impose a fine. The few fines imposed were given 
because a migrant did not show up at his/her interview for admission. Approximately 18 per cent of the municipalities 
have imposed fines. In most situations the local government official first tries to find out why the migrant did not 
show up or explains the reason for the call. See Evaluation report Integration in the Netherlands, Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), June 2010, p. 31.
79  Article 32 WI.
80  Article 33 WI. 
81  Article 37 WI. 
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2.7 costs 
According to the principle of the WI, the migrant is responsible for financing the preparatory 
course and the examination. At the entry into force of the WI, the government only offered 
migrants a loan for a maximum period of three years.82 The loan could be requested both for 
the preparatory course and the examination itself. This money would be paid directly to the 
examination institute or course institute where the immigrant follows the integration course 
or will do the examination.83 If the migrant pass the integration examination within the given 
timeframe, the costs will be partly refunded.84 This financial burden (the loan could amount 
to €6000), combined with the insecurity of reimbursement, appeared to be a hurdle for im-
migrants to subscribe for an integration course: the classes remained empty. Since 2007, the 
municipalities are funded to organise the integration courses. Migrants are offered a course 
and one examination. If they fail, they have to pay themselves for the retake.
2.8 Future
In September 2012, the Act on Integration has been amended, which implies that since 1 
January 2013, migrants have to finance and organize their participation in a course them-
selves.85 If they lack the sources to finance a course, they can contract a loan.86 Refugees, 
however, still get an offer to follow a course for free. The education itself has been left to the 
initiative of the market. Under the new Act, the obligation to make a portfolio with practices 
about daily life situations is no longer part of the examination.
From 1 January 2013 onwards, the temporary residence permit of migrants who do 
not pass the integration examination within three years, can be withdrawn or not-renewed. 
However, in the parliamentary debate on this act, the Minister admitted that, for family 
members, this ground for withdrawal or non-renewal can hardly be applied because of the 
obligations of article 8 ECHR and the EU Family Reunification Directive.87 Family members 
of highly skilled workers are exempted from the integration obligations.88
2.9 case law
On 8 June 2011, the District Court ’s-Gravenhage decided that the integration require-
ment for a permanent residence permit does not apply to Turkish nationals and their family 
82  This option is not available for volunteers.
83  See Article 16 WI and chapter 4, section 1 of the Integratie besluit.
84  Article 18(1) WI and 4.17 Integration Decree (Integratie besluit). Every candidate who passes the examination will 
automatically receive a minimum of €650. Sometimes a higher amount will be reimbursed, depending on the costs the 
immigrant had to bear. This will be 70 per cent of the total costs of the course and the examination with a maximum of 
€3,000. For this extra compensation, the immigrant has to make an application.
85  Staatsblad 2012, nr. 430.
86  Staatsblad 2012, nr. 430.
87  Handelingen Eerste Kamer 11 September 2012, 2012-2013, no. 38 item 7, p. 36.
88  See van Oers and Minderhoud, Integration of High Skilled Third Country Nationals in Europe: A New Proposal for 
Circular Talent Management. The Dutch position in the “battle for brains” (not yet published).
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members, because the costs for the exam would violate the Association Agreement between 
the European Union and Turkey.89 According to the District Court, the obligation for 
Turkish nationals to pass the integration exam violates the discrimination clause of Article 9 
of the Association Agreement and Article 10 (1) of the Decision 1/80, because Union citizens 
do not have to pass the integration exam either. The District Court also referred to the CJEU 
judgment of April 2010 mentioned above.90
In August 2011, the Dutch Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep), re-
ferring to the “Sahin” case, judged that the integration requirement for admitted Turkish 
nationals and their family members negatively affects their legal position in the Netherlands, 
and is not in compliance with EU-Turkey association law.91 As a result of this decision, the 
integration requirement for Turkish nationals has been abolished. This means that having 
passed the integration examination is no longer a condition for obtaining a permanent resi-
dence permit and those municipalities may no longer oblige Turkish nationals to participate 
in integration courses or impose penalties on those who do not participate. As the Integration 
Act Abroad is only applicable to migrants who are obliged to fulfil integration requirements 
after admission, the Minister for Integration announced, in September 2011, that Turkish 
nationals were also exempted from the integration requirement abroad.92 This means that the 
integration test abroad cannot be applied anymore to one of the largest target groups of this 
Act.
3 EFFEcts93
3.1 integration test abroad
It is too early to draw conclusions on the effect of the WIB on the integration of migrants 
in the Netherlands. As Regioplan, which conducted the evaluation for the government, al-
ready pointed out, the success of their integration depends on many other factors as well. 
Nevertheless, it could be concluded that the efforts and stress involved in passing the test 
are not in proportion to the positive effect of the test. The interviews of the Intec research 
confirmed the outcome of two other studies, which showed that the integration test abroad 
(combined with the income requirement) negatively affects the social and economic health 
89  Rb ‘s-Gravenhage, 8 June 2011, LJN: BQ7656.
90  CJEU, 29 April 2010, C-92/07, European Commission vs. The Netherlands.
91  CRvB, 16 August 2011, case nos. 10/5248, 10/5249, 10/6123, 10/6124 INBURG, JV 2011/416 nt K.M. de Vries 
[LJN: BR4959].
92  Kamerstukken II, 2011-2012, 31 143, no. 89.
93  In the framework of the Intec research in 2010, 56 interviews were conducted with migrants, language teachers, 
NGOs and officials, in order to find out the (perceived) effects of the tests.
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of spouses.94 It causes stress, but it also delays family reunification, which results in long-
term separation. Some applicants for family reunification dropped out of higher education 
or accepted a job with fewer long-term prospects in order to earn sufficient income to bring 
over their family. Both consequences affect integration chances. Respondents from the Dutch 
Refugee Council pointed to the fact that family members living in (post) war countries face 
difficulties with the preparation of the test, as they lack the Internet and sometimes even 
electricity, and have to travel twice through unsafe areas (once for the test, once for the visa).
The respondents in the Intec research confirmed that learning the Dutch language 
abroad does not seem to substantially contribute to their knowledge of the language. The of-
ficial evaluation of the WIB for the government showed that the Dutch language skills at the 
beginning of their integration course in the Netherlands were only marginally higher than for 
a control group of immigrants who were not required to take the test abroad. According to 
the researchers, the higher level of education of the former group may account for part of the 
difference. The impact of learning the Dutch language in the Netherlands is much greater 
and is, therefore, more effective. The proportionality of the test is particularly problematic 
with regard to the lower educated (including illiterate persons) and elderly persons, who face 
the most problems in meeting the requirements. The chance to pass diminishes each time the 
examination is repeated. However, there is no information on the situation of the person who, 
finally, does not succeed. The number of applications has declined by one-third. Taking into 
account that the population of the applicants has become younger and more highly educated, 
one can conclude that the elderly and lower educated migrants are over-represented in the 
group, which no longer applies for family reunification. The researchers used the term “self-
selection” (Odé 2009: pp. 288-292). The restraining effect on family migration seems to have 
hit family reunification the hardest, although the measure targeted family formation. Some 
respondents pleaded for a general exemption for migrants aged 55 years or older.
On the basis of interviews conducted by the Centre for Migration Law, it can be conclud-
ed that migrants are positive on learning about the Dutch society as a preparation for their 
movement to the Netherlands. A number of respondents, however, stressed that they would 
also have prepared for Dutch society without a test. All respondents emphasised that prepara-
tion for the test would have been impossible, or at least much more difficult, without having 
attended a course. Participating in a course also offers the possibility of getting into contact 
with other future inhabitants of the Netherlands, and getting more realistic expectations of 
living there. Female candidates especially seem to benefit from this. These respondents were 
in the fortunate position of being able to attend a course. Immigrants lacking this opportu-
nity also lack these advantages, and they will face more problems with passing the test. In 
general, elderly and low-educated migrants as well as migrants living in unstable regions have 
the most difficulty in meeting the criteria, and are thus confronted with a delay in their (re)
94  I. Kulu-Glasgow, A. Leerkes, H. Muermans and J. Liu, Internationale gezinsvorming begrensd? Een evaluatie van 
de verhoging van de inkomenseis en leeftijdseis bij migratie van buitenlandse partners naar Nederland, The Hague: 
WODC 2009; Ö. Hünkar Ilik, Gescheiden gezinnen, Portretten van slachtoffers van het Nederlandse beleid inzake 
gezinshereniging, Utrecht: Inspraak Orgaan Turken in Nederland, April 2010.
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unifi ca tion. Failing the test results in living separately, entering the Netherlands and residing 
there irregularly, or moving to another EU Member State, in order to benefit from the liberal 
EU family reunification rules. No research has been conducted so far on the choices spouses 
make when the test turns out to be a permanent obstacle to family reunification. What is 
evident is reduction in the number of applications, especially from lower educated and elderly 
migrants. The act serves as a selection based on education and age, instead of the intended 
selection based on motivation. One part of the decreasing number of applications for family 
formation can be ascribed to the drop in the number of marriages Turkish and Moroccan 
migrants conclude with someone residing in their country of origin. With regard to the other 
part, further research is needed on the causes and consequences of the decrease in the number 
of applications for family reunification.
Raising the level to A1 and introducing a reading test without offering further support 
to prepare for the test has increased the problems in meeting the requirement, and thus in-
creased the risk of exclusion from family reunification. It should be closely monitored to 
what extent the more stringent requirements form an obstacle. The political choice to raise 
the level, unless this carries the risk of exclusion, reveals two intentions of the government: 
to reduce the number of family migrants and to make immigrants solely responsible for their 
integration into the Dutch society.
3.2 integration tests in the country
The courses
It is too early to draw any conclusion on the effects of the integration tests in the country 
with regard to the integration of migrants. What has already become clear is that the Civic 
Integration Act (WI) has led to a substantial increase in the number of participants on the 
integration courses and, thus, to an improvement in the language level of migrants. A major-
ity of the respondents are in favour of the obligation to participate in courses because of the 
improved language skills of migrants and because it helps to prevent an isolated situation in 
particular groups of migrants (women, oldcomers and migrants of Chinese origin). At the 
same time, oldcomers are the most difficult group to motivate. Some of them think it is un-
just to oblige them to take a test after many years’ residence in the Netherlands, during which 
they were not supported in their integration process. According to them, they were motivated 
to learn the language 20 years earlier. Participants in the courses offered on the basis of the 
WIN complained that the certificates they had achieved appeared not to be sufficient for an 
exemption within the framework of the (higher requirements of the) new act. This policy of 
changing requirements towards the same target group caused frustration among oldcomers.
There are three categories of migrants who would perhaps not participate in a course if 
they were not obliged to do so. Regarding two of these groups, there are practical reasons: 
mothers and migrants with a full-time job have difficulty combining their activities with at-
tending a course, especially when flexibility in the course is absent. The third group involves 
women who are not supported by their husbands to integrate; they would probably have been 
kept at home had participation been voluntary.
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Young migrants are, in general, more positive about the obligation to attend the course. 
Some respondents, however, think that the obligation is not necessary to motivate them to 
learn Dutch. A significant proportion of respondents think that participation is hard to com-
bine with having a full-time job or taking care of children. More flexible organisation would 
help them to fulfil all their different tasks at the same time.
Most teachers, civil servants and migrants think that the requirements for exemption on 
the basis of sufficient language skills are too rigid. Migrants clearly demonstrating sufficient 
knowledge of the language are still forced to pass the short exemption test. Although most of 
the respondents were of the opinion that the level of the course was insufficient to increase 
the possibility of finding a job, they thought it helped migrants to live in the Dutch society 
and to improve their (number of) contacts with others.
Despite the notion of individual responsibility of the migrants, the courses are free of 
charge in most cases. The respondents consider this as a vital element which counterbalances 
the personal investments required from the migrant. It proves that the government recognises 
a shared responsibility for the integration of migrants.
The tests
A large number of respondents acknowledge that the level of the test is too low for creat-
ing access to the labour market, but too high for certain groups with learning difficulties 
(illiterates, oldcomers). They regret that passing the test does not seem to be of much value 
for migrants seeking a job. Therefore, some of them suggested organising a follow-up course 
in order to qualify migrants for the labour market or to award a certificate to the successful 
migrants, which would be recognised by employers. With regard to the groups for which the 
level of the test is too low, several civil servants, teachers and migrants pleaded for an exemp-
tion for elderly migrants, for instance those older than 55. They suggested offering them a 
proper course, based on their needs, but without obliging them to attend it.
The content of the test is not a subject for public or political debate, probably because it is 
secret. Yet, this secrecy constitutes a lot of (unnecessary) stress for the candidates. This seems 
to deter certain migrants from taking the test. The practical part of the test is judged very 
differently: some think it difficult and humiliating (especially because they have to ask for 
signatures), others are positive because it has helped to strengthen their self-confidence and 
make contacts. Many respondents, however, had aggravating experiences with the portfolios 
because it takes a lot of time and organisation. Some teachers and civil servants perceive the 
portfolios as quite bureaucratic. 
Although the test for naturalisation and the test for permanent and independent residence 
are similar, the consequences for residence rights are more far-reaching if the test is taken for 
a permanent residence permit. A permanent residence permit offers security of residence, as 
some withdrawal grounds cannot be applied anymore. It can be expected that family mem-
bers who know that their future lies in the Netherlands, make more personal investments in 
the Dutch society. Migrants who fail the test remain in an insecure legal position, which can 
hamper or slow down their integration process. In particular, refugees will be less receptive 
towards integration as long as they fear being expelled because of a change in circumstances 
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in their country of origin. The possession of a temporary permit also affects the daily life of 
the migrants, for instance, because they are not able to buy a house and because employers 
are more hesitant to employ them. Despite the women’s liberation policy, women who are 
deprived of an independent status because they fail the test, remain dependent on their hus-
bands. This could prevent them from participating in society in the way they wish. 
These consequences lead to the paradoxical result that the test, which was introduced 
to promote integration, hampers the integration of the most vulnerable migrants (illiterates, 
the low-educated, elderly migrants, refugees, and women). The data on pass rates and the 
background of migrants who fail the test most often, show that these groups are actually 
affected the most by the integration requirement. Since the introduction of the integration 
requirement, the number of applications for a permanent residence permit has been halved. 
Since 1 January 2013 the temporary residence permit can be withdrawn if the migrants do 
not fulfil the integration requirement within three years. Although, in most cases, Article 8 
ECHR and the EU Family Reunification Directive will prevent the government from doing 
so, this national policy will create more insecurity and stress, especially for migrants who face 
difficulties meeting the criteria. Applying this policy will therefore be counter-productive for 
the aims of the integration policy.
3.3 conclusions
The effects of the integration requirements at the different stages show a clear relationship 
and relevant similarities. Migrants appreciate the offer of language and integration education, 
which they think is effective. However, the connection of passing the test with a certain 
residence right can turn out to be counter-productive for the integration aims. After all, 
migrants who fail the test will not acquire residence rights which could promote their integra-
tion. On the contrary: being unable to live with their family, or living permanently in the 
Netherlands on a temporary or dependent basis, are circumstances hampering their integra-
tion. Immigrants relatively more often affected by the integration requirements are elderly 
and low-educated migrants, immigrants with an asylum-related background and migrants 
from least-developed or developing countries. Therefore, tests serve as a selection on age, 
education and nationality. Yet, these migrants are relatively often more in need of support for 
their integration.
The government could emphasize that integration is a reciprocal process by offering 
language and integration courses on the one hand, and obliging migrants to participate in it, 
on the other hand. Migrants could be pressed to make an effort to integrate, which is differ-
ent from forcing them to achieve certain results. The latter happens by connecting a certain 
knowledge level to residence rights. The shift from a shared responsibility to the sole respon-
sibility of the migrant was already the case in the admission policy, but will now be extended 
in the integration policy in the country with the amendment of the “Act on Integration”. By 
withdrawing the organisational and financial support of integration courses by authorities, 
the government risks fewer migrants managing to strengthen their position in the Dutch 
society. By not taking care of the most positive elements of the Integration Act, which are 
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closely related to the high quality of education, the government might fail the test on effective 
integration policies.
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The “EU-Asia Dialogue”-project is a joint projected by the European Commission and the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung of Germany. 
It aims to foster exchange and understanding between policy-makers, non-governmental 
organizations and researchers from Europe and Asia. The stakeholders shall be provided with 
a platform to discuss regional and cross-regional developments in order to identify both short- 
and long-term challenges, to prevent their emergence and solve them at an early stage. This 
informal exchange shall help to enhance bi-regional cooperation across sectors and disciplines. 
The project addresses issues from seven different topics:
1. Climate Change Diplomacy
2. Eco-Cities
3. Migration / Integration
4. Social Cohesion
5. Human Trafficking
6. Maritime Piracy and Security
7. Food Security
All activities are implemented by a consortium consisting of the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung Singapore, East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore, European 
Policy Centre in Brussels and European Union Centre in Singapore.
Besides conferences in Europe and Asia, the project will produces research papers and 
book publications. These will, together with the conference reports, be made available online.


